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Abstract: 
The first part of the thesis analyses the conditions for the development of a critical 
feminist psychoIc'gy, while the second par: exemplifies the practice of a cqtical 
feminist psychology in relation to health - specifically, breast cancer. The 'chapterS in 
Part One consider, in turn, the institutional context within which a critical feminist 
psychology is necessarily located; the theories upon which it might draw; and the 
methods which it might use, with a particular emphasis on focus group methodology. 
The chapters in Part Two offer reviews of the feminist and psychosodal literature on 
breast cancer; and analyses of a data set consisting of thirteen focus group discussions 
in which women with breast cancer talk about their experiences. The analyses draw 
upon critical and discursive approaches to examine, in particular, the women's talk 
about "thinking positive", and about the "causes" of breast cancer. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Twenty years ago, feminist psychology did not exist in Britain as a distinctive field of 
scb:olarship: we had to construct it This collection of articles is in part a history, and 
in part a continuation. of my own contribution to this - ongoing - process. Its unifying 
theme is the construction of (a critical version of) the field. Part One (OIapters 1-6) 
analyses the conditions for the construction of a critical feminist psychology; and Part 
Two (OIapters 7-12) exemplifies the practice of a critical feminist psychology in 
relation to health - specifically, breast cancer. . 
Preamble: On names and definitions 
The term 'feminist psychology' denotes psychological theory and practice that is 
explicitly informed by the political goals of the feminist movement It places a high 
value on women. considering us worthy of study in our own right, not just in 
comparison with men. and it recognises the need for social change on behalf of 
women (Unger and Crawford, 1996: 6). Whereas mainstream psychology has 
polarised 'science' (pure, objective scholarship) against 'politics' (ideologically biased 
advocacy), feminist psychology names itself as pro-women and so as avowedly 
political (d. OIapter 2). In establishing the field, however, feminist psychologists have 
often considered it expedient to be less explicit about their politics. In the USA, where 
. feminist psychology originated, it was called 'psychology of women' from the earliest 
days in a conscious attempt to gain acceptance from the mainstream of the discipline 
(Mednick, 1978) - and this name remains the dominant one internationally, 
particularly in institutional contexts, such as the national psychological societies (cf. 
OIapter 1). Here, however, as in my scholarship more generally, I elect explicitly to 
name my feminism. 
I have chosen to refer to a 'critical' feminist psychology for three reasons. First, as a 
movement for social change, feminist psychology must - necessarily - enter a critical 
engagement with mainstream psychology. Psychology, as a discipline, has been 
complicit in the social control of women - its classic theories and traditional practices 
have played a major role in perpetuating our oppression (cf. Chapter 4). Feminist 
psychology, since its inception, has sought to challenge and critique these theories and 
practices. Second, feminist psychologists are committed not just to transforming the 
1 
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discipline of psychology, but to transforming the conditions of women's lives, In this 
objective, feminist psychology can be considered part of the broader contemporary 
movement of 'aitica1 psychology': a hDeratory movement "that emphasizes social 
justice and human welfare" (Prilleltensky and Fox. 1997: 3; see also Spears, 1997; 
'. Parker, 1999) - this is the second way in which the field is aitica1. FmaIly, feminist 
psychology can be considered aitica1 to the extent that,. as feminist psychologists, we 
reflexively examine our own practices - i.e. engage in aitica1 analysis and debate 
about the implications and utility of particular theories arid methods for advancing the 
feminist political project.' All three aitica1 strands are woven throughou~ this 
collection. 
PART ONE: CONTEXT, THEORY AND METHOD 
The chapters in Part One focus on the conditions for the construction of a aitica1 
feminist psychology: They consider, .in turn, the institutional context within which a 
aitica1 feminist psychology is necessarily located; the theories upon which it might 
draw; and the methods which it might use, with a particular emphasis on focus group 
methodology. 
Chapters 1 and 2: Institutional context' 
The first chapter is one of a series of articles I wrote in the early 1990s documenting 
fen:urust psychologists' struggles for representation within the institutions of 
psychology, particularly the national psychological societies; and analysing the 
opposition they faced as a way oi constraining disciplinary change in the face of 
challenge (see also Wilkinson, 1990, 1991a). The specific institutional context for this 
was my involvement,. from 1984 on, in the campaign for - what was then called - a 
'feminist psychology' section of the British Psychological Society (this eventually 
succeeded in late 1987, with the formation of the 'Psychology of Women' Section). In 
charting the history of the campaign, I became interested in the obstacles produced to 
impede its progress and in the rhetorics (repeatedly) used to justify these obstacles. I 
also began to compare the British experience with similar campaigns in other English-
speaking countries (the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) - and found 
remarkable similarities. Eventually (m the article included here), I used a sociology of 
science framework, presenting women's organisations in psychology as a case study to 
illuminate the processes of disciplinary stasis and change. An early version of this 
2 
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paper was presented at the 24th International Congress of Psychology in Sydney, 
Australia in 1988, and I was subsequently invited to submit it to Australian 
Psychologist Its publication was controversiaL and stimulated a aitical debate about 
the power to name and define (WIlkinson, 1991b: Williams, 1991) . 
. . 
The second chapter also uses a sociology of science framework to analyse the 
institutional context of feminist psychology. In this article, published in Philosophical 
Psychology, I offer an explanation for the (to date) relatively limited impact of feminist 
psychology on the mainstream of the discipline, in terms of its perceived illegitimacy. 
Building on a earlier paper by Unger (1982), I identify a number of dime~ons of 
legitimacy and consider the institutional operation of each. Fmally, developing my 
own earlier work on reflexivity (W1ikinson, 1988), I conclude by arguing that, in order 
to increase its impact, feminist psychology needs to engage in a more reflexive 
analysis of the soda! processes by which legitimacy is conferred, and a more self-
conscious utilisation of these processes. 
Chapters 3 and 4: Theories 
Chapter 3 defines the field of feminist psychology in terms of its aims and scope, and 
outlines some of the key debates and 'lines of fracture' within the field. It was 
published as the inaugural editorial of the international peer-reviewed journaL 
Feminism &: Psychology, which I founded in 1991 and continue to edit The other 
. 'm:~ers of the journal's first Editorial Group (Susan Condor, Christine Griffin, 
Margaret Wetherell and Jennie Wi1liams) offered valuable comments on a draft of the 
article, but, as journal Editor, I took sole responsibility for writing it The article 
summarises feminist psychology's aitique of the mainstream and sets an agenda for 
the field. I argue, in particular, that in order for feminist psychology to develop and 
achieve its objectives, we need to ·put feminism first": i.e. to speak to each other, as 
feminists, working 'towards the shared goal of social change, rather than being 
primarily accountable to psychology. I also note that it may (eventually) be necessary 
to separate from the mainstream of the diScipline, in order to give our energies 
primarily to feminism. 
Another possible strategy for the effective development of feminist psychology is 
forming alliances and working together with other aitical and Iiberatory movements. 
Chapter 4 situates feminist psychology within the context of newly-developing 
3 
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movement of critical psychology (see also Wllkinson. 1997a. in which I look in more 
detail at some of the tensions between feminist psychology and ~tical psychology). 
Here, I provide a more sustained critique of mainstream psychology than in Chapter 
3, and also a more elaborated exposition of the main (alternative) theoretical traditions 
.. 
of feminist research, particularly in relation to their theorisation of sex differences. In 
line with my earUer arguments in favour of theoretical eclecticism in feminist 
psychology (cf. Wilkinson. 1986, 1996), I do not attempt to adjudicate between 
(sometimes logically incompatible) theoretical approaches, but, rather, assess the 
advantages and disadvantages of each approach for advancing the feminist project of 
understanding and improving women's lives. This chapter waS origina"tly published 
in an international edited collection on critical psychology. 
Chapters 5 and 6: Methods 
The final two chapters in Part One consider the methods feminist psychologists might 
use, with a particular emphasis on focus group methodology (see also Wilkinson. 
1999a, 1999b). ChapterS, originally published as an article in Women's Studies 
International Forum, looks brieBy at the history of focus group research before turning 
to examine the use of focus groups in the context of contemporary feminist research. 
It argues that the main benefits of focUs group methodology for feminists include their 
ability to address key ethical concerns; their generation of high quality interactive 
data; and their potential for theoretical advances concerning the co-construction of 
meaning between research participants. 
Chapter 6, originally published as an article in Psychology of Women Quarterly, offers 
. a more sustained review, both of the (non-feminist) methodo!ogicalliterature on focus 
groups, and of the literature on feminist research methodology. It relates the feminist 
use of focus groups to feminist critiques of methods which are artificial, 
decontextualising, and exploitative of research participants. Although both of these 
articles highlight the advantages of focus groups for feminist research, in both I also 
identify some of the problems in the current use of focus groups, in keeping with a 
broadly critical stance. I also argue for methodological eclecticism. and against the 
prevailing orthodoxy of qualitative methods as "quintessentially feminist" (Maynard 
and Purvis, 1994: 3). 
4 
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PARTlWO: TOWARDS A CRITICAL FEMINIST PSYCHOLOGY OF HEALlH 
The chapters in PartTwo exemplify the practice of a aitical feminist psychology in 
the area of women's health - specifically, in relation to breast cancer. The first two 
chapters selectively review the (medical, self-help, psychosocial and feminist) 
literatures on breast cancer; and the remaining four chapters provide analyses of a 
data set consisting of thirteen focus group discussions in which women with breast 
cancer talk about their experiences. The analyses draw upon aitical and discursive 
approaches to examine, in particular, the women's talk about "thinking positive", and 
about the "causes" of breast cancer. 
Chapters 7 and 8: The breast cancer literatures 
Chapter 7 reviews, and provides a feminist aitique, of (a) the medical literature, and 
(b) the popular, self-help literature on breast cancer. It shows how the experience of 
breast cancer, and the medical practices surrounding it, are rooted in cultural 
constructions of breasts as objects of male sexual interest and male sexual pleasure. It 
also shows how popular (especially 'New Age') literature promotes victim-blaming 
fantasies of omnipotence over breast cancer. It argues that both orthodox medicine 
and 'New Age' healing are harmful to }\'omen with breast cancer, and that an 
alternative - feminist - approach is badly needed. This chapter was co-authored with 
Celia I<itzinger, who contnbuted valuable expertise on the aitique of 
medical! psychiatric and self-help literatures (cf. I<itzinger, 1987;I<itzinger and 
Perkins,1993), but I took principal responsibility for writing and revising it. It was 
first published as an article in Women's Studies International Forum, and 
subsequently reprinted (in slightly revised form) in Wilkinson and Kitzinger (1994). 
The following chapter (Cbapter 8) relates my own research to (a) the mainstream 
psychosocial literature, and (b) the feminist literature on breast cancer. I focus on 
what women have said about their experiences of breast cancer, particularly in 
relation to diagnosis, relationships, treatment, and life changes; and on the politics of 
breast cancer, particularly in relation to feminist campaigns and other forms of 
activism, The chapter is included in an international edited collection on women's 
health. 
5 
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Chapters 9 -12: Data analyses 
The last four chapters in Part Two offer data analyses. These analyses are based on a 
data set consisting principally of thirteen focus group discussions (plus four 
inilividual interviews) in which 81 women with breast cancer talk about their 
experiences. A short follow-up questionnaire (referred to briefly in Chapter 11) was 
also utilised. I was solely responsible for all participant recruitment and data 
collection. The women were recruited, on a volunteer basis, through a symptomatic 
breast clinic at a general hospital in a city in the north of England; most were within 
five years of diagnosis, but were at different stages of treatment They~et;. generally 
in groups of 3-7, in a comfortable university environment;. and were asked to talk 
about their feelings at 6rst diagnosis, their treatment;. their 'coping' and 'support' 
systems, their ideas about the causes of breast cancer, and the effects of breast cancer 
on their lives and relationships. The data were audiotaped and subsequently 
transcnbed. (Chapters 10 and U provide more details of the sample and 
methodology.) 
The four analytic chapters are characterised by: (a) their critical reading of mainstream 
psychosocial research on breast cancer; (b) their exploration of different methods of 
analysing the data, particularly critical and discursive approaches; and (c) their 
evaluation of different theoretical! epistemological frameworks for understanding the 
data. My approach to data analysis, in general, has been influenced by the 'turn to 
... language' in feminist research, as in the social sciences more generally (d. Wilkinson 
and I<itzinger, 1995); and, particular, by the approach to discourse analysis (discursive 
psychology) developed primarily at Loughborough University (d. Antaki and 
Widdicombe, 1998; Edwards, 1997; Edwards and Potter, 1992; Potter, 1996; Potter and 
Wetherell,1987). IUs also part of a move towards developing a critical health 
psychology (d. Murray and Chamberlain, 1999). 
Chapter 9 specifically develops and extends the arguments developed in chapters 5 
and 6 on focus group methodology. In this chapter, focus groups are considered in the 
context of health research, particularly in relation to their use in exploring 'personal 
meanings' of heal th and illness. The last section of the chapter uses my breast cancer 
data to illustrate the notion that "thinking is a socially shared activity" (Radley and 
Billig, 1996: 223) - i.e. that people build their ideas, beliefs, understandings and 
worldviews in interaction with others. I look at women (a) co-constructing the 
6 
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meaning of wearing a breast prosthesis, and (b) c<>-constructing a theory that, in pub. 
landladies, breast cancer may be caused by the strenuous activity of 'pulling' pints. 
. . 
This chapter was originally published as an article in the Iournal of Health 
Psychology. 
Chapter 10 develops and extends the critique begun in chapter 7, in offering a critical 
reading of the mainstream psycho-oncology and alternative self-help literatures - here, 
in relation to their conceptualisation of "positive thinking". Both literatures regard 
"positive thinking" as a cognitive coping strategy - part of the "fighting spirit" which is 
said to be correlated with morbidity I mortality rates, and with overall mental health. 
~ ..... 
The chapter critically interrogates the basis of such claims; and o£fers'an a1ternative-
discwsive - approach, which considers what statements about "thinking positive" 
actually mean for speakers in the conversational contexts in which they typically 
occur. The analysis shows that "thinking positive" functions as a conversational 
idiom, with a prescriptive moral force - but that it is also possible for women to resist 
its moral prescriptions. This chapter, first published as an article in Social Science and 
Medicine. was co-authored with Celia Kitzinger. The data analysis and initial writing 
were undertaken jointly; however, I was responsible for the selection and 
(re)transcription of the data extracts, and for revisions to the final version of the article. 
" Chapter 11 analyses the specific contribution of feminism to the development of a 
critical health psychology, using breast cancer research and activism as a case study. 
Again pursuing the argument for theoretical eclecticism (cf. Chapter 4), I explore the 
particular contributions, advantages and disadvantages of three key traditions of . 
feminist research (positivist empiricist, experiential and discursive traditions). I 
illustrate each tradition with an example of data analysis drawn from my own breast 
cancer research. An early version of the paper was given as an invited plenary 
address at the first international conference on "Reconstructing Health Psychology" in 
Newfoundland, Canada, and the version included here was subsequently submitted 
for publication in the Special Issue of the Iournal of Health Psychology based on the 
conference. 
The final chapter (Chapter 12), again a contribution to a critical feminist psychology of 
health, returns to the argument for methodological eclecticism (cf. Chapters 5 and 6), 
in offering three different analyses (a content analysis, a biographical analysis and a 
discursive analysis) of the same data set: extracts from one of my focus groups in 
7 
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which women talk about the causes of breast cancer, and Blaxter's (1983, 1993) classic 
interview data in which women talk about the causes of health and illness more 
generally. It compares these types of analysis in relation to the key (epistemological) 
problems of "context", "footing" and "multiple versions", and concludes that a 
. discursive approach offers more comprehensive solutions to these problems than do 
either content or biographical analyses (although all three approaches have particular 
advantages in particular contexts). The chapter, first published as an article in . 
Feminism &: Psychology, incorporates an extensive discursive analysis of a long 
segment of focus group data. 
Postamble: On continuing construction 
This collection is, of course, itself a construction: a somewhat arbitrary 'slice' of 
academic and political life, offered through a selection of my publications over 
(approximately) a ten-year period. The articles were not, of course, originally written 
with the objective of collection or integration in mind, so I have selected the material 
partly on the basis of an incremental story about the development of my ideas over 
time; and partly on the basis of recurring 'themes' - some of which are highlighted 
above. 
The collection has a more clearly-defined beginning than ending. This is partly 
because my work on the breast cancer project continues; and partly because our 
(collective) vision of what feminist psychology is - and can become - continues to be 
constructed throughoilr practice. The struggle to found a BPS section (documented in 
.. Chapters 1 and 2) provides an. institutional marker for the beginnings of the field of 
feminist psychology in Britain, although feminist psychologists were active at least a 
decade before then (cf. Chetwynd and Hartnett, 1978; Hartnett et al, 1979). Since then, 
we have been able to construct a robust field of scholarship, which now has sufficient 
maturity and confidence to see its diversity as strength, and have begun to debate the 
strengths and weaknesses of a wide range of theoretical, methodological and political 
strategies (Wilkinson, 1996). 
Feminist psychology still has much to achieve, however, both in terms of its challenge 
to mainstream psychology, which remains resolutely misogynist, heterosexist and 
racist (Wilkinson, 1997b) - but, more importantly, in terms of its impact on the broader 
structures and practices of oppression. In short, as feminist psychologists, we are still 
8 
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constructing our field of scholarship, and we are still seeking transfonnation of 
women's lives. 
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Women's Organisations in Psychology: 
Institutional Constraints on Disciplinary 
Change 
Sue Wilkinson 
Coventry Polytechnic 
Abslr:aCl: Following recent contentions that the impllCl of feminist psychology has been 
relatively limited. this article examines some of the strategies employed by onc type of 
academic institution - academic·professional societies ,.. to contain challenges to their 
lICholatship and organisation. It focuses on women's attempts to orgaoise within their national 
psychological societies in five countries. with panicular attention to comparisons between 
the UK and Australia. Using a sociology of science framework. it demonstrates that an 
analysis of the constraints imposed on such organisationalllClivity can illuminate the proc:csses 
of disciplinary stasis and change. Finally. the paper argues that a reflexive consideration 
of the obstacles to disciplinary change is a prerequisite for ensuring the efficacy of such 
change. 
Feminist psychology, or the psychology of women (as it is often termed 
in the USA), is one of the growth areas of modern psychology - as 
evidenced by the dramatic rise in the number of publications and the 
burgeoning of new courses (Russo, (982). A useful working definition 
of feminist scholarship is provided by Klein (1983, p. 90): it is research 
Mfor~ women, that ~ries to take women's needs, interests and experiences 
into account and aims at being instrumental in improving women's lives 
in one way or another." However. despite the growth of the field, and 
the strer.gth of the social concerns underpinning it, there have been a 
number of recent claims (e.g., Fine & Gordon, 1989: Lykes & Stewart, 
1986: Wallston, (981) that the work of feminist psychologists has had 
relatively little impact on the mainstream of the discipline .. 
While, as Lykes and Stewart (1986) note. it is not easy to assess the 
impact of feminist psychology (and citation alone is unlikely to be a 
valid indicator of change in practice), it is still harder to attempt an 
explanation of why its effects may yet be relatively limited: indeed, feminist 
psychologists have scarcely begun this task (e.g., WiIkinson, 1990). Little 
is known about the specifics of disciplinary change; however, one concrete 
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suggestion is that feminist psychology has suffered from the lack of an . 
institutional base within the discipline's academic-profes.sional societies 
from which to operate. Without representation in mainstream psychology 
and its organisations, the work of feminist psychologists has effectively 
been marginalised - and hence has had little opportunity to be influential. 
If this is accepted, a central aspect of disciplinary change for feminist 
psychology is women's attempts to organise within psychology, particularly 
in terms of achieving representation within .their national psychological 
societies and associations. 
This paper seeks to address this aspect of disciplinary change and, 
in doing so, it has two objectives. First, as an excursjon in feminist 
psychology, it aims to - at least partially - "tell the storiiisw of women 
organising within psychology: Much of this material remains at the level 
of a shared women's culture, has not been documented, and is in danger 
. of being lost. Second, as an excursion in the sociology of knowledge, 
the article seeks to identify issues and themes which recur across time 
or across countries, and which may shed light on some of the specificities 
of disciplinary change in this particular area. In particular, I will focus 
on comparisons between the U.K. and Australia; a more detailed analysis 
of UK activities maybe found in the volume edited by Erica Burman 
. (1990). 
The paper will draw on more genera1ised accounts of the processes 
of disciplinary change in science and academia from within the sub-field 
of the sociology of science (e.g., Cole, 1979; Cole & Zuckerman, 1975). 
This field provides both a useful framework and analytic tools with which 
to consider the influence of feminist psychology, and its concurrent 
emphasis on potential b~rriers to dISCiplinary change may also be of value 
in informing effective feminist practice. 
WOMEN'S ORGANISATIONS IN PSYCHOLOGY: CURRENT 
STATUS 
I will first briefly ·review the position of women's organisations within 
psychology in five countries: the UK, USA, Canada, Australia, and New 
Zealand. Although this analysis is limited to English-speaking countries, 
I am not aware of the existence of comparable organisations elsewhere 
. in the world; however, there has recently been news of organisational 
activity in Israel, Argentina. and Italy (personal communications). The 
following table summarises the status of the organisations in existence 
in mid-1989. 
Four of the five countries surveyed have some kind of formal 
organisation within their national psychological societies (the exception 
being New Zealand), although these differ in name, the length of time 
they have been established. and the extent of their current activities. What 
they have in common. however, is the experience of opposition: In all 
of these countries women have been engaged in a struggle of some kind 
prior to establishing their organisations .. 
'''. 16 
Table 1 Women's organisations in psychology 
UK 
USA 
Canada 
Australia 
NZ 
The British Psychological Society has a ~Psychology of Women-
Section - formed late 1987, after rejection of proposal in 1985, 
and tw~ycar campaign by members of Women in Psychology 
organisation; preceded by some activity in 1975 
The American Psychological Association has a ~Psychology of 
Women-Division - formed 1973, after four-year campaign by 
the Association of Women in Psychology; AW P continues as a 
separate organisation' . . 
The Canadian Psychological Association" has a "Section on 
Women and Psychology- - officially recognised as an interest 
group in 1976, after three-year campaign 
The Australian Psychological Society has a ·Women and 
Psychology- Interest Group - formed 1984, after rejection of 
proposal for Professional Board, and fonowing three years' 
conference activities 
The New Zealand Psychological Society has no organisation -
after unsuccessful attempt to form women-only Division in late 
1970s. 
ANALYnCFRAMEWORK 
It will be evident that the bare skeleton above supports a vast weight 
of rich and fascinating material. The sources of data employed have been 
varied and extensive. For each country. I have systematically surveyed 
published literature (both formal and informal) relating to women's 
organisations in psychology, and obtained relevant unpublished reports 
wherever possible; extensive correspondence has also been pursued with 
a number of people involved in the Cormation of each organisation. In 
addition, visits have been made and interviews conducted with key 
individuals from the USA, Australia, and New Zealand, with such ~oral 
history" being substantiated by corroborating accounts and archival 
material wherever po~sible. 
In seeking to select a relatively limited and self-contained set of. issues 
as the basis for this article, I have decided to focus on the key scenario 
of engagement between a ~grassroots" movement and· the academic 
establishment, represented by the national psychological societies. In all 
five countries, women (as "outsidersj were seeking adequate representation 
and recognition of their work within the establishment. My central concern 
in this article will be how the establisnment responded to such requests. 
A sociology of science analysis indicates that neither the revisionary 
theoretical perspective of feminism. nor the challenge to existing status 
hierarchies provided by its practitioners. is likely to be welcome to 
mainstream psychology (Unger, 1982). Further, it would contend that 
in the face of such a challenge. the establishment will be able to mobilise 
an impressive array of control strategies to ensure the actual or potential 
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. confonnity of the "challengers." The analysiS presented here will focus 
on the operation of such control strategies, with particular reference to 
three broad types: 
I. Control by defInition: These are perhaps the simplest type of strategy, 
yet also the furthest-reaching. Essentially they entail delimiting the nature 
and ·scope of a proposed new organisation by reference to existing formal 
"rules" or "codes of practice." If the activities of the new organisation 
fall outside such "rules," or deviate from them in any way, the organisation 
can be regarded, by defmition, as "illegitimate" - and in consequence 
be ignored or dismissed. . . , 
2. Use of "informal" tactics to control deviance: These strategies are 
the means by which the influence of the new organisation is limited within 
.the "parent" body; they are also the basis by which defmitions are 
maintained and reinforced. The potential range·of such strategies is wide, 
but examples include ignoring, failing to provide information necessary 
for the new organisation's effective operation, invocation of new (or 
previously unstated) criteria for assessment, denial of platforms on which 
to speak, denial of or restraints on funding, exclusion from adequate 
representation on decision-making bodies - and many other forms of 
active and passive discrimination. 
3. Deployment of rhetorics: These verbal strategies are often used by 
the "parent" body in order to justify the use of the defmitional and 
"informal" tactics outlined ;bove. Commonly used rhetorics include 
"meritocracy," "equal opportunities," "democracy," "non-discrimination, " 
and the nature and respective roles of "science" and "politics." Such 
rhetorics often carry a moral imperative, or at least appear intuitively 
"reasonablew: therein lies their power. 
To simplify matters still further, I will look at the operation of these 
strategies in relation to a limited range of "sites" which are central to 
the activities of any academic! professional organisation. These are: the 
organisation's structure; the content of the discipline!sub-discipline it 
represents; its membership policies; and its aims. Broadly speaking, I hope 
to demonstrate that institutional "barriers" raised at each of these sites 
have provided particular difficulties for women organising within 
psychology, and that each provides an opportunity to observe the operation 
of controlling devices (definition/informal tactics/rhetorics) in action. 
SITE 1: THE STRUCTURE OF THE "PARENT" ORGANISATION 
A common first question, raised by the national psychological organisation 
faced by a group of women seeking representation for their activities. 
is ~hether the proposed group fits readily \\;thin the existing structure 
of the organisation. If it does not, it is easy to reject t~e proposal on 
"definitional" grounds alone. the argument being simply: "This is not 
a Sectionl Division/ Board (or whatever)." However, a proposal will not 
necessarily be rejected on this criterion alone, particularly if it fulftls a 
number of others. 
.. : 
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The I1peration of such a structural barrier can most clearly be seen 
in the cases of the UK and Australia. However, it also surfaces in Canada, 
where Esthcr Grecnglass (1973) reports that the reason given by the 
.Program. Committee of the Canadian PsYchological Association (CPA)· 
for rejecting a sYmposium entitled On Women, By Women (submitted 
for the June 1982 CPA Association meeting), was that "It didn't fit in 
anywhcrc.w 
In the UK, early letters from British Psychological Society (BPS) 
advisors to the proposers of the new organisation focus on definitions 
of Society sub-systcms and, in particular, on whether the proposal is 
closer to the definition of a Special Group ("concerned with principal 
areas in which psychologists provide advice, tuition or services": BPS, 
1988a) or a scientific Section "concerned with special branches or aspects 
of psychology": BPS, 1988a) .. The appeal to formal rules is clear: "if a 
women's section within the BPS is formed it would have to fit within 
one of the definitions in the revised Charter" (BPS to Section proposers, 
May 1985). and the implications of this are spelled out: "the likelihood 
of the idea being accepted would depend on whether or not the Section 
was able to fit within one of the defined areas~ (BPS to Section proposers, 
May 1985). 
Another argument used in the UK was that the psychology of women 
as an area cuts across both existing Section structure and (more 
contentiously) other theoretical perspectives in psychology (BPS to Section 
proposers, October 1985, and circulated to Section supporters); Very similar 
arguments appear in Australia, where the proposal for a Women and 
Psychology Board was said to cut across the aims and interests of existing 
Boards (G~ult, 1986). These arc components of the Division of Professional 
Affairs and represent the major professional subdivisions of psychology 
(e.g .• ~linical; forensic). Here, the problem was cast in terms of the area 
spanning the "scientific" and "professional" divisions of the organisation: 
Neither the Diyision of Scientific Affairs (which does not have sub-systems) 
nor the Division of Professional Affairs saw it as fittir.g exclusively within 
their structures (Gault, personal communication, undated, c. 1986). 
To be fair, the Australian Psychological Society (APS) did grant the 
women the status of a "Special Interest Group" within the Society (these 
are not under the aegis of a division, bu~ report directly to the Council), 
though not the Board they wanted; wrilst ,he British Psychological Society 
. (following the first rejection of the section proposal by the council) advised 
either a modified proposal supporting a new case or a special interest 
group outside the Society. Perhaps one might also bear in mind that 
the APS was a "Branch" of the BPS until the comparatively recent date 
of 1965 (Turtle & Orr, 1988), and initially "inherited" its structure (although 
there are now substantial differences) - so these similarities are perhaps 
not too surprising. However, they arc important as they arc mirrored 
in the \\1der tensions within psychology as a whole - and which are 
very much a part of the current schisms within the American Psychological 
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Association, which have led to the founding of the American Psychological 
Society. . 
I have emphasised the - perhaps rather obvious - structural point quite . 
strongly for two reasons. r1l'St, it cannot be healthy for psychology (and 
its national societies) that a major criterion for new developments is whether 
they "fit in," rather. than whether they are of interest or relevance to 
academics and practitioners. Second, this argument exemplifies the 
discipliruuycritique mounted by Women's Studies proponents: that existing 
disciplinary structures cannot accommodate feminist work; rather. 
reorganisation of the structures of knowledge is necessary (Spender. 1978) . 
. " SITE 2: THE CONTENT OF THE NEW SUB-DISCIPUNE 
A second question facing the proposed new organisation is the familiarity 
of the academic content of the field it seeks to represent. In most of 
the countries surveyed. the proposers had encountered negative reactions 
to the psychology of women itself, ranging from ignorance, through 
misconception, to hostility (the extent of such reaction su&,aesting deliberate 
blocking tactics). 
Unger (1982) suggests one reason for this is a perception of the content 
area as "too narrow in focus." Thus. when she introduced a psychology 
of women course in the USA in 1972, she was faced with questions such 
as: "Will there be a companion course in the psychology of men?"; and 
"Is there enough material to support such a course?"The opposite argument 
- that the psychology of women is too broad a field, and I or that it 
lacks conceptual unity :.: is also used. . 
Thus. in the UK. members of the BPS Council. in rejecting the first 
proposal for a Psychology of Women Section, were reported to have 
"questioned whether there is a theoretical or methodological basis to the 
study of the psychology of women, as pertains to other areas of our 
discipline" (BPS to Section proposers. October 1985, circulated to 
supporters). The C9nclusion was that: 
the psychology of women as an area of the discipline • • . lacks the necessary 
cohesion to be the basis of a scientific Section of the Society in the same 
way we would not expect to have a psychology of animals Section. The focus 
is on the subject of the investigation rather than on the theoretical or 
methodological approach. 
In that there are no formal rules defining the required content or 
approach of a Section (the BPS Charter. Statutes and Rules, 1988, simply 
specify the procedures to be followed in setting up a Section and the 
requisite level of support), these content-based comments are clearly 
operating at the level of informal tactics to control deviance. It is interesting 
to note, first, that they are brought into play despite the fact that the 
first proposal for a Psychology of Women Section in the UK (undated, 
c. May! June 1985) included a deliberate attempt to educate, in setting 
out the scope of the field: this was clearly ignored. Second. there has 
been some attempt in most of these countries (although not always 
~ -:. ...... ,. 
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dovetailing with attempts to organise) to prepare and! or publish reviews 
of the field that seem to serve both an educational and a self-justificatory 
function (e.g., W'mlder, Smith. Dagleish, cl Gault, 1975, for Australia; 
Pyke cl Stark-Adamec, 1981, for Canada). 
SITE 3: MEMBERSHIP POUOES 
A third area within which the legitimacy of the new organisation may 
be assessed is the extent to which its proposed membership policies conform 
to the membership policies of the "parent" organisation. These are, 
. invariably, that membership of sub-groups must be open to all who are 
~appropriately qualified"; separatism on other grounds is not acceptable. 
Such a focus mirrors internal debate within the field of the psychology 
of women, as indeed do many of these issues (see also Basow, 1987, 
for a fuller consideration of this point). Here the issue is one of ~separation 
versus integration" (Kahn cl Jean, 1983): Should the field seek to develop 
autonomously or work to create change within the "parent" discipline 
of psychology? 
The latter course is likely to entail conflict and compromise (see Burman, 
1990, for a range of examples) - and, for some, the extent of these will 
be unacceptable. Kitzinger (1990), for example, sees institutionalised 
psychology as neutr:iIising the radical impact of feminism, rather than 
changing (i.e., becoming politicised) in response to it. One response to 
this - though perhaps that of the minority - is to seek to establish separatist 
organisations. Holl)Vay (1986), for example, argues that women-only 
organisations are a prerequisite for real innovation, direct political action, 
and the prodUction of new knowledges about gender. However, this course 
is unlikely to be successful within the academic-professional structures 
of the national psychological associations. 
New Zealand· was the only country of the five surveyed in wnich an . 
attempt was made to establish a women-only division - in the late 1970s. 
This was rejecteQ by the Council of the New Zealand Psychological Society 
(NZPS). One of the proposers (Jane Ritchie; the other was Joanne 
Cunningham) recalls that male members. or the NZPS objected that the 
proposal was against the 1977 Human Righ;,; Commission Act (the appeal 
to rules again). The women appealed to the Human Rights Commission. 
who ruled that they could have programmes for women only, but not 
a women-only division. It is perhaps not surprising that the movement 
lost its momentum and these were never held, though there was an informal 
association of women psychologists in Aucldand for a couple of years 
(Ritchie. personal communication, May 1988). 
An Australian feminist psychologist recently commented: "I don't 
suppose names matter so much" (Gault, personal communication, undated. 
c. February 1987). On the contrary. historical analysis indicates that the 
given name of a field,. organisation powerfully influences how it is perceived 
by outsiders (see also Alpert, 1978, for application of this argument to 
the psychology of women as a field). In particular. the name suggested 
. :~:... 
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by the proposers of "women's" sub-groups within national psychological 
associations has been taken to indicate their position on the separatism 
issue. . . 
Thus, Walsh (1985) reports that as long ago as 1958 - in the USA 
- the International Council of Women Psychologists deleted "Women" 
from its name in a bid to become a Division of the American Psychological 
Association (APA), having previously opened its membership to men. 
The offending word had not been identified formally as the "stumbling 
block," but Harry Harlow (then APA President) was reported to have 
commented that "a group that is 90% women is a women's group" (Walsh, 
1985). However, they were still rejected, the "official" grounds being the 
inappropriateness of an international organisation seeking to affiliate to 
a national organisation. This mode of rejection - essentially entailing 
invoking additional, and previously unstated, criteria - constitutes another 
of the "informal tactics" commonly used to control "deviance." 
It may not even be the word "women" which creates problems, but 
rather the preposition! conjunction linking them to psychology. Despite 
Una Gault's claim to disregard names, the Australian proposers were 
aware of the separatist issue and sought to avoid confrontation by means 
of their choice of conjunction: their name Women and Psychology both 
de-emphasised separatist suggestions and emphasised concern about all 
women (Gault, personal communication. undated, c. February 1987). 
Interestingly, Women and Psychology is a,lso the title of choice in Canada, 
where the struggle appears to be the least heated of the five countries 
surveyed, as far as it is possible to determine. 
In the UK, the f1I"St draft of the original proposal (which u~ the 
name Women in Psychology) was wrongly inferred to be for a women-
only organisation. This was dealt with in the usual manner (i.e., involving 
the invocation of rules, operation of informal procedures, and justification 
by use of rhetoric). Thus an early request from the proposers for 
information about the procedure for establishing a Section produced the 
following "informal" advice: 
1 would add to the point •.• concerning the Council being unlikely to accept 
a sub-system of the Society if membership were open only to women. Arguably 
this would be going against the Society's own recently approved Code of . 
Conduct. which bans discrimination on the grounds of race. sex, etc. (BPS 
to Section proposers. May 1985) 
Further, the arguments presented against the Section at the crucial 
Council meeting continue to assume separatist aims: 
The anology [sic] was used of the debate in the Labour Party over "Black 
Sections." the introduction of which some would agree is an admission of 
failure since the ultimate goal should be for non-discrimination to be so all· 
embracing that nobody notices colour at all. In a nutshell. the argument was 
put forward that to single out the psychology of women in this way could 
be regarded as patronising to women or. at best. an admission of failure. 
(BPS to Section proposers. October 1988. circulated to Section supporters) 
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The use of "discrimination" rhetoric is particularly interesting here: This 
argument appears to be used frequently to deflect potential divisiveness 
within the national psychological societies. Thus both the BPS and the 
APS have in the past partly explained their failure to provide a breakdown 
of their membership by gCruier by the comment that it would be 
"discriminatory" (Phillips, personal communication, July 1987; Gault, 
personal communication, June 1988); though, to be f~, there are also 
likely to be practical problems regarding the natu~ of the records held 
(Gault, personal communication, January 1990), and the BPS has in the 
last year permitted a preliminary analysis (Morris, HoIloway, & Noble, 
1989). However, the BPs has also recently deployed' similar arguments 
in the contexts of ethnic monitoring (BPS, 1988) and a proposed boycott 
of South African psychologists (BPS, 1987). 
This links quite closely with the fourth area which may provide a barri~r 
for the proposed new organisation: its aims. . 
SITE 4: THE AIMS OF THE NEW ORGANISATION 
A final site of potential conflict is the congruence between the aims of 
the new organisation - or its perceived aims - and those of the '"parent" 
body. The suggested name of the new organisation has frequently been 
'"used in evidence" with respect to its aims. I have space here only to 
focus on one key aspect of this issue: the extent to which the aims of 
women organising within psychology are seen to be "political." 
The national psychological associations in the UK, USA, and Australia 
seem to have been inordinately concerned with this. and very quick either 
to dissociate themselves from political issues or to proscribe the activities 
.. of their members in this regard. Thus, the British Psychological Society 
will not allow groups with "political" aims (such as Psychologists for 
Peace) to form under its aegis, while in the Australian Psychological 
Society (APSj they are tolerated only as interest groups (which, as indicated 
earlier. are somewhat peripheral to the main structure of the Society) 
- with Psychologists for the Prevention of War and Women and Psychology 
recently being joined by the less contentiouS Psychology of Ageing and 
Computers in Psychology. Further, I understand that the activities of 
interest groups are limite.i both by formal "rules" (e.g., a poliCY document 
specifying the process to be undertaken before they can publicise their 
affiliation with the APS), and more informaIly by certain strictures on 
representation and financi'lg - which it may be difficult for the smaIler 
groups to meet, althou~h it must be said that Psychologists for the 
Prevention of War have been outstandingly successful (Gault. personal 
communications, February 1987, April 1987, January 1990). 
These sorts of issues were rehearsed much earlier within the American 
Psychological Association (APA), with the formation of the Society for 
the Psychological Study of Social Issues (SPSSI) in 1936. Accounts of 
SPSSI"s history (e.g .. Mednick; 1984) refer to similar tensions - but also 
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suggeSt that these did not impede SPSSI from getting on with its work. 
"Political" is$ucs were also important when APA's Division 3S (Psychology 
of Women) was formed in 1973. Martha Mednick notes: 
The truth is that we were always political and always activists ••• However, 
although' we behaved this way from the outset. we did not talk like this. • • 
Elizabeth Douvan. our rust president, confmed our political nature to the 
"intensely political purpose of knowledge. The existence and growth of the 
Division will obviously have the effect of legitimizing the study of women. 
And this is political in the last analysis." (Mednick. 1978) 
In addition, at that time she drew a clear distinction between the Association 
for Women in Psychology (AWP) as "political-activist" ~d APA Division 
35 as "intellectual-professional-substantive," and was quoted in the APA 
Monitor of September 1973 as saying: "The new Division would NOT 
be a political organization" (Mednick, 1978). 
This shows a strong awareness of one of the dominant rhetorics of 
the national psychological societies: the polarisation of "science" (as 
appropriate activity) and "politics/activism" (as illegitimate activity and 
as unrelated to "sciencej. The American women would seem, therefore, 
to have been politically astute in their emphasis on the scientific aspects 
of the proposal (and in their limitation of stated activist intentions to 
the political role of knowledge). However, there is no doubt that this 
view of events in the US is too simple, and must await further oral 
and archival investigation. 
In the UK in the 1980s there was both a greater optimism that studying 
the psychology of women would now be regarded as legitimate, and 
(perhaps due to the intellectual heritage of a long association with European 
social/ political thought), no real dissociation of scientific and political 
aims - or perhaps just naivety. The strength of the opposition on "political" 
grounds was certainly unforeseen. 
Undoubtedly the broader "political climate" surrounding psychology . 
at the time of the '1985 proposal for a BPS Psychology of Women Section 
must be seen as influential. The proposal came at a time of rapidly 
increasing professionalisation and bureaucratisation of the discipline. In 
particular, the BPS was seeking chartered status for appropriately qualifled 
and experienced psychologists, prior to setting up a register of psychologists 
qualified to offer services to the public.. This had to be granted by 
parliament, so the Society was extremely conscious both of its relationship 
with all kinds of government bodies and of its external image more 
generally. 
In perusing the wide range of documents issued by the Society around 
this time, two kinds of argument predominate. First, there is the 
representation of the Society as a unified whole, which entails minimising 
any internal dissent - some would say even healthy academic disagreement. 
Second, there is the emphasis on what the Society can offer as a scientific-
professional body, which entails calling attention to scientific rigour, 
objectivity, detachment. and neutrality as hallmarks of scientific activity. 
24 
166 Sue Wilkiason 
Both'of these·kinds. of argumellt can be seen quite'clearly,.in the way 
the proposal for a Psychology· of· Women Section was handled., For 
example: 
the Society has to maintain a neutral and evenhanded position on social issues 
on which individual Society Members will hold conflicting political views ..• 
The neutrality of the Society in the eyes of government might be compromised 
if ••• campaigning groups were allowed within the Society. (BPS to Section 
proposers. July 1985) 
Rhetorics about the nature of "science" (falsely polarised against 
'"politicsj are a common feature of the arguments. For example: 
some of the things you have in mind for the Section are sufficiently loaded 
politically for the whole proposal to fail. I am sure !hat by rephrasing the 
difficulties can be overcome, as long as you also share the conceptual distinction 
between the scientific duty [sic] of the psychology of womanhood ... and 
a feminist pressure group seeking to promote causes on the basis of moral 
conviction alone. (BPS to Section proposers. July 1985) 
It is fascinating how almost identical arguments appear in Australia. 
The following is a comment on the formation of Interest Groups within 
the Australian Psychological Society: 
t he Society = on the claim that its members are scientists and thus capable 
of the objectivity and detachment that characterise science. The promotion 
of interest groups could represent a conflict with this position: it is the taking 
of a position which is of necessity partisan and thus in conflict with a basic 
objective of the Society, Le. of objectivity. . . • if ~psychological knowledge" 
is not objective, we may then become like any other Community group. What 
is our distinction if the professional body is identif13.bly partisan and is not 
maintaining integrity through objectivity? ... if we are seen by the public 
and governments as partisan, as sup!,ort:~g particular points of view, our 
credibility is lost. (Little, 1985) . . , 
Of course, there are crucial distinctions between academic-professional 
societies' and other community groups, but the view that "science" is 
characterised by "objectivity and detachment" reflects only one, albeit· 
the dominant, paradigm of enquiry (i.e., positivism): witness the extensive 
literature on the philosophy of science, as applied to psychology (e.g., 
Sampson, 1978; Sloman, 1976). It is not only feminists who have argued 
the limitations of such a paradigm and the. impossibility of a value-free 
science: Such arguments were central to the "crisis" in social psychology 
in the mid-1970s (see Wilkinson, 1986, for a review of both bodies of 
literature). 
CONCLUSION 
In these ways, it can be seen how the "control strategies" I have identified 
are employed by the national psychological societies across a wide range 
of sites: Hardly any aspect of a proposed new sub-group fails to come 
under this kind of scrutiny and regulation. Taken together, the range 
of practices and the diversity of the areas in which they are utilised constitute 
a formidable (though not insurmountable) array of potentially limiting 
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factors to the development and dissemination of feminist scholarship. 
Whilst feminist psychology has lacked (and in many countries, including 
New Zealand in this analysis, stiII lacks) representation within the national 
psychological societies. it has had neither a central forum for the 
development and exchange of ideas nor an arena· within the discipline 
for the presentation of its arguments. Whilst its practitioners have been 
engaged in protracted struggles to establish (and now to maintain and 
consolidate) women's organisations in psychology, their energies have been 
(and continue to be) diverted from their substantive scholarly work. It 
no longer seems surprising that feminism has had a relatively limited 
effect on mainstream psychology - rather, it is surprising that its influence 
has already been so extensive. .. 
In conclusion, I would like to comment on what I see as the importance 
of this kind of analysis. 
FU'St, there is its value as an "informing" exercise, primarily for 
psychology as a discipline. Although we are all aware of both fluctuating 
"fashions" (Mednick, 1987) and more enduring trends within psychology, 
relatively little is known about the dynamics of disciplinary change. This 
is even more the case in relation to revisionary theoretical perspectives 
(such as feminism), and their institutionalisation (in this case by women 
organising within psychology): Thus, while the Mertonian school of the 
sociology of science has had a limited amount to say about women in 
science (see for example, Co!e's 1975 book, Fair Science), the newer school 
of the history I sociology of science - represented by the journal Social 
Studies 01 Science and the work of Karin Knorr-Cetina and Michael 
Mulkay (1983), for example - along with other schools in the sociology 
of science, has ignored gender completely as a topic (Delamont, 1986). 
This article is a beginning in documenting and analysing the role of women 
. .. . . in creating change within psychology, and considering some of the wider 
processes of disciplinary change that are involved. 
Second, and mo~ important, is the value of this kind of analysis as 
a "learning exercise": primarily for women as a group (and for feminist 
psychologists in particular). This project is intended as a piece of feminist 
research, according to the defmition stated at the outset; that is, as being 
primarily "for" women, and seeking to be instrumental in improving their 
lives; Thus it seeks not only to chart our history in this particular sphere, 
or to analyse the obstacles to the progress of feminist psychology, but 
to provide an impetus to, and a direction for, future feminist action. 
Essentia11y, it is a preliminary to the important task of increasing our 
influence within the discipline. In this regard, I would argue that a 
comprehensive understanding of the institutional barriers to feminist 
scholarship and organisation is a prerequisite to self-conscious action in 
order to limit their influence. I trust it is not unduly optimistic to suggest 
that such reflexive practice could operate both to strengthen our 
organisations and to increase the wider impact of our field. 
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ABSTRAcr This paper e:camines issues of legitimacy SUTTounding feminist research in psycho-
wgy, in· relation co its current and future impaa on the mainsrream of the discipline. It argues 
that its relati'Dely limited impaa to date is due, in parr, co the nature of feminm psychowgy, 
. and, in parr, co its interaction with the social institutions of psychowgy as a discipline. Further, 
the paper contends that the influence of the field may fDeU remain relati'Dely minor, nwer 
con'Oincingly its potential benefits are argued, if it fails both co analyse and CO utilize the social 
processes by fDhich legitimacy is confmed. 
Introduction: what is feminist research? 
This paper seeks to analyse the 'relatively limited impact to date of feminist work on 
the mainstream of psychology, and to consider its prospects for the future. It 
focuses, in particular, on the mainstream perception of feminist psychology as 'not 
legitimate science', and on the variety of bases (both epistemological and institu-
tional) upon which this view appears to be founded. . 
It is, perhaps, necessary to begin by noting that definitions of feminist· 
psychology vary widely, in both substance and inclusiveness. For example, in the 
U.S.A. the terms 'feminist psychology' and 'psychology of women' often appear to 
be used synonymously: psychological research on women, and its practitioners, are 
automatically designated 'feminist'. In the U.K., however, the two are generally 
more clearly differentiated. While it is never easy to define 'feminist research' 
without over-simplifying or appearing prescriptive (see, for example, Mitchell & 
Oakley, 1986, for the complexity of the issue), Renate Duelli Klein's identification 
of two main characteristics (Klein, 1983, pp. 89-90) provides a useful starting point 
for a 'baseline' definition for the purposes of this paper. These characteristics are: 
regarding women's experiences and needs as valid in their own right; and the 
incorporation of an explicit statement of values: feminist research is research 'for' 
. women (i.e. instrumental in improving women's lives). 
This characterization may usefully be expanded by means of two short extracts 
from a report of the Task Force of the American Psychological Association Division 
35 (Psychology of Women). These definitional extracts indicate that that feminist 
research in psychology tends to be cc ••• co-operative, participative ... , interdisciplin-
30.' 
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ary, (and) non-hierarchical ••• (beginning) with personal experience" and recogniz-
ing that "truth is not separate from the person who speaks it" (cited in Lott, 1985, 
" p. 156). This 'alternative' model for research follows, of course, from a developed 
critique of traditional psychological research, with a particular focus on methodo- . 
logy: for a review of this critique, see, for example, W11kinson (1986). 
The Limited Impact of FeminiSlD OD Psychology 
The increasing participation of women in psychology has been reflected both in 
institutional change (most recently the new Psychology of Women Section··of the 
British Psychological Society, inaugnrated in December 1987, whiCh follows similar 
developments in the American Psychological Association and the Canadian Psycho-
logical Association), and in the growth of teaching and research activity in the broad 
area of the psychology of women (Russo, 1982; Walsh, 1985a). However, this 
increased activity appears to have had little impact on mainstream psychology; and, 
in particular, there have been several recent claims that the work of feminist 
psychologists has ''neither been integrated into nor significantly changed the field of 
psychology" (Lykes & Stewart, 1986). Such claims have rarely been supported by . 
empirical evidence, however-perhaps because of the complexity of the task in the 
face of many varieties of feminism and many potential indices of change. Lykes & 
Stewart also note that it is inherently difficult for active feminist researchers to 
reflexively examine their own successes and failures-although, as will be arglied, 
this is probably essential for the future of the field. 
Lykes & Stewart's (1986) study is an exception to this, in that it does artempt 
an empirical evaluation of the impact of the psychology of women/feminism on 
research in personality and social psychology (although it is still a relatively 
unsophisticated examination of the issue). They conducted three related studies, 
... utilizing three kinds· of index of change (women's involvement as authors and 
reviewers; types of research method; and concern with substantive gender issues in . . 
research). These assessed change over 20 years in a mainstream jouma1; compared a 
psychology of women and a mainstream journal; and analysed citation patterns in 
different sources. The focus here will be· only on those methodological (and to a 
lesser degree substantive) indices which seem indicative of feminist research, as 
defined above, rather than of the psychology of women more generally. 
In the 20 years between 1963 and 1983, the Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology (JPSP) showed no Significant changes in methodology, apart from a 
decrease in the number of studies with all male 'subjects' (from 40% to 19%): most 
important, there was no change in the number of studies using only laboratory 
experimental methods (about 60%). The only change in substantive concerns was a 
shift from stereotypically masculine research topics towards more stereotypically 
feminine ones. The comparison between JPSP and Psychology of Women Quarterry 
(PWQ) (over the years 1976-1983) showed that the latter included only 14% of 
articles based on experimental methods only, while the former included 65%. In 
addition, PWQ was significantly more likely than JPSP to publish articles involving 
a substantive concern with gender issues (on all four indices of this type employed). 
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Lykes &: Stewart also found that key feminist articles originally published in 
mainstream journals were more likely to be cited in mainstream journals, and thus to 
influence mainstream research, than those published in feminist journals: the latter, 
however, were cited equally-but often in non-psychology sources. The importance 
of citation will become still more apparent later in this paper. 
How might we explain the lack of change in mainstream psychology in 
response to the feminist critique, symptomatized by the restriction of feminist 
research to feminist journals (or the "ghettoization of methodology", as Lykes &: 
Stewart have it)? The answer,. I will contend,· lies substantWIy in issues of 
legitimacy: feminist research is not perceived by the mainstream· to be 'legitimate 
science': and is hence dismissed. Further, I will argue, following Unger (1982), that 
it is possible to deconsnuct this perceived illegitimacy into reasons associated with 
the nature of feminist research (and its practitioners); and reasons pertaining to its 
interaction with psychology as a scientific discipline (including its practitioners and 
the institutions within which they operate). The two are not easily separable, 
however, in that scientific practices themselves influence the nature of a sub-
discipline, which, in turn, affects its acceptance by the scientific community. 
Nevertheless, an attempt will be made to tease out these strands, under the general 
headings of 'status', 'politics', 'epistemology' and 'power' (themselves somewhat 
arbitrary divisions). 
Legitimacy and Status ' , 
The most straightforward (and perhaps naive) reason that may be given for the lack 
of impact of the feminist approach within psychology is the undergraduate's 
favourite apologia for the parent discipline: it is a 'young science' which has not yet 
had time to make its mark. More pertinent, perhaps, is the concomitant lack of 
institutional support (until very recently) for the psychology of women more 
generally: the American Psychological Association's Division 35 was only founded 
in 1973 (Walsh, 1985b); and the equivalent Section of the British Psychological 
Society only in late 1987, both following a snuggle for recognition. Without a 
central forum of this kind, it is difficult to establish channels of communication, to 
sustain academic dialogue, and to integrate research results-let alone to exert an 
influence upon the mainstream of the discipline. 
Newness as a problem is compounded by a lack of status. While there is an 
interesting debate over who can legitimately conduct feminist research (see Wilkin-
son, 1986, chapter I, for a ,1lmmary), it is presently the case that the majority ofits 
practitioners are female: at least if one takes authorship of articles in the main 
feminist journals as an index. It is a common observation that professions dominated 
by women are regarded as low status (at least by male practitioners); for an example 
within psychology see Humphrey &: Haward's (1981) concern about the increasing 
numbers of women being recruited onto clinical psychology training courses, and its 
likely effect on the status of the profession, While such valuations persist, the area 
has an intrinsic handicap in attempts to establish itself. 
Issues of status are reinforced by institutional practices. A single example will 
". ' . 
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suffice here: that oC citation pattems. Sociologists oC science note that high status, 
, established scholars are cited more frequently that low status 'unknowns' (Merton, 
.. 1968): thereby increasing the credibility oC the citer's own work. Feminist resear-
chers, thereCore, do not increase their credibility by citing each other, nor are they 
likely to increase the impact oC their field on the mainstream in this way: the work 
oC Lykes Se Stewart (1986), referred to earlier, provides additional support Cor this 
argument. 
Status' factors relating to the practitioners oC Ceminist research are further 
compounded by the content oC such research, in that much oC it (in practice, if not 
by definition) relates to women as a group or to areas oC hUman functioning 
popularly regarded as 'women's issues' (e.g. pregnancy and childbirth, housework, 
sexual harrassment)-and hence is itself regarded as oC low status. As the sociolOgist 
Jessie Bemard noted in 1973, research in which women are not related to a male 
norm is systematically devalued: this ,is no less true now, or in psychology (see 
Griffin, 1986, Cor a pertinent example), and little priority has been given to funding 
research on experiences specific to women (e.g. the menstrual cycle) or oC particular 
importance to women Cor social, historical or other reasons (e.g. marriage). 
Legitimacy and Politics 
OC course, there are many aspects oC Ceminist research which do not conform to 
traditional notions oC 'science'. In particular, however, because Ceminist research 
incorporates an explicit value statement (the advocacy oC women), it challenges the 
positivist characterization oC research as neutral or value-Cree. This is difficult to 
accept Cor psychologists who have been socialized into the belieC that advocacy and 
scholarship are incompatible (Unger, 1982). Further, in that such advocacy entails a 
commitment to, social and political, change oC benefit to women, it provides a 
convenient 'handle' Cor' the labelling oC Ceminist research as 'purely political'. 
Equating this Ceature oC Ceminist research with the whole provides the mainstream 
researcher with grounds Cor dismissing it as illegitimate: politics has nothing to do 
with science. Such a strategy obviates any need Cor engagement with Ceminist 
, arguments at all; its Calse polarisationoC 'science' and 'politics' also protects the 
mainstream researcher from having to acknowledge the political dimension oC 
her/his practice at all. 
Such a stance is evidently detrimental to feminist research. It may, however, be 
argued that it is equally detrimental to mainstream psychology, on the grounds that 
it is profoundly unscientific to dismiss an alternative perspective without attempting 
to evaluate it properly. More fundamentally, it is itself a political act to refuse to 
engage with a theoretical/methodological challenge: for it leaves the status quo 
entirely untouched. There are a number of possible reasons for this, but I will focus 
particularly on two: the epistemological threat posed by the feminist approach; and 
its challenge to the social institutions of academia, which support the power base of 
psychology as a scientific discipline. 
It is also possible to differentiate between two kinds of rejection of the feminist 
approach. The first of these, ('naive' rejection), which is based on the limited 
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petception or misperception of the nature of feminist research, fails to engage with 
the feminist c:hallenge of 'doing science better' (e.g. Blder, 1984). The second, 
.. ('aware' rejection), which is based on the perception of feminist research as a threat, 
fails to engage with the feminist c:hallenge of 'doing a different science' (e.g. Keller, 
1985). 
Legitimacy and Epistemology 
Naive rejection of the feminist approach can be addreSsed by. situating feminist 
research within the discourse of 'legitimate science', as presently defined by the 
dominant positivist paradigm. This also demonstrates that feminist research is 
concerned with scholarship, as well as advocacy. In these terms, and extending the 
argumenu of Lott (1985), it may be contended that the feminist approach provides . 
considerable impetus for those working within the traditional paradigm to improve 
their research. 
First, it identifies hitherto unrecognized sources of bias (e.g. overgeneralization 
from male 'subjecu' to people in general, as in Gilligan's (1982) critique of 
Kohlberg's work on moral development; or sexist assumptions/ expectations, as in 
Sherifs (1979) work on the menstrual cycle)-which one can then reduce or 
eliminate. Second, it increases critical thinking: both focusing attention on gender as 
a variable (e.g. as in Eagly & Carli's (1981) analysis of social influence studies), and 
offering a more differentiated analysis of the concept (e.g. as in Deaux's (1984) 
distinction between gender as a 'subject' variable and gender as a 'stimulus' 
variable). Third, it broadens the scope of research: not only stimulating new 
research questions in under-researched areas (e.g. violence against women; volun-
tary childlessness), but generating new ways of looking at old problems. Thus for 
example, a feminist approach to explaining the limited numbers of women in . 
management would focus less on intra-psychic factors (e.g. lack of ambition; fear of 
success) than on social mid situational factors (e.g. how the characteristics and 
practices of institutions may disadvantage women): cf. Marshall (1984) for a 
programme of feminist research on this particular topic. 
In epistemological terms, this third point is particularly far-reaching in its 
implications, for the feminist approach offers the possibility of an 'extra dimension' 
to psychological knowledge: by looking at human experience from the point ofview 
of women, we can enrich and extend our understanding of the whole of human 
functioning and its possibilities (Callaway, 1981)-indeed, Sloman (1976) argues 
that this is one of the fundamental aims of science. Acceptance of this argument, 
however, presupposes the acceptance that women as a group have a legitimate claim 
to different knowledges or different perspectives on knowledge from men; similarily 
those whose 'consciousness has been raised' with respect to feminism will see things 
differently from those who are ui:tfamiliar with feminist analyses (Bernard, 1973). 
This is, of course, antithetical to the dominant conception of contemporary science 
(the positivist paradigm), which eliminates the perspective of the knower from the 
'objective' pursuit of knowledge, defining that knowledge as a set of abstract, 
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general and universal laws of psychologic:al functioning. This kind of science is, of 
course, held to be value-free. 
.' However, the dominant paradigm may be contrasted with a view of psychologi-
c:al knowledge as dynamic:: constructed by means of interactions between people in 
specific socio-cn1tural settings (Sampson, 1978). Sampson's arguments provide a 
mm basis for the feminist epistemologic:al argument. He demonstrates convincingly 
that the dominant paradigm is far from value-free; that in fact, as a product of its 
time, it affirms a particular set of values: those of h'beralism, individualism, 
capitalism and-most important here--male dominance. Thus it emphasizes, for 
example, male values such as detachment, mastery and achievemelit. Further, it is 
unable to recognize such a value bias: because of its conception of truth as general 
and universal (rather than particular and specific), the dominant paradigm has "a 
kind of built-in blindness to the bias of (its) own socio-historical position" 
(Sampson, 1978, p. 1338). In particular, for the purposes of this paper, it will fail to 
recognize its own gender-centricity. ' 
Such arguments may be extended with reference to the work of the feminist 
philosopher Elizabeth Grosz (1987), who has identified a number of varities of 
male-dominated theory. Of particular interest here is the characterization of 'phallo-
centric' theory: this is defined as "the use of general or universal models to 
represent the two sexes according to the interests and terms of one, the male" 
(Grosz, 1987, p. 477): although, of course, this is unacknowledged by the theorist. 
Grosz argues the necessity of deconstructing such models: to demonstrate that their 
conceptual terms are masculine; that these are over-valued; and that their import 
does not lie in their inherent explanatory power, but in their 'covering' of other 
kinds of conceptual terms (i.e. the feminine is occluded by the equation of 
'masculine' and 'universal'). 
Legitimacy and Power 
Notions such as these, it ~y be argued, are at the heart of the mainstream 
rejection/ignoring of feminist research, for they represent a considerable threat to 
the power base of traditional scientific discipline: not only are its practices being 
challenged, but also its bedrock-the nature of scientific investigation and the form 
and status of the knowledge it produces. Perhaps most important here is the 
questioning of the values of the system: in that it is a system which denies that it 
even has values. There is considerable evidence from the sociology of science that ' 
revisionist theoretical perspectives, particularly those which threaten existing status 
hierarchies, will have difficulty in gaining acceptance from established disciplines 
(Cole Se Zuckerman, 1975). Further, mainstream social science is enabled to resist 
challenges such as the feminist one by means of a range of institutional practices, 
which support the dominant paradigm as a power base for its practitioners. 
We saw earlier how the impact of feminist research is limited by its (present) 
low status: the other side of the argument is that these institutional practices can be 
used to maintain the area's low status (and hence control its impact) in the face of 
, the perceived threat outlined above. This is not the place to document the operation 
of such practices in any detail: it is sufficient to provide an example. 
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Often these practices are coven: (and hence not easy for an 'outsider' to 
penetrate): their unacknowledged nature being part of their power. There exists, for 
. . eDDIple, a 'rhetoric of meritocracy': the idea that merit will be judged objectively 
and rewarded appropriately. However, there is a much smaller correspondence 
between productivity and reward for women than men (O'Connell etal, 1978, cited 
in U nger, 1982). In addition, sociologists of science have documented some of the 
ways in which women are at a disadvantage relative. to men, particularly in terms of 
what is known about the institutionalization-and hence legitimation-of new 
knowledge, such as feminist research. The eDD1ple of citation has been given above 
(in relation to status); anothereDDIple is the operation of UU:o.rma1 networks of 
academics amongst whom information is passed, papers reviewed, journals edited, 
and jobs and research grants allocated (Cole & Zuckerman, 1985). It is difficult for 
women to break into such networks, not least because they are largely based on male 
culture (Epstein, 1970)-and when they do, they are often allocated particular roles 
within the network, such as the 'token woman' (Laws, 1975) or the 'Queen Bee' 
(Staines et al, 1974), which serve to delimit their power and influence. 
\ 
Conclusion: re.ftenve analysis and self-conscious practice 
Finally, I would like to pose the question of what feminist research can do to 
increase its impact in the face of such difficulties. It appears that it will not be 
. .-
enough simply to argue its benefits, but rather that it will also be necessary to study 
the conditions which govern its acceptance or rejection. Further, I would contend 
that the area needs to undertake a thoroughgoing reflexive analysis (such as has only 
begun here): both of its own nature and the intellectual and institutional conten of 
its operation. Feminist practitioners need to be aware both of the nature of the 
threat that their revisionary perspective poses, and of the academic practices that 
operate to constrain its influence (whether 'intentional' or not). It is only by 
understanding the processes by which legitimacy is conferred or withheld that one is 
likely to be able to influence them. 
Indeed-to end on a more optimistic note-there is already evidence that the 
nen step is taking place. Feminist psychologists are beginning to utilize the insights 
of such a reflexive analysis in a self-conscious attempt to increase the impact of 
their work on the mainstream. Thus, for example, a group of feminist psychologists 
based at Hunter College in New York are developing an antidote to informal 
academic networks by means of a distinctive variant of the male 'mentoring' system 
(Denmark, 1987; Paludi, 1987). It is too early to evaluate the success of this 
deliberate attempt to effect change in institutional practice (and such evaluation will 
not, of course, be easy). However, 'self-conscious theoretical perspectives' (Unger, 
1982) and informed practices of this type may well have an important role to play 
as the field of feminist research develops within psychology. This is particularly so 
if the area is not only to become more visible, but also to effect significant change 
within the wider discipline. 
:,.~.:., . 
. . '- "". 
268 StJB WIUaNSON 
Ackuowledgement 
I would like to thank Mathilde Idema for bringing the work of Lykes &: Stewart to 
. . my artention. 
An early version of this paper was presented at the Annual Conference of the 
British Psyc:hologic:al Society, U Diversity of Leeds, April 1988. 
References 
BERN.wl, 1. (1973) My Cour revolutions: an autobiographical history oC rh ASA., IImeri=IJtnrI'IfQJ of 
Sodology, 78(4), pp. 21-26. ,< 
Bt.EmI, R. (1984) Scinu and GnuUr. IJ critiqru of biology and its theories .;, fIIomm (New York, 
Perpmou). 
CAuAWAT, H. (1981) Wome!I'S petspectives: research as re-visioD, iD: P. REAsoN Bc 1. RoWA..'I (Eds) 
H_/~ IJ $OtlfC4baok of'"'" ptmzdigm m.<JTCh (LondoD, \ViIey). 
CoLI!, 1.R. Bc Zl1CDIIMAN, H. (1975) The emergence oC a scientific speciality: rh seIC-ezemp!ifying 
case oC the sociology oC science, iD: L.A. Cosa (Ed.) T/u ItkIJ of Social Srruaun (New York, 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich). 
DEAvx, K. (1984) From individual difi'ereoces to social categories: analysis oC a decade's research on 
gender,lImeri=I Ps,ychologist, 39, pp. 105-116. 
DI!NM.\B, F. (1987) The politics oC mentoring: proCessioual netwOrks, Womm's WI1I'ids: V'uiIms and 
RtvistmJ, 7'1u Third 11IItmllZitmal lnurdUciplinary Congress on Womm, 6-10 July, Trioity 
College, University oC Dublin.. 
l!AGLT, A.H. Bc CAau, L.L (1981) Sex oC researchers and sex-typed communications as determinants 
. oC seJ: difi'ereoces in inBuenceability: a meta-anaIysis oC social inBuence studies, Ps,ychologioal 
Brdktin, 90, pp. 1-20. " 
ElsTEIN, CF. (1970) W"""",'s PlDu: oprions and limits in proflSsWnal ctmm (University oC 
California Press). 
Gn.uGAN, C. (1982) III IJ Diiftmlt Voice: psydwlogioal thetny and fIIomm's m./opmtnt (Cambridge, 
Ma, Harnsd University Press). 
GIIIP1'tII, C. (1986) Qualitative methods and Cemale aperiencc: young women from school to the job 
market, iD: S.J. W!l.mI3ON (Ed.) Feminist Social Psychology: m.loping thetny and pru.ai&t 
(Milton Keynes. Open University Press). . . 
Gaosz, E.A. (1987) Feminist thtoty and the challenge to tnowlcdges, Womm's Studies 11IItmllZitmal 
FrmmI, 10, pp. 475-480. 
H11M1'HRET, M. Bc HAWARD, L. (1981) Sex differences in clinical psychology rccruitment,Brdktin of the 
. British Psychologioal Sodtty, 34, pp. 413-414. 
Km.u!R, E.F. (1985) Rejf4ctiMu on GIIIdn and Sdtnc. (Yale University Press). 
KLmN, R.D. (1983) How to do what we WIIlt to do: thoughts about Ceminist methodology, iD: G. 
BoWLES Bc R.D. KLmN (Eds) 7'1u"";'s of Womm's Studies (LondoD, Routlcdge). 
LAws, J.L. (1975) The psychology oC tokenism: an analysis, Sa Roles, 1, pp. 51-67. 
LOtT, B. (1985) The potential enrichment oC sociaIIpersona1ity psychology through Ceminist research 
and vice versa, Anuric<J1l Psychologist, 40, pp. 155-164. 
LYKES, M.B. Bc STEWAR'I', A.J. (1986) Evaluating the Ceminist challenge to research in personality and 
social psychology: 1963-1983, Psychology of Womm Qu<Jrrero-, 10, pp. 393-412. 
MARsH.w., J. (1984) Womm M<J1I<Jgm: tTafJ.l1m in IJ m<Jle fIIl1I'ld (LondoD, Wiley). 
MrrClIELL, J. Bc OAKLEY, A. (Eds) (1986) What is Feminism} (Oxford, Basil BlactweU). 
PALVllI, M.A. (1987) Women and the mentor-protege relationship: a Ceminist critique Cor the 
inadequacy oC the old solutions, Womm's War/lis: Visions and Re'I1isions, The Third International 
InurdiscipliMry ConlfTtsS on Womm, 6-10 July, Trinity CoUege, University of Dublin. 
R11SSO, N.F. (1982) Psychology oC women: analysis of the faculty and courses oC a developing field, 
Psychology of Womm Quarrero-, 7(1) pp. 18-31. 
.' ':~' . 
" .. l';: 
""",,, 
37 
· .. : .. ~. 
THE IMPAcr OP PEMINJST RESEARCH 269 
SAMrsoN. E.E. (1978) Scienrif!c pandigms aDd social values: wanted-a scientific revolutiDa, ID11m1ll . 
of PmtmQ/iry and S«W JVdIDlDD. 36. pp. 1332-1343. 
SIIBIIP. C. W. (1979) Bias iD~. iD: J.A. SIII!IIIWI &: aT. BBc: (EdI) TIu Prism of s.: utayf 
.' in rM fllCiQlDD of /rMmWp (Madisou,Wi....""j". UDiversity otW'lSCOasiD Press). 
SLOMAN, A. (1976) WhaI: are the aims ot scieDce? Radical Philotophy. SpriDr. pp. 7-17. 
STAJNES, G •• TAVBIS C. a: JAYAlIAnm, T.E. (1974) The Qsteeu Bee synchome, ~ Tod4zy, 7, 
JIIIUUY. pp. 55-60. 
UNGIII, lUC. (1982) Adwcaq __ scho1anhip revisited: issues iD the psychology ot womea, 
JVdIDlllty of IV"""" Qruzrur(y. 7(1), pp. 5-17. 
WAtSH, MA (1985.) The ~ ot WOIllel1 course: a coatiDaiDg catalyst tor change, TeadWrg of 
JVdIDlDD, 12, pp. 198-203. . .' 
WAtSH, MA (198Sb) Academic protessioaalwolllel1 organiziag Cor chaage: the ,truggle iD psychology, 
Jormuzl of SociDl 1_. 41(4), pp. 17-28. " 
WUINSON. 5.1. (EeL) (1986) Ftminis: S«W Psycholllgy: m.loping tluory IJ1fd praaiu (Milton 
Keyaes, Open Uaiversity Press). 
" . 
38 
-'. 
.. ' .. 
0iAPTER3: 
Willdnson. S. (1991) Feminism and psychology: 
From aitique to reconstruction. 
Feminism &: Psychology, 1(1): 5-18. 
.... '" 
, 
, 
i.. 
, < 
, 
, . ,. , . 
. }'. 
•.•. , •• __ .c·~_ ~---c-~~~=~=====~ 
•• ' r 
EDITORIAL 
Sue WILKINSON 
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Margaret WETHERELL and lennie WILLIAMS 
Feminism & Psychology: 
From Critique to Reconstruction 
The launch of Feminism & Psychology is predicated on a sense of possibility: 
both in our awareness of the particular set of social and historical conditions 
which have made it possible; and in our enthusiasm and excitement about 
the future and what it may be possible to achieve. As feminists within 
psychology, we share major dissatisfactions with our discipline's failure to 
engage with the lives of the majority of women, and the distortion and 
damage often produced when it does engage. We are committed to changing 
this and to developing a psychology which properly represents women's 
concerns in all their diversity. However, more importantly, we are also 
committed to the deployment of such a psychology to address a range of 
social inequaIi\ies (including, for example, race and class, as well as gender) 
and to improve the conditions of women's lives: i.e. to feminism. We believe 
that in these twin purposes - the reconstruction of psychology and the 
impetus for social and political change - lies the radical potential of 
Feminism & Psychology .. 
WHY FEMINISM cl PSYCHOLOGY! 
The Background 
It is possible to identify a number of broad strands of influence as constitut-
ing the context which has made the journal possible, although to a large 
degree these interconnect. First, we would identify the feminist movement. 
We were all affected to a greater or lesser degree by the burgeoning of 
Feminism cl Psychology © 1991 SAGE (London. Newbury Park and New Delhi). 
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second-wave feminism in the 19705. as the numbers of (mainly white. 
middle-class) women entering education and the professions increased. and 
the intellectual 'climate' began to change. More recently. we have been 
inftuenced by developments in the feminist movement which have sought to 
challenge academic feminism's predominant focus on white. western culture 
(our own context); to move from asserting commonality of experience in 
order adequately to address difference and diversity. including the multiple 
oppressions of race. class. sexuality and disability'(.amongst others); and to 
develop and strengthen international links. . 
Second. we have been inftuenced by historical and contemporary devel-
opments in psychology. particularly social psychology. which seem to offer 
spaces within which it may be possible to develop new kinds of theory and 
practice that address feminist concerns. (We should perhaps note here that 
European social psychology has always been less narrowly experimental 
than the North American variety. as well as more strongly associated with 
political movements.) These developments range from the so-called 'crisis' 
in social psychology in the 19705 (with its critique of the mainstream and 
range of alternative prescriptions), to contemporary developments broadly 
associated with postmodernism: for example. the emphasis on the specificity 
and social construction of knowledge; the conjunction of knowledge and 
power; the focus on language and subjectivity; the analysis of discourse and 
rhetoric.' . 
The third line of inftuence also entails developments within psychology: 
specifically the academic and institutional recognition that has been 
achieved for 'the psychology of women' as a disciplinary area. It is evident 
that women's specific engagement with institutional psychology (at least in 
several English-speaking countries) was underpinned by second-wa.ve fem~ 
inism, with both US and Canadian women achieving formal representation 
of their work within their national psychological societies in the mid-1970s 
(see Walsh. 1985; and Pyke and Stark-Adamec, 1981; respectively, for brief 
histories). Although there was some conference activity in the UK at this 
time. it was some fifteen years later that we achieved a 'Psychology of 
Women' Section within the British Psychological Society (see Wilkinson and 
Bums. 1990). so this constitutes an important contemporary context for us, 
Indeed. the sense of a growing community of feminist psychologists from the 
mid-1980s, including a 'groundswell' of postgraduate student opinion, has 
provided considerable support for us. Such engagements with the establish-
ment. however~ have highlighted the costs and compromises, as well as the 
benefits, of institutional recognition, and we have therefore chosen to 
develop the journal independently of formal institutional affiliation in order 
to permit a broader and more creative exploration of a conjunction of 
feminism and psychology which puts feminism first. 
The fourth line of influence is also culturally specific: it is the changing 
'climate' in the health and social services. in which. increasingly. pro-
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fessional practice is being shaped by dialogue with clients and consumers. 
The involvement of service users in planning and evaluating services is now 
much more common. and pressure groups such as 'Survivors Speak Out' (a 
British-based self-advocacy group) and the 'Campaign' Against Psychiatric 
Oppression', whose members identify themselves as system survivors. are 
becoming increasingly effective. We want to see this kind of dialogue 
continued - and extended - within a specifically feminist context. 
Fifth. we would identify the growth of publishing interest in feminist 
material in recent years. Independent feminist and lesbian publishers were 
succeeded by popular feminist publishing. which in turn has encouraged 
academic publishers to develop feminist lists. In the academic journal field, 
the established multidisciplinary women's studies journals have been 
followed by a number of new feminist journals focused on particular disci-
plines. although - as with Feminism & Psychology - by no means restric· 
ted to them. We also regard it as fortunate that we have been able to find a 
publisher which respects and supports our intentions in establishing this 
journal. 
Finally, we cannot delineate these formative strands without also eicpress-
ing an awareness of our own limitations. As we have developed this project, 
the membership of the editorial group has changed (becoming more homo-
geneous). and currently both it and the international advisory group are 
insufficiently representative of the diversity of experience and opinion we 
aim to represent. We intend to change this. by creating the space for others 
to join us. and by encouraging as wide a range of contributors to the journal 
as possible. Our oivn visions of what Feminism & Psychology might become 
are inevitably limited and partial: we look to others to expand and elaborate 
them. in order that Feminism & Psychology might realize its full potential 
for creating social and disciplinary change. . -
The Dissatisfaction with MainlMalestream Psychology 
Just as Feminism & Psychology does not emerge from an historical vacuum. 
neither does it come from an intellectual one: rather from a tradition of 
feminist critique, and a felt need to move beyond this critique to reconstruc· 
tion and action. This is not the place to document the feminist critique of 
psychology in any detail (indeed to do so would impart an unwarranted 
sense of stasis); we are simply providing an orientation sketch. Nor are we 
tracing in detail the links between psychology and other disciplines. includ-
ing multidisciplinary women's studies, although we note that parallels with 
sociology may be particularly informative (see also Dorothy Smith's article 
in this issue). 
Feminists have argued that psychology's theories often exclude women, 
or distort our experience - by assimilating it to male norms or man· made 
stereotypes. or by regarding 'women' as a unitul"j category, to be under· 
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stood only in comparison with the unitary category 'men'. This is under-
pinned by the emphasis on generaIizabiIity (preferably universality) of 
research 'findings'. Similarly, psychology's preferred locus of explanation 
(individual, preferably biological) is an effective screen for multiple. p0ss-
ibly fragmented subjectivities (within or between people); the sociaVcul-
turaVhistorical specificity of knowledge; and - especially - the existence 
and operation of social and structural inequalities between and within social 
groups (power differentials are written out). 
The false polarization of 'politics' and 'science' is~one ofthe reasons why 
feminism has found psychology so resistant. The insistence on (very nar-
rowlydefined) 'scientific' credentials has shaped psychology's traditional 
reliance on positivist research methods: these are also criticizeiJ by feminists 
for what they distort or occlude; but, in addition, for presenting as 'neutral' 
and 'objective' values and assumptions which are culturally 'male' (see 
HOllway,1989, for an elaboration of these arguments). The feminist critiqne 
has also examined the ways in which professional practices are often 'blind' 
to gender issues, or explicitly oppressive: Wendy Hollway's article in this 
issue shows how discrimination at work is not covered in the training of 
occupational psychologists in Britain; while the Open Forum on clinical 
psychology training presents a similarly dismal picture. Others have looked 
at the ways in which academic and professional institutions operate to 
marginalize or neutralize the feminist challenge (and thus reaffirm the status 
quo) - often by Covert discriminatory practices, supported by highly per-
suasive rhetoric. This may lead to a position in which women come to regard 
the discipline of psychology as irrelevant to their concerns or as inaccessible 
to them-and so they leave (see several of the accounts in Burman, 1990). 
All this is focused primarily within the discipline, however, and does not 
address the power of psychology to shape everyday understandings and 
produce material effects in most aspects of life. Feminist psychologists have 
also been critical of the harm that psychology (and the popularization of 
psychological ideas) has wrought in women's lives: primarily (but not exclu-
sively) through the location of responsibility - and also pathology - within 
the individual, to the total neglect of social and political oppression. Femi-
nists have pointed out that 'mother-blaming', for example, ranges from the 
use of Bowlby's work to keep mothers in the home. and feeling guilt-ridden 
aboutthe effects of separation (Riley. 1983); to the suggestion that working-
class mothering is 'deficient' (Walkerdine and Lucey. 1989); to the view that 
mothers are ultimately responsible if their relationships with their daughters 
are conflictual (Caplan. 1989). 
Pursuing the Promise of Feminism 
Embracing feminism within and beyond psychology offers tremendous 
potential for change. Even within the empiricist framework of traditional 
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psychology, a feminist perspective offers the possibility of 'better science', 
alert to sex/gender bias (Grady, \981). It also offers the possibility of 
'enriching' (Lott. 1985) and 'revitalizing' (Shaver and Hendrick. 1987) the 
discipline, in its focus on new questions and new modes ofinvestigation. We 
would argue, however (with many others), that the potential of feminism 
lies far beyond this: in suggesting the possibility of a transformation of 
psychological inquiry. Serious attention to the feminist critique would 
require the acceptance of different models of knowledge (as socially and 
temporally specific; as acknowledging subjectivity and values; in which the 
knower not only shapes but is an integral part of what is known); the 
development Qf different theories and methods (grounded in women's lives; 
more sensitive to diversity, variability and inconsistency; more reflexive); 
and the acknowledgement and analysis of power differentials as central to 
social life (and the research process) - including the profoundly political 
role that psychology itself plays in maintaining such differentials. (See 
Wilkinson, 1986, for a more detailed review and research examples.) 
When we think about the impact of feminist research on psycholoS!', 
however, its purpose cannot rest with the transformation of the discipline: 
we must constantly evaluate its effectiveness in dismantling social inequali-
ties and transforming women's lives. Some of the work we have already 
referred to has had this effect; too little (in our view) has this explicit 
intention. Further, it is often the case that good feminist practice is not 
visible because it d!'e5 not receive adequate publicity, particularly in the . 
international context. In the western academic tradition, feminist activism 
has been stronger in US than UK psychology: the newsletter columns 
written by the 1989-90 President of AP A Division 35 attest to this (Walker, 
1989, 1990a, 1990b). There are also two instances in this issue we would 
particularly like to highlight: Fine and Gordon's examples of feminist 
psychologists supporting battered women, denouncing sexual harassment; 
and defending education rights; and Paula Caplan's letter documenting 
some of the vital work that she and other feminist psychologists have been 
doing in opposition to the misogynist diagnostic categories proposed for the 
American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorden. Feminism & Psychology will explicitly publicize such 
work, but more importantly, it will provide a context in which it can be 
supported and developed, in order to enable it to become more effective in 
promoting social and political change. 
HOW WILL FEMINISM & PSYCHOLOGY OPERATE? 
Aims and Scope 
Our title is a statement of intent: the journal is about the conjunction 
between feminism (not women. or gender, or sex roles) and psychology; and 
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feminism comes first in our order of priority. We are committed to feminist 
engagement with psychology and to exploration of all the possibilities and 
. contradictions of that engagement. Nor is this journal restricted to 'feminist 
psychology' (as a type or branch of psychology), but will aim for creative 
exchanges with feminist work in other disciplines (e.g. sociology,philos-
ophy, anthropology, literary criticism, education) and with multidisciplin-
ary women's studies - provided such work has psychological implications. 
Our subtitle is also important: although aware of our initial Anglo-Ameri-
can bias, we hope to develop as an international forum for the publication of 
high-quality original work and the promotion of Critical debate at the 
in terface of feminism and psychology. '. 
The journal will be a strong and radical voice for feminism within and 
beyond psychology, providing a space for women, in particular, to be heard, 
voicing our own concerns, and engaging in dialogue with each other. 
Feminism cl Psychology will foster the development of feminist theory and 
practice, and explore what this might entail in relation to psychology. We 
welcome-for example - feminist critiques of mainstream psychology; the 
development of feminist alternatives, which explicitly acknowledge social 
inequalities and consider their effects; and reports of feminist interventions 
which improve the quality of women's lives. The journal will seek to 
integrate theory, research, practice and broader social concerns; and to 
maintain a balance between theoretical, empirical and practical contribu-
tions. In particular, we aim to bridge the traditional 'academic-applied' 
divide by encouraging academics to address the practical implications of 
their work, and by inviting practitioners to develop, present and assess the 
value of theory (as well as to report on practice). We will also seek to make a 
space for a wider range of voices to be heard: by encouraging contributions 
from members of under-represented groups and from those at all stages of 
their careers, We also aim to open up the journal to those traditionally 
denied a 'voice' in psychology, although profoundly affected by it - for 
example: students, clients, users and survivors of psychology- particularly, 
but not exclusively, through our Open Forum (see later). 
Policies and Practices 
Our intention to develop a feminist journal has serious implications for our 
policies and practices: we cannot simply reproduce uncritically the conven-
tions of academic journal publishing. In particular. we need to develop ways 
of making the journal more open and accessible; and of redefining tra-
ditional academic criteria to foster the development of high-quality. innova-
tive work. However. we are also constrained by the practical and financial 
necessity of operating within particular academic (and publishing) insti-
tutions. which sets very real limits on what we can achieve (or even contem-
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plate attempting). We detail here how we intend to operate - and some of 
the compromises we have made. We intend to subject our policies and 
practices to regular review. and welcome suggestions as to how we may 
better meet our objectives. 
The editor (who serves a three-year term) provides a central focus for 
manuscript handling and other day-to-day administration. However. she is 
part of-and accountable to - an editorial group (also appointed for three 
years). which effectively runs the journal: collectively shaping its policies. 
content and format. and with members each taking responsibility for parti-
cular editorial activities. The group is Britisli-based,~ but as we are largely 
independent of institutional support and have limited funds for travel and 
other expenses, this is unlikely to change; we are presently all white - we 
intend this to change. 
The central editorial group is supported by an international advisory 
group. Members of this latter group will monitor the journal's development 
and offer advice and suggestions, while promoting the journal in their own 
countries; they will also act as an initial 'core' of manuscript reviewers. We 
have selected this group on the following bases: active interests (but not 
necessarily extensive publication) in feminism and psychology; demonstra-
table energy and enthusiasm for work in the area; to include both academics 
and practitioners; and.women at different stages of their careers. We are 
conscious that the composition of the advisory group - and also our 
reviewers _. is hi~ly reflective of our own (white western academic) 
backgrounds and present networks, and are actively seeking to change this. 
In particular, we intend to redress the under-representation both of prac-
titioners and of certain geographical areas. notably Africa. the Indian 
subcontinent and South America, as our networks expand. Please send us a 
brief curriculum vitae if you would like to be considered as a potential-
member of the group - or if you would be willing to act as a manuscript, 
reviewer. It is the journal's policy to appoint only women to the editorial 
group and international advisory group. 
Our publication policies (which are summarized on the inside back cover) 
are closely linked to the aims and scope of the journal; we wish to provide 
some additional detail here. Contributions should be suitable for an inter-
national audience (this does not preclude the discussion of iss'ues specific to 
individual countries. provided they have broader implications); they should 
be clearly written. avoiding unnecessary jargon. and technical terms should 
be explained. All contributions must meet the main aims of the journal: i.e. 
foster the development of feminist theory :lIld practice in and beyond 
psychology; and seek to address gender inequalities and consider their 
effects. Studies simply 'on' women or reporting sex differences will not be 
acceptable unless they are set in this critical context. Where appropriate. the 
implications of other social inequalities. such as race. class and sexuality. 
should be considered in addition to. or in intersection with. gender. Sexist. 
,. 
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racist and heterosexist language, assumptions and practices will not be 
acceptable. It is the journal's policy not to accept contributions from individ-
uals affiliated to South African institutions, and it will not be available for 
sale or distnbution in South Africa. 
We encourage innovation and will accept articles in a variety of formats. 
However, please note the journal's paftic:ular conventions for referencing 
and footnotes. Feminism & Psychology w11l publish theoretical artic:les; 
reviews; experimental reports; reports of empirical work, professional prac-
tice and feminist interventions. We will also publish i11cerviews, discussion 
transcripts, conference and workshop reports, other short reports and book 
reviews (these WIll include relevant fiction, and occasionally other media). 
The latter will generally be commissioned by the book review editor, 
although unsolicited reviews will be considered. Debate will be encouraged 
in the form of observations and commentaries (which should be regarded as 
extended correspondence) and, particularly, via the Open Forum, which is a 
distinctive feature of the journal. We will also have occasional ~special 
issues' on specific themes. 
The Open Forum w11l initially appear in alternate issues of the journal. It 
will constitute up to a quarter of an issue, and the format will vary according 
to topic. Its primary concerns are to present debate on a wide range of 
contemporary issues surrounding feminism and psychology; and to highlight 
the views of women who are rarely represented in academic journals, such as 
students or service survivors (who will, of course, be welc:ome to submit 
articles as well). Topics might be: incest survival; sexual harassment; 
students' experiences of psychology; women organizing in psychology; 
combining motherhood and career; young lesbians; hospital c:losure and 
community care; racism in police and probation work; language and elitism. 
Suggestions are invited for Open Forum topics, and detailed proposals are .. 
welc:ome from individuals or groups (these will usually be developed in 
conjunction with a member of the editorial group). 
All full-length articles will be subject to anonymous review by two inde-
pendent reviewers: please ensure you cannot be identified from your manu-
sc:tipt. Shorter contributions will generally be reviewed by the editorial 
group. We are trying to develop positive reviewing procedures, in order to 
give authors constructive feedback on their work. particularly if it is not 
suitable for publication. We want to encourage contributions from members 
of under-represented groups and those at an early stage of their career or 
unused to journal publication; in order to help us not to discriminate against 
such contributors, we invite them to submit any (brief) biographical details 
. they would wish to have considered as part of the reviewing process. We are 
also prepared to offer such contributors limited informal advice (without 
prejudice to later publication) on whether a piece of work is worth develop-
ing for the journal; but time and resource limitations mean we are unable to 
provide detailed suggestions for development. 
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• How might feminism change psychology?; how far is it desirable for its 
boundaries (and other disciplinary boundaries) to dissolve? 
• How might psychology contribute to feminist political campaigns?; in 
what other ways might feminism deploy psychology to promote social 
change? 
• How can we ensure that psychology becomes politiciZed, and not femin. 
ism depoliticlzed? 
• Is it possible to sustain a dual allegiance to feminism and psychology?; 
how can conflicting goals and modes of operation be reconciled? 
• What kinds of costs and compromises are entailed?; to what extent are we 
forced to choose to give priority either to feminism or to psychology?; is 
there a point at which we might choose to separate from the mainstream, 
rather than continue to engage with it? 
We also expect debate concerning feminist epistemology and methods. Are 
there distinctive feminist knowledges? If so, who can have them. and what 
can be known? What other kinds of knowledges might be possible? How do 
the questions we ask and the methods we use produce know ledges? What is 
feminist research. and does it have distinctive methods? These kinds of 
questions are crucially linked with the criteria for evaluation of feminist 
work: how are we to assess the value/validity of such knowledge(s); when is a 
piece of work 'feminist'; how do we balance feminist against other know· 
ledges? In terms of lines of fracture, we expect debate between those who 
embrace 'empiricist'. 'feminist standpoint' and 'postmodernist' epistemolo-
gies (Harding, 1987); and between those who argue for and against distinc· 
tive feminist research methods (cf. Peplau and Conrad, 1989). We also hope 
that contnoutors will address the problems of exclusion in feminist thought 
(cf. Spelman, 1988), exploring (not merely acknowledging) the range and 
diversity of e<,perience. 
A third, and related. area of debate is the question of subjectivity. What 
does it mean to identify oneself as a woman (or a man, or a child)? How is 
such subjectivity produced. and sustained? How is it to be valued? What are 
its consequences? How flexible are these categories? How do they intersect 
or intermingle with 'race'. class. sexuality. age, (dis)ability? What kinds of 
theorizing about subjectivity most effectively address heterogeneity? For 
what political ends might subjectivity be created/exploited? An area of 
tension here is likely to be between essentialism (i.e. the notion of distinctive. 
and relatively invariant characteristics. attributable to all members of a 
social group) and constructionism (i.e. the idea that subjectivities are 
socially generated for particular purposes. and are therefore relatively 
flexible, within and between groups). 
The related area of gender difference(s) has been subject to equally 
diverse conceptualization (see Hare·Mustin and Marecek. 1990). Psy· 
chology's traditional (and essentialist) approach to sex/gender difference-
'''.1 
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i.e. the polarization of male characteristics. which are valued. and female 
characteristics. which are not - has long been used as a base from which to 
legitimate social inequality. It also. as Fine and Gordon (this issue) note. 
occludes differences within gender categories [indeed. we hope that some of 
our contributors will explore the rich 'heterogeneity' (Stimpson, 1989) 
among women]; and masks the whole arena of gender relations and their 
attendant power differentials. Hollway (this issue) also argues for a focus on 
gender relations. but her concept of gender difference is different again: she 
regards subjectivities as bemg gendered. but neither asfixed. nor as proper-
ties of individuals; they are produced - and continually reproduced -
through difference. in relations between women and men. This view bears 
some affinities with the concept of gender as a (context-dependent and 
highly ftexible) process, rather than a category (e.g. West and Zimmerman, 
1987); it may also be regarded as linguistically constituted (e.g. Wetherell. 
1986). One final potential line of fracture in this area is the notion of 
'androgyny': initially viewed (at least within psychology) as transcending 
gender differences. but now recognized both as reinforcing them and as 
problematic in other ways (e.g. Morawski. 1987; Mednick, 1989), it is still 
widely - and often uncritically - used. 
The debates in the arena of gender differences include, as central, con-
siderations of power and of language (and. indeed, of language as a form of 
power). Power and language have long'been central to feminism (with their 
conjunction proving a particularly fertile source of analysis and subversion: 
e.g. Spender, 1980; Daly, 1987; Penelope. 1990); while psychology has 
focused on language (albeit in limited ways), but has largely ignored power. 
or language as power (the important exception being the work of feminists in 
psychology. particularly in cross-disciplinary collaboration: e.g. Thorne et 
al.. 1983). The importance we attach to exploring the concept and operation 
of power canl;!e seen by the publication of three articles on this topic in our 
first issue, with Erica Burman's, in particular, regarding language as consti-
tutive of power: an example of the post -structuralist focus on the use of 
discourse/rhetoric. Celia Kitzinger and Rachel Perkins both give critical 
attention to feminist claims of 'empowering' women, which we expect to be 
another important issue for the journal. 
We envisage dialogues, and no doubt tensions. within feminism. There 
have been historical differences and divisions, and we would expect these to 
continue. One of the most important issues for psychology to consider is in 
what ways women's experience might be framed by patriarchy and in what 
ways by other structural inequalities. such as class. 'race' and sexuality? -
and, further, how do these set priorities and suggest processes for change? 
We also anticipate debate around different theoretical and ideological 
orientations within psychology: perhaps particularly liberal humanism (with 
its emphasis on the autonomy of individuals. and their equal rights to self-
expression and self-development) and postmodernism (with its emphasiS on 
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multiple and changing realities. constructed through language in particular 
social contexts}. In contrast to conventional academic journals. Feminism &: 
Psychology provides a context for explicit discussion of values and political 
commitments (rather than denying. disguising or justifying them. with 
reference to 'the facts'). We hope that contributors will use this freedom not 
only to acknowledge particular political and intellectual frameworks. but 
actively to interrogate the implications and utility of such frameworks. We 
also hope it will be possible to develop substantive critical debate, which 
seeks constructively to address difference and contradiction. , 
, 
Values and Visio1l$ 
Despite the many feminisms. and the many psychologies. and all the poten-
tiallines of fracture between them. it is not difficult to identify the central 
values of Feminism &: Psychology. which underpin a wide range of possible 
visions for its future. The primary commitment of Feminism &: Psychology is 
to feminism: we choose to give priority to setting our own agendas and 
developing our own work. with the primary objective of social change. 
rather than being primarily accountable to psychology. Our main audience 
is therefore likely to consist of feminists and those interested in the intellec-
tual and political challenge of feminism (in psychology and other disciplines, 
including multidisciplinary women's studies), rather than non-feminist psy-
chologists. or those'who must be persuaded of the value of our work. We 
must emphasize that this does not mean we will not speak to psychology. or 
cease the struggle to reconcile it with feminism. or abandon hope of signifi-
cant disciplinary change, It is simply that we choose to give our main 
energies to feminism in order to develop a stronger. clearer voice and to 
pursue the social arid political change that is so badly needed .. 
Feminism &: Psychology is 'for' women: it will make public the feminist 
theory. research and action that is so often hidden; it will provide a suppor-
tive context for the sustained development and reflexive critique of our 
work; and it will provide a major forum for debate among ourselves •. 
including space for hitherto silenced voices to be heard. Above all. however, 
it will support, celebrate and actively engage in the feminist struggle. We' 
invite all who share these goals and values to join us as we strive to develop 
that special blend of passion. rigour and responsibility that is so quintessen-
, tially feminism. 
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Sue Wilkinson 
Editors' note Feminist psychology's enormous influence on critical 
psychology is apparent throughout this book. Feminist psychologists have 
instigated and maintained much of the critical effort to redirect psychology's 
theoretical assumptions, research methods, professional practices, and ethical 
guidelines. But despite feminism's partial success in forcing mainstream 
psychology to make room for women's perspectives, Sue Wilkinson makes it 
clear in this chopter that the struggle is far from over. 
Wilkinson identifies a process we have seen earlier: psychologists seeking 
fundamental social change establish a new area or perspective within 
psychology only to see their political goals recede from the new fiel(b 
concerns (see Chapters 10, 11, and 14). In this case, "although 'psychology 
of women' was established with clear feminist intentions, a large part of the 
field is rigidly conventional in its support for the status quo." This dynamic 
has parallels in the larger society, where movements for social change are 
often cooptedas they become institutionalized in less confrontational form. 
Because feminism radically challenges psychology as well as society, it is not 
surprising that its success has been limited. Nor is it surprising that 
psychologists seeking liberal reform rather than more significant transforma-
tion now dominate the depoliticized field called ''psychology of women. .. 
Adding to feminist psychology's difficulties is that its proponents lack 
consensus on many ~s. a situation many readers may find surprising and 
confusing. Wdkinson evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of competing 
feminist perspectives, making it clear there is no single co"ect approach. As 
we noted in Chapter I, differing perspectives are common throughout critical 
psychology. These differences lead to many of the dilemmas critical psycho-
logists confront as we try to determine how best to bring about emancipation 
and equalitY. 
Feminist psychology is psychological theory and practice which is explicitly 
infonned by the political goals of the feminist movement. Feminism 
embraces a plurality of definitions and. viewpoints, but these different 
versions of feminism share two common themes (Unger and Crawford, 
1992: 8-9). First, feminism places a high value on women, considering us 
as worthy of study in our own right, not just in comparison with men. 
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Second, fc:m;n;sm recognizes the need for soc:ia1 change on behalf of 
women: feminist psychology is avowedly political. 
The terms "feminist psychology" and "psychology of women" are s0me-
times used interchangeably, particu1arly in mainstream North American 
psychology (e.g., W orre1l, 1990). It is true that much of the research 
conducted under the banner of "psychology of women" is explicitly or 
implicitly feminist in intent, although it does not use that label This has 
arisen because of mainstream psychology's opposition to any kind of overt 
politics. Mainstream psychology has polarized "science" (pure, objective 
scho1arship) against "politics" (ideologically biased advocacy), and has 
actively resisted feminist psychology's clear political basis (Unger, 1982; 
W"illdnson, 1989). , 
Historlcally, this clash between mainstream psYchology (purportedly 
"value-free") and feminist psychology (explicitly politically engaged) has 
had important consequences for the development of feminist psychology. 
This history illustrates some key problems confronted by critical 
psychology in general. It shows how psychological perspectives which are 
outside, or in opposition to, the mainstream are fundamentally shaped and 
controlled by that mainstream. Critical psychologies do not develop in a 
vacuum simply on the basis of the theories, methods and politics of their 
advocates. If critical psychologists want to make effective interventions in 
mainstream psychology, to have an impact through their journals, books 
and conferences, then they have to engage (to varying degrees) with the 
mainstream. Not surprisingly, the mainstream uses this opportunity to 
constrain what critical psychologists can say. 
In the case of feminist psychology, the mainstream has defined a context 
within which the field has been allowed to develop, and has used its 
institutional power to shape and control the field as a whole. Across at least 
five English-speaking countries (the United Kingdom, the United States, 
Canada, Australia arid New Zealand), the national organizations for 
academic and,professional psychologists - for example, the British Psycho-
logical Society' (BPS), the American Psychological Association (AP A) -
have strenuously opposed the formation of internal groupings (Sections, 
Divisions, Interest Groups) clearly identified as feminist (Wilkinson, 199Oa). 
The cost of entry into mainstream institutions has been loss of the label 
"feminist." 
So, for example, in the US in the 1960s, a number of feminist psycho-
logists worked together outside the APA in a forum which was "a model of. 
feminist practice and a site for practising feminism" (Tiefer, quoted in 
Parlee, 1991: 42). Their activities eventually led (in 1973) to the formation 
of the "Psychology of Women" Division (Division 35) inside the APA. 
Division 35's first president stated clearly that while the earlier grouping of 
feminist psychologists was "political-activist," "the new rpsychology of 
Womenj Division would NOT be a political organisation" (cf. Mednick, 
1978). Similarly, feminist psychologists in the UK. in the 1980s were 
cautioned against allowing themselves to be construed as "a quasi-political 
· I I 
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pressure group concerned with feminist causes" (d. Wilkinson, 1990b: 145), 
and their proposal for a formal grouping within the BPS (paralleling AP A 
Division 35) was deh'berately submitted under the title "Psychology of 
Women." In both countries, then, psychologists with explicitly feminist 
commitments were instrumental in forming groupings within their national 
professional bodies which avoided the tenn "feminist" in favor of 
"psychology of women." Psychologists doing feminist work have sometimes 
made strategic use of the label "psychology of women" as a less politically 
contentious enphemism. 
Inevitably, however, the formation of these new groupings within the 
national psychological organizatious meant that "psychology,of women" 
(and not "feminist psychology") emerged as a newly reputable area of 
mainstream psychology. Any psychologists researching "women" or 
"women's issues" can now identify themselves as appropriately located 
within "psychology of women" as a field - without the necessity of 
expressing any interest in or commitment to feminist principles. Indeed, the 
institutional constraints of mainstream psychology mean that there is 
considerable pressure on people working within "psychology of women" to 
disavow any political dimension to their work. A recent survey of members 
of the BPS "Psychology of Women" Section reported concerns about 
the "stigma of feminism" (Walker, 1994: 8), and in its ten-year history the 
Section has held at least two formal discussions on "Should Psychology of 
Women be Political?" - implying that the answer "no" is a distinct 
poSSlbility. Critical psychologists are unlikely to find the radical political 
analysis they might expect of feminist approaches in Psychology of Women 
Quarterly, the official journal of APA Division 35. Indeed, as was pointed 
out in a recent editorial, "the title of the Journal says nothing about 
feminism" (W omU. 1990: 2). . 
In Sum, although "psychology of women" was established with clear 
feminist intentions, a large part of the field is rigidly conventional in its 
support for the status quo. Much of "psychology of women" challenges 
neither the institutions and practices of psychology, nor the dominant 
conceptions of women which the discipline constructs and promotes. It 
does not engage with the damage psychology has done to many women's 
lives, nor does it struggle to end psychology's continuing oppressions. 
Incorporation into national psychological organizations necessarily involves 
feminists in attending to the business of those organizations, rather than in 
setting our own agenda as feminists (WiIlcinson, 1991 a; 1996). Critical 
psychologies in general are constrained not simply by . the political 
limitations of their adherents. but by the institutional power of mainstream 
psychology. 
Those who call themselves "feminist psychologists" often set out 
explicitly to differentiate themselves from the harmless and acceptable face 
of "psychology of women." They use the term "feminist" to highlight the 
political and critical aspects of their work. Feminist psychology challenges 
the discipline of psychology for its inadequate and damaging theories about 
58 
250 Critical Psychology: An Introduction 
women, and for its failure to sce power relations as central to social life. 
The international journal Femiiusm cl Psychology was founded in 1991, 
and, unlike Psychology of Women Qw:zrteriy, is deliberately not affiliated 
with any national psychological· association. As its inaugural editorial 
makes clear: "Our title is a statement of intent: the journal is about the 
conjunction between feminism (not women, or gender, or sex roles) and 
psychology; and feminism comes first in our order of priority" (WilkinsoD, 
1991b: 9-10). 
Feminist psychology has its origins in the work of feminists in psy-
chology at the turn of the century. For example, Helen Thompson Wooley 
described mainstream psychological research on sex differences as 
characterized by "flagrant personal bias, logic nlartymi in the cause of . 
supporting a prejudice ••• [and] sentimental rot and drivel" (1910: 340). 
More than half a century later, as second-wave feminism gathered 
momentum in the 1970s, feminists launched clear and direct challenges to 
psychology as a discipline. In one of the most commonly cited early . 
critiques, Naomi Weisstein asserted that: "Psychology has nothing to say 
about what women are really like, what they need and what they want ... 
because psychology does not know" (1968/1993: 197). In 1970 PhylIis 
Chester took the platform at the annual APA conference not to deliver the 
expected academic paper, but to demand that the APA provide: 
one mi11ion dollars "in reparations" for those women who had never been helped 
by the mental health professions but who had, instead, been further abused by 
them: punitively Jabeled, overly tranquilized, sexually seduced while in treatment, 
hospitalized against their will, given shock therapy, lobotomized, and, above 
an, disliked as too "aggressive," "promiscuous," "depressed," "ugly," "old," 
"disgusting" or "incurable." (ChesJer, 1989b: xvii) 
Other feminist psychologists have characterized the discipline as "a psy-
chology against women" (NancY Hentey; 1974: 20), which has "distorted· 
facts, . omitted problems, and perpetuated pseudoscientific data relevant to 
women" (Mary Parlee, 1975: 124). 
Feminist psychology is distinguished by its insistence upon exposing and 
cha11enging the operation of male power in psychology: 
psychology's theories often exclude women, or distort our experience - by 
assimilating it to male norms or man·made stereotypes, or by regarding -Women" 
as a unitary category, to be understood only in comparison with the unitary 
category "men" •.. Similarly, psYchology [screens out) ... the existence and 
operation of social and structural inequalities between and within social groups 
(power differentials are written out). (Wilkinson, 199Ib:7-8) 
Feminist psychology also looks beyond the confines of psychology as an 
academic discipline, addressing the power it has in shaping everyday 
understandings and in producing real, material effects in the world. It 
emphasizes how psychology obscures the social and structural operation of 
male power by concentrating its analysis on people as individuals - and it 
points to the dangers of this individualism: . 
· . 
'. 
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FCI11iniu psydwlogisls have also been critical of the harm that psydwlogy (and 
the popu1arizatioD of psychological ideas) has wrought in women's lives: 
primarily (but not exclusively) through the location of r=poIISI'biIity - and also 
pathology - within the individual, to the total neg1ect of social and political 
opptcssioD. (Wilkinson, 1991 b: 8) . 
Perhaps most important, according to feminist psychologist Michelle Fme, 
is that feminist psychology is a "a social change strategy" (19923: viii). It 
aims to end the social and political oppression of women. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I will present feminist psychology as a 
key form of critical psychology. Fust, I will illustrate the ways in which 
mainstream psychology has oppressed and controlled women. Second, I 
will describe feminist psychologists' challenges to the mains~ of their 
discipline, highlighting live distinctive theoretical traditions. Finally, I will 
consider the long-term goals of feminist psychology. 
Psychology's OppressloDS: the Social Control of Women 
Psychology's central assertion has been that women are inferior to men. 
According to pioneering feminist psychologist Naomi Weisstein, whose 
much-reprinted article" Kinder, Kiiche, Kirche as Scientitic Law: Psychology 
Constructs the Female" has become a "classic" of feminist psychology, 
women are characterized by psychology as: . 
inconsistent, emotionally unstable, lacking in a strong conscience or superego, 
weaker. "nurtutant" rather than productive, "intuitive" rather than intelligent, 
and, if they are at an "normal," suited to the home and the family. In short, the 
list adds up to a typical minority group stereotype of inferiority. (Weisstein, 19681 
1993: 207) 
All apparent "differences" between women and men are characterized by 
psychology as "inferiorities," except where women's differences equip us so 
naturally to excel in our roles as wives and mothers. The most blatant 
examples of psychology's characterization of "women-as-inferior" come 
from the early days of psychology; more recent formulations are rather 
more sophisticated. But over the last century or so, from the beginnings of 
psychology onwards, this characterization of women as inferior has been 
used to coniine women to the kitchen. the bedroom and the nursery. It has 
also been used {historically) to deny women access to education and to 
professional careers; and (more recently) to "explain" and justify our 
limited successes within these spheres. 
Women's traditional role as wives and mothers has been particuarly well 
enforced by clinical psychology and therapy. When the writer Charlotte 
Perkins Gilman collapsed with a "nervous disorder" in 1885, she was 
referred to S. Weir Mitchell, "the greatest nerve specialist in the country," 
and inventor of "the rest cure." MitcheU's prescription for Gilman included 
injunctions to "Live as domestic a life as possible," "Have your child with 
you all the time," "Have but two ho)lrS intellectua1life a day" and "Never 
touch pen, brush or pencil as long as you live" (Gilman, quoted in 
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Ehrenreich and English, 1979: 102). Eventually, Gilman came to under-
stand the source of her "illness:" she did not want to be a wife, but wanted 
to be a writer and an activist. She divorced her husband, and took baby, 
pen, brush and pencil off to California. 
A century later than Charlotte Perkins GiIman, "Jane" experienced a 
"nervous breakdown." Initially diagnosed as suffering from "post-natal 
depxession." and following three months' hospitalization (including a 
course of electroconvulsive therapy), and six further years of "unhappiness 
and violence," "Jane" came to realize that: 
like many women. I went from being someone's daughter to someone's wife and 
mother without developing any real identity of my own . • • I was trying to do 
what was expected of me as a woman, and when I "failed" I blamed myself. I 
somehow felt it was my fault when my husband stayed out an nighL I even had 
the feeling he was justified whenever he hit me . . • I couldn't seem to keep the 
baby from crying, cook and clean perfectly, and keep myself attractive and 
desirable: I felt so "inadequate." We lived in two rooms, and there was very little 
money. I went mad. ("Jane," 1986: 10) 
The feminist analysis offered in a women's studies course enabled "Jane" to 
attribute her "breakdown" to her life circumstances and the constraints of 
her expected social role, rather than to her own personal "inadequacy." 
Feminists have rigorously critiqued mainstream therapeutic practices for 
reinforcing stereotypical notions of women as wives and mothers. Today, 
hospital "oa:upational therapy" programs typically involve women in the 
activities of putting on makeup, sewing, and cooking for their families 
(Jobnstone, 1992). " 
Psychological arguments have been used - again, since the very begin-
nings of psychology - not only· to justify keeping (white middle-class) 
women in the home as wives and mothers, but also to explain their 
"unsuitability" for education and professional work. Sigmund Freud, for 
. example, argued vehemently against educational reforms for women: . 
It is really a stillbom thought to send women into the struggle for existence 
exactly as men ... I believe that an reforming action in law and education would 
break down in front of the fact that, long before the age at which a man can earn 
a position in society, Nature has determined woman's destiny through beauty, 
charm and sweetness. Law and custom have much to give women that has been 
withheld from them, but the position of women will surely be what it is: in youth 
an adored darling and in mature years a loved wife. (Freud, quoted in Reeves, 
1971: 163-164) 
The "founding fathers" of psychology around the turn of the century (for 
example, James M. Cattell, G. Stanley Hall, Edward Thomdike, E. B. 
Titchener) all drew on the new science of evolution - including the view 
that women are less highly evolved and possess only primitive mental 
abilities - to support their arguments that women should be excluded from 
high academic rank and from professional organizations (Bohan, 1992a: 
34). According to these psychologists (particularly Hall), education could 
threaten women's fertility, because the brain would compete with the uterus 
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for blood and energy, leading - in "the mental wonian" - to uterine 
atrophy and shrivelled, non1actating breasts (Ehrenrcic:h and English, 1979: 
. 125-131). . 
Few psychologists would advance such arguments today, but discrimina-
tion against women in the professions is still justified in some contemporary 
writing with reference to psychological "findings." Take. for example. the 
work of Dr. Glenn Wilson, a Fc1Iow of the British Psychological Society, 
who says that the reason 95% of bank managers, company directors, judges 
and university professors in Britain arc men· is because men arc "morc 
competitivc" and because "dominance is a personality characteristic deter-
mined by male hormones" (1994: 62, 63). He also advances arguments to 
demonstrate that women in academic jobs arc less producthoc than men, 
stating that "objectively speaking, women may already be over·promoted." 
Women who do achieve promotion to top management positions "may 
have brains that arc mascu1inizcd" (1994: 65). The psychological research 
which enables Wllson to make these claims is derived in part from the 
psychometric testing industries which are particularly implicated in 
providing "scientific" evidence of women's inadequacies: for example, 
women lack mathematical ability (Benbow and Staniey, 1980), arc less 
good at spatial tasks than men (Masters and Sanders, 1993) and suffer 
from impaired performance on visua1 spatial tasks during parts of the 
menstrual cycle (Hampson. 1990). Even if women arc considered to have 
the ability to perform well in professional jobs, we have personality defects 
- in particular "low self-esteem" (Lenncy, 1977) or "lack of assertiveness" 
(Alberti. ·1977) - which impede our performance. 
To summarize, then, psychology is deeply implicated in the patriarchal 
control of women. Psychologists have asserted that women arc inferior to 
men, and they have used this assertion to justify women's exclusion from, 
or limited achievements within, education and t.be professions. Psychology 
is used to enforce normative sex roles for women and tojustify and to 
perpetuate oppressive practices. 
Central to psychology's success in perpetuating oppression is its indi· 
vidualism. By locating "causes". and "cures" within individuals, and by 
ignoring or minimizing the social context, psychology obscures the mech-
anisms of oppression. So, for example, women's unhappiness after 
childbirth is treated as a problem in individual functioning (with possible 
hormonal causes), thus distracting attention away from the difficult 
material situation in which. many new mothers find themselves (e.g., 
Nicolson, 1986). Women's (allegedly) limited achievements in the work· 
place are treated either as the consequences of biological differences 
between the sexes, or as individual problems of social skills. The "solution" 
is either to accept those "differences" as given (and so not to expect women 
to perform as well as men in many domains) or to change women, through, 
for example, assertiveness training. This preoccupation with what is wrong 
with women in the workplace locates women as the problem and has 
nothing to say. about organizational structure, policies or procedures. It 
'-', 
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ignores the social context within which women (and men) work (cf'. 
Honway, 1991). The whole field of sex differences exhibits a relentless focus 
on the individual and the internal at the expense of external circumstances 
and social systems. In giving precedence to individual and interpersonal 
explanations, mainstream psychology "explains" and justifies the strw:tural 
oppression of women. 
Fembrist Oa11enges to Mainstream Psychology: FIVe Traditions 
Since the 19709, feminists have developed a wide range of different 
approaches, both within and against psychology. feminist psychology is 
not a unified field with a single "politically correct" ,line. In the early days 
of feminist psychology, its adherents wrote for nonfeminist readers-
attacking the theories and implicit political commitments of mainstream 
psychology. Now, feminist psychologists are equally likely to write for 
feminist readers with whose theories and politics they disagree. Contem-
porary feminist psychology is characterized by debate as much within the 
field as between feminist psychology and mainstream psychology. The field 
embraces a rich variety of incompatible - and at times conflicting -
theoretical traditions, methodological approaches, and types of activism. 
Feminist challenges to mainstream psychology's central assertion of 
women's inferiority are lodged within five distinctive (and contested) 
theoretical traditions. These five traditions argue against psychology's 
presentation of women as inferior in the following ways: 
, , 
I Psychology is poor science: it has mismeasured women. 
2 The problem is not women, but women's internalization of oppression. 
3 We can gain a different perspective by listening to women's voices. 
4 We should displace the question of sex differences. 
S We should reconstruct the question of sex differences. 
Feminists disagree with each other as to which of these (sometimes logically 
incompatible) approaches offers the most effective challenge to mainstream 
psychology, and there are feminist (as well as more conventional) criticisms 
of each. I will present each approach in turn, ending with brief summaries 
of both the benefits and the problems of each approach considered from a 
feminist perspective. 
The Mismeasure of Women 
This tradition of feminist research refutes mainstream psychology's state-
ment that women are inferior by arguing that psychology as presently 
conducted is poor science. In particular, this tradition points to the fact 
that many of psychology's classic theories (for example, Koblberg's theory 
of moral reasoning, Erikson's theory of lifespan development) were derived 
from all-male samples and the findings then generalized to all humankind. 
Women are judged according to how well they "measure up" to a male 
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norm. and any findings of sex differences are interpreted as female deficits. 
As Carol Tavris (1992) points out, much of sex differences =h is 
designed to find out why women are not "as something" as men: for 
. example, as moral, as creative, as rational, as timny. Compared with men, 
womens~y: . 
• have lower self-esteem 
• undervalue their own efforts 
• are less self-confident 
• have more difficulty developing a separate sense of self 
• are more likely to say they are "hurt" than to admit they are "angry." 
An alternative reading of these "findings" is to say that, compared with 
women, men may be seen as: ' 
• more conceited 
• overvaluing the work: they do 
• less realistic hi assessing their abilities 
• having more difficulty in forming and maintaining attachments 
• more likely to accuse and attack: others when unhappy, rather than 
stating that they feel hurt and inviting sympathy. 
For example, there is a fairly consistent sex difference in self-confidence: on 
tasIcs such as estimating how many points they think they earned on an 
exam before the actua! grades are mown, women estimate fewer points (on 
average) than men do. This finding has often been interpreted as indicating 
that women lack: self-confidence. In fact, when estimated scores are com-
pared with actua! scores, it turns out that men overestimate their perform-
ance by about as much as women underestimate theirs (Hyde, 1994). 
Another example of feminists exposing mainstream psychology as "poor 
science" is the successful institutional challenge to the USA mental health 
system via the Diagnostic aid Statistical Manual (DSM) of the American 
Psychiatric Association. (This is its official diagnostic handbook:, on the 
basis of which many mental health practitioners malce their clinical judg-
ments.) Feminist psychologists challenged two particular categories in the 
DSM, both predominantly applied to women: "Self-defeating Personality 
Disorder" ("masochistic personality,,), and "Late Luteal Phase Dysphoric 
Disorder" ("premenstrual syndrome"). . 
The DSM diagnostic criteria for "Self-defeating Personality Disorder" 
include: "chooses people and situations that lead to disappointment, failure 
or mistreatment," "incites anger or rejection responses from others," 
"engages in excessive self-sacrifice" and "fails to accomplish tasks crucial to 
his or her personal objectives" (American Psychiatric Association, 1987). 
Feminist psychologists argued that this category was "a way to call . 
psychopathological the woman who had conformed to societal norms for a 
feminine woman" (Caplan, 1991: 171). A review of the evidence for "Self-
defeating Personality Disorder" shows that the existence of the category is 
not supported by empirical data, that research in the field is seriously 
...... 
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flawed methodologically, and that the category has poor diagnostic power. 
The idea that "suffering people - and especially women - consciously or 
unconsciously bring their suffering on themselves" (Caplan and Gans, 1991: 
263) is not the result of objective scientific investigation but the ideological 
bias of white male psychiatrists. There is no parallel diagnostic category of 
"Delusional Dominating Personality Disorder" ("macho personalltyj,. 
predominantly applied to men, and calling psychopathological the man 
who has conformed to social norms for a "masculine man." (See Cap1an, 
1991, for some suggested diagnostic criteria for "Delusional Dominating 
Personality Disorder.' 
Feminists have used similar arguments about "bad science" and "ideo-
logical bias" to challenge the DSM category of' "Late Luteal Phase 
Dysphoric Disorder" - a notion incorporating the idea that menstruation is 
a debilitating condition that makes women unfit for work. Such notions 
were common in the early part of this century and were used to exclude 
women from the workforce. However, as Emily Martin (1987) points out, at 
the start of World War n (when women were needed for war work), studies 
suddenly found that menstruation and "premenstrual tension" were not 
problems for working women; while immediately after World War n (when 
men wanted women back in the home), menstruation became a "problem" 
again. Further, research on "premenstrual syndrome" erupted in the 1970s 
when "women had made greater incursions into the paid work force for the 
first time without the aim of a major war" (Martin, 1987: 120). Many 
feminists have pointed to the scientific inadequacies of "premenstrual 
syndrome" researcli (e. g. Parlee, 1973), describing it as "plagued with 
methodological errors" and as "deeply flawed" (Caplan et al., 1992: 27). 
. In conclusion, feminists in this tradition point to the scientific errors 
rampant throughout the sex difl'erences literature. They expose empirical 
studies as riddled with technical flaws, such as experimental biases, 
inadequate sampling techniques, lack of control· groups, insufficiently . 
sensitive measurement techniques, unreplicated "findings" and unspecified 
effect sizes (e.g., Hyde, 1994; Eagly, 1994; Tavris, 1992). In sum, weak data 
are used to support sexist prejudices. Naomi Weisstein, castigating sex 
differences research as· "theory without evidence," indicts the practice of 
sexist researchers: "[They] simply refuse to look at the evidence against 
their theory and practice. And they support their theory and practice with 
stuff so transparently biased as to have no standing as empirical evidence" 
(1968/1993: 197). 
Feminist psychologists' allegation of "bad science" challenges the main-
stream on its own terms and raises the possibility - by. doing "better 
science" - of beating the boys at their own game. On the other hand, this 
tradition does not challenge the game itself. Cella Kitzinger (l990b) 
advances an important critique of this kind of feminist research. She argues 
that, in challenging the scientific objectivity of mainstream psychology, 
feminist psychologists reinforce the notion that objectivity is potentially 
attainable. Such challenges also obscure the extent to which the practice of 
" 
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science is deeply enmeshed in the social and ·political practices of which it is 
a part. 
Internalized Oppression 
This feminist tradition accepu (to some extent) psychology's assertion of 
women's inferiority - but contends that such "inferiority" is not intrinsic to 
women. Rather, it is the result of our oppxession. According to this argu-
ment, women are socialized differently from men in ways which encourage 
the development of personal cbaracteristics detrimental to our happiness 
and achievement. This means that even when, with the recent successes of 
feminism, external constraints on women's progress are remQved, we still 
. oppress ourselves. 
The classic work cited by many writers in this tradition is Matina 
Homer's (1972) research on "fear of success" in women. Matina Homer 
gave women undergraduates the opening sentence of a story to complete: 
"After first term finals, Anne finds herself at the top of her medical school 
class." (For undergraduate men the sentence was the same except that the 
character's name was "John. j On the basis of the resulting stories, Homer 
argued that women exhibit a "motive to avoid success." While for men, 
professional success was greeted with joy and a sense of achievement, the 
same success led women to feel "disconcerted, troubled or confused" and 
was associated with "the loss of femininity, social rejection, personal or 
social destruction." Stories written by young women included one in which 
. Anne drops out of medical school to get married, another in which she is 
terrified of becoming a lesbian, and a third in which she is physically beaten 
and maimed for life by her jealous classmates. Women's alleged "fear of 
success" has subsequently provided a very popular explanation for women's 
failure to advance in professional life. Other explanations following in this . 
. . same tradition inclUde lack of assertiveness, low self-esteem, poor self-
confidence, underestimation and undervaluation of achievement, and 
failure to develop an autonomous self (Tavris, 1993). 
Innovative in its focus on women as women (rather than in relation to, or 
comparison with, men), this framework remains a dominant one in inuch 
contemporary feminist psychology. In particular, it underpins the large (and 
growing) feminist therapy industry which is seen as offering "compensatory 
socialization" (Crawford and Marecek, (989) for women. It seems to be 
popular because it offers clear prescriptions for creating change in the world 
- at both a social and an individual level. Social change is conceptualized as . 
something which comes about as a natural result of the cumulative change 
of a sufficient number of individuals; and individual change can be wrought 
by counseling and therapy so as to improve women's lives, Feminist 
therapies and counseling programs aim to help women to overcome inter-
nalized oppression by becoming more assertive. getting in touch with our 
"real" desires, and understanding the ways in which unhelpful messages 
from our childhoods control and limit us in our everyday lives, 
, ,- , 
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This same idea. - that women have intemalized negative messages about 
ourselves which prevent us from s1Icceeding as well as we might in the 
world - is also at the root of the (scxalled "feminist") POP-PSYCh. self-help 
manuals which have Booded the market since the 19805 (c.g., The 
Cindere/Ja Complex, Dowling. 1981; The Doormat Syndrome, Namka, 
1989). According to these popular books, women are oppressed less by 
"men" or "society" than by our own lack of self-esteem, our own passivity. 
This argument rests on the assumption that feminism has achieved most of 
its goals: women have power, equality, liberation from withont. The 
problem now is to deal with the legacy of past oppression on our psyches: 
we need "revolution from within.. (Stcinem, 1992). Enema!, structural 
. changes take second place to internal transformation: 
In society in general, women have enough opportunity, experience, and dare I say 
it, power to demand great changes. But they have not done so . . . The reasons 
for this passivity lie ... in aspecu of the male and female psyche. (Coward, 1992: 
13) 
Although this approach is enormously popular in contemporary feminist· 
psychology, many feminists (e.g., Sethna, 1992; Schilling and Fuehrcr, 
1993) have drawn attention to its victim-b1aming implications, and to its 
perpetuation of mainstream psychology's relentless focus on the internal 
and individual at the expense of the social and political. Others have 
extended this critique by asking whether individual change must always 
precede social change (e.g., Kitzinger and Perkins, 1993). 
listening to Women's Voices 
The third main approach of feminist psychologists is to agree that women 
are different from men, and to IlIlIJtimize and celebrate sex differences. 
Feminists working within this tradition (particularly those associated with, 
or influenced by, the Harvard Project on Women's Psychology and Girls' 
Development) identify the discipline of psychology as speaking with a male 
voice. As Carol Gilligan (Initiator of the Harvard Project) has said in 
interview: 
I picked up what you're not supposed to pick up in psychology - that there was a 
voice, and I asked "Who's speaking'!"; "Whose voice is this?," "Whose body and 
where's it coming from?" If you listen to the imagery of sexuality and separation 
... you realize this is a man's body. This is a man's voice speaking as if from 
nowhere. (GiJligan, in Kltzinger and Gilligan, 1994: 413) 
These feminists argue that psychology, with its "male voice," has deScribed 
the world from its own male perspective, which it has confused with 
absolute truth. The task of feminist psychology is to listen to the voices of 
women and girls who speak in a "different voice" (Gi1Iigan, 1982; Brown 
and Gilligan, 1992) and have distinctive "ways of knowing" (Be\enky et al., 
1986). Lyn Mikel Brown and Carol Gilligan (1992) have developed a 
"voice-centered relational method" to enable them to listen responsively to 
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the voices of women and girls. They emphasize the radical potential of 
starting from these voices: 
What we have teamed most oC all about women's psychology and girls' develop-
ment ••• is the power oC bqi1ming with girls' voices. From Iistclling to girls at 
the edge oC adoJescence and observing our own and other women's responses, we 
begin to sce the outlines oC new pathways in women's development and also to 
sce new possI'biIities for women's involvement in the process oC political change. 
(Bl'OWII and GiDigan, 1993: 32) 
The work of Carol Gilligan and her associates has been enormously in1iu-
entia1. The feminist magazine Ms. named Gilligan "Woman of the Year," 
and the New York Tunes Magazine put Gilligan on the fron~ -cover. Their 
approach has been enthusiastically embraced in a range of applied areas, 
particularly youth work and secondary education. It has been institution-
alized in. for example, research on young women's experiences in schools 
commimoned by the American Association of University Women (1991); 
the development of feminist pedagogy and curric:u1um materials; and the 
launch of a glossy magazine called New Moon, which celebrates young 
women's growth, development and "self-affirmation" throughout their 
teenage years. 
The importance of this tradition lies in reversing the frame of reference 
within which women have been conceptualized by mainstream psychology. 
Feminist psychologists have asserted, for example, that "Gilligan's work 
touched a nerve ••• women were being denied a voice; and philosophica.1ly, 
it meant there was an alternative voice in the c:u1ture - that there is more 
than one way of looking at the world" (Haste, 1994: 399-400). Equally, 
however, it has been criticized by feminists for unproblematica.1ly repr0-
ducing the notion of the "pure" voices of the oppressed - as though 
.. women, simply by virtue of being women, can utter truths about the world 
and thereby reveal our authentic selves. A key "discovery" which hlls arisen 
from listening to women's voices is that women inhabit a more "relational" 
world than do men: women are more "connected" with and "caring" about 
other people. Many feminists have pointed out how this feeds back into 
traditional ideas about women, and reinforces the social structures which 
impose on us the jobs of caring for small children and elderly relatives (e.g., 
Faludi, 1991). Feminists have also emphasized that women are not, as 
some work within this tradition seems to suggest, a cohesive group who 
speak in a single voice. These critics have argued that the Harvard Project 
imposes a false homogeneity upon the diversity oC women's voices across 
differences of age, ethnicity, (dis}abiJity, class and other social divisions 
(e.g., Davis, 1994). 
Displacing the Question of Se.'C Differences 
The fourth theoretical tradition of feminist psychology argues that women 
are neither inferior nor superior to men. In fact. these researchers refuse to 
compare the sexes. They minimize, indeed undermine, the importance of 
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sex differences. arguing that being male or female is not a central deter-
minant of psychological functioning. Rather, there are elements of mu-
c:ulinity and femininity in everyone, and a key aspect of mental health and 
well-being is the ability to deploy these ftexibly according to the situation 
(so we are able to be relatively confident and assertive in a job interview, 
say, while being relatively self-effacing and sympathetic to a friend in 
distress - regardless of whether. we are male or female). Back in 1974, 
Sandra Bem first proposed such "psychological androgyny" as "a new 
standard of mental health, one that removes the burden of stereotype and 
allows people to feel free to express the best traits of men and women" 
(1974: 125). . 
Perhaps because it removes the critical spotlight'both from psychology 
and from women, and also oITers a reframing of the familiar concept of 
"sex roles" in the positive context of improving mental health, this work 
has had surprising success within mainstream psychological theory. 
Detached from its feminist intent, it sits comfortably with the discipline's 
h"bera1 rhetorics - and also oITers the bonus of an associated measuring 
scale: the Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSR1). This was widely used in the 
1970s and 19805 to correlate androgyny with many different indices of 
mental functioning, and it is still one of the most popular scales in use in 
socia1 psychology today. 
The BSRI consists of a list of personality descriptions, some of which are 
classified as "feminine" and others as "masculine." In completing the BSRI, 
people are asked to indicate to what extent each of these personality 
descriptions is "lilCe me." People score high on "masculinity" if they 
describe themselves as independent, aggressive and competitive; high on 
"femininity" if they describe themselves as caring, emotional and yielding. 
"Androgynous" people describe themselves as characterized by both sets of 
. traits. Sandra Bem's early research suggested that "androgynous" people 
are able to be flexible and adaptive in response to diITerent situations. 
People who are "masculine" only cope well in stereotypica1ly masculine 
situations, and people who are "feminine" cope well only in stereotypica11y 
feminine situations, but "androgynous" people are competent in both. 
When under pressure to conform, they behave in a "masculine" way and 
stick to their own opinions; when listening to the problems of a lonely 
fellow student, they behave in a "feminine" way and are empathetic and 
caring (Bem et al., 1976). 
At the time it was developed, the notion of androgyny and the mini-
mizing of sex differences oITered a powerful corrective to the "women-as-
inferior" position common in mainstream psychology. It also disrupted 
traditional ideas about the essential qualities of being "male" and "female" 
- about what should count as "normal" gender identity. Although the scale 
and its associated concepts are still widely used, many feminists, including 
Sandra Bem herself, no longer consider it to be a particularly helpful 
approach (cf. Kitzinger, 1992b). It focuses (like traditional psychology) on 
individuals at the expense of social structure (Mednick, 1989) and it ignores 
- -- -- ------
-- - -- - - - - - -----------------------
. . 
Feminist Psychology .261 
the power differentials which shape "appropriate" male and Cemale behav-
ior. Moreover, in· c:1assifying items like "caring" as "Ceminine" and items 
like "competitive" as "masc:uline," the BSRI actually reinforces the very 
stereotypes it aims to undermine • 
Reconstructing the Question of Sex Differences 
F"mally - and most recently - feminist psychologists working within the 
frameworks oC social constructionimr andpostmodemism (e.g., Hare-Mustin 
and M=k. 1994; Honway, 1994; see also Chapter 17 in this volume) 
have argued that sexJgender should no longer be theorized as difference 
between indiviJw:r/s, but reconceptllalized as a principle of social organiz-
ation, structuring power relations between the sexes. This tradition oC work 
is highly controversial and difficult to understand. Because it challenges 
some oC our most taken-Cor-granted ways oC thinking, it can even seem 
bizarre. Perhaps not surprisingly, social constructionism/postmodemism has 
gained very little recognition in psychology. Indeed, to most mainstream 
psychologists - and even many critical psychologists - it is unrecognizable 
as psychology. 
In the previous section we saw how androgyny theory served to displace 
sex differences by reCocusing attention on "masculinity" and "Cemininity" 
as personality attributes that cut across the "male"rCemale" divide. Instead 
oC questions about differences between the sexes, this approach enabled 
psychologists to think more clearly about differences within the sexes - and 
their implications Cor menta! health and well-being. However, in the 
androgyny approach, sex (the state oC being "male" or "Cemale") is seen as 
the biological bedrock upon which gender differences· (psychological 
attributes oC "masculinity" or "Cemininity") are constructed. According to 
androgyny theory, there are two types oC human being ("men" and 
"women") - and "mascu1inity" has been iniposed on men and "Cemininity" 
on women in a way which serves to limit and constrain both sexes. The 
androgyny approach advocates cutting "masculinity" and "Cemininity" Cree 
Crom biological sex, so that both sexes have access to a wider range of 
human capacities. 
The social constructionist perspective takes this a step further. It suggests 
that it· is not just the psychological attributes of "masculinity" and 
"femininity" which are constructed by a sexist society - but the biologically 
based categories of "men" and "women." It questions the notion of 
biological sex and refuses the taken-for-granted "knowledge" that people 
are either men or women. This assumption that people come in two sexes 
is, feminist social constructionists argue, a political necessity Cor sexist 
oppression. Only by dismantling the assumption of biological "maleness" 
and "femaleness" as fundamental categories can we end that oppression. 
The argument that people do not "naturally" come in two sexes is, of 
course, counter-intuitive. Feminist social constructionists suggest that this is 
because our "intuitions" are formed under male supremacy. They have 
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asked why it seems so obvious to us that people are either male or female, 
and whether it is possible to imagine that we do not "naturally" exist as 
women and men - that these are fundamentally ideological, not biologicaI, 
categories. This means that instead of asking questions about what the 
"real" dift"erences are between men and women, feminist psychologists in 
. this tradition ask questions about how people (mc1uding psychologists) 
construct men and women as dift"erent sexes. Sometimes these dift"erences 
are constructed physically - for example, through surgery upon the genitals 
of intmexed infants (to bring them into· conformity with the biological 
categories of male or female: Kessier, 1990) or upon transsexua.Is (to 
change the biological markers of their sex to those of the other sex: 
Blanchard et al., 1985). More often, the constructioil of gender dift"erences 
is accomplished soc:ially (and psychologically) - by repeated assertions 
about what "men" and "women" are "really" like. Hi$!orically, it is male 
psychologists who have made these pronouncements. Today, it is as likely 
to be feminists who do so - by saying, for example, that women are more 
caring than men, or that women have less self-esteem than men, or that 
women are just as mathematically competent as men. The effect is the 
same, whoever is making the pronouncements, and whatever the content of 
these pronouncements (whether they proclaim that women are inferior, 
women are superior, or that there is no dift"erence between the sexes). It 
reinforces the categories of "men" and "women." According to feminist 
social constructionists: 
the psychological' literature on male-female dilTemlces is Dot a record of 
cumulative knowledge about the "truth" of what men and women are "rcally" 
like. Rather it is a repositol)' of accounts of gender organized within particular 
assumptive frameworks, and reflecting various interests. (Hare.MUSIin and 
Marecek, 1994: S3S) 
. . 
FeministSargue,of course, that it is men's interests which are primarily. 
reflected in these "accounts of gender." 
Social constructionists suggest that feminists who try to show that women 
are "the same as," or "dift"erent from," men actually underwrite women's 
oppression, by reproducing in their research the category "woman" upon 
which that oppression is predicated. Some writers (e.g., the French feminist 
Monique Wittig, 1992) propose jettisoning the concept of "woman" 
altogether. They argue that, just as the concept of "race" was constructed 
only within the socioeconomic reality of black slaveI)' (Guillaumin, 1995), 
so the concept of "woman" functions only as a marker of otherness and 
subordination within a social system based on male dominance. To describe 
woman as a "natural" category is to give an "essential," biological under-
pinning to a historical situation of male dominance and female subordi-
nation. This perspective in feminist psychology is a vel)' radical one. It goes 
well beyond notions about the "sex role stereotypes" and "socia1ization 
processes" supposed to produce "masculine" men and "feminine" women. It 
challenges the vel)' categories "men" and "women" themselves. 
.' 
~-- ~--- .. -~ --~----------------------
Feminist Psychology 263 
A social constructionist/postmodemist approach offers feminist psycl1o-
logists· opportunities for alliances outside psychology. Feminists and critical 
theorists are using such approaches in other disciplines and in a multi-
disciplinary women's studies context. Although social constructionisml 
postmodemism offers a Ii.mdamentaI challenge to mainstream· ways of 
thin!cjng. the 1UIl implications of this challenge have rarely been appreciated. 
The approach has often been dismissed as too radical, or simply too 
outrageous. It has also been criticized for its unintelligibiIity - partly due to 
the difficulty of the concepts, but partly due, too, to the willful obscurity of 
much of its writing -. and for the difficulty of translating its theoretical 
challenge into a clear political program (e.g., Weisstein, 196811993). 
Feminist Psychology: Towards ReCorm or Re,olution? 
Despite the (sometimes virulent) disagreements between these different 
traditions of feminist research, all of them have enabled feminists to make 
important interventions in psychology - and some of them have also 
provided a basis for social change. All five traditions have been used to 
challenge psychology's oppressive practices. Equally, as we have seen, these 
different traditions incorporate within them aspects which are rather less 
"radical" or "critical" in their implications. The "mismeasure of women" 
approach reinforces psychology's attempt to be an objective "science" at 
the cost of the other "ways' of knowing" emphasized by other feminists. 
Approaches which rely on notions of "internalized oppression" run the risk 
of reinforcing the individualism and victim-blaming biases of mainstream 
psychology. "Listening to women's voices" reinforces the whole idea that 
"women" natural1y exist as a homogeneous and distinctive group - an 
assumption cha11enged by othedeniinists. In "displacing sex differences," 
theories of "androgyny" perpetuate the focus on individuals, reinforce 
"science," and underwrite the very notions of "masculinity" and 
"femininity" which they purport to challenge. Finally, social constructionist 
feminists who aim to "reconstruct the question" are often simply unintel-
ligible in their refusal of our "intuitive" knowledge and "common-sense" 
understandings of the world. In any event, their theoretically sophisticated 
treatises rarely translate into any practical political action, either within 
psychology or beyond it in the wider social world. 
Feminist psychologists are likely to agree that "transformation" of 
psychology, at least, is needed to create a better world for women (Burman. 
1996; Crawford and Marecek,1989; Wilkinson. 1996; Worrell and Etaugh 
1994). There is also broad agreement that we are "still seeking" this trans-
formation (W"ilkinson, 1996) and that the process "has far to go" (Worrell 
and Etaugh. 1994: 448). Feminist psychologists disagree, however, on 
whether our project is primarily one of "reform," or one of "revolution" 
(Ferree and Hess, 1985): on whether we aim to change psychology, or 
whether we aim to overthrow it. Some argue that although feminism and 
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psychology are "uneasy partners" (Ussher, 1990: 54), feminists should still 
be working to "reconstruct" psychology (Bohan. 1992b; Morawski, 1994) 
iD Iinc with feminist principles. Others argue that the whole notion of a 
"feminist psycllology" is a contradiction iD terms (FiDe and Gonion, 1991); 
or that femini"'l1 is "antipsychology" (Squire, 1990). This is because psy-
chology is, almost by definition, the study of the "individual" (albeit, iD the 
case of socia1 psychology, "the individual iD society"), whereas feminism is 
IimdameZltaUy about socia1 structures and institutiona1ized oppression. 
Furthennore, psychology claims to be an objective science, whereas femin-
ism is an overtly political movement. 
CeIia Kitzingcr a.rgaes that the "hybrid" feminist psychology "can be 
made c:onc:eptually coherent either through the politiCization of psychology 
or through the depoliticization of feminjsm" (199Oc: 134). The history of 
feminist psychology and its institutions provides more evidence of main-
stream psychology incorporating feminism (and assimilating it as 
"psychology of womenj than of a feminist revolution in psychology. It 
may well be that feminist.s are "forced to choose to give priority either to 
feminism or to psychology" and that there is "a point at which ~e may 
choose to separate from the mainstream rather than continue to engage 
with it" (Wilkinson, 1991b: 14). However, as Erica Burman WlIl'IIS, "the 
cost of separatism for feminist psychology is marginalintion" (1996: 4). It 
seems that whether our goal as feminist psychologists is to change or to 
overthrow mainstream psychology, we have to continue some kind of 
critical engagement with it. More importantly, however, we must not lose 
sight of social activiSm as "the project within which we conduct our work" 
(Fme, 1992a: vili1. Feminist psychology embraces the political goals of the 
feminist movement. Above all, it aims to end the social and political 
oppression of women. 
(NB References collected at end of volume) 
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FOCUS GROUPS IN FEMINIST RESEARCH: POWER, 
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OF MEANING 
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SUE WILKlNSON 
Women', Studies Reseon:h Group. Deportment of Social Sciences. Loughborough University. 
Loughborough. Leicestershire LEII 3TU. United Kingdom 
Synopsis-Despite a theoretictll emphasis on undersUlrtding the person-in<ontexL individualistic re-
searcn methods have dominated feminis. psychology. and femini" .... orch more generally. I suUe" 
the need for more socially situated methods. and argue that group in.erviews. or focus groups. are of 
particular value in conducting. and developing. feminisI t'eSe:ll'Ch. The historical developm~nt of focus 
groups i, brieOy oudined and eXatnples provided of their use in conlempornry feminisl .... orch projeclS. 
I demonslr.lle that the particular beneft" of focus groups include: addressing feminisl ethical concerns 
aboul power and the imposition of meaning; generoling high quality. in.eractive da"" and offering the 
possibility of theoretical advances regarding the co-conslNction of meaning between people. The po.en-
tial for fuaue developmenl of focus group theory and methodology in feminiS! research is argued. and 
illustrated. in particular. with reference to the dynamic negotiation of meaning in sped fie socitll contexts. 
Cl 1998 Elsevier Science Lld 
If you really want to know either of us. do not 
put us in a laboratory. or hand us a survey. 
, '~ __ .. or even interview us separately alone in our 
homes. Watch me (MF) with women friends. 
my son. his father. my niece. or my mother 
and you will see what feels most authentic to 
me. (Fine & Gordon, 1989, p. 159) 
Feminist psychology is about understanding the 
person within a social world. Rejecting the at· 
omistic individualism of much mainstream psy-
chology. feminist psychologists have high-
lighted the influence of social context (e.g .• 
Weisstein. 1968/1993; Sherif. 1979/1992); the 
relational aspects of self (e.g .• Jordan. Kaplan. 
Baker Miller. Stiver. & Surrey. 1991; Taylor. 
Gilligan, & SuIlivan. 1996); and-most radi-
cally-the construction of meanings and knowl-
edges through interaction (e.g .• Hare-Mustin & 
Marecek. 1990; Morawski & Agronick. 1991). 
Although there are theoretical debates about the 
nature and interpretation of data. particularly be· 
tween "essentialists" and "social construction-
ists." from both of these perspectives. research 
III 
methods which isolate individuals from their so-
cial context should clearly be viewed as inap· 
propriate. 
It is perhaps somewhat surprising. then. to 
find that within feminist psychology. individual· 
istic research methods have been more the norm 
than the exception, at least until recently. The 
traditional dominance of quantitative research 
methods has only recently been eroded. and it 
is still the case that when qualitative research is 
undertaken. the individual interview is probably 
the most widely used method. Many of the clas· 
sic qualitative studies in feminist psychology 
use the one·to-one interview as their only or pri. 
mary research tool (e.g., Belenky. Clinchy. 
Goldberger. & Tarule. 1986; Chesler. 1972: 
GiIligan. 1982: Walker. 1979) and of the 77 em-
pirical reports published in the first six volumes 
(1990-1996) of the intemationaljoumal. Femi-
nism & Psychology. 56% rely exclusively or 
primarily on data collected through one-to-one 
interviews. Given the extent to which the indi-
vidual interview dislocates the person from her 
social context. it is particularly ironic to note 
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that it is precisely those feminist researchers 
who have made the most insistent claims for 
women's collectivist, sociocentric. communal, 
or connected selves who have relied on individ-
" uaI interviews to substantiate these claims (Be· 
. leaky et a1~ 1986; Gilligan, 1982). 
The aim of this paper is to suggest that 
group interviews of various Jdnds (generically 
designated focus groups) offer an important op-
portunity to explore issues relevant to the per-
son-in-context-so providing a valuable meth-
odological tool for feminist psychology. and for 
feminist research more generally. My main aim. 
then. is to illustrate what focus group methods 
have to offer to feminist research; it is not my 
intention here to address the parallel question of 
what feminist research may have to offer to fo-
cus group methods (a different task, less appro-
priate for a feminist readership). I will first out-
line the contemporary use of focus groups in 
relation to their historical development, and will 
then discuss their advantages. In particular. I 
will show. first, how-compared with one·to-
one interviewing-the focus group obviates 
many ethical concerns raised by feminists about 
power and the imposition of meaning (while in-
troducing others). Second, I will illustrate the 
power of focus groups to yield high quality data. 
Third, I will suggest the potential of focus group 
data. particularly when viewed from within a so-
cial constructionist framework. to inform us 
about the co-construction of realities between 
people. the dynamic negotiation of meaning in 
context. I will end with some suggestions for 
developing the use of focus groJlps. both as the· 
ory and as method. in feminist research. 
FOCUS GROUPS: IllSTORY AND 
CURRENT STATUS 
As researchers point out, "what is known as a 
focus group today takes many different forms" 
(Stewart & Shamdasani. 1990. p. 9). but cen· 
trally it involves group discussions in which par· 
ticipants focus collectively upon a topic selected 
by the researcher and presented to them in the 
form of a film. a collection of advertisements. 
or a vignette to discuss. a "game" to play. or 
simply a particular set of questions. The groups 
(rarely more than 12 people at a time. and more 
commonly 6 to 8) can either consist of preex-
isting clusters of people (e.g .. family members. 
Khan & Manderson. 1992; BilIig. 1992; col-
leagues, Kitzinger. 1994) or of people drawn to-
gether specifically for the research. Many as-
pects of focus groups (e.g.. the role of the 
moderator. the specific focus of the group. the 
setting in which they meet, and the value of pre-
existing versus "artificial" groups) are dis-
cussed in detail in the various "how to" books 
that address this method (e.g~ Krueger. 1988; 
Morgan, 1988. 1993; Stewart & Shamdasani. 
1990; Vaugbn. Schwnm, & Sinagub. 1996). and 
it is not my intention to rehearse those discus-
sions here. Discussions between group partici-
pants (usually audiotapeti and transcribed) con-
stitute the data. and conventional methods of 
qualitative analysis (ranging from content anal-
ysis to rhetorical or discursive techniques) are 
then applied. The method is distinctive. then. not 
for its mode of analysis but rather for its data-
collection procedures. Crucially-and many 
commentators on the method make this point-
focus groups involve the interaction of group 
participants with each other as well as with the 
researcher/moderator. and it is the collection of 
this kind of interactive data that distinguishes 
the focus group from the one-to-one interview. 
Focus groups involve the "explicit use of the 
group interaction as research data" (Kitzinger. 
1994. p. 103). and "the hallmark of focus 
groups is the explicit use of the group interac-
tion to produce data and insights that would be 
less accessible without the interaction found in 
a group" (Morgan. 1988. p. 12. his emphasis). 
However. despite the fact that interaction be-
tween participants is supposed to be a defining 
characteristic of the method. one reviewer com-
ments that, in over 40 published reports of focus 
group studies. she "could not find a single one 
concentrating on the conversation between par· 
ticipants and very few that even included any 
quotations from more than one participant at a 
time" (Kitzinger. 1994. p. 104). For this article. 
I reviewed well over 200 focus group studies 
ranging in date of publication from 1946 to 
1996. with the same result. Focus group data is 
most commonly presented as if it were one-to· 
one interview data. with interactions between 
group participants rarely reported, let alone ana-
lysed. Where interactions between participants 
are quoted. they are typically used simply to il· 
lustrate the advantages of focus groups over 
other methods. and analysed solely at the level 
of content (rather than in terms of their interac-
tional features). For example. Lewis (1992) uses 
interactive data to illustrate that group inter-
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views "help to reveal consensus views"; "may 
generate richer responses" ; "may be used to 
verify research ide:is of data gained through 
other methods"; and "may enhance ••. reliabil-
. iry." while Denscombe (1995. p. 137) repro-
duces an inter:lction in order to "offer some data 
on shared perspectives" and to iIIustr:lte its po-
tential "to check the truth of participants' state-
ments." 
My presentation of focus group data in this 
article is not typical of the way in which this 
data is nonnally reported. I have deliberately 
sought out (=l published examples of interac-
tive data in order to make the best possible ClISe 
for the use of focus groups-and I have quoted 
these examples in full. as given in print. In addi-
tion. in presenting these data extr:lCts. I have of-
ten moved beyond content to drow attention to 
interactional features of the data which are not 
commented upon by the authors themselves. 
Use of the focus group method has been re-
ported in the social science Iiter:lture for more 
than half a century. Although Bogardus (1926) 
used group interviews in developing his social 
distance scale. the invention of the focus group 
is usually attributed to sociologist Robert Mer-
ton who (along with his colleagues Patricia Ken-
daIl and Marjorie Fiske) developed a group ap-
proach ("the focussed group-interview") to 
eliciting infonnation from audiences about their 
responses to r:ldio programs (Merton. Fiske. & 
Kendall. 1956: Merton & Kendall. 1946). Focus 
, groups have not been widely used in psychology 
(partly because "they did not fit the positivist '" 
criteria extant in the dominant research para-
digm." Hartison & Barlow. 1995. p. Ill. but 
nor have they been widely used in other social 
science disciplines. and only a decade ago it was 
possible for one researcher to comment that fo-
cus groups had "virtually disappeared from the 
social sciences" (Morgan. 1988. p. 11). This ne-
glect of focus groups is clearly evidenced within 
feminist research. too: for example. "inter-
views" -but not "focus groups" -are refer-
enced in Miller and Treitel's (1991) annotated 
bibliography of feminist research methods. and 
Nielsen's ( 1990) collection of "exemplary read-
ings" of feminist research methods does not in-
clude any research using focus groups. 
It is only in th~ past 5 years or so that the 
focus group has been described as "gaining 
some popUlarity among social scientists" (Fon-
tana & Frey. 199~. p. 3M). so the current "re-
surgence of interest" (Lunt & Livingstone. 
1996. p. 79) in focus groups is a very recent 
phenomenon. In my review of over 200 studies 
using group interviews (whether or not these 
were formally designated as "focus groups"), 
I found only a couple of dozen conducted by 
feminists. Recent feminist research that extends 
the one-to-one interview to a group setting in-
cludes focus groups with men talking about sex 
(Crawford, Kippax. & Waldby. 1994); group in-
terviews with punks talking about their appear-
ance (Widdicombe. 1995); semi-structured dis-
cussion groups (Lovering. 1995) and "joint" or 
"group interviews" (Kissling. 1996) with 
young people at school ori the topic of menstrua-
tion: an explor:ltory discussion group with edu-
cated working-class women (Walkerdine, 
1996); and the use of "girls' groups" to explore 
young women' s experiences of sexual harass-
ment (Herbert. 1989) and other gendered in-
equalities (MacPherson & Fine. 1995). The re-
cent publication. in the international journal 
Feminism & Psychology. of student "work in 
progress" suggests that many new researchers. 
in particular. are drown to focus groups as a re-
search method: see. for example. Bartinger's 
(1992) focus groups with incest survivors; 
Raabe's (1993) use of focus groups to explore 
the ways in which young people construct their 
identities in relation to inequalities berween 
women and men: and Lampon' s (1995) focus 
group research on lesbians' perceptions of safer 
sex practices. 
One unfortunate consequence of the histori-
cal neglect of the focus group within social sci-
ence research is that those social scientists who 
are now beginning to use group interviews. 
group discussions. or "focus groups" in their 
research often lack a clear theoretical frame-
work within which to locate their method of 
choice. Where these researchers have sought to 
defend or to justify their use of method. they 
have tended to do so in relation to nonns of 
quantitative or positivist research. and not in re-
lation to alternative qualitative approaches to 
data collection: for example. the following re-
searchers provide no rationale for the use of 
group as opposed to individual interviews: Fra-
zero 1988: Griffin. 1986: Lovering. 1995: Walk-
erdine. 1996: Widdieombe. 1995. There has. in 
fael. been a tendency for researchers to use both 
one-to-one interviews and focus groups in the 
same study. and to present the data derived from 
each method as commensurate. with no discus-
sion of the relationship between them-indeed. 
":,:.~ . 
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often with no indication of which quoted ex-
tractS are derived from which source (e.g .• Es-
pin. 1995; Press. 1991). The picture is further 
complicated by the fact ,that some researchers ' 
are clearly working within an essentialist frame-
work. and others within a social constructionist 
framework-yet the framework is often not 
made explicit. and/or there appears to be slip-
page between frameworks. I will return to this 
point. 
FEMINIST RESEARCH ETHICS AND 
FOCUSGRO~:ffiSUESOFPOWXR 
AND CONTROL IN QUALITATIVE 
RESEARCH 
Feminist social'scientists (e.g .• Finch. 1984; 
Oakley. 1981) have expressed many concerns 
about the ethical issues involved in one-to-one 
interviewing. particularly in relation to the po-
tentially exploitative nature of the interaction in 
which the researcher controls the proceedings. 
regulates the conversation. reveals minimal per-
sonal information. and imposes her own frame-
work of meaning upon participants (although 
they have also identified limits on the research-
er's power due to the constraints of research in-
terviews per se, cf. Ribbens, 1989). Also. the 
interviewer's control is sometimes eroded. or 
. .... _... even overridden. by the power of the research 
participants:· for example, when interviewing 
those in positions of institutional power (cf., 
Scot!, 1985; Smart. 1984), or in cases of sexual 
harassment of a female interviewer by male in-
terviewees (cf .• McKee & O'Brien. 1983; Tay-
lor, 1996). 
These ethical concerns do not. of course, 
simply disappear when the one-to-one interview 
is replaced with the focus group (in particular 
because the researcher retains a powerful role in 
the analysis and writing-up of the data). but in 
the data collection stage at least. the research-
er's power and influence is reduced. because she 
has much less power and influence over a group 
than over an individual. Indeed it is possible to 
conduct self-managed focus groups in which 
there is no preconstructed interview guideline. 
so effectively removing the researcher's per-
spective from the interaction altogether (Mor-
gan. 1988. p. 18). Although this seems rarely to 
be adopted. the key point here is that focus 
groups tend, in practice-and smiplY by virtue 
of the numbers of research participants in-
volved-to shift the balance of power during 
data collection. such that research participants 
have more control over the interaction than does 
the researcher. This shift in the balance of power 
can. in fact. expose researchers to harassment 
and abusive behaviour from their research par-
ticipants. Green. Barbour. Bernard, and Kit-
zinger (1993). a group of four women research-
ers involved in four different studies about HIV-
related risk behavio~, comment that 
• 
Harassment was more overt in the public set-
ting of a group discussion. Often. in a group 
situation men were displaying to other men 
attempting to humiliate the researcher. 
Whilst this was unpleasant in itself it also led 
to anxiety that the badinage might escalate 
and become out of the researcher's control: 
Another kind of "sex-talk" was sexual 
"pick-up" comments directed at me, or 
sometimes simply whispered into the tape 
recorder in my absence. These varied 
from requests for my phone number or 
questions about boyfriends to the sugges-
tion that I should provide sexual services 
in return for participants' co-operation 
with my research. [ ... J 
On one occasion one of the participants 
took the microphone off the table. placed 
it between his legs at an angle of approxi-
mately 45° and jerked his hand up and 
down it. 
In face-to-face interviews, the respondents' 
behaviour during "sex talk" tended to be 
less threatening, rarely straying beyond 
oblique or straightforward signs of sexual in-
terest looking for consent, which we would 
not necessarily describe as harassment. 
(Green et al., 1993, p. 631) 
More positively. the relative power of re-
search participants in a group discussion is man-
ifested throu!!h their taking control of the topic 
of conversatiOn. Feminist sociologist Elizabeth 
Frazer (1988) met regularly with seven groups 
of teenage girls over an extended period in order 
to talk about gender: "I didn't ask questions 
about class as such. but the public school groups 
• 
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frequently brought it into the discussion'" 
(p. 344 )-eventua1ly forcing her, as researcher, 
to consider the role of class in these girls' lives. 
Feminist psychologist Christine Griffin also re· 
o fleets upon the way in which she was guided by 
the young women in her research as to what the 
appropriate questions might be: 
The informa4 semi·structured nature of the 
group interviews in schools meant that young 
women sometimes began to discuss particu-
lar issues amongst themselves, without wait-
ing for my next question .•• these discussions 
did not always falI within my list of pre-
selected topics, and I was able to amend this 
list as the research progressed. (Griffin, 1986, 
p. 180) 
needs of child welfare workers, and then to re-
flect upon the efficacy of the training provided: 
this, they say, offers "an interactive technique, 
which empowers the respondent and demon-
strates respect and concern for their views" 
(Harrison & Barlow, 1995, p. 12). . 
Group discussions were used by feminist 
Maria Mies (1983) as part of an action research 
. project aiming to make practical provision for 
battered women. She wanted to implement a 
nonhierarchical egalitarian research process, to 
ensure that the research served the interests of 
the oppressed; to develop.{lolitical awareness in 
the oppressed; and to use her own relative power 
as a feminist and as a scholar in the interests of 
other women. Mies (\983, p. 127) argued that 
in order to do this, "interviews of individuals 
••• must be shifted towards group discussions. 
In a study of women's reactions to violent epi- if possible at repeated intervals." She also states 
sodes on television, Schlesinger, Dobash, 00- that "this collectivization of women's experi-
bash, and Weaver (\992, p. 29) also saw the ence is not only a means of getting more and 
group discussions as an opportunity for women more diversified information but it also helps 
to "determine their own agendas as much as women to overcome their strucrural isolation in 
possible. " their families and to understand that their indi-
Perhaps in part as a consequence of the fact vidual sufferings have social causes" (Mies, 
that participants in focus groups exercise a con- 1983, p. 128). 
siderable degree of control over the discussion The similarities between focus group discus-
process, many respondents are reported. to enjoy sions and the "consciousness raising" sessions 
the experience of participation. lane! Fmch common in the early years of second-wave fem· 
(\984, p. 75) comments that "almost all the inism have fuelled the interest of several femi-
women in my two studies [one with clergymen's nist researchers. Noting that it was through con-
wives, the other with women whose children be- sciousness raising that Farley (1978) came to 
-----Ionged to the same playgroup] seemed to lack identify and name the experience of • 'sexual ha-
opportunities to engage collectively with other" rassment," feminist sociologist Carrie Herbert 
women in ways which they would find support- (1989) combined participant observation and di-
ive," and so found the group discussions a sup- ary writing with "the more unorthodox use of 
portive environment in which to explore their group meetings, devolved power and reciproc-
experiences. Women participants in a study of ity" (Herbert, 1989, p. 41) in her work with 
media images of violence against women also young women in schools on their e:tperience of 
expressed positive views about the experience. sexual harassment. Researchers using focus 
"Other people spark you off thinking," and groups in this way hope that through meeting 
"It's interesting to get other people's point of together with others and sharing experience, and 
view and to actually discuss what you've seen. through realising group commonalities in what 
I mean, I don't get a chance to discuss things had previously been considered individual and 
you know, with being on my own with my little personal problems, women will develop a 
boy" (Schlesinger et al., 1992, p. 27). Ac- clearer sense of the social and political pro-
cording to Harrison and Barlow (1995. p. 12): cesses through which their experiences are con· 
"Such active partiCipation empowers group structed-and perhaps also a desire to organise 
members who feel that their views and e:tperi- against them. It is indeed possible to find snip-
ences are valued." These latter researchers also pets of dialogue in the literarure in which 
cite the work of Denning and Verschelden women could be said to be '"raising their con-
(1993), who used a phased program of focus sciousnesses" through sharing experience. In 
groups to identify and categorise the training the following extract. women ure discussing a 
,.~J 
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video they have just watched in which a woman (Kitzinger. 1994. pp. 108-109) 
was raped: 
Researcher: You were saying you think she 
should have stood up for herself 
more? 
Speaker 2: I think she should've done. 
Speaker 3: Yeah, but we don't. I lived with a 
man for ten years, and everyone 
thought it was a wonderful mar-
riage. You don't say "I'm not 
. standing this" for years. 
Speaker 1: I put up with having his girlfriend 
living in my spare room for ten 
months. You don't stand up and 
say -you say you would. and you 
, say people ought to, but you don't. 
It takes something to really get you 
like "This is it. I can't take it." 
Speaker 4: Suddenly you think. "What the 
hell's happened to me?" 
Speaker 3: There's got to be a better life. 
(Schlesinger et a1 .. 1992, p. 124) 
Chronicling a set of conversations with adoles-
cent girls, Michelle Fine (1992, p. 173) claims 
that, "through a feminist methodolggy we call 
'collective consciousness work,' we sculpted .•. 
a way to theorize consciousness. moving from 
stridently individualist feminism to a collective 
sense of women's solidarity among difference." 
It has to be said that other researchers using 
focus groups are less sanguine about their con-
sciousness raising potential-and indeed. there ' 
may even be a conflict between researchers' of-
ten stated desire to relinquish power in relation 
to the group, and the hope that the group will 
achieve feminist goals of consciousness raising. 
Jenny Kitzinger's (1994) focus groups' discus-
sions of HIV risk offer salutary counterexam-
pies of the alleged "consciousness raising" 
benefit of group discussion. In several groups. 
she says, "any attempt to address the risks HIV 
poses to gay men were drowned out by a ritual 
period of outcry against homosexuality": 
ITM: Benders. poufs 
ITM: Bent bastards 
ITM: Bent shops 
ITM: they're poufs. I mean 1 don't know how 
a man could have sex with another man 
it's . .. 
ITM: It's disgusting 
ITM: Ah. Yuk! 
Her (footnoted) comment on this and other simi-
lar material is that such materials: 
..• raise ethical diletnmas for any researcher. 
These may be particularly acute for the group 
facilitator if such comments are directed at 
other members of the group and take the form 
of bullying or intimidation. Such ethical 
problems can be addressed through (a) think-
ing about the composition of the groups prior 
to running any such sessions and Cb) using 
dissent within the group to challenge and de-
bate such attitudes. Looking through the tran-
scripts it is also clear that. on a few occa-
sions. I simply intervened to silence 
discussion. or at least • 'move it along" be-
cause of my own discomfon with what was 
being said or the perceived discomfon of 
other members of the group. (Kitzinger •. 
1994. p. 118, f3) 
Amongst the plethora of material extolling 
the benefits of focus groups for participants (the 
empowerment of self-expression in a supponive 
environment, the consciousness raising effects 
of group discussion), this is a rare and valuable 
comment on some of the ethical difficulties that 
may arise precisely because of the (relative) lack 
of control exercised by the researcher over 
group interactions. It is interesting to note that 
the desirability of debriefing research partici-
pants is nowhere suggested in the focus group 
manuals, and that this research team is one of 
the very few to offer "the opponunity for peo-
ple to make comments in confidence either on 
paper or to the researcher alone" (Kitzinger. 
1990, p. 333). 
To some extent. of course. the ethical issues 
arising in the conduct of focus groups are the 
same as those arising in one·to-one interviews 
(although exacerbated by the group context): for 
example. whether-or how-to challenge rac-
ism or heterosexism. In a group. however. the 
issues are wider-ranging and more complex. in-
sofar as group participants can collaborate or 
collude effectively to intimidate and/or silence 
a particular member. or to create a silence 
around a particular topic or issue. in a way that 
could not occur in a one-to-one interview. It re-
quires panicular skill on the pan of the 
researcher/moderator to decide whether/how to 
intervene: and a need to balance the goals of 
• 
• 
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relinquishing power/control against goals of 
supporting individuals, encouraging "fair 
play," broadening out the discussion, or explor-
ing an apparent taboo. This is an area little ad-
dressed in the focus group literature -and ODe 
much in need of further discussion and develop-
ment 
OBTAINING mGH QUALITY, 
INTERACTIVE DATA: THE VALUE OF . 
FOCUS GROUPS FOR FEMINIST 
RESEARCH 
The relative power possessed by re5e3lCh partic-
ipants at the data collection stage of focus 
groups, compared with interviews, is not simply 
an ethical issue. It also improves the quality of 
the data. As Jenny Kitzinger (1994) argues, 
group work ensures that priority is given to the 
respondents' hiet3lChy of importance, their lan-
guage and concepts, their frameworks for under-
standing the world. "In fact, listening to discus-
sions between participants gives the re5e3lCher 
time to acclimatise to, for example, their pre-
ferred words for speaking about sex and pre-
vents the rese3lCher from prematurely closing 
off the generation of meaning in ber own search 
for clarification" (Kitzinger, 1994, p. 108). In 
the following extract from a "girls' group," one 
of the =hers (Michelle) learns the language 
used in the school context of three 17-year old 
. girls, Jane!. Shermika, and Sophie: 
Michelle: Now do you think guys [at your 
school] brag to each other about this 
stuffl 
Jane!: Yes [giggles). Oh yeah, in a major 
way. 
Shermika: (simultaneously) Girls brag, too. 
Sophie: All they talk about is what they're 
getting. 
Michelle: Is that their language, "What they're 
getting"? 
Sophie: "Fly girls" and what they're getting 
off them. 
[All laugh while Pat and Michelle say, "Wait a 
minute!"] . 
Shermika: "She all that!" .•. I hate that! 
Sophie: "All that and more." 
Janet: "Fly" is. like, totally hot. she's the 
most gorgeous woman on the earth. 
(MacPherson & Fine, 1995. p. 193) 
Learning the language (and the relevant con-
cepts) of the people being =hed is a prereq-
uisite for sensitive understanding of their lives. 
One of the problems with tests, scales, and ques-
tionnaires has often been their lack of (sub)cul-
turaI sensitivity to people's own vocabularies • 
In =hing women's responses to violence 
on television, Schiesinger et al. (1992) used both 
questionnaires and focus groups. The following 
focus group interaction illustrates how the group 
data revealed to the re5e3lChers a problem with 
the wording of one of the questionnaire items, 
which asked women to ~dicate the extent to 
whicb they found a video'clip "entertaining": 
Speaker 1: Even though I said-what I meant 
by "not enrertaining," I just think 
it's the wrong word ..•• I enjoyed 
it in a way, but entertainment's not 
the right word for it 
Speaker 2: Gripping? 
Speaker 1: No. 
Speaker 3: Enthralling? 
Speaker 4: Riveting-something like that? 
Speaker 1: No, I just don't know. But it's not 
entertaining anyway. 
Speaker 3: Because entertaining sometimes is 
something that's humorous, amus-
ing, jovial. . 
Speaker 1: Yes .•• that just grabbed you. 
(Schiesinger et al., 1992, p. 138) 
Many rese3lChers have also commented on 
the extent to which interaction between partici-
pants leads to the production of high quality 
data. Participants ask questions of, disagree 
with, and challenge each other, thus serving "to 
elicit the elaboration of responses" (Merton, 
1987, p. 555). According to the authors of a text-
book on focus groups, a major advantage is the 
fact that they. "allow respondents to react to and 
build upon the responses of other group mem-
bers," creating a "synergistic effect" (Stew-
art & Shamdasani, 1990. p. 16). This may be 
a particular advantage in the use of preexisting 
groups who (in the AIDS Media Rese3lCh Proj-
ect) "often challenged each other on contradic· 
tions between what they were professing to be· 
lieve and how they actually behaved (e.g .• 'how 
about that time you didn't use a glove while tak· 
ing blood from a patient?' or 'what about the 
other night when you went off with that boy at 
the disco?')" (Kitzinger, 1994, p. 105). 
Another example of the way in which partici· 
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pants' prior knowledge of each other can add 
depth to their discussion is illustrated in this 
brief extract between two women (Marlene and 
Rebecca) who were asked to comment on a tele-
vision drama dealing with abortion as a moral 
issue. We have here an interviewer who appar-
ently misunderstands Marlene's initial response 
to a question (hearing Marlene's "eloquent" as 
"awkward") and who subsequently seeks clari-
fication as to the referent of her comment Re-
becca intervenes with a shared memory which 
both she and Marlene understand as contradict-
ing Marlene's earlier starement, and a detailed 
discussion of that particular experience devel-
ops out of Rebecca's intervention. One has to 
suspect that the quality of the data would have 
been diminished if the interviewer and Marlene 
had been left alone together in a one-to-one in-
terview: the conversation is enormously en-
hanced by Rebecca's participation in this group 
setting: 
Interviewer: So what did you think? In general. 
Marlene: Parts of it were kind of unrealistic. 
... I think the pro-life people [ ... 1 
They're not that eloquent and I 
don't think they're that knowl-
edgeable. ' , 
Interviewer: Not that awkward ... 
Marlene: Eloquent .•• and not that knowl-
edgeable and also every ... 
Interviewer: The pro-life people? 
Marlene: . Yeab ..• and everyone r ve talked 
to basically told me a lie. so ... 
. Rebecca: But remember the urn. the false 
clinic that we went to .. . 
Marlene: ... that one women .. . 
Rebecca: That one woman was so eloquent. 
(Press. 1991, p. 432) 
Whether or nOI focus group particIpants 
know each other in advance of the group. they 
often assist the researcher by asking questions 
of each other (perhaps more searchiAg than 
those the researcher might have dared ask); by 
contradicting and disagreeing with each other 
(in a manner which. coming from the researcher. 
might have seemed authoritarian): and by point-
ing to apparent contradictions in each others' ac· 
counts (often in a manner which the "empa-
thetic" and "sensitive" researcher might feel to 
be inappropriate coming from her). [t is not too 
difficult to find examples of this in the literature. 
Feminist psychologist Christine Griffin quotes 
from a group discussion between four teenage 
girls: 
Treena: But if a bloke asks you for sex, what 
do you do? 
Brid: 
Stella: 
Kate: 
I'd tell him to go off and have a wank! 
You dirty thing! 
It's wrong, you ought to get married in 
a white dress. 
Stella: But I don't think it is-if you like the 
bloke why not? Why wait until you're 
married? 
Treena: She's talking~i bet she's done it! 
Kate: You ought to sleep with a bloke if you 
love him and he asked you to. 
Stella: But you just said that you have to get 
married in white! 
(Griffin. 1986, pp. 182-183) 
Frustratingly, the extract ends there. Stella has 
challenged Kate's apparently contradictory 
statements (in a manner in which Christine Grif-
fin, as a high-status adult. would probably have 
felt uncomfortable doing), and Kate is left with 
ajob of explaining do. It is precisely in the work 
of explaining and justifying statements about 
sex and marriage in conversations with peers 
that interesting data about the way in which 
young women construct their sexual identities 
and ideologies can emerge. 
The presence of other group members with 
contradictory opinions often leads to elaborated 
presentations of particular points of view. After 
viewing a televised reconstruction of the rape 
and murder of a young female hitchhiker, one 
. participant in Schlesinger et a1.' s (1992, p. 
146) research responds to another member of 
the group-who had expressed the opinion 
that "she was leading them on, [ .•. J and her 
clothes as well ... her top. her shirt" -with 
the unequivocal statement that "Her clothes 
have got nothing to do with it." She adds, "[ 
didn't want to say anything because my views 
are totally clear on this ... " -and she then ex-
pounds them at some length. The provocation . 
of the earlier speaker ensured that this woman' s 
views were elicited and elaborated. Similarly. 
Elizabeth Frazer (1988) quotes a discussion be-
tween three teenage girls who identify them-
selves as "upper class." One of them (Caroline) 
queries whether the class system is really as op-
pressive as some of the others have suggested. 
and is then forced to defend her (implied) view 
that the behaviour of the working class is at 
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fault, while another participant (Candida) finds 
herself explaining the problems of the class 
system: 
CMoIine: but is it that bad? is there any need to 
reduce the classes 
Candida: of course it's bad 
Cressida: look at how we patronise them, they 
resent us 
CaroIine: I think they're jealOUs, they want our 
money 
Candida: of course they resent, their families 
were our grandparents' servants, of 
course they resent ... 
Caroline: they wouldn't say that though. would 
they? they'd say it's because we're 
rich. 
(Frazer, 1988, p. 349) 
In the following focus group extract, from 
work by Michelle Fine and Judi Addelston, male 
and female law students are discussing why a 
disproportionate number of women at an elite, 
private, equal access law school graduate with 
much poorer academic credentials than their 
male countexparts. A male student responds to 
a female speaker (M) with a comment incorpo-
rating the phrase "making a mountain out of a 
molehill," and is challenged by two other fe-
male students, who support M's version. 
short, their social l181Ure-which may also re-
sult in distortion and bias. This is in part through 
the loss of (sensitive) materia\, which people are 
unwilling to make public, and in part because 
individual opinions may be biased or "contami-
nated" by the group context so that people sim-
ply confonn to majority opinions, or express 
"socially desirable" ideas: "the responses from 
members of the group are not independent of 
nne another, which restricts the generaIizability 
of results" (Stewart & Shamdasani, 1990, p. 
17). In fact, it seems not necessarily to be the 
case that less "personal": information is re-
vealed in focus groups. Instead, it may be found 
that the less inhibited members of the group 
"break the ice" for shyer participants or one 
person's revelation of "discrediting" informa-
tion encourages others to disclose similar expe-
riences. According to KissIing (1996), for exam-
ple, it is actually easier for an adult researcher 
to collect young people's talk about menstrua-
tion in a group context: the "solidarity among 
friends" seems to "decrease their discomfort 
with the topic"; and Kitzinger (1994, p. 111) 
cites data in which focus group members enable 
and encourage one of their participants to talk 
about oral sex. as an example of the facilitation 
of the expression of difficult or taboo experi-
ences in a group context. Whatever the effect of 
groups on the contribution of individuals within 
them, what these concerns reveal is a thorough-
Female student: You're not listening to what going individualism, rooted within an essential-
. M said. She said, It entirely shook my faith . ist framework, and fundamcittalIy at odds with 
in myself. I will never recover. Some of us the potentially radical use of focus groups to un- . 
just sunk deeper and deeper ina mire, and derstand the person as situated in, and con-
just keep sinking lower and lower. structed through. the social world-and for 
Another female student: That's right. I used which a social constructionist stance is neces-
to be very driven, competitive. Then I started sary. 
to realize that all my effort was getting me 
nowhere. I just stopped caring. I am scarred 
forever. 
(Fine & Addelston. 1996, pp. 131-132) 
This extract not only illustrates the extent to 
which "personal" information is revealed in a 
group context; it also shows how one participant 
may challenge another, and be supported by a 
third; and how the "meaning" of being a 
woman student in this institution is co-con-
structed in a group context. 
However, many researchers have expressed 
a concern that it is precisely this quality of focus 
groups -their interactive form, the challenges. 
and disagreements to which they give rise. in 
BEYOND INDIVIDUALISM: THE CO-
CONSTRUcnON OF REALITIES IN 
THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF THE 
FOCUS GROUP 
Underlying concerns about "bias" and "con-
tamination" is the assumption that the individ-
ual is the appropriate unit of analysis. and that 
her "real" or "underlying" views (conceptual-
ised as the views she would express "in pri-
vate") represent the "purest" form of dam. For 
these researchers. the challenge in any kind of 
qualitative data collection is to overcome social 
desirability. self-presentation. self-deception. 
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and, of course. the individual's presumed reti-
cence in talking openly about intimate or per-
sonal matters 10 a complete stranger. In the con-
text of interviewing. it is feared that features of 
the interviewer (gender. appearance. ethnicity • 
manner of questioning) will "bias" the answers 
given-and of course these problems are exac-
erbated in a group interview context, in which 
individuals are exposed 10 an unpredictable 
combination of people arguing. telling stories. 
cracking jokes, and in other ways interfering 
with the "pure" expression of an iridividual 
point of view. The presence of other people (in-
cluding the interviewer herself) is always seen 
as a potentially CODtaminating influence from 
within this individualistic perspective. 
Within this (broadly "essentialist") theoreti-
cal framework. focus group methods can never-
theless be seen as offering an important correc-
tive 10 the study of the individual in isolation. 
Instead, they offer the opportunity to study "the 
individual in social context" (Goldman. 1962; 
Rubin & Rubin. 1995. p. 95)-a social context 
which is relatively "naturalistic" (Press. 1991. 
p. 423). Insofar as individual opinions are 
formed and shaped through talking and arguing 
with families. friends. and colleagues about 
events and issues in evetyday life. focus groups 
tap into ordinary social processes and evetyday 
socia1 interchange. Indeed, focus group re-
searchers often maximise this by studying pre-
existing or naturally occurring social groups. 
such as· friendship groups. worlc colleagues. 
family members. or members of clubs and orga-
nisations. Such researchers JD<IY well argue that 
focus group data are more "authentic," or 
"closer 10 the essential meanings of women's 
lives," than data elicited by other methods (such 
. as the one-to-one interview). 
An alternative (broadly "social construction-
ist") theoretical framework. however. goes 
much further: such a framework challenges the 
view of qualitative data (whether or not col-
lected within a "naturalistic" social context) as 
revealing individual opinions. Rather. it high-
lights the extent to which what people say is ac-
tually constructed in specific social contexts. the 
extent to which any given utterance is "a discur-
sive production" serving a panicular function 
in the context of a given interchange (e.g .• Ed-
wards & Potter. 1992; Gergen. 1985; Potter & 
Wetherell. 1987; Wilkinson & Kitzinger. 1995). 
What is (and what is not) expressed in the con-
text of a one-to-one interview is as social a pro-
duction as what is (and what is not) expressed 
in the context of a group discussion: although 
the two may well be different in form and func-
tion (as well as in content). Differences between 
what is said in interviews and what is said in 
focus groups (and there is precious little empiri-
cal research to indicate what those differences 
might be) cannot be used 10 indicate the superi-
ority of one data collection method over an-
other-although. as 1enny Kitzinger (1994. 
p. 117) points out, "it is a predictable sign of 
the dominance of the interview paradigm that 
when researchers haVe found differences be" 
tween data collected by interviews and group 
discussion. they have sometimes blithely dis-
missed the latter as ·inaccurate· ... 
It is increasingly recognised. across the social 
sciences. that the interview is not. and cannot 
be. a sterile instrument through the careful use 
of which "truthful" reports and "honest" reac-
tions can be extracted from inside the heads of 
research participants. The effect of the inter-
viewer upon the data collected is. from this per-
spective. not a problem. but a/ealUre of inter-
viewing. and many researchers have rejected the 
stance of the objective interviewer. and insisted 
on the fundamentally interactive nature of the 
interview (cf .• Butt & Code. 1995. p. 9). Social 
constructionist (and. more recently. discursive 
or postmodern) researchers. in particular. have 
. attempted to expose and openly acknowledge 
the role of the researcher as a means of explor-
ing how knowledges are constructed in intemc-
tion between people. For example. Crapanzano 
describes his interview-based study of Tuhami. 
his Moroccan Arab subject: 
As Tuhami's interlocutor. I became an active 
participant in his life history. even though I 
mrely appear directly in his recitations. Not 
only did my presence. and my questions. pre-
pare him for the text he was to produce. but 
they produced what ( read as a change of con-
sciousness in him. They produced a change 
of consciousness in me too. We were both 
jostled from our assumptions about the na-
ture of the everyday world and ourselves and 
groped for common reference points within 
this limbo of interchange. (Crapanzano. 1980 
cited in Fontana & Frey 1994. p. 372) 
As Fontana and Frey (1994. p. 372) comment. 
"No longer pretending to be faceless subject 
and invisible researcher. Tuhami and Cmpan-
• I 
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zano are portrayed as individual human beings 
with their own personal histories and idiosyn-
crasies, and we, the readers. learn about two 
people and two cultures." What is said in inter-
.. view is always derived not simply from the 
mind of the interviewee, but from the interaction 
between interViewer and interviewee: interView 
data, as much as that from focus groups. is con-
structed by its context and yields "context-
specific understandings" (Henwood & Pidgeon, 
1995, p. 10). 
A key difference between interviews and fo-
cus groups lies in the fact that, while interview-
ers have historically been able to assert thllt their 
data are decontextualised and have an existence 
independent of the relationship between inter-
viewer and interViewee. focus group researchers 
have typically been forced. by the messiness of 
their data. to recognise the fundamentaI\y social 
nature of talk. It is hard to avoid this recognition 
when a group of people are telling stories, crack-
ing jokes, arguing. supporting one another. and 
talking over one another. Whether researchers 
choose to interpret such data in essentialist 
terms (as indicating "the influence of social 
context on the formation of individual opin-
ions") or in social constructionist terms (as "an 
instance of the co-construction of meaning in 
action' ') is likely to depend on prior theoretical 
allegiances. In either case, for researchers com-
mitted to understanding the person in the con-
text of a social world, focus group methods af-
ford that social world a key role in the data 
collection process. However. the potential of fo-
cus groups may be seen as further-reaching. and 
as more radical in what it offers'. for social con-
structionists than for essentialists. 
From the perspective of feminist psychology. 
and indeed feminist research more generally, it 
is particularly frustrating to find that it is pre-
cisely the social nature of focus group data that 
is often obscured or glossed over in research re-
ports. Most reports of focus group data simply 
quote extracts from the talk of a single individ-
ual. taking it out of the context of that individu-
aI's interaction with others in the group. As 
noted earlier. when interactions are reported. 
they are typically analysed simply in terms of 
coment. and not in terms of their interact;"e fea-
tures. that is. the processes of interaction and 
the functions these may serve. So. for example. 
the conversation between Marlene and Rebecca 
(cited in Press. 1991). which I used earlier to 
illustrate how Rebecca's imervention. contrib-
utes to the development of Marlene's narrative, 
is used by Andrea Press (1991, p. 432) only to 
illustrate the (alleged) "resentment" of her pro-
choice participants about a relatively positive 
depiction of pro-lifers. In other words, a brief 
exchange that could be analysed in terms of the 
construction of meaning through interaction is 
instead presented merely in terms of its sup-
posed contenL Similarly. SteUa's challenge of 
Kate (cited in Griffin, 1986), which I quoted as 
an example of participant interaction through ar-
gument, is described by Christine Griffin (1986, 
p. 183) merely as an example of the "complex-
ity" of her data and is not analysed for its inter-
active properties. 
Contrast this with Michael Billig's (1992) 
analysis of group discussions about the British 
Royal Family-admittedly not a feminist study, 
but one that incorporates theoretical and meth-
odological approaches that feminists may use-
fully adopt in analysing the interactive feal\U'Cs 
of focus group data. One part of Billig's analysis 
is concerned with the way in which some people 
are constructed as gullible, uncritical consumers 
of the media. and are used as "Contrastive Oth-
ers" to illustrate the speaker's own critical pow-
ers. Such "Othering" is very much a contem-
porary concern within feminist psychology 
(Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 1996), and in Billig's 
presentation of his data. one can see the process 
of Othering at work. He describes a group dis-
cussion between four people. aged between 59 
and 66 and all related, plus the mother of one 
of them. aged 87, whose "contributions to the 
conversation were often interruptions, as she 
told jokes or reminisced about poverty before 
the war. She even broke into song once: 'I'm 
'Enery the Eighth I am.' she sang. For periods, 
she remained mute, while the not-so-elderly got 
on with their nimble conversational business" 
. (Billig. 1992, p. 159). It is this woman (rather 
unforrunately designated "the old lady" by Bil-
lig) who is constructed as the gullible Other by 
her relatives. and Billig analyses the mechanism 
through which this Othering is achieved. The 
woman's daughter commems that "what they 
write in the papers today is a load of rubbish": 
She added. with a little laugh. and with the 
voiced a2reement of her husband.· that 
"mother believes everything:' The old lady 
said nothing. 
Later on. the topic was raised again .... 
Were women more imerested in royalty than 
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men, the interviewer bad asked. "r should 
think so, Mum you read all about the Royal 
family don't you?" called out her daughter. 
"Yeah," said the old lady. Her daughter con-
tinued: "In the Sun and the Mirror [national 
British tabloid newspapers], and it's all 
true," she said with ironic emphasis. This 
time the old lady was not invited to reply. 
Nor did she. She was being presented as a 
specimen object, the Contrastive Other. 
The irony in the speaker's remark was 
heavily stressed to ensure that the other lis-
teners. especially the interviewer. received 
the message. She was distancing herself from 
elderly gullibility •••. (Billig. 1992. p. 159) 
This distance. this marking of her mother as the 
guUible Other, is achieved, says Billig (1992. 
p. 159). in part through "an act of collective 
deafness." Before the exchange quoted above, 
the "old lady" had spoken of her past: 
Years ago she used to work in the print-
works for the Argus [a local British newspa-
per]. Yeah, it was terrible."alllies they used 
to tell down that paper." she laughed. She 
worked for four shiUings a week to start off, 
during the FIrst World War: "That. was only 
a penny then. it was very cheap, the Argus 
was; they still do it now. but they tell more 
lies than ever." She laughed again. It was the 
turn of the younger generation. the not-so-
. hard-of-hearing, to show deafness. None of 
them asked her about her first-hand experi-
ences of the press-experiences which. for 
all their confident judgementS 3bout newspa-
pers. they did not possess. No-one appeared 
to notice that she had switched from her past 
to the common present today the papers tell 
more lies than ever, she was saying. 
The daughter persisted in presenting her 
mother as the gullible Other. helplessly un-
able to sort out today's fiction from fact. Was 
this how she wanted her mother to be seen, 
a helpless object beyond her time? How they 
all wanted to see the old lady? And did their 
deafness to her words arise from this desire? 
There can be no definite answers. only inter-
pretations. (BilIig, 1992. p. 160) 
In this example, the rese:trcher has made full use 
of the interaction between people-indeed, it is 
this interaction that forms the basis of the anal-
ysis. 
Perhaps the failure adequately to address in-
teractions between group participants derives 
from researchers' lack of familiarity with the ap-
propriate theoretical concepts-or even vocabu-
.laries-for so doing. As social constructionist 
psychologist Kenneth Gergen (1987) points out, 
given that for over 2,000 9ears the prevailing 
form of understanding in Western culture has 
been an individualist one (with the individual 
person standing as the subject of enquiry. and 
attributes of individuals consistently looming 
large in explanations of human nature): 
The auspicious question is whether we can 
replace individualized theories of self with 
relational theories. It is as if we have at our 
disposal a rich language for characterizing 
rooks, pawns, and bishops but have yet to 
discover the game of chess. (Gergen. 1987. 
p.63) 
While feminist psychologists-and other 
feminist researchers-have rejected the ram-
pant individualism of mainstream psychology 
(e.g .. Kitzinger. 1992; Morawski. 1994). they 
have yet to develop a full range of theoretical 
and methodological alternatives adequate to the 
pursuit of their social and political goals. Re-
search methods that isolate individuals from 
their social contexts are clearly inappropriate. 
and the potential advantages of focus groups -
in mitigating ethical concerns about the power 
of the researcher in data collection; in yielding 
high quality. interactive data; and in addressing 
the role of social context (for essentialists) and! 
or the co-construction of meaning in social in-
teraction (for social constructionists)-are 
readily apparent. 
Of course. there are also disadvantages to fo-
cus groups. both in teims of practical consider-
ations in running them. and in terms of the theo-
retical limitations of focus groups as a method. 
Practical disadvantages include the following: 
it can be difficult and time consuming to recruit 
appropriate participants and to bring them to-
gether; some prior training (and practice) in the 
skills of moderating a group is highly desirable: 
specialised equipment (particularly a 360" mi-
crophone) is necessary for good-quality record-
ing; ideally. the moderator needs an assistant to 
operate the recording equipment. to keep notes 
on the group process. and to deal with practical 
matters (such as latecomers. interruptions. and 
refreshments). Perhaps the most significant 
practical problem. however. is that both the tran-
scription of the tapes (however good the record-
85 
• 
- ~-~-----------------
focus Groups in F.minist Resean:b 123 . 86 
ing quality), and the subsequent analysis of hun-
dreds of pages of transcribed data, are extremely 
painstaking and time-consuming processes • 
Theoretical limitations of the method include 
. ·the fact that focus group data is ill-suited to 
quantification, or to use in making broad gener-
a1isations. It is difficult to make a good theoreti-
cal case for aggregation of data across a number 
of diverse groups, for example, or for direct 
comparison of groups defined by the researcher 
as "different" on a single dimension: "worIc-
ing-class" and "middle-class" women. for ex-
ample. Further, focus group researchers (in 
common with other researchers using qualita-
tive methods) rarely offer a clear theoretical 
warrant for the interpretation of their data. and, 
even when they do, there is a great deal of slip-
page between essentialist and social construc-
tionist frameworIcs. One of the most common 
problems is for avowedly social constructionist 
researchers to infer "underlying" attitudes, 
opinions, feelings, or motives from individuals' 
talk (see WiIkinson & Kitzinger, 1995 for fur-
ther theoretical discussion and examples of 
this). 
However, despite these practical and theoret-
ical disadvantages, focus groups have already 
shown their value, both as theory and as method, 
for feminist psychology. Focus groups can ad-
dress ethical concerns about the power of the 
researcher in the data collection process; can 
yield high quality, interactive data; and can offer 
a route to studying the person in the context of 
a social world. In pwciJlar, when interpreted 
within a social constructionist framework. 
focus group data offer considerable potential for 
exploring the co-construction of meaning 
through an analysis of interactive processes. 
Sensitively analysed. such data can offer in-
sights into the relational aspects of self, the pro-
cesses by which meanings and know ledges are 
constructed through inter:lctions with others, 
and the ways in which social inequalities are 
produced and perpetuated through talk. Viewed 
in this way. I suggest that focus groups have the 
potential for future development into an ap-
proach par e.~celIence. for feminist research. 
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FOCUS GROUPS 
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Sue Wilkinson 
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Focus groups are little used in feminist psychology, despite their method-
ological advantages. Following a brief introduction to the method, the 
article details three key ways in which the use of focus groups addresses 
the feminist critique of traditional methods in psychology. Focus groups 
are relatively naturalistic and so avoid the charge of artificiality; they 
offer social contexts for meaning-making and so avoid the charge of 
decontextualization; and they shift the balance of power away from the 
researcher toward the reSearch participants and so avoid the charge of 
exploitation. The final section of the article, which evaluates the potential 
of focus groups for feminist research, identifies some other benefits of 
the method and also discusses some problems in the current use of focus 
groups. It concludes that the use-and development-of focus group 
methods offer' feminist psychology. an' excellent opportunity for the 
future. 
A family group, gathered around the TV in their living room, argues over a favorite 
soap opera; teenage girls sprawled over tables in a classroom swap stories about 
sexual harassment in high school; women waiting for appointments in a family 
planning clinic discuss methods of contraception-these are all potential focus 
group scenarios.' A focus group is-at its simplest-"an informal discussion among 
selected individuals about specific topics' (Beck, Trombetta, & Share, 1986, p. i3), 
Researchers using focus groups typically organize and run a series of small, focused. 
group discussions and analyze the resulting data using a range of conventional 
qualitative techniques. As a research method, focus groups are similar to one-to-
one intel'\iews, except that they involve more than one participant per data collection 
The author thanks Hannah Frith for the data extract quoted and for enthusiastic discussion of 
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. session; indeed, they are sometimes described as focus group interviews, group 
interviews, or group depth interviews. 
Although focus groups are widely used in some fields, particularly in applied 
areas-such as communication/media studies (e.g., Lunt & Livingstone, 1996), 
education (e.g., Vaughn, Schumm, & Sinagub, 1996), and health C'.Ire (e.g .. Brems & 
Crifliths, 1993)-few feminists (and even fewer feminist psychologists) use the 
method. 11tis article makes the C'dSe for the value of focus groups in feminist 
psychology and in feminist research more generally. As such, it is a contribution 
to the continuing feminist debate on methodology, both within psychology(e.g., 
Marecek, 1989; Morawski, 1994; Peplau & Conrad, 1989; Willdnson, 1986) and 
beyond it (e.g., Bowles & K1ein, 1983; Fonow & Cook, 199!: Hanling, 198i; 
Stanley & WISe, 1993; Westkott, 19;9). This debate considers not only the pros 
and cons of different methods of data collection, but also the wavs in which 
methodolOgical issues are intrinsically conceptual ones (cf. U nger. 1983). The design 
and conduct of a research project, the questions that are asked. the methods of 
data collection, the type of analysis that takes place, the perceived implications or 
utility of that analysis-all of these necessarily incorporate particular assumptions, 
models. and values. As Jeanne Marecek (1989, p. 3iO) noted, "a method is an 
interpretation.· The choice of one method over another is not ·simply a techniC'.ll 
decision, but an epistemolOgical and theoretical one. This means that, as feminists 
considering the use of innovative or unusual methods, we need (as much as with 
conventional methods) to be aware of the epistemologiC'.ll commitments and value 
assumptions they make (Riger, 1992). In this article, I introduce focus group 
method; I then highlight the particular advantages of focus group method for 
feminist researchers; finally, I evaluate the potential of focus group method for 
feminist research. 
. INTRODUCING FOCUS GROUPS 
As the authors of a key text on focus groups pointed out, ·what is known as a focus 
group today takes many different forms· (Stewart & Shamdasani, 1990, p. 9), but 
centrally it involves one or more group discussions in which participants focus 
collectively on a topic selected by the researcher and presented to them in the 
foriD of a film. a collection of advertisements, a vignette to discuss, a "game' to 
play, or simply a particular set of questions. The groups (rarely more than 12 people 
at a time and more commonly 6 to 8) can consist of either preexisting clusters of 
people (e.g., family members, Khan & Manderson, 1992; work colleagues, J. Kit-
zinger, 1994a, 1994b) or people drawn together specifically for the research. Many 
aspects offocus groups (e.g., the selection of participants, the setting in which they 
meet, the role of the moderator, the specific focus of the group, the structure of 
the discussion) are discussed in detail in the various "how to· books that address 
this method (e.g., Krueger, 1988; Morgan, 1988, 1993: Stewart & Shamdasani. 
1990; Vaughn et al., 1996), and I will not rehearse such discussions here. Discussions 
between group participants, usually audiotaped (sometimes \ideotaped) and tran-
scribed, constitute the data. and methods of qualitative analysis (mnging from 
conventional content analysis to rhetorical or discursive techniques) are generall~' 
employed. The method is distinctive not for its mode of analysis but for its dat.l 
.... 
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collection procedures. Crucially-arid many commentators on the method make 
this point-focus groups involve the interaction of group participants with each 
other as well as with the rese-.ucher/moderator. and it is the collection of this kind 
. of interactive data that distinguishes the focus group from the one-to-one interview 
(cr. J. Kitzinger. 1994a; Morgan. 1988). 
. In general, focus group method is well suited to exploratory. interpretive. multi-
method, and phenomenological research questions (Frey & Fontana, 1993). In 
considering whether to use focus groups. two leading experts (Morgan & Krueger. 
1993) suggested that the researcher should take into account not only the purpose 
of the study. but also the appropriateness of group discussion as a format, the 
match between researchers' and participants' interests. and the type of results 
required. In conducting a focus group study, the researcher must make critiC-.ll 
decisions about the following key parameters. all of which fundamentally affect 
the design and analysis of the study: the type of participants and the number of 
groups to be conducted, the topic or activity on which the groups are to focus; the 
conduct of the sessions; recording and transcription issues; and the analytic frame 
to be employed (see Knodel. 1993, for a useful summary discussion of design 
issues). 
Although social psycholOgist Emory Bogardus (1926) used group interviews in 
developing his social distance scale. the invention of the focus group is usually 
attributed to sociologist Robert Merton, who. along with his colleagues Patricia 
Kendall and Mrujorie Fiske, developed a group approach ("the focussed group-
intervieW) to elicit'information from audiences about their responses to radio 
programs (Merton & KendalI, 1946; Merton. Fiske. & Kendall. 1956). The method 
is most widely used within the fields of business and marketing (Goldman & 
McDonald, 198i). and it is only in the past five years or so that it has been described 
as "gaining some popularity among social scientistsW (Fontana & Frey. 1994, 
. p. 364). so the current "resurgence of interestW (Lunt & Livingstone. 1996. p. i9) 
in focus groups is a recent phenomenon. Focus groups have not been widely used 
in psychology. in part because "they did not fit the positivist criteria extant in the 
dominant research paradigmW (Harrison & Barlow. 1995. p. ll). The method rarely 
appears in texts of psychologic-.ll research methods (although for recent exceptions 
. see Millward, 1995; Vaughn et al .• 1996), nor is it often cited in feminist research 
methods texts. (For an exception see Reinharz, 1992. But even here there are only 
two paragraphs on focus groups, and the author cites just one focus group study 
by a feminist psycholOgist-and that in an unpublished dissertation.) 
Despite half a century (or more) of focus group research. feminist psycholOgiSts' 
use of the method seems to have begun only during the 1990s. Such focus group 
research includes work on men talking about sex (Crawford. Kippax, & Waldby, 
1994) and about unemployment (Willott & Griffin, 199i); immigrant/refugee 
women explOring sexuality and gender.related issues (Espin. 1995); and sorority 
women talking about the threat of sexual aggreSSion (Norris. Nurius, & Dimeff, 
1996). In particular, feminist psycholOgists at the beginning of their careers seem 
to be drawn to focus groups as a research method: under the heading of student 
"work in progress," see Barringer's (1992) work with incest survivors. Lmlpon's 
(1995) study of lesbians' perceptions of safer sex practices, and Raabe's (199:3) 
research on young people's identities. There are. of course, other feminist psycholo. 
gists who rely on conversations"between groups of participants as a iTIt'UllS of data 
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conection but do not use the term "focus groups" or rely on the literature as-
sociated with this method. Michelle Fine's research with groups of girls (e.g., Fine, . 
'. 1992: Fme & AddeIston, 1996: Macpherson & Fine, 1995) is an example of such 
group work; others include BilIinghurst (1996), Erkut. Fields, Sing, and Man 
(1996), Kissling (1996), Lovering (1995), Walkerdine (1996), and Widdicombe 
(1995). 
ADVANTAGES OF FOCUS GROUPS FOR FEMINIST RESEARCHERS 
"''': 
Feminist researchers have identified a range of problems inherent in traditional 
psycholOgical methods (see, e.g., critiques by Jayaratne & Stewart, 1991: Reinharz. 
1983). Central to such critiques are the artificiality of traditional psycholOgical 
methods, their decontextualized nature, and the exploitative power relations be-
tween researcher and researched. These three problems are key to feminist critiques 
of traditional methods, and it is precisely these problems, I argue, that can be 
addressed through the use of focus groups. 
Artificiality. Many feminist psycholOgists have been critical of data generated 
via experimental methods (e.g., Parlee, 19i9; Sheru. 19i9/1992) and by tests and 
scales (e.g., Lewin & Wild, 1991: Tavris, 1992), urging "the abandonment of the 
. experiment as contextually sterile and trivial in favor of more qualitative methods 
that are closer to actual experience" (LOtt, 1985, p. 151). Feminist researchers 
have argued that feminist methods should be naturalistic in the sense that they 
should tap into the usual "modes of communication" (Maynard, 1990, p. 2;5) and 
the "evexyday social processes" (Graham, 1984, p. 113) that constitute people's 
social lives. 
Decontextuali::ation. From the beginning of second wave feminist psychology, 
researchers emphasized the importance of social context and insisted that feminist· 
methods should be contextual: that is, they should avoid fOCUSing on the individual 
devoid of social context or separate from interactions with others (e.g., Weisstein, 
1968/1993). The "context-stripping" nature of experiments and surveys was criti-
cized becaUse, as Janis Bohari (1992, p. 13) stated, "the reality of human experi-
ence-namely that it always occurs in context- ... is lost." Feminists (along with 
other critical social psycholOgists, e.g., Gergen, 198;: Prilleltensky, 1989: Sampson, 
1988) have criticized psychology's individualism. proposing that the individual self 
may be characterized as "in connection" or "relational" (e.g .• Jordan, Kaplan, Miller, 
. Stiver, & Surrey, 1991; Taylor, Gilligan, & Sullivan, 1996) or seen primarily as a 
social construction, a cultural product of Western thought (e.g., C. Kitzinger, 1992; 
Lykes, 1985). "If you really want to know either of us," wrote Michelle Fine and 
Susan Cordon, then "do not put us in a laboratOlY, or hand us a survey, or even 
interview us sepamtely alone in our homes. Watch me (MF) with women friends, 
my son. his father. my niece. or my mother and you will see what feels most 
authentic to me" (Fine & Cordon. 1989. p. 159). Other (social constructionist and 
postmodemist) critics have gone further in suggesting that human experience is 
constructed within specific social contexts. Collective sense is made. meanings 
negotiated, and identities elabor.lted through the processes of social intemction 
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between people (e.g., Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1990; Morawski & Agronick, 1991; 
West & Zimmennan. 198i). 
Exploitatton. Feminist psychologists have criticized the extent to which the 
interests and concerns of research participants are subordinated to those of the 
researcher and the way in which people are transfonned into -object-like subjectsft • 
(Unger, 1983. p.149) and have castigated the traditional hierarchy of power relations 
between researcher and researched (e.g .• Campbell & Schram.1995. p. 88; Peplau & 
Conrad, 1989. p. 386). In feminist rese-arch. -respecting the experience and perspec-
tive of the otherft (Worell & Etaugh. 1994. p. 444) is key. Many feminist researchers 
express commitment to 'realizing as fully as possible women' s voi~ in data gather-
ing and preparing an account that transmits those voicesft (Olesen, 1994. p. 167), 
suggesting that feminist research is characterized by -non-hierarchical relations· 
(Seibold, Richards, & Simon. 1994. p. 395). and evaluating research methods (at 
least partly) in tenns of their adequacy in enabling feminist researchers to engage 
in "a more equal and reciprocal relationship with their infonnants" (Graham. 1984, 
~lm. . 
These three problems-artificiality, decontextualization. and exploitation-in 
conjunction have led feminist researchers frequently to advocate qualitative ap-
proaches. even to suggest that these are "quintessentially feminist" (Maynard & 
Purvis, 1994. p. 3). I will not rehearse here the arguments for the use-or particular 
merits-of qualitative methods in feminist research, as these have been well docu-
mented elsewhere (see, e.g., Griffin. 1985; Henwood & Pidgeon, 1995; Marshall, 
1986; Reinharz, 1983). Rather. I will demonstrate the particular value of focus 
groups as a qualitative feminist method. 
Avoiding Artificiality: Focus Groups are a Relatively 
NNaturalistic"· Method 
The claim that focus groups are 'naturalistic" (or "ecologically valid') is common-
place in the focus group literature (e.g .• Albrecht, Johnson, & Walther, 1993, p. 
54; Liebes. 1984, p. 4i). Focus groups avoid the artificiality of many psycholOgical 
methods because they draw on people's nonnal. everyday experiences of talking 
and arguing with families, friends. and colleagues about events and issues in their 
everyday lives. It is exactly this ordinary social process that is tapped by focus group 
method. Everyday topics about which focus groups are invited to talk might include 
drinking behaviors (Beck et al., 1987), sexual decision making (Zeller, 1993), labor 
and birth experiences (DiMatteo, Kahn, & Berry, 1993), buying a new car (Stew·art & 
Shamdasani. 1990), coping with marriage bre-akdown (Humon & Thiessen, 1990), 
and experiences of friends' and acquaintances' heart attacks (Morgan & Spanish, 
1984). As focus group textbook author Richard Krueger (1988, p. 4!) noted, people 
are "social creatures who interact with others," who are "influenced by the comments 
of others," and who "make decisions after listening to the advice and counsel of 
people around them." F oeus groups tap into the "natural" processes of communica-
tion, such as arguing, joking, boasting, tensing, persuasion, challenge. and disagree-
ment. Robin Jarrett (1993, p. 194) described her focus groups \vith young women 
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as having "the feel of rap sessions with friends. The atmosphere was exuberantly 
boisterous and sometimes frank in language.w , 
Feminist researchers who have used focus groups have typically commented 
favorably on the e.nent to which they mirror everyday social interchange in a 
relatively naturalistic way. A study of female friends' talk about abortion involved 
groups of friends meeting to watch' an episode of the TV program Cagnerj & 
lAcey in the home of one of their members, which "provided a fairly naturalistic 
environment for television viewin~ (Press, 1991, p. 423). Feminist psychologist 
KatIuyn Lovering (1995), in talking about menstruation with young people at 
school, found that group discussions provided a context for a "relatively natuJ;alistic 
conversational exchangeW (p. 16Hn this C'dSe characterized -by a great deal of 
"embarrassmentW and "gigglingW (pp. 22-23). In discussing thes~ topics, participants 
, draw on the modes of interaction, communication, and expression common in their 
everyday lives. ' 
Many focus groups use preexisting or naturally occurring social groups such as 
friendship groups (e.g;, Liebes. 1984), work colleagues (e.g .• J. Kitzinger, 1994a. 
1994b), family members (e.g .• Khan & Manderson, 1992), members of clubs 
(J. Kitzinger, 1994a. 1994b), or simply "people who have experienced the same 
problem, such as residents of a deteriorating neighborhood or women in a sexist 
organization- (Rubin & Rubin. 1995, p. 139). According to focus group researcher 
Jenny Kitzinger (1994a), in a study of the effects of media messages about AIDS: 
By using pre-existing groups we were sometimes able to tap into fragments of interac-
tions which approximated to, 'naturallY-OCCUrring' data. .•. The fact that research parti-
cipants already knew each ';ther had the additional advantage that friends and col-
leagues could relate each others' comments to actual incidents in their shared daily 
lives. (p. 105) 
Feminist researchers have also drawn on people who already !mow each other 
in setting up their groups. Heterosexual college women frmn sorority houses at a' 
large west coast university in the United States were invited (together with a friend) 
to attend group meetings to discuss the perceived threat of se1.'Ual aggression from 
fraternity acquaintances (Norris et al., 1996). In another project, the participants 
themselves decided to bring along their best friends, which worked well for the 
group: "The best friend pairings ensured that each girl had a familiar audience 
and, as it turned out, a critical one; challenges C'J.me only from the friend at first, 
uncritical questions came from the other girlsw (Macpherson & Fine, 1995, p. 182). 
Participants who !mow each other may recall common experiences. share hall~ 
forgotten memories. or challenge each other on contradictions between what they 
are professing to believe in the group amI what they might have said or done 
outside the group ("""11at about the other day. when you ... ?"; "But last night you 
'd I") Sa! ..... 
The V'.llue of ha\ing people who 1."l10W each other as participants in a focus group 
is ilIustmted in the foll(l\\ing exchange between ~Iarlene ancl Rehecca. two members 
of a locus group asked to discuss a tele,ision dmma dealing with abortion lIS a 
moml issue. In the foU()\\ing extract. the intel'\iewer apparently misumlt'rstll\l(l~ 
Marlene's initial response to a (juestion (healing "elo(jllent" lL' "llwkwlIrd"I alul 
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subsequently seeks clarification of her referent. Rebecca Intervenes with a shared 
memory, which both she and Marlene understand as contradicting Marlene's earlier 
statement: 
Interviewer: 
Mmene: 
Interviewer: 
Mmene: 
Interviewer: 
Marlene: 
Rebecca: 
Marlene: 
Rebecca: 
So wbat did you think? In general. 
Parts of it were kind of unrealistic ...• I think the pro-life people ..•• 
They're not that eloquent and I don't think they're that knowledgeable. 
Not that awkward ..• 
Eloquent ••• and not that knowledgeable and also every. , , 
The pro-life people? . 
Yeah ••• and eveJ'l/One I've talked to basicallv told me a lie, so ... 
But remember th~ um, the false clinic that ';e went to ... 
•.. that one woman. , • 
That one woman was so eloquent. (Press, 1991. p. -132) 
In this extract, Rebecca contrasts the material in the TV drama with an actual 
experience, which Marlene shared, and their joint memories of this particular 
experience provoke a detailed discussion typical of what can occur when participants 
already know each other, 
In sum, focus groups enable feminist research to be "natur.ilistic" insofar as 
they mirror the processes of communic-ation in everyday social interaction, This is 
particuIarly the case when group members are friends or already acquainted and! 
or when they are discussing topiCS or issues within the range of their evelyday 
experiences. Focus groups themselves are not, of course, "natural" (in the sense 
of spontaneously arising). Theyare facilitated by a researcher for research purposes. 
There are debates within the literature about the extent to which they may be 
considered "naturalistic· (see, e.g., Morgan, 1993). However, tile interactions that 
take place within focus groups are closer to everyday social processes than those 
_ afforded by most other research methods. The use of focus groups allows feminist 
researchers to better meet the feminist research objective of aVOiding artificiality.-
Avoiding Decontextualization: Focus Groups are Social Contexts 
for Meaning-Making 
A focus group participant is not an individual acting in isolation. Rather, participants 
are members of a social group. all of whom interact with each other. In other . 
words, the focus group is itself a social context. As David Morgan. a leading focus 
group researcher, emphasized: "The hallmark of focus groups is the e:cpliclt /lse of 
group Interaction to produce data and inslghts that tcould be less a('ces.~ible tcit/Wllt 
the interaction found in a gro/lp" (Morgan, 198.'), p. 12; his emphasisl. These social 
interactions among participants constitute the primary data. 
The interactive data genemted by focus groups are bused on the premise that 
"all talk through which people generate meaning is contextual" (Dalllgren. 1988. 
p. 292). The social context of the focus group provides an opportunity to exmnine 
how people engage in genemting meaning. how opinions are formed. expressed. 
and (sometimes) modilled within the context of discussion and debate \\ith others. 
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As Jenny Kitzinger (1994b, pp. liO-lil) pointed out, in focus group discussions, 
me-mings are constantly negotiated and renegotiated: 
Participants do not just agree with e'JCh other, they also misunderst.md one another. 
question one another. tly to persuade euch other of the justice of their own point of 
view iIIld sometimes they vehemently disagree .•.• Such une:tpected dissent [can lend] 
them to clarify why they thought lIS they did. often ldentif)'ing aspects of their personal 
e:tperience which had altered their opinions or specific occnsions which had made 
them rethink their point of view .... People's different assumptions are thrown into 
relief by the w'<1Y in which tlley challenge one another: the quespons they ask. the 
sources they cite. iIIld which e:tplanations ~em to sway the opinion of other members 
of the group. . 
In the focus group, people take differing individual experiences and attempt to 
make "collective sense" of them (:\iorgan & Spmush. 1984. p. 259), It is tlus process 
of collective sense-making that occurs through the intemctions among focus group 
participants. 
In indi\idual inter\iews. the interaction is between the inter\iewer and a single 
interviewee; in focus groups, "a multitude ofinterpersonal d~llumics occur: thro~gh 
interactions people change theiniews, and "the unit of analysis becomes the group" 
(Crabtree. Yanoshik. Miller. & O·Connor. 1993. p. 144). Focus groups not only 
provide u context for the collection ofinteractive data. but also offer "the oppommity 
to obsen;e directly the gror~ process. In the individual inter\iew respondents tell 
how they would or did behave in a particular social situation. In the group inter\iew, 
respondents react to each other, and their behuvior is diret-tIy obsen;ed" (Goldman. 
1962. p. 62. his emphasis). An example of the way in wruch group processe5 can 
become a key part of the analysis is found in Michael Billig's (1992) work on talk 
about the British Royal Family. One of Billig's t'Oncems is the way people construct 
others as gullible and uncritical consumers of the media: they are used as "','ontr.lSti\'e 
others" to illustrate the speaker's own critical powers and thereby enhance his or 
her own identity. Billig described a group discussion among four people, aged 
between .59 and 66 and all related. plus the motller of one of them. aged 8i. whose 
"contributions to the conversation were often interruptions. as she told jokes or 
reminisced about poverty before the WdJ'. She even broke into song once: "I'm 
'Enery the Eighth I am: she sang. For periods. she remained mute. while the 
not-so-elderly got on with their nimble conversational business" (Billig. 1992. 
p. 159). It is tl1is woman who is t'Onstructed as the gullible other by her relatives. 
Billig analyzed the inter.lCtive mechanisms through wruch this othering (cf. Wilkin-
son & Kitzinger. 1996) is achieved. In his presentation of the data. one can see 
the process of othering at work and how the elaboration of the speaker's own 
identity depends on the interactive production of this t'Ontr.lStive other. (For a 
more extended discussion of the \V'ay in which Billig's analysis has made full use 
of the group interaction. see Wilkinson. 1998a.) Focus groups. then. ofler the 
researcher the opportunity to observe directly the coconstruction of meaning in a 
social context \ia the interactions of group participunts. . 
The few feminist rese.lrchers who ha,·e used focus groups (and other kinds of 
group work) hu\'e Similarly taken ud\'antuge of the method to illustrate how ur~u-
· .... -
' ..... 
97 
• 
Focus Groups 229 
ments are developed and identities elaborated in a group context, typically through 
challenge and provocation from other members of the group, For example. after 
viewing a televised reconstruction of the rape and murder of a young female 
hitchhiker, one participant in Schlesinger. Dobash, Dobash, and We-.lver's (1992, 
p, 146) research responds to another member of the focus group (who had expressed 
the opinion that the hitchhiker "was leading them on , , , the way she was dancing 
and her clothes as well, , , her top, her shirn with the unequivoc'oll statement: 
"Her clothes have got nothing to do with it, ~ She adds, "I didn't want to say anything 
bec'oluse my views are totally clear on this , , , .~ and she then expounds them at 
some length, The provOC'ation of the earlier speaker ensured ih'olt this woman's 
\iews were elicited and elaborated. Other examples of this include a (self-identified) 
"upper cl'olss~ teenage girl. whose remarks imply th'olt the beh'olvior of the working 
class is responsible for the problems of the class system and who is challenged by 
other discussion group members to defend this view (Frazer. 1988, p, 349). and 
female students in an elite law school, who elaborate their experiences of profound 
'ollienation (and support each other in so doing) in the context of provOC'ation from 
a male student who refers to "m'olking a mountain out of a molehill" (Fine & 
Addelston, 1996, pp, 131-132), 
The elaboration of meaning and identity through group interaction is also evident 
in an over-dinner group, in which "the text of conversation co-created by we sb:~ 
(Macpherson & Fine. 1995, p, 181) is used to el'olborate racial/ethnic differences 
'olmong the participants, Jmet (described by the authors as "Korem Americm~) is 
challenged by Shermik'ol. when she refers to Africm Americ'olDS 'olt her school: 
Shennika: I don't consider mvself no African-Amerie-.lR, 
Janet: That's the acceptable politically correct" , 
Shermika: I'm full American, I've never been to Africa. 
Junet: Are you black or wh[ite), , ,African-American? (Sorry,) , , 
(Janet inadvertently repe-~ted the "black or white" dichotomy tIlUt Shermiku had 
announced was excluding Janet.) 
Shermika: I'm neither one, 
Michelle: What racial group do you consider yourself? 
Shermika: Negro. Not black. not Afrie-.lR-American. That's just like saying all white 
people come from Europe. Why don't you call 'em Europe-American? 
(Macpherson & Fine, 199.5, pp. 188-189) 
Here. Shermika is defending ood el'olborating her identity ('olS "full American~ wd 
as "Negro") in the context of'ol challenge from 'ol group member. Janet's challenge 
also leads Shennik-.i to explain her reasons for these identity label choices (''I've 
never been to ACrie-a"), This exchwge then prompts Jwet to elaborate her o\\n 
identity, creating her own differences from Shennika. 
In sum, then, feminist focus group researchers have shown how the social CO!ltext 
of the focus group offers the opportunity to observe the coconstruction of meaning 
and the elaboration of identities through interaction, The interactive nature of 
focus group data produces insights that would not be available outside the group 
, context (although there is disappointingly little e\idence of sophisticated analyses 
by leminists of such interactive data). This emph'olSis on the person in context IIm~es 
the focus group ,an ideal method for leminist psychologists who see the sell 'olS 
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relational or as socially constructed and who argue. therefore. that feminist methods 
should be contextual. 
Avoiding Exploitation: Focus Groups Shift the Balance of Power 
Focus groups inevitably reduce the researchers power and control. Simply by 
virtue of the number of research participants simultaneously involved in the research 
interaction, the balance of power shifts away from the researcher. The researcher's 
influence is Mdiffused by the very fact of being in a group rather than a one-to--
one situationW (Frey at Fontana, 1993. p. 26). As the aim of a'focus group is to 
provide opportunities for a relatively free·flowing and interactive exchange of views, 
it is less amenable to the researcher's influence. compared with a one-tcrone 
interview. Focus groups place Mcontrol over [the} interaction in the hands of the 
participants rather than the researcherw (Morgan. 1988. p. 18). 
. In direct contrast to the goals of most feminist researchers, the reduced power 
and control of the researcher is typically identified as a disadvantage of the method 
in the mainstream focus group literature. As Richard Krueger. a leading handbook 
author. lamented: 
the rese-archer has less control in the group interview as compared to the individual 
interview. The focus group inteniew allows the participants to influence and interJ.Ct 
with each other. and, as a result. group members are able to influence the course of 
the discussion. This sharing ,of group control results in some inefficiencies such as 
detours in the discussion. and the raising of irrelevant issues. (Krueger. 1988, p. 46) 
Similarly. other researchers have warned that the potential of groups to "USUlp the 
moderatorW (Watts at Ebbutt. 198i. p. 32) may lead to "relatively chaotic data 
rollectionw (Kvaie. 1996. p. 101). The reassertion of control over focus group 
participants is seen as a management issue and is addressed by many of the "how 
toW books on focus groups. which offer advice for dealing with individual "problem" 
participants who do not behave in line \vith the researcher's requirements (e.g .• 
Krueger. 1988; SteW'J.rt at Shamdasani, 1990; Vaughn et al .• 1996). One focus group 
expert offered detailed instructions for maintaining power over participants in a 
section headed "Pest Controlw (Wells. 19i4). Moderator training is seen as essential 
and typically focuses around "leadership" issues. According to the handbooks. such 
tmining should enable the moderator to take "the role of nominal leader" (SteW'art & 
Shamdasani. 1990. p. iO) and to exercise "a mild. unobtrusive control over the 
group' (Krueger. 1988. p. i3). 
With this emphasis on the moderator's role. the issue of power and control in 
interactions among group members is rJ.rely addressed. either as a feature of focus 
group method or even as a management issue for the modemtor/researcher. A mre 
exception is a footnoted comment on the researcher's ethical obligation to deal 
with offensive comments. bu11~ing. or intimidation directed at other group members 
(]. Kitzinger. 1994u. p. 118). also suggesting how this may be done (e.g .. by consider-
ing group composition in advance. by usin)t dissent \vithin the group to cha11enge 
offensive remarks. or bv direct intervention to silence or move on the discussion). 
In general. the more subtle exercise of power relations among group members (e.g .. 
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apparent collusion in constructing a particular argument or silencing a particular 
member) is rarely made explicit and is addressed in the focus group literature only 
insofar as it can be reduced to a ·problem" generated by an individual group 
. '. member and ·solved" by direct Intervention of the researcher. Billig's (1992. 
p. 159) demonstration of the process by which a family constructs its oldest member 
as the gullible other is therefore an unusual exception (although note that the 
researcher appears here only as recorder/analyst. not as a participant In the group 
interaction). 
Some researchers do recognize that the reduction in the researcher's influence 
. in focus groups can be seen as an adv-antage. David Morgan (1988, p. 18) pointed 
out that ·participants' interaction among themselves replaces their interaction with 
the interviewer, leading to a greater emphasis on participants' points of view: 
Focus groups are sometimes presented as an opportunity for ·listening to local 
voices" (Murray. Tapson, Turnbull McCullum. & Little, 1994), for learning the 
participants' own language instead of imposing the researcher's language on them 
(Bers, 198;; Freimuth & Greenberg, 1986; Mays et al., 1992), and for gaining an 
insight into participants' conceptual worlds (Broom & Dozier, 1990). Focus groups 
can ullow participants much greater opportunity to set the research agenda and to 
·develop the themes most important to them" (Cooper, Diamond, & High. 1993), 
which may diverge from those identified by the researcher. Compared with a one-
to-one interview, it is much harder for the researcher to impose his or her own 
agenda in the group context. 
The relative lack of power and control held by the researcher in the focus group 
ullows the participants to challenge each other (Jarrett. 1993) and to challenge-or 
even to undermine-the researcher, insisting on their own interpretations and 
agendas being heard in place of the formal requirements of the research project. 
The follmving exchange is taken from the first few minutes of a focus group session 
in which the moderator (a 45-year-old man) attempts to set the agenda for the 
discussion. The participants are ·18- and 19-year-old 'vomen: _. 
Moderator: The discussion is on se:rual decision making and interpersonal relation-
ships between those of the female and those of male arr.mgements. 
Tomorrow night. we are talking to the guys to see what their view of 
this thing is. 
Participant: I'd like to listen to that. (laughter] 
Moderator: There is ever\' reason to believe that ... 
Participant: [Like] Oprah\\'infrey! (laughter] 
Moderator: There is every reason to believe that girls and guys see se, differently. 
Participant: I C'olII tell you that right now. [laughter] (Zeller, 1993, pp. 174-175) 
The interruptions, laughter. jokes, badinage, and cl)ptic comments of the partici-
pants cut across and m'er the formal introduction attempted by this modemtor. 
The apparent attempt to set particular discussion topics is undennined by the 
"oun" women. who f'ril'olousl\' compare his acrenda to that of a popular TV progml11 
4 0 • t't ... • 
or who imply that his (mther pompously presented) hypotheses are simply sell-
elident ("I c>lntell yoU that right now"). In this extmct the participants ure--<:ollu-
bomtil'ely-tuldng control ol'er the process of context-setting and hence contribut-
. .'.- ," 
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ing· to the detennination of the subsequent course and nature of this discussion. 
(To be fair, this author does aclmowledge the advuntages of this process.) 
Focus group researchers, then, are virtually unanimous that, compared with 
many other methods of data collection (especially the one-to-one interview), focus 
. groups reduce the researcher's influence. For some (e.g., Krueger, 1988), this is 
a disadvantage that, although offset by the numerous advantages of the method, 
needs careful management. For others (e.g., Morgan, 1988), it is an advantage that 
enables participants to contribute to setting the research agenda, resulting in better 
access to their opinions and conceptual worlds. But, whether identified as a problem 
or a benefit, researchers concur on the relative lack of power held by the focus 
group researcher. .. " <' 
The few feminists who have used focus groups (and other kinds of group work) 
have Similarly emphasized the shift in the balance of power-and particularly the 
extent to which the method enables research participants to speak in their own 
voice-to express their own thoughts and feelings and to determine their own 
agendas. In a recent article in the Psychology ofTtVomen Quarterly, Jeanette ~orris 
et al. (1996, p. 129) claimed that: "Within feminist research, focus groups have 
been used to provide a 'voice' to the research participant by ghing her an opportunity 
to define what is relevant and important to understand her experience: Feminist 
psycholOgist Oliva Espin (1995, p. 228), using focus groups in her exploration of 
immigrant/refugee women's understandings of selCllality and their internalization 
of cultural norms, commented that the method's Mopen-ended narratives allow for 
the expression of thoughts and feelings while inviting participants to introduce 
their own themes and concepts." Similarly,ln a study of women's reactions to violent 
episodes on television, Schlesinger et al. (1992, p. 29) saw the group discussions as 
an opportunity for women to Mdetermine their own agendas as much as pOSSible." 
(See also Griffin (1986) and Frazer (1988) for examples of how group discussions 
led the researcher to change the research questions to address participants' concerns 
better.) . 
The follOWing exchange arises in response to a (young, female) researcher's 
request to her focus 'group participants for examples of the excuses they use to 
avoid sex. Three young, heterosexual \vomen (Lata, Cath, and Helen), challenge 
the researcher's implication that young women have to find excuses to avoid ha\ ing 
sex with their male partners: 
Cath: 
Researcher: 
Lam: 
Cath: 
H"len: 
Laru: 
Cath: 
Lar~: 
Do you mean Uke reallv nuff excuses? 
Weli. an~thing that yo~ would use. 
But I mean .... 
But it depends how far you'ye got because that can go completely ... 
No. but ... no. but that just giyes you a few days respite doesn't it?-and 
then I think that after a f"w da~~ you'd just fe"! so shitty that ~uu had 
to relv on that. 
That'; horrible. wilY should you have to lie on an issue that is just 
perfectly right and ;·ou fe .. l strongly about. why do you have to t'Ome 
up with excuses? 
That's ri gh t. 
[ mean. 'i would much mther. it would b .. so nice just to b .. ahl .. to say 
no. for no particular reasun. I don't r .. ally lmow. [hawu't felt the n .... d 
to think "bout it. [ just don't particularly t,mcy it. 
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Helen: 
Lata: 
I just don't feel like it at the moment. 
Wouldn't that be nice! (Frith. 199;) 
233 
. Although these young women lire evidently able to generate excuses to avoid se:t, 
they reject the ide-a that this is an appropriate question for' the researcher to be 
asking or a desirable action in which to be engaged. 
In sum. feminist focus group researchers recognize that focus groups shift the 
balance of power and control toward the research participants. enabling them to 
assert their own interpretations and agendas. De~'Pite the disadvant-ages of this in 
some contexts (particularly when researching powerful--e.g .. male-groups: cf. 
Green. Barbour. Bernard. & Kitzinger. 1993). this reduction in thlt relative power 
of the researcher also allows the researcher to access better. understand. and tuke 
account of the opinions and conceptual worlds of research participants. in line with 
the suggested principles of feminist research. 
THE POTENTIAL OF FOCUS GROUPS FOR FEMINIST RESEARCH 
As I have shown. the particular advantages of focus groups for feminist research 
lire that they are relatively "naturalistic.' that they offer a social context for meaning-
making; and that they shift the bahmce of' power away from the researcher toward 
the research participants. In this manner. focus groups meet tile concerns of 
feminist researchers to avoid the problems of artificiality. decontextllalization. and 
exploitative power relations. There lire also other w'ars in which focus group method 
may benefit feminist research: for example. in the appropriateness of focus groups 
for use with underrepresented and severely disadvantaged social groups. theirvalue 
for action research. and the role of focus groups in consciousness-raising. 
Work u:ith underrepre,~ented social groups. Some focus group researchers have 
----. suggested that focus groups may be' particularly useful for accessing the \iews of 
those who have been poorly sen'ed by traditional research: 
Social research hus not done well in reaching people who are isolated by the daily 
exhausting struggles for su"i,'lll. senices and dignity-people who will not respond 
to surveys or whose experiences. illsights and reelings lie outside the mnge of data 
survey methods. These people are also uncomfortable with individual inte" iews. We 
found that almost all elements in the community could be a<:cessed in tile safe and 
familiar context of their own turf. relations and 'organizations through focus groups. 
(Plaut. Landis. & Trevor. 199:3. p. 216) 
Focus group partiCipants have included. for example. difficult-to-reach. high-risk 
families in an inner city (Lengua et al .• 1992): Black gay men (Ma~'S et al .• 1992). 
the elderly (Chapman & Johnson. 199.5). and village \vomen in rural counties of 
China (Wong. 11. Bunis. & Xiang. 1995). Such use of focus groups is in line \vith 
the proposal that feminist research should pay particular attention to the needs of 
"those who [havellittle or no societ:!1 voice' (Rubin & Rubin. 199.5. p. 36). and 
feminist focus group researchers have similarly used the method in researching 
the lives of immigmntlrefugee women (Espin. 199.5) and urban African Amerielm 
preadolescents and young adolescents IMng in poverty (Vera. Reese. Paikoff. & 
Jarrett. 1996). 
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Actfon research. Some focus group researchers have suggested that the method 
"has promise in action researchw (Vaughn et al., 1996, p. 32), that it C'an be used 
radically "to empower and to foster social change- (Johnson, 1996, p. 536). For 
'. example, Raymond Padi!1a (1993) described a project to overcome barriers to the 
success of Hispanic students in a U.S. community college, based on the work of 
Brazilian educator Paulo Friere. He Used focus groups as a "dialogical method- to 
empower research subjects to change their own lives as part of "a larger project 
of politiC'.u freedom, cultunU autonomy, and liberation from oppressive economic 
and social conditions- (p. 154). It is the project's intent that 
",l 
By criticulIy examining thrOugh dialogue the problematic aspectS 'of their own Uves. 
the subjects are 'dble to gain the critic:d understanding th..t is necessary to identify 
viable alternatives to existing social arrangements and to take appropriate actions to 
change and improve their own lives. (PadiIIa. 199.1, p. 154) 
Some feminists have also wanted their research to have direct practical effects in 
women's lives and have used focus groups (and other kinds of group work) in 
action research projects. For example, Maria Mies (1983), in a project aiming to 
make practical provision for battered women, insisted that, in order to implement 
a nonhierarchical egalitarian research process, to ensure that research serves the 
interests of the oppressed, to develop political awareness, and to use her own 
relative power in the interests of other women, "interviews of individuals .•. must 
be shifted towards group discussions, if possible at repeated interva!sW (p. 128). 
Mies' view is that "this collectivization of women's experience ... helps women to 
overcome their structur.U isolation in their families and to understand that their 
individual sufferings have social causes" (p.128). Similarly, Jean Orr's (1992) project 
. on Well Women Clinics "encourages members to see that problems are olten not 
caused by personal inadequacy but are based in current social structure" (p. 32). 
offering "support to members in changing aspects of their lives" and enabling them 
to "feel confident in asserting their needs to others" (p. 32) within the Community 
Health Movement and beyond. (Further examples of the use of focus groups in 
. feminist action research on health issues may be found in de Koning & Martin's 
(1996) edited collection.) 
Consciousness-raising. The similarities between focus group discussions and 
the consciousness-raising sessions common in the early years of second wave femi-
nism have fueled the interest of sever.u feminist researchers. Noting that it W'dS 
through consciousness raising that Lynn Farley (1978) came to identify and name 
the experience of ·sexual harassment: feminist sociologist Came Herbert (1989) 
included group discussions in her work with young women on their experience of 
sexual harassment. Similarly. Michelle Fine (1992, p. 173), chronicling a set of group 
discussions with adolescent girls. claimed that "through a feminist methodology we 
call'collective consciousness work: we sculpted ... a way to theorize consciousness. 
moving from stridently indi\idualist feminism to a collective sense of women's 
solidarity among difference: Feminist researchers using focus gn>up work in this 
w.IY (cf. ~lies. 1983: Orr, 1992) hope that. through meeting together with others 
and sharing experience and through realizing group comll1onalities in whllt hall 
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previously been considered individual and personal problems, women will deVelop 
a clearer sense of the social and political processes through which their experiences 
are constructed and perhaps also a desire to organize against them.It has to be 
said, however, that other researchers using focus groups are less sanguine about 
their consciousness raising potential. Jenny Kitzinger's (l994a) focus groups' discus-
sions ofHIV risk offer salutaxy counterexamples of the alleged consciousness raising 
benefit of group discussion. In several groups, she said, "any attempt to address 
the risks HIV poses to gay men were drowned out by a ritual period of outcl)' 
against homosexualityM (J. Kitzinger, 1994a, p. 108). 
Given the advantages of focus groups, it is perhaps surprisin~ that they are not 
more widely used by feminist researchers. Among the qualitative 'methods available 
to feminists, the one-to-one interview is the most commonly used technique: accord-
ing to some researchers (Kelly, Burton, & Regan, 1994, p. 34), it has become "the 
paradigmatic 'feminist method': Many of the classic qualitative studies in feminist 
psychology use the one-to-one interview as their only or primary research tool 
(e.g., Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, & TaruIe. 1986: Chesler, 19i2: GiIligan. 1982: 
Walker, 19i9). Of the It empirical articles published in the first si" volumes 
(1991-1996) of the international journal Feminism i.- Psychology, 43 (56%). used 
interviews, and no other qualitative method was used in more than 10% of studies. 
Over a similar period, Psychology afWomen Qllarterly published 25 studies using 
interviews, although these constituted a much smaller proportion of the total num-
ber of empirical articles (only li%), with no other qualitative method used in more 
than 2% of studies. Focus groups were rarely used: in the same period, there were 
8 focus group studies published in F&P and only 1 in PWQ (plus two studies that 
used group discussions). 
I would suggest that there are many reported instances of the use of intel'\iews 
in feminist research where focus groups could have met the researcher's aims 
_ better, provided fuller or more sophisticated answers to the research question. or 
addressed particular methodolOgical concerns. For example, Niobe Way (1995) -
interviewed 12 girls in~vidually to answer the question: "What are the various 
ways urban, poor, and working-class adolescent girls speak about themselves. their 
schools and their relationships to parents and peers over a three-year period?" 
(p. 109). Given the stated assumptions of this study, including that research is 
"inherently relationalM (p. 109) and that "the words of adolescents cannot be sepa-
rated from the cultural and societal context of which they are a part" (p. 109), it 
seems that focus groups might have been a better methodologicul choice. It is 
particularly surprising that the work of the Humm:i Project on Women's Psychology 
and Girls' Development (e.g., Brown & GiIligan, 1983: Gilligan. 1982: Taylor et 
al., 1996), which theorizes the self as fundamentallv "relational: relies almost 
exclUSively on indi\idual intel'\iews with young wome'n. 
Finally, although it is a pity that there is not greater use of focus groups in 
feminist research. it is also a pity that there is not better use of focus groups. 
capitulizing on their partieular advantages us a method. I \vill close by highlighting 
some of the main problems in the current lIse of focus groups (by feminists and 
others) and indicate the wm"S in which these could be overcome. in order to 
m'Lximize the value of the m~thod as a toollor leminist research. These problems 
are inappropriate use of focus groups, neglect of group illtenictions. and insumcient 
epistemolo!,rie,t! warranting. I \viII look briefly at each. 
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Inappropriate use of f0CU3 group.!. Although the "how to" books include advice 
on "how not to" (and also "when not to") use focus groups (e.g .• Morgan & Krueger. 
. . 1993; Vaughn et al., 1996). this advice is often disregarded, not least by feminist 
focus group researchers. For e=ple, although the textbooks caution against using 
focus groups as a quick and easy way of increasing sample size, indic-.lting that the 
method is unsuitable for conducting large-scale studies. it is not uncommon for 
researchers to present as their rationale for using focus groups that they are "effec_ 
tive and economic-.u in terms of both time and money" (Espin. 199.'5. p. 228). or 
that they are "a means of gathering qualitative data from a relatively large sample" 
(Lampon.1995. p. 1il). Similarly, although the handbooks warn against inllppropri- . 
ate quantific-ation of focus group dara (cf. Morgan & Kruege·r: 1993. p. 1-1). this. 
too, is often apparent: for example. Gel'".lghty (1980) olfered a statisti~-aI profile of 
donors to a particular charity based on four focus groups. and Flexner. McLaughlin. 
and Littlefield (19;;) presented i\ graph comparing three focus groups ("consum-
ers: "potential consumers: and "providers" of abortion senices) in tenns of the 
avel'".lge ranks given by members of each group to features of an abortion service. 
More recently, an article included in a special issue of QlttzlitCltil:e Health Research 
on "Issues and Applications of Focus Croups" (Carey. 199.5) clltegorized the social 
service concerns of HIV -positive women and tabulated the number of responses 
coded under each category (Seals et al., 199.'5). This is despite at least two injunctions 
elsewhere in the special issue not to quanti(v focus group data. 
Neglect of group interactions.. Although intemction among group participants 
is supposed to be a defining' characteristic of focus group methods. one re,iew of 
over 40 published reports of focus group studies "could not find a Single one 
concentl'".lting on the conversation between participants and vel~; few that even 
included any quotations from more than one participant at a time" (J. Kitzinger • 
. 1994a, p. 104). For this article, I re\iewed almost 200 focus group studies I'".lnging 
in date of publication from 1946 to 1996. \vith the same result. Focus group chlta 
are most commonly p.resented as if they were one-ta-one inter-iew data. with 
intemctions among group participants mrely reported. let alone analyzed. This is 
despite clear statements in the focus group litemture that "researchers who use 
focus groups and do not attend to the impact of the group setting \ViII incompletely 
or inappropriately analyze their data" (Carey & Smith. 1994, p. 125). The extmcts 
quoted in this article are not. in fact. typic-.u of the w'ay in which focus group chlta 
are normally reported. I have deliberately sought out those mre published examples 
of intemctive data in order to make the best possible case for the use of focus 
groups. In presenting these data extracts. I have often dl'".lwn attention to intemc-
tional features that are not commented on bv the authors themselves. More ~'()m­
monly. the focus is on the content mther than the process of intel'".lction. One 
wishes feminist focus !ITOUp researchers were producina analyses of interactions 
'" '" -approaching the sophistication of that offered by Billig (1992). 
Insufficient epistemologic(/llL'(/rranting. In common \vith other ~pes of qualita-
tive data. data from focus groups are open to either essentialist or social constnIctio~~­
ist interpretations (Cuba & Lincoln. 1994: cf. also C. Kitzinger & Powell. 1990 '. 
For feminist researchers working within an essentialist fmme. it may be the mices 
of indi\idual women (speaking \vith, or in contmdiction to. other women) that tht'Y 
\vish to hear. and for them focus groups offer a valuable route to "the in<li\ idual 
• 
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in socia1 contextW (Goldman, 1962; Rubin &: Rubin. 1995. p. 95), These researchers 
may well argue that focus group data are more "authenticw or "closer to the essential 
meanings of women's lives· than data elicited by other methods. Within a social 
constructionist (or postmodernist or discursive) frame. however. focus group data 
are just as constructed--albeit diff'erently-as. say. responses to an opinion poll or 
behavior in a laboratory setting. Viewed within this frame. the method offers access 
to "the patterns of talk and interaction through which the members of any group 
constitute a shared reality" (Devault. 1990. p. 9;). The analytic emphasis is on the 
construction and negotiation of persons and events. the functions served by different 
discourses. and-for feminists-tbe ways in which social inequalities are produced 
and perpetuated through talk (cf. Wilkinson &: Kitzinger. 1995. for'further examples 
of this approach). However. focus group rese-archers rarely offer a clear epistemolog-
ical warrant for the interpretation of their data, and there is a great deal of slippage 
between essentialist and social constructionist frames. 
In conclusion. this article has argued that focus groups offer considerable potential 
for the future development of feminist research in and beyond psychology in ways 
congruent with feminist goals. I do not embrace the orthodoxy that qualitative 
methods are "quintessentially feministW (Maynard &: Purvis. 1994. p. 3). nor do I 
believe that any particular method can be deSignated feminist per se (cf. \Vilkinson. 
1986. p. 14). Indeed, as Peplau and Conrad (1989. p. 3;9) observed, "no method 
coines with a feminist guarantee." FollOwing Peplau and Conrad (1989). I do not 
seek to define feminist research in psychology primarily at the methodological level 
but rather to evaluate a particular method-. the focus group-in terms of its 
usefulness in the pursuit of feminist goals. Within this context. I have shown that 
focus groups are a valuable method for feminist research because they meet three 
key feminist goals: they enable relatively "naturalistic" research. give due account 
to social context. and shift the balance of po\ver in research. They are also useful 
in work with underrepresented groups. in action research. and in consciousness-
i-aisiilg. , . 
In order to realize the potential of focus groups as a research method, however. 
feminist researchers cOUld develop a better awareness of the appropriate uses of 
focus groups and the functions they can-and c-annot-serve. In general. focus 
group method is well suited to research questions involving the elicitation and 
clarific-ation of perspectives. the construction and negotiation of meanings. the 
generation and elaboration of hypotheses. and a whole range of exploratory analyses. 
It is poorly suited to research questions involving the estimation of frequencies. 
the testing of causal relationships. gener.ilizations to larger populations. comparisons 
between population groups. and most types of inferential analysis. It would also 
be useful for feminist researchers to pay more attention to the interactive nature 
of focus groups. reporting and analyzing interactions among group participants in 
ways that do justice to their role in meaning-making. Finally, feminist researchers 
could more clearly identify the epistemological fmmeworks that inform their inter-
pretations of focus group data in order to waIT-mt the particular analyses they 
present. 
It is true that, at present, focus groups are not widely used by leminist psycholo-
gists, perhaps because. as Jill Morawski (1994, pp. 21-22) stated, "Attempts to 
study women's experiences that. take seriously the transindhidual, contextually 
embedded. or SOcially constructed nature of those experiences risk using methodolo-
...•. 
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gies that are appropriate to their mandate but that fail to meet orthodox standards 
of the sclence.~ We have. as psychologists. undergone training within a discipline 
that has "placed a high value on quantification and imbued us with suspicion of 
. . alternative methods and non-positivistic sclence~ (Mednick. 1991. p. 618). If, how-
ever. as feminist psychologists we agree on "the need for more iriteractive. conte:ctu-
alized methods in the service of emancipatory goals~ (Riger. 1992. p. i36). then 
feminist psychology needs to be bolder in its challenge to the orthodoxies of the 
discipline. It needs to harness "varied epistemological forces from empiricism 
and materialism to utopianism and postmodernism. in order to construct feminist 
sclence~ (Morawski & Agronick. 1991. p. 5i5. my emphasis). and it needs to 
demonstrate a commitment to "developing and testinginnovatiVi!'eoncepts. methods 
and applications for understanding and empowering women~ (Russo. 1995. p. 1). 
The continued use and further development of focus group method offer feminist 
psychology an eltcellent opportunity for the future. 
Initial subm • ..wn: Nocember 17, 1996 
Initial acceptance: janllanj 22, 1997 
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ENDNOTE 
I am delighted to report that the field of f()(US group research has developed COnsiderably since 
this article was accepted for publication. Second editions of several of the classic handbooks have 
appeared. as weD as a number of new texts. TIlere is now a growing body of feminist focus group 
research. and some of the researchers referenced in this article (e.g. Niobe \\' ay, members of the 
Harvard Project) have moved from exclusive reliance on one·to-one Intenie\Vs to Include group 
discussions in their work. More up-to-date reviews of the field have also been published. Including 
two of my own. on the use of f()(US groups in health research (\VUkinson. 1998b) and across the 
social sciences (WUkinson. 1998c). 
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WHOSE BREAST IS IT ANYWAY? 
A Feminist Consideration of Advice and 
'Treatment' for Breast Cancer 
SUE WILKINSON 
Institute oC Nursing Studies. University of Hull. Hull. HU6 7RX, UK 
CELlA KrrziNOI!R 
Soda! ScIences Department, Loughborough University, Loughborough, LEII 3TtJ, UK 
~ f.: 
S1DOpsis -In asserting the imponance of breast cancer as a feminist issue, the authors look at the 
ueatment oC women with breast cancer, both at the hands oC the medical proCession and within the 
'alternative,' self-help movement. The authors argue that both orthodox medicine and 'New Age' 
healing are harmful to women with breast cancer, and that a feminist approach is badly needed. 
The authors sketch out some oC the characteristics oC such a theory and consider how it has in-
formed, and might continue to inform, practice. 
BREAST CANCER: A FEMINIST ISSUE 
It is a central tenet of feminism that wom-
en's invisible private wounds often reflect 
social and political injustices, It is a com-
mitment central to feminism to share bur-
dens. And it is an axiom of feminism that 
the personal is political (Datan. 1989. p_ 
17S)_ 
___ Nancy Datan. the feminist psychologist 
now dead from breast Cancer. who wrote 
these words. was calling for the development 
of feminist theory and practice around the is-
sue of breast cancer. In this article we look in 
more detail at the harm that is done to 
women with breast cancer both by orthodox 
medicine and by alternative philosophies of 
'self-help.' We then sketch out some of the 
main features which we see as essential to de-
veloping a feminist approach to breast cancer 
and its 'treatment_' 
A version of this paper was first presented at the 
Women's Studies Network (UK) ConC.rence, London, 
July 1991. At that time, Sue Wilkinson was based in the 
depanment oC Social Science and Policy Studies. Coven-
try Polytcchnic. and Celia Kitzinger was based in the De· 
partment oC Psychology. University of Surrey. 
The authors would like to thank Susan Liroff of th. 
Women's Cancer Resource Center, Berkeley, California, 
for hospitality and information provided during their 
visit th.re in March 1992. 
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Breast cancer is a major health issue for 
women: There are 22.000 cases per year in 
England and Wales (OPCS statistics for 
1985. published 1990). One in 12 of us devel-
ops breast cancer at some point in our lives. 
and it is the leading cause of death for women 
in the 4S-64 age group. For lesbians. the risk 
of breast cancer is even higher because fewer 
of us have borne children: The incidence of 
breast cancer is about doubled for women 
who postpone childbearing until after the age 
of 30. or who do not have children (MacMa-
hon. 1970. quoted in Travis. 1988)_ 
Breast cancer is not just physically trau-
matic. but also causes tremendous emotional 
distress. Jo Spence. the feminist photogra-
pher. diagnosed as having breast cancer (and 
who has since died) writes about how "I have 
had to face the fact that I am totally vulnera-
ble. able to die. to feel terror. to be terror-
ized" (Spence. 1986). Many women seriously 
consider killing themselves during the period 
of physical recovery from mastectomy (2511/0 
in one study: Wellisch. Jamison. & Pasnau. 
1978). Few women feel they are getting ade-
quate support from their family and friends: 
In one study more than half said the support 
was inadequate and nearly three-quarters 
said that other people seemed to avoid and 
fear them (Peters-Golden. 1982). And. in-
deed, other people do: 610;0 of healthy people 
~---~ 
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say they might avoid contact with a friend 
who had cancer (Peters-Golden, 1982). 
'. MALE CONSTRUCI10NS A1IID 
MEDICAL PRACI1CE 
The experience of breast cancer is clearly in-
fluenced by the cultural emphasis on breasts 
as objects of male sexual interest and male 
sexual pleasure: 
Given that women are expected to be the 
object of the male gaze, are expected to 
beautify themselves in order to become 
loveable, are still fighting for basic rights 
over their own bodies, it seemed to me 
that the breast could be. seen as a meta-
phor for our struggles ..• (Spence, 1986, 
p. 155). 
The 'page 3' mentality is reproduced in the 
medical and psychological literature, as well 
as the material from major cancer charities. 
. In one advertisement, two images are juxta-
posed: a shadowed breast and a perfect, lus-
cious pear. Superimposed on the breast, 
around the nipple, are three dotted circles, 
containing the instruction 'press.' Breast self-
examination is triviaJised in the manner of a 
smutty seaside postcard. The illustrations for 
a breast self -examination leaflet produced by 
the Women's National Cancer Control Cam-
paign (reproduced in Baum, 1988) are indis-
tinguishable from soft porn. The convention-
ally attractive, slim, white model poses coyly, 
self-consciously stroking her large 'perfect' 
breasts. 
The routine use in the medical literature of 
words like "disfigurement, ""mutilation," 
and "lop-sided" to describe the post-mastec-
tomy patient both reinforces women's own 
sense of their bodily imperfections and re-
flects men's horror. at wounded female 
bodies. 
Throughout the medical and psychological 
literature the implicit assumption is that wom-
en's breasts are there for men's sexual plea-
sure. When women express concern about the 
loss of their breasts, this is frequently trivial-
ised: "no one will know" or "we can make you 
a new one." One woman who was told she 
would have to have a mastectomy recounts 
how her surgeon broke the news: 
"It's not the end of the world," he beamed. 
"I can make you another one. If you were 
my wife, I'd want you to have it." (prior, 
1987, p. 920) 
There seems to be more concern about the 
effect of mastectomy on women's husbands 
than on the women themselves. One adver-
tisement, portraying a worried-looking man, 
asks: "How would a mastectomy affect your 
other half1" The text continues: "A woman's 
breast cancer can seriously affect someone 
else. Her partner •.. Macmillan Breast Care 
nurses talk at length to men about their loved 
ones' cancer. . . . " 
Despite the heterosexism of this advert, 
many men do find breast cancer distressing-
about half the women in one study said that 
their husbands found looking at their scar 
distressing (Meyerowitz, 1981, cited in Mey-
erowitz, Chaiken, & Clark, 1988)-and psy-
chologists have developed 'treatment' for 
such men, including 'systematic desensitisa-
tion,' which entails deep relaxation as stead-
ily more distressing scenarios are presented in 
sequence (Tarrier & Maguire, 1984). 
The medical profession is especially con-
cerned to ensure that men have sexual inter-
course with their post-mastectomy wives. 
This is, in fact, part of what is meant by "nor-
malisation of life to pre-mastectomy status." 
Women who have had mastectomies are di-
agnosed as suffering from "sexual dysfunc-
tion" if they have "stopped intercourse or 
ceased to enjoy it" (Maguire, 1978). The re-
strictedness of this definition and its offen-
siveness to all women - especially lesbians-
is self-evident. Moreover, sometimes women 
themselves are not even consulted about their 
sexuality. In one study, the husbands of mas-
tectomy patients were asked about their over-
all sexual satisfaction and about the fre-
quence with which their wives submitted to 
sexual intercourse (WeIlisch et al., 1978). 
Mastectomy and after 
The emphasis on sexuality and body im-
age - meaning being attractive to men and 
engaging in sexual intercourse with them-
is a major preoccupation of the psychiatric 
and psychological literature on mastectomy. 
There is very little discussion of other issues 
in relation to breast loss - breast feeding, or 
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explaining (or concealing) the loss of a breast 
to a child, for example. 
Treatment of women post-mastectomy fo-
.. c:uses on encouraging women to "look femi-
nine" as quickly as possible (Meyerowitz et 
al., 1988). Nurses are told to help women to 
do their hair nicely and apply make-up while 
still in their hospital beds (Anstice, 1970; 
Byrd. 1975). 
Prostheses are fitted as soon as possible. A 
prosthesis is a false breast made of lambs-
wool to be stuffed inside a bra, or a breast-
shaped pocket to serve as a substitute breast. 
These (according to the North American 
"Reach to Recovery"booklet) can be weighted 
with birdseed, rice, small plastic beads, fish-
ing sinkers, or gunshot. Eventually women 
are fitted with protheses made of plastic, sili-
con, or rubber. In the UK, NHS protheses are 
marketed with names like "Carefree," "Tru 
Life," and "Confidante" (Baum, 1988). In the 
USA there is one c:a1led "Nearly Me," mar-
keted by' Ruth Handler, described as "the 
woman who ••• dared to put bosoms on Bar-
bie Doll" (c.f. Daly, 1979). 
Discomfort in wearing a prosthesis is a 
commonly reported physical complaint fol-
lowing mastectomy. Yet the message a woman 
gets on the first morning after surgery is to 
"get fitted." The message for a woman who 
has just had a mastectomy is that her body is 
now defective, and that her first priority will 
. be to seek an artificial cosmetic remedy. a life-
time of disguise. There is little room for ac-
cepting the loss oCa breast. the wound. and the 
scar that healing will bring. 
Increasingly here and in the United States. 
so-called "breast reconstruction" is heavily 
marketed. This involves taking new skin and 
tissue from another part of a woman's body. 
and. keeping the blood vessels intact. these 
are swung around to form a mound on the 
site of the original breast. Alternatively. the 
breast tissue can be substituted by a plastic 
sac which is laced under the skin and then 
filled with fluid until the "correct" size is 
reached (Fallowfield & Clark. 1991). 
Twenty thousand women in the United 
States undergo breast reconstruction each 
year. No wonder-when post-mastectomy pa-
tients in the United States are routinely given, 
on the day after their mastectomy, a leaflet 
written by the American Society of Plastic and 
Reconstructive Surgeons, Inc. It says: 
If you are like most women, your breasts 
have great psychological significance to 
you and you will feel more feminine and 
more secure socially and sexually with a 
reconstructed breast follOwing mastec-
tomy for cancer. (Datan. 1989. p. 181) 
Breast reconstruction does not. of course, re-
store sensation to a breast; the implant can 
result .in heavy bleeding and infection. and 
further surgery may be needed if it shifts po-
sition. After a: breast .reconstruction. recur-
rences of cancer on the chest wall are much 
harder to detect. 
Michael Baum. Professor of Surgery at 
the Royal Marsden Hospital, has said re-
cently that a main goal of breast reconstruc-
tion is "to establish symmetry between the 
new breast mound and the remaining breast" 
(Baum. 1988). He also says "this may entail 
reduction mammoplasty for the other side": 
in other words. they chop bits off the healthy 
breast to make it 'match' the reconstructed 
one-most likely for women with large 
breasts. bigger than a size B bra cup. Baum 
also aims "to create a pleasing nipple/areola 
complex"-he does NOT mention that this 
may entail using skin from the remaining nip-
ple or from the labia (Faulder. 1989). 
The language used in the medical litera-
ture in discussing breast reconstruction is all 
about exciting new medical advances to im-
. prove on women's bodies. They write. for ex-
ample. of "ingenious new techniques" to en- . 
able "the exhibition of a modest degree of 
cleavage" (Baum. 1988). 
How far can these preoccupations be 
taken? One woman tells of the pressure put 
on her. following mastectomy and breast re-
construction. to have a second mastectomy 
(of her healthY breast)-and of her regrets: 
My own second mastectomy, performed 
at the time of breast reconstruction, was 
prophylactic. My surgeon said he could 
not offer "a good match" after reconstruc-
tion unless. both breasts were recon-
structed and I allowed myself to be swayed 
to his belief. Now. I regret sacrificing my 
healthy left breast ... If I had to do it 
again. I would not trade a healthy, func-
tioning breast just to try to achieve what a 
surgeon calls "a better match". It is a last-
ing regret. I could have breastfed our son 
.-._------ -------
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if I had resisted that surgeon's coercion 
••• (JoMson, 1987, p. 101). 
'. If these examples seem incredibly offen-
sive, it is worth pointing out that even the 
most cursory glance at the breast cancer liter-
ature yields many more examples of this 
lcind. Of course, we are not saying that all 
medical and health care practitioners are like 
that, or suggesting that such instances should 
debar women from seelcing needed medical 
help. But such attitudes and practices reflect 
assumptions and values widely held within 
the culture, so it is perhaps not surprising 
that we have found the psychological and 
medical literature redolent with sexism and 
heterosexism. Nor are we saying that (the 
few) feminists-particularly sociologists-
worlcing in cancer medicine have failed to of-
fer a critique of its man-made orthodoxy 
(e.g., Morris, 1983), or its disregard and dis-
tortion of women's experience (e.g., Rosser, 
1981). However, it is clear that these lone 
voices remain largely unheard in the medical 
wilderness. 
HEAL THYSELF: 'ALTERNATIVE' 
HEALmCARE 
What the "self-help" books say 
The medical profession, at best, denies 
- ~. women power; at the worst, it reduces us to 
the state of passive victims. Feeling this loss 
of control, this passivity and powerlessness in 
men's hands, and desperate to "do some-
thing" about their illness, it is little wonder 
that many women turn to thecomplemen-
tary, fringe or holistic health care move-
ments, which appear to offer women a mea-
sure of control and power over their lives. 
Many women are now involved in these. 
When Sue O'Sullivan co-ordinated a day 
workshop on 'Women, Health and Sexuality' 
at an adult education institute she was not 
prepared for: 
•.•. the number of women who were so 
wound up in holistic medicine that re-
actions to oppression and exploitation, as 
well as health, were individualised into a 
matter of a 'state of mind'. Not only could 
you prevent cancer through being 'in tune' 
with your mind and body, you could tran-
scend sexism by the same method. (0'5u1-
Iivan, 1984, p. 51) 
Because we are psychologists, we have 
looked particu1arly at the psychological 
c1aims made by many of the popular "self-
help" books and tapes available for women 
with cancer. The basic argument of these 
books and tapes is that we give ourselves can-
cer because of unhealthy attitudes, personal-
ity, or behaviour-and that we can get rid of 
it by developing positive, thinking and/or a 
healthier lifestyle. . , 
Such ideas are, in fact, neither 'new' nor 
'alternative': as long ago as 200 AD the Ro-
man physician Galen had observed that 'mel-
ancholic' women were more likely to get 
breast cancer than 'sanguine' women, and the 
association between cancer and certain 'men-
tal dispositions' can be traced on through his-
tories of medicine (Bro~n, 1987). It is cer-
tainly part of current medical orthodoxy, as 
indicated in a 1991 article in the British Medi-
cal Journal: . 
Certain personality traits, such as ten-
dency to suppress emotion, especially 
anger, and to respond to stress by using a 
repressive coping style, have been found 
to be commoner in patients with cancer. 
(Lovestone & Fahy, 1991, p. 1219). 
Ellen Goudsmit and Robin Gadd (1991) pres-
ent a compelling argument for the 'psycho-
logising' of women's physical illness as typ-
ical. 
There is a plethora of popular and semi-
popular books and tapes available for the 
cancer sufferer. We will look at how the ar-
guments are developed in three widely read 
"self-help manuals" - Penny Brohn's The 
Bristol Programme; Rachael Clyne's Cancer: 
Your Life. Your Choice; and Colin Ryder 
Richardson's Mind over Cancer-and in a 
tape by Louise Hay called Cancer: Discover-
ing Your Healing Power. This tape is a best 
seller at feminist bookshops (we got it at 
Silver Moon in London). These books and 
tapes exude an aura of warmth and hope: 
They talk of nature, spirituality, and love; 
their covers depict rainbows (Richardson), 
leaves (Brohn), hearts (Hay), and a circle of 
people with linked arms (Clyne). All take an 
holistic view of health and illness: 
--, -~------------'----
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Cancer can be broadly viewed as the result 
of decreasing co-operation with the natu-
ral flow of life (Clyne, 1989, p. 60) 
'. Cancer or similar diseases are illnesses of 
the weakened spirit which is off balance 
and has lost the rhythm of life, of love 
(Richardson, 1988, p. 105). 
These booles and tapes say we are responsible 
for giving ourselves cancer; that we can cure 
ourselves of it; that we choose whether to get 
well or not; that it is our own fault if we die. 
Individual, personal responsibility at every 
step is the overwhelming message of the 'self-
help'literature. 
Louise Hay's tape says we cause cancer by 
our thoughts and beliefs: 
It is my belief that we are each 100070 re-
sponsible for every experience in our 
lives - the best and the worst. We all create 
our experiences by the thoughts we think 
and the words we speak. The universe to-
tally supports us in every thought we 
choose to think and believe. Our subcon-
scious mind accepts whatever we choose to 
believe • • . And we have unlimited choice 
about what we can think ••• Resentment, 
criticism and guilt are the most damaging 
mental thought patterns we can have. This 
kind of thinking creates and maintains dis-
ease in the body. Acid, biting thoughts of-
ten create acid blood and your blood is your 
life force. These thoughts liter~y eat away 
at the body. Criticism as a permanent habit 
can often lead to arthritis. Guilt always 
looles for punishment and creates pain. 
And resentment,long held, eats away at the 
body and becomes the dis-ease we call can-
cer. (Hay, 1984) 
For Colin Richardson, "negative atti-
tudes" lead to "negative behaviour patterns," 
which in turn damage the body: 
Perhaps you are young and have breast 
cancer - so why have you got this illness? 
Have you been on the pill? Have you had 
affairs of the heart too often? If you have 
been a mother, have you naturally breast 
fed your children? Has your past life been 
totally blameless? Haven't you somehow 
abused yourself sexually? Most cancers are 
preventable and are found mainly in per-
sons guilty of self-abuse. Just know that 
cancers are far less common in disciplined 
societies - it is for example rare for nuns to 
have cancer of the neck of the womb ••• 
(Richardson, 1988, pp. 100-101). 
Richardson's misogyny continues as he sug-
gests husbands may have cancer because their 
wives drink, shoplift, or are 'unfaithful'; and 
children may have cancer because their moth-
ers smoked while pregnant. 
Responsible for causmg our cancer, we 
must take personal responsibility for getting 
rid of it. All that is needed is to harness the 
power of positive thought: 
The fll'st step usually involves coming to 
terms with our reality; being willing to 
accept our feelings and circumstances 
exactly as they are, without condition. 
Strangely enough this in itself can produce 
a powerful sense of freedom - a change in 
the way we experience something that 
takes the burden or significance of it 
away. Accepting something from the 
point of view of responsibility then begins 
to create this opportunity of choice, the 
opportunity that we can choose to experi-
ence our situation another way. (Clyne, 
1989, pp. 84-85) 
The next step is to 'let go' of negative pat-
terns of thought: -
When we want to begin to change a condi-
tion, one of the first things to do is to say 
so. Literally say 'I am willing to release 
that pattern within me that is creating this 
experience or condition.' You can say this 
to yourself over and over every time you 
think of your illness ...• The minute you 
say it you are stepping out of the victim 
role. You are no longer helpless. You are 
acknowledging your own power. (Hay, 
1984) 
We must forgive our abusers, accept life 
exactly as it is and - particularly - offer our-
selves total and unconditional love: 
If we are open to the giving and receiving 
of love we are becoming part of the most 
powerful force in the universe .... 
... -.-.. __ .. __ .-~~--~-------
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••• As we learn more and more about 
love we will fmd that it is actually possible 
to handle everything that comes our way 
. ·with love. Gradually we sball have less 
need to respond with anger. fear. grief or 
sympathy because, by understanding these 
emotions better we sball gain control over 
them. Once we have achieved this we can 
choose to detach from these responses and 
use only love. (Brohn, 1987. p. 130) 
No negative condition can remain in our 
lives when we truly love and accept our-
selves. Love is the healing force. Love dis-
solves anger. Love gets rid of guilt. Love 
fades away fear. Love for ourselves is the 
power that heals us. (Hay. 1984) 
There is no need to change any situation, 
only our reaction to it - and it is also made 
quite clear that if we cannot do this, it is our 
own fault that we remain ill: 
When we first started the Centre one of 
our earliest patients was a girl with lung 
secondaries following a breast cancer. She 
was enthusiastic about what Bristol had to 
offer, was a vigorous and faithful devotee 
of the diet, had her doctor running around 
prescribing all the vitamins and minerals, 
and was generally a model patient. Unfor-
. tunately she did not seem to be much bet-
ter for all this, and we were concerned 
about her lack of progress •..• 
• . • it became dear that this girl had such 
a low self-image that she couldn't do such 
a thing as picture herself well and happy. 
I believe that if people have such a low 
self-image they cannot even IMAGINE 
themselves better, then no amount of 
treatment in the world can help them_ 
(Brohn, 1987, p_ 144) 
The logic of this extends even to making us 
responsible for our own death: "Your mind is 
. very powerful and if you feel you are going 
to die, you will. It is as simple as that" (Rich-
ardson, 1988, p. 95). We may even positively 
'choose' to die: 
· .. a very small number of people ... 
had cancer for a slightly different reason_ 
· . _ They all died and I believe they chose 
to have cancer as a means of growing spir· 
itually, the benefits of which went beyond 
Death. • • • One • • • had to go through 
the process of dying for what he described 
as his 'group spirit' to evolve. Another had 
expressed his certainty of reincarnation 
and implied that his illness was a major 
growing point in his own continuum. 
(Oyne. 1989. pp. 88-89). 
If we dei not choose death, some of these 
programmes promise a cure for cancer: 
Louise Hay's is intended ,to "build perfect, 
vibrant health." which she 'sees as "our birth-
right." Others make a clear distinction be-
tween physical and mental 'healing': 
Some patients . . • are glaringly aware of 
the fact that the cancer has not gone away. 
It is still palpable and painful, and they are 
actually conscious of it. Nevertheless .•. 
finish up with a mental picture of being 
clear and free from disease. We believe 
that this is important on levels of other 
than the physical. We shall all be com-
pletely healed in a spiritual sense, whether 
or not we get rid of the disease (Brohn, 
1987, pp. 141-142). 
However. all offer some version of whole-
ness, happiness, growth, joy. enlightenment, 
fulfilment, or empowerment, which is at-
tained by the exercise of freedom. control 
and choice.: . 
· .. learn to redraw the rules of life in 
your favour. This is natural freedom to 
which we are all entitled ..•• 
I have made these changes and because of 
them I AM GLAD I HAD CANCER! 
· . . I have a freedom that previously I did 
not possess. This freedom is entirely in the 
brain. It means I can enjoy life better by 
accepting the good things we all have and 
rejecting the bad things we don't require. 
· .. worries are now rejected and instead 
a feeling of warm love is within me (Rich-
ardson, 1988, p. 134). 
This message is a dangerous one for the dis-
tressed and desperate cancer sufferer. It is 
full of false promises; it indulges in victim-
blaming of the highest order; and it offers a 
spurious illusion of power over illness, in-
deed over all aspects of life. It does not admit 
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to any causes oC cancer over which we may 
have no control, and it takes no ac:c:ount of 
the material realities of most women's lives •. 
.. Christabelle Sethna (I m) disparages a simi-
lar message on New Age 'subliminal per-
suasion! self-hypnosis' tapes marketed to 
'release' women from the effects of pre-
menstrual syndrome, abortion, and sexual 
abuse. 
Why they say it· 
While it is clear what the 'alternative' ther-
apies offer the cancer patient, why does their 
broad philosophy appear to be so widely ac-
. cepted in western society? Susan Sontag pro-
vides an explanation both in terms of the his-
tory· of medicine and the contemporary 
popularity oC psychology: 
• • • theories that diseases are caused by 
mental states and can be cured by will 
power are always an index oC how much is 
not understood about the physical terrain 
oC a disease. Moreover there is a peculiarly 
modem predelic:tion for psychological ex-
planations oC disease, as of everything 
else. Psyc:hologising seems to provide con-
trol over the experiences and events (like 
grave illnesses) over which people have 
in fact little or no control (Sontag, 1979, 
p.56). 
whole person is the person who will not be-
come ill, and the unharmonious individual 
is the one who will be susceptible to dis-
ease •.• It is as if disease has become a 
kind of morality, demonstrating the level 
oC the individual's control over their liCe 
(Coward, 1989, p. 92). 
In the 20th century capitalist economy, 
redolent with Thatcherite values, health as 
one's personal responsibility (and moral 
duty) is a very convenient rhetoric. As Carol 
Smith (1980) points out, although many can-
cers are thought to be caused by the condi-
tions under which we work, government pub-
lications typically play down occupational 
factors and emphasise the need for people to 
'look after their own health.' They argue that 
we 'voluntarily' expose ourselves to cancer 
risk, for example by smoking or by eating an 
'unhealthy' diet. Alternative medicine's at-
tempts to get people to take individual re-
sponsibility only reinforces such a victim-
blaming approach. 
TOWARDS A FEMINIST THEORY OF 
BREAST CANCER 
Orthodox medical and· 'alternative' ap-
proaches to breast cancer are both harmful to 
women. We need to move beyond them to de-
. velop a feminist theolY. of breast cancer. Of 
She goes on to show how the 19th century course, such a theory is not a freestanding al-
psychologising oC tuberculosis evaporated ternative to traditional or complementary 
with the advent oC streptomyCin; psychologi- medicine. The physical realities of breast can-
c:al analysis now surrounds the 20th century cer will usually necessitate engagement with a 
diseases of cancer and HIV / AIDS. range of medical practices-and we are not 
It is not coincidental that these diseaSes are simply suggesting the substitution of sister-
often viewed within a moral· context. As hood for surgery. However, a feminist theory 
Rosalind Coward argues, western society of breast cancer cannot mean accepting male 
(and, we would add, western psychology) has defmitions of our 'femininity' and sexuality, 
long sustained a view of an individual 'self or or victim-blaming fantasies of omnipotence 
'inner core' of personality which determines over the cause of our disease. We must lay 
behaviour and experience. She continues: claim to our experience of breast cancer 
In particular, there has always been an at-
tempt to link this view oC the personality 
to morality, to the existence of good and 
bad people. Everything which happens to 
an individual is ultimately to be explained 
by their own actions and therefore their 
personal responsibility. It is not hard to 
see the ways in which this has been trans-
lated into the body and health, where the 
through, Cor example, consciousness-raising, 
and we must develop a thoroughgoing poli-
tics of illness which incorporates industrial 
society's contribution to ill-health, and anal-
yses the social and economic forces that 
frame the availability and 'choice' oC 'treat-
ments' for cancer. Further, we cannot stop at 
theory: We need to develop feminist practice 
around breast cancer, through, for example, 
political lobbying and the provision of illness 
, 
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support groups. Here we illustrate how such 
theory and practice may be developed, largely 
through the words of women who have spo-
ken out about the meaning of breast cancer 
for their own lives and feminist politics. 
To begin with, we must acknowledge that 
"silence and invisibility go hand in hand with 
powerlessness" (Smith, 1980, p. vii), and that 
breast cancer must be publicly 'owned' as an 
issue for ALL of us within the feminist com-
munity. As Nancy Datan writes: 
The woman who has been raped or might 
be, the mother seeking child care, or the 
woman seeking an abortion, all face issues 
that once were defmed as personal and pri-
vate and now are seen as public and politi-
cal. Breast cancer too can be seen as more 
than a singular affliction, as feminists 
consider rape to be not an isolated per-
sonal trauma but an expression of a larger 
social context in which male sexuality, the 
patriarchal family, and aggression against 
women are blended. Similarly, breast can-
cer is not a solitary ordeal but an illness of 
the community, to which the community 
responds with an expression of communal 
values, which may certainly include re-
pudiation, denial and isolation (Datan, 
1989, pp. 183-184). 
Repudiation, denial, and isolation cannot 
be overcome until we can speak freely of our 
experience, whether we are the friends and 
lovers of those with breast cancer, or have 
had breast cancer ourselves. Feminist writers 
such as Audre Lorde (1980, 1982), Adrienne 
Rich (1978), and Nancy Datan (1989), in 
speaking out about the experience of breast 
cancer, enable others to speak out also, and 
to expose the heteropatriarchal values' in-
herent in both orthodox medical and 'al-
ternative' treatments for breast cancer. Vi-
. sual images, too, have prompted feminist re-
appraisals of the meanings of our breasts and 
the violence perpetuated by men in the 'treat- . 
ment' of breast cancer (e.g., Spence, 1986; 
Sebestyen, 1992). 
As feminists we need to expose silicon im-
plants as "a clear example of how both sexism 
and the profile motive effect [sic] women's 
lives" (Smith, 1980); take issue with the perni-
cious practice of victim-blaming; and seek to 
identify - and, as far as we can, prevent-
causes of cancer largely unacknowledged to 
those in power. Of course, neither we nor the 
medical profession know the full story about 
what causes cancer, but our levels of explana-
tion-and priorities for action-are likely to 
be very different. Jackie Winnow, a longtime 
lesbian-feminist activist and founder of the 
Women's Cancer Resource Center in Berke-
ley, California (who died of breast cancer in 
1991) writes: 
Real 'prevention would mean changing 
fundamental social structures. It would 
mean going after the tobacco industry, 
stopping the pollution of our environ-
ment, providing quality food. But when 
the medical profession talks about preven-
tion, they mean at best small, individual 
acts - like stopping smoking and reducing 
dietary fat intake. When they talk about 
prevention, they talk about early detection 
methods like mammograms or breast self-
examination. But once a tumour is found 
in your breast, you already have cancer 
••• (Winnow, 1992, p. 73). 
Audre Lorde, in her powerful account of 
her own experience of breast cancer, sees the 
effects of victim-blaming-and environmen-
tal pollution - on her own life: 
Last week I read a letter from a doctor in a 
medical magazine which said that no truly 
happy person ever gets cancer. Despite my 
knowing better, and despite my having 
dealt with this blame-the-victim thinking 
for years, for a moment this letter hit my 
guilt button. Had I really been guilty of 
the crime of not being happy in this best of 
all possible infernos? ••. 
Was I wrong to be working so hard against 
the oppressions afflicting women and 
Black people? Was I in error to be speak-
ing out against our silent passivity and the 
cynicism of a mechanised and inhuman 
civilization that is destroying our earth 
and those who live upon it? Was I really 
fighting the spread of radiation, racism, 
woman.slaughter, chemical invasion of 
our food, pollution of our environment, 
the abuse and psychic destruction of our 
young, merely to avoid dealing with my 
first and greatest responsibility - to be 
happy? ... 
• 
• 
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The happiest person in this countty can-
not help breathing in smokers' cigarette 
fumes, auto exhaust, and airborne chemi-
c:al dust, nor avoid drinking the water, and 
eating the food. The idea that happiness 
can insulate us against the results of our 
environmental madness is a rumour circu-
lated by our enemies to destroy us. • • • 
We are equally destroyed by false happi- . 
ness and false breasts, and the passive ac-
ceptance of false values which corrupt our 
lives and distort our experience (Lorde, 
1980, pp. 66-67). 
Reflecting the false notion of'survivor,' some 
women claim their own vic:timhood. A les-
bian with pervasive cancers in different sites 
of her body identifies herself as: 
.•• a victim of the government's irrespon-
sible bombing experiments in the Nevada 
desert. Here I was victim of fall-out when 
I was just a teenager and stood outside 
watching the beautiful yellow sky. My sis-
ters (1 have five) began, now, to get can-
cer. My older sister and the one just 
younger than me. Did we three stand un-
der the same yellow sky, or did we drink 
the same contaminated milk or chew on a 
blade of grass thick with poisons: rolling 
on the lawn on hot summer nights after the 
big mushroom's death particles bathed our 
homes and gardens with 'safe-level fall-
out'? (Johnson, 1981, p. 8).· 
Such experience must be shared within our 
feminist communities. It must be analysed 
within a feminist political framework - and 
such analyses must be turned into political 
action . 
. In the USA, feminist activists have 
pointed to the discrepancy between resources 
available for AIDS and for cancer, given the 
relative scale of these problems for women: 
e.g., in 1988, there were 100 women with 
. AIDS in the San Francisco Bay Area, and ap-
proximately 40,000 with cancer (Winnow, 
1992). The national Women's Health Net-
work (an organization which promotes and 
monitors women's health-care delivery in the 
USA) has testified at Congressional hearings 
that the government must reconsider its cur-
rent priority of funding research for treat-
ment while ignoring research for prevention 
(Rosen, 1991). Women with breast cancer 
have started organisations to lobby for better 
preventative care, increased research fund-
ing, and improved insurance coverage; and 
to provide information and support services 
for all women whose lives are touched by 
breast cancer. Examples of such organis-
ations are the Women's Cancer Resource 
Center, Berkeley, California; the Women's 
Community Cancer Project, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts (both o( )Which provide a mix 
of politic:al action, education, information, 
and support services); and the Mautner Proj-
ect for Lesbians With Cancer, Washington, 
DC (which proves direct services to lesbians 
with cancer, their families, and caregivers). 
Fostering a sense of feminist community is 
central to the philosophy of all of these proj-
ects. This is perhaps seen most clearly in their 
establishment of support groups which do 
not exist in order to swell the plastic surgeon's 
profits (as in Reach to Recovery), but which 
provide women with personal and practical 
resources to face the trauma of breast cancer 
AND the strength to challenge male power. 
Describing one such lesbian support group, 
Joan Nestle writes: 
The group does not make illness go away, 
it does not bring back breasts or vision or 
the ability to walk without pain, but it tells 
. me that in other lesbian lives the struggle 
goes on, and when I see their power and 
courage I am close to the heart of every-
thing that has given my life meaning - the 
lesbian spirit of defiance and creation 
(Nestle, 1981, p. 8). 
Nancy Johnson was a member of this group 
and was supported by it in her class action 
suit against the US government for condemn-
ing the people of Utah to years of cancer. 
One of the important attractions of the al-
ternative health movement is that it offers us 
the illusion of "stepping out of the victim 
role" (Hay, 1984). By contrast, a feminist 
analysis of health and illness begins by ac-
knowledging that we ARE victims - victims 
of a patriarchal world and a heterosexist 
health system, which, as feminists, we strug-
gle against. It continues with campaigns and 
community action: to change current medi-
cal, social, and political approaches to can-
cer, and to provide information and support 
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for all who need it. That is what "stepping out 
of the victim role" really means. That is what 
we mean by a feminist approach to breast 
c:3ncer. . 
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BREAST CANCER: A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE 
Sue Wilkinson 
',. 
Breast cancer is the most common cancer among women, with highest incidence in the 
industrialised West: one woman in eight in the USA, and one in twelve in the UK, will 
develop breast cancer at some pOint in her life. It is the leading cause of death for 
middle aged women in both countries, and second only to cardiovascular disease for 
older women (Royak-Schaler, 1994). 
Despite the publicity surrounding 'the breast cancer genes' (BRCA1 and BRCA2), only 
5-10% of breast cancers have an identifiable genetic component (Love, 1995). Age is 
the most important risk factor: fewer than a third of breast cancers occur in pre-
menopausal women, and risk increases steadily with age (Royak-Schaler, 1994). Other 
'I .. 
risk factors relate to reproductive history (not having children; a 'late' first pregnancy; 
and a greater than average number of menstrual cycles); 'lifestyle' factors (e.g. high-fat 
diet, being overweight, excessive drinking); and the presence of envirorunental 
carcinogens (Rosenthal, 1997). Recent reports suggesting that lesbians have a three 
times higher risk of breast cru:'cer than heterosexual women are not well-founded (c.f. 
Yadlon, 1997): they are based primarily on a ten-year-old USA survey oflesbian 
health, and lesbians' risk of breast cancer is extrapolated from the finding that lesbians 
are less likely to have children, and more likely to be overweight and to abuse alcohol. 
Breast cancer has been central to feminist campaigns around women's health and in 
the rest of this chapter I draw on my own research, as well as other published work 
within the field, to explore women's experience of breast cancer and the political 
activism it has generated. 
1 
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The experience of breast cancer 
Eighty-one women with breast cancer have talked with me, and with each other, in 
focus group discussions about their feelings on diagnosis; their relationships; their 
·experiences of treatment; and the changes cancer had created in their lives (c.f. 
WiIkinson 1998a, b; 1999; WiIkinson and Kitzinger, 1999), Their experiences differ 
widely, The 'meaning' of breast cancer for each woman depends on its context in her 
life as a whole, 
Diagnosis: The diagnosis of breast cancer was desaibed by one participant as "every 
" ~ t" 
woman's nightmare": other women said they were "devastated", "gutted", or 
"poleaxed" by the news, Many described feelings of fear ("tenified", "panic stricken", 
"fear stricken', "mghtened", 'paralysed in me head with fear"), sometimes 
accompanied by physical reactions: such as crying, shaking uncontrollably, or 
collapsing, Some women recalled their feelings of shock and disbelief ("you don't 
believe it', "I couldn't believe that it could happen to me', "you don't think it's ever 
going to happen to you, and when it does you just can't believe it"), Others desaibed 
an inability to take in the information or to react to it ("it didn't register properly", "I 
was in a stupor and I never spoke", "I just went numbj, Feelings of detachment were 
common: one woman said, "when I was told, it was someone else - it was a long while 
, , 
before I realised it was me"; others described being "on another planet" or "in a 
different world", 
Relationships: Women often worried about other people's reactions arid sometimes 
withheld the news of their diagnosis from aged parents, young children, or relatives 
abroad, Telling others was carefully 'managed': they waited until children had 
finished examinations, or sick colleagues had returned to work. "I really did 
deliberately play it down" said one woman (talking about her son), "I thought he's far 
away - it would worry him sick", In order to protect others - especially family 
members - perceived as vulnerable, women may also hide or minimise their own pain, 
distress and anxiety: "I daren't say too much to me husband and family for fear of 
distressing them; "you don't want to put your worries on them do you, all the time?"; 
"you end up being strong for your mends, your family, because ~ don't know how 
to handle it", Expressing the views of many others, one participant commented: "We 
become very goOd at behaving ourselves, especially as women - we're very good at 
hiding what we feel and just putting on a brave face for everybody else", 
2 
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As with cancer generally (Sontag, 1979), breast cancer patients may find that people 
seem to avoid and fear them (almost three-quarters of Peters-Golden's (1982) 
respondents reported this experience). "My neighbours seem to think I'm a leper", one 
of my research participants said, "there's one lady in particular and she always aosses 
the road _ as though if she touches me she's going to get something". Another told 
how her sister (also diagnosed with breast cancer) returning unexpectedly to a friend's 
house, found the friend "cleaning the cushion of the settee that she'd been sitting on .•• 
as if she thought she could catch the cancer", Women are often aware of silences 
around cancer. people around them "are embarrassed", "don't know what to say", or 
" 
"just don't want to know": 
I've found people at my work don't mention it all •.• nobody's Jlm approached 
the subject in a direct way, nobody's ever asked what my experience of it was, 
or what happened to me, or how I felt about it. 
They also refer, usually disparagingly, to other people's use of euphemisms like "the 
bigC'. 
While many women spoke of colleagues, friends and family members who "didn't 
want to know", "just couldn't handle it", or "couldn't accept it", others characterised the 
support they had received - from various sources - as "brilliant": "I had marvellous 
" support from my husband"; "I've no family but my friends were absolutely 
wonderful"; "I could paper me walls with get well cards", A number spoke highly of 
the local breast care nurse and of the value of talking to other women with breast 
cancer: "it's not the sympathy you want;. I don't think ... it's the reassurance ... you all 
~ because you've been th~e and you've had the fear". However, not infrequently 
others' attempts to offer support were experienced as excessive: women said of their 
partners, "there was a sort of startling protectiveness" or "my husband won't let me out 
of his sight"; while work colleagues were described as "a bit suffocating at times" or as 
having to be reminded "I'm not an invalid", Women also disliked being called "brave", 
or "positive", feeling that this minimised their fear and pain ("they don't know what 
you've gone through") and made it difficult for them ever to break down, 
Treatment: Most of my research participants had undergone surgery for their breast 
cancer (35% lumpectomy; 63% mastectomy), typically backed up by radiotherapy, 
plus (for 64%) a course of tamoxifen - a synthetic anti-oestrogen drug, A further 21% 
had taken tamoxifen alone. Relatively few had been prescribed chemotherapy, or had 
3 
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chosen 'alternative' treatments. Women exchanged experiences of treatments and' 130 
symptoms: the awfulness of not being able to wash for several weeks once 'marked up' 
for radiotherapy ("the smell was horrid"; 1 felt I ponged from here to here"); the 
radiotherapy bums and skin irritation ("bright red, I was like a tomato"; "as if I was on 
.~e ... I was sort ofbuming"); and the weight gain, night sweats and vaginal itching 
produced by tamoxifen ("it was really driving me crazy"; "all inside was really raw"). 
However, they focused most extensively on their feelings about surgery, and its 
consequences for their physical appearance. The psychosocial and popular literatures 
alike (e.g. Maguire, 1982; Kahane, 1995)suggest that a woman who has lost a breast is 
. u! 
"less a woman" , and -like I<asper's (1995) interviewees - my research participants 
often spoke as if this were so: "you're not sort of normal any more ... only half a 
woman"; 1 just felt like all my womanhood was being taken away and I wasn't going 
to be a she any more, I was going to be an tt". They commonly expressed fears that 
without breasts, or with less than perfect breasts, they would be unattractive to, or 
rejected by, men: 1'm very aware that there are marriages that break down under the 
stress ... and what your body looks like"; "part of it was to do with me husband, I didn't 
know whether he was going to reject me"; 1 was single and I thought, 'Oh well, 
nobody's ever going to be interested in mem; "nobody would want anybody who'd had 
their breast removed". Some women sought reassurances from the men around them 
, , 
that they were still attractive and desirable; one woman embarked upon a new love 
affair within days of surgery, 
... Of the 50 women who had had mastect0Inies, 48 wore(or had worn) a prosthesis -
eight of these women had gon~ on to have breast 'reconstruction' (i.e. silicon 
implants). Women reported - or were attributed as having - reconstructions 'for' their 
husbands (even when they themselves would have preferred not to undergo further 
surgery). There was much swapping of information about the varieties - and general 
management - of prostheses: "you can be fitted with an adhesive one"; "you can get 
stick on nipples to match your nipple"; "never forget your safety pins"; "you've got to 
be careful not to stick a pin in"; "I've got a puncture repair kit on it now"; "put a sponge 
in your swimsuit"; "you'll swim to one side". In one particularly boisterous focus 
group, a prosthesis was removed and passed from hand to hand; the participants from 
another group reconvened in the ladies' lavatory to compare prostheses. 
4 
Meyerowitz et al (1988) has argued that dying is more of a concern for women with '131 
breast cancer than is their appearance - and sometimes my participants suggested this 
too. However, statements such as "your life's more important than a boob, isn't it?" 
were relatively rare; more often women appeared to be engaged in juggling concerns 
.about appearance and mortality, prioritising one or the other at different times, for 
, 
different reasons, and in response to others around them. 
tife changes: It was common for women to claim that the experience of breast cancer 
had completely changed their outlook on life: heightened awareness of mortality and 
uncertainty about the future made them "appreciate life", "enjoy life", and "live for the 
• - f' 
moment". One woman said: . , 
1 used to be a person who used to always look into the future. We'd got to 
save up for when we get older and we ought not to have a big holiday because 
really, you know, we might need the roof mending. 1 was that sort of person, 
but I'm not so much that now. 1 think to myself. 'Oh to heck with it, 1 might 
not be here next year'. 
Many emphasised "an urgency about life", a need to "live life to the full", to "do more 
with your life", and to "do it today". One declared "if you wanna do it, 1 think you've 
got to gQ for it" ~ and they did: new experiences (since cancer) ranged from long- ' 
distance travel to scuba diving to flY,ing an aeroplane. Others said "my priorities in 
life have changed" or "m having to reassess what I want to do now" - they decided to 
spend money, rather than save it; to take a job and become independent for the first 
time; or to exploit a new-found ability to leave housework undone. Several women 
- described themselves as "more selfish", saying "You've got to think about yourself"; , 
"m number one now"; , feel ~ have a stronger responsibility to myself"; "m entitled 
to be able to do something for myself"; and "I want to do even more now of the things 
that I want to do". 
Surprisingly few women dwelt on the lasting negative consequences of their breast 
cancer - most commonly mentioned was the worty that any ache or pain might signal 
a recurrence of the cancer. Others highlighted increased tiredness, loss of confidence, 
and social withdrawal. 
Such experiences are documented further both in the huge popular literature on breast 
cancer - which includes autobiographies (e.g. Butler and Rosenblum, 1991; Lorde, 
1980; Picardie, 1998; Seagrave, 1995; Wadler, 1992) and anthologies (e.g. Brady, 1991; 
5 
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Gross and Ito, 1991; Stacker, 1991, 1993; Ward, 1996) - and in the extensive 
psychosocial oncology literature (useful reviews include Meyerowitz, 1980; 
Meyerowitz et ai, 1988; Morris, 1983; Rosser, 1981 and Royak-Schaler, 1991). 
, The politics of breast cancer 
Feminist work on breast cancer has not only made women's ~ experiences (rather 
than medical and psychiatric perspectives) central, but has also sought to locate these 
experiences within their broader social and political context Additionally, feminist 
activists have campaigned for increased research funding and improved healthcare 
. ~". 
facilities; have set up resource centres and support services; and have exposed 
commercially driven, and potentially harmful, procedures and practices in the 
detection and treatment of breast cancer. 
Feminists (e.g. Spence, 1986; Kasper, 1995) have argued that the experience of breast 
cancer is profoundly shaped by the cultural emphasis on breasts as objects of male 
sexual interest They have decried the pervasive sexualisation of breasts and breast 
cancer both by medical professionals and in the literature; and have deplored the 
associated - and largely unacknowledged - heterosexism (Wilkinson and Kitzinger, 
1993). They have spoken out against the pressure on women to 'look feminine' as 
, , 
quickly as possible post-mastectomy (Meyerowitz, 1988), by being fitted immediately 
with prostheses, and encouraged to consider breast 'reconstruction' (Lorde, 1980, 
Datan, 1989). Many feminists have objected to the dismissal or trivialisation of 
women's concerns: feminist psychologist Nancy Datan (who has since died of breast 
cancer) suggested the implied, identity for which the breast cancer patient should 
strive is that of "perpetual would-be cheerleader", adding, with characteristic humour: 
"rve never been a cheerleader, and I couldn't see trying out for the part with falsies" 
(Datan, quoted by Crawford, 1995: 168). 
The feminist breast cancer movement started in the USA in the 19705 with a few 
strong individuals· who (like Nancy Datan) not only refused to hide their breast 
cancer, but who spoke out against medical orthodoxies. Rose Kushner (1975) was 
instrumental in changing surgical procedures and Nancy Brinker (cited in Love, 1995) 
was an early pioneer in fund-raising. Audre Lorde (1980) became visible as a black 
lesbian feminist with preast cancer, paSSionately refusing a 'victim' identity, and 
speaking out against environmental carcinogens. In the 1980s several grass-roots, 
6 
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community cancer projects were founded by feminist and lesbian activists, including 13 3 
the Women's Cancer Resource Center in Berkeley O'ackie Winnow), Breast Cancer 
Action in San Francisco (Eleanor Pred), the Women's Community Cancer Project in 
Boston (Susan Shapiro), the Mautner Project for Lesbians with Cancer in Washington, 
. pC (Susan Hester), and the Lesbian Community Cancer Project in Chicago. These 
organisations campaigned for, and offered, better resources and services for women 
with breast - and other - cancers, often appropriating successful AIDS advocacy tactics 
for the breast cancer cause (c.£. Winnow, 1992). There is a similar - although much 
smaller - movement in Canada. 
Feminist journalists have offered some powerful expos~ of the breaSt cancer 
'industry': highlighting the profiteerlng of drug companies and cosmetic surgeons, and 
questioning the safety of tamoxifen trials and silicone implants, and the efficacy of 
mammography and genetic screening programmes (Batt, 1994; Oorfene-Casten, 1996). 
Other feminist activists continue to work (largely) within the medical profession and 
the political establishment. Lesbian oncologist Susan Love - famously quoted for 
characterising breast cancer treatments as "slash, bum and poison" (5tabiner, 1997) -
established a state-of-the-art treatment program at a leading (US) Medical-Surgical 
Oncology Center, and co-founded (with Susan Hester and Amy Langer) the National 
Breast Cancer Coalition - an umbrella organisation which co-ordinates the 
" 
campaigning activities of several hundred (mainstream and radical) breast cancer 
groups (Love, 1995). The Coalition has achieved some spectacular successes, building 
a network of breast cancer advocates across the USA, and obtaining a five-fold 
. _ increase in federal funds forbreast cancer research - including the diversion of funds 
from the US Department of Defense (Kaufert, 1998). 
Together, feminists have made the experience of breast cancer more visible; 
interrogated its social and cultuiaJ. meanings; campaigned for - and provided -
improved support and resources; and challenged the medical, scientific, and political 
establishments. It is an impressive record of activism - and one which, urgently, 
continues. 
7 
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Abstract 
.' 
Focus group method is 
becoming increasingly popular 
among qualitative researchers. 
After introducing focus group 
method and briefly overviewing 
its use in health research. this 
article shows that the 
distinctive (and under-used) 
feature of focus group method 
is its generation of interactive 
data. Illustrating my argument 
with examples from health-
related focus group research 
(including my own data on 
breast cancer), I argue that this 
feature makes focus groups an 
ideal method for gaining access 
to research participants' own 
meanings. Intemctive data 
result in enhanced disclosure. 
improved access to participants' 
own language and concepts, 
better understanding of . 
participants' own agendas. the 
production of more elabomted 
accounts, and the opportunity to 
observe the co-construction of 
meaning in action. Focus 
groups are. then. an ideal 
method for exploring people' s 
own meanings and 
underslandings of health and 
illness. 
Keywords 
breast ("ancer, co·consrruction. 
focus group. imerClcrion. 
meaning 
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SEVEN WOMEN. linked by a shared diagnosis 
of breast cancer. meet over coffee one evening. 
Their conversation ranges across 'finding the 
lump'. cone biopsies. a friend's death from 
" breast cancer. the insensitivity of medical pro-
fessionals. the experience of radiotherapy. part-
ners' reactions tn mastectomy scars. and the 
merits-or otherwise-of 'stick-on nipples'. 
They tell stories. crack jokes. argue. support one 
another. and' talk over each other. This is a 
typical focus group scenario. drawn from my 
own research. A focus group is. at its simplest. 
'an infonnal discussion among selected individ-
uals about specific tnpics' (Beck. Trombetta. & 
Share. 1986. p. 73). Focus group research 
generally involves organizing and running a 
series of small. focused group discussions. like 
the one described above. and analysing the 
resulting data using a range of conventional 
qualitative techniques. The method has become 
popular among qualitative researchers in recent 
years. with. for example. over 100 focus group 
articles published in 1994 alone (Morgan. 
1996). 
The invention of what are now called focus 
groups is usually attributed to sociologist Robert 
Mertoo. who. tngether with colleagues Pauicia 
Kendall and MlIIjorie Fiske. developed a group 
approach (the 'focused group-interview') for 
studying audience responses to radio pro-
grammes (Merton & Kendall. 1946; Merton. 
Fiske. & Kendall. 1956). Although focus groups 
have been in use as a research tool for more than . 
half a century. relatively few studies were 
published before the late 1979s. and most of 
these were in the field of business and marketing 
(see Goldman & McDonald, 1987. for a review). 
The contemporary 'resurgence of interest' (Lunt 
& Livingstone. 1996. p. 79) in focus groups has 
meant expansion well beyond this field: the 
method is now 'gaining some popularity among 
social scientists' (Fontana & Frey. 1994. p. 
364). with much current research concentrated 
in the fields of health (e.g. Harrison & Barlow. 
1995). communication/media studies (e.g. Lunt 
& Livingstone. 1996) and education (e.g. 
Vaughn. Schumm. & Sinagub. 1996,. 
Health researchers pioneered the use of focus 
groups in social action research. particularly 
family planning and preventive health education 
(e.g. Folch-Lyon. de la Macorra. & Schearer. 
1981: Schearer. 1981: Suyono. Pier. Srirling. & 
.130 
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Ross. 1981). and research on health-related 
topics continues to be a major area of focus 
group research today. Much of this research, 
however. has been conducted within nursing. 
social policy and sociology. Within psychology. 
focus groups have been less widely used, and 
the method rarely appears in psychological 
research methods texts. even in those devoted to 
qUalitative methods (although for recent excep-
lions see Millward [1995] and Vaughn et al. 
(1996]). This may be partly because. as Harrison 
and Barlow (1995, p. 11) suggest. psychologists 
have been concerned that focus groups 'did not 
fit the positivist criteria extant in the dominant 
research paradigm'. I will talce it for granted that 
I do not need. in this context. either to establish 
a case for qualitative over quantitative methods. 
or to differentiate the particular sets of rechnical. 
epistemological and political issues associated 
with qualitative and quantitative methods 
respectively (see Bryman. 1988). Rather. I will 
consider the particular advantages of focus 
group method per se for qualitative researchers. 
particularly for those (e.g. phenomenological. 
experiential or narrative researchers) concerned . 
to elicit participants' own meanings and under-
standings of health and illness. 
Centrally. focus group method involves one 
or more group discussions. in which participants 
focus collectively upon a topic or issue. most 
commonly presented to them (either verbally or 
in written fonn) as a set of questions; although 
sometimes as a film. a collection of advertise-
ments. cards to sort. a game to play. or a' 
vignette to discuss. Focus group participants 
(usually 6-8) may be pre-existing clusters of 
people (such as family members. friends or 
work colleagues) or they may be drawn together 
specifically for the research. An increasingly 
common use of focus groups is to bring together 
'a group of people who have experienced the 
same problem. such as residents of a deteriorat· 
ing neighbourhood or women in a sexist organ-
ization' (Rubin & Rubin. 1995. p. 139). Discus-
sions between group participanrs. usually 
audiotaped (sometimes videotaped) and tran-
scribed. constitute the dara. and conventional 
techniques of qualitative analysis are then 
employed. This most commonly entails some 
variety of content analysis or thematic analysis 
(sometimes computer·assisted with the use. of 
programs such as NUD.lST or THE ETHNO-
GRAPH) as typically employed in analysing 
other fonns of qualitative data, such as that 
generated in one-to-one interviews. Addition-
ally, some researchers have used rhetorical, 
discursive and conversation analytic techniques 
.. (e.g. Agar & Macdonald, 1995; Myers. 1998). 
There is an extensive methodological lit-
eratUre on the practical details of conducting 
focus groups (e.g. Barhour & Kitzinger, 1998; 
Krueger, 1994; Morgan. 1988, 1993; Stewart & 
Shamdasani. 1990; Vaugba et al., 1996), so I 
will not rehearse such details here. A useful 
brief introduction to the method is provided by 
Kitzinger (1995), while a recent 'state of the art' 
review may be found in Morgan (1996). As 
many of these commentators on focus group 
method emphasize, the method is distinctive not 
for its mode of analysis, but rather for its data 
collection procedures. Crucially, focus groups 
are characterized by the interaction of group 
participants with each other as well as with the 
researcher/moderator, and it is the collection of 
this kind of interactive data that distinguishes 
the focus group from the one-to-one interview 
(cf. Kitzinger, 1994a; Morgan, 1988), as well as 
from procedures which use multiple participants 
but do nOl pennit interactive discussions (cf. 
Stewart & Shamdasani, 1990). I will return later 
to some of the implications of the iDteractive 
nature of focus group data. 
From across a wide range of perspectives, 
particularly those sometimes referred to as 'anti-
positivist' (Murray, 1997, p. 9).' as well as some 
versions of cognitive psychology and some 
research on health beliefs and attitudes, increas-
ing interest is being directed· toward partici-
pants' own meanings of health and illness: 'the 
patient's view' (Armstrong, 1984). Such mean-
ings are seen as essential in understanding, for 
example, coping behaviour, psychosocial well-
being and adaptation to negative life events. as 
well as offering important insights into people's 
phenomenological Iifeworlds (cf. Fife, 1994). 
For those researchers with an interest in access-
ing participants' own meanings-either as a 
research topic in their own righL or as an 
adjunct to other more conventional (or pos-
itivist) approaches-focus groups offer a valu-
able way forward. 
After briefly overviewing the main uses of 
focus groups in health research. I advance the 
key argument of this article: that focus groups 
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are an ideal method for gaining access to 
participants' own meanings. D1ustrating my 
argument with examples from health-related 
research (including my own current work on 
breast cancer), I consider the Specific mecha-
nisms through which focus groups facilitate 
access to participants' own meanings. I con-
clude by discussing the potential of focus group 
method for future research on participants' own 
meanings of health and illness. 
Overviewing focus groups in 
health research ., 
Before expanding on the particular value of 
focus groups in eliciting people' s own meanings 
and understandings of health and illness. I will 
outline the range of different topics and approa-
ches currently used in health related focus group 
research. An extensive range of topics central to 
health and illness has been studied using focus 
groups. Such topics include: the experience of 
specific disorders and diseases;' reproductive 
issues;' violence and abuse:" living with chronic 
illness or disability;' health care practices and 
procedures:' health-related behaviours;7 and 
broader factors that mediate health and illness.' 
A wide variety of participants has also been 
involved in focus group studies on health-related 
issues. ranging from Australian schoolchildren 
(Houghton. Ourkin. & Carroll. 1995) to old 
people in residential care in England (Chapman 
& Iohnson, 1995), and from fonner LSD users 
(Agar &. Macdonald, 1995) to rural Chinese 
women (Wong. Li. Bums, & Xiang. 1995)." 
Focus groups are an appropriate method for 
addressing a broad range of research questions 
across a variety of health-related domains. and 
they are suitable for use with diverse popula-
tions of research participants. Focus groups have 
been used in five main theoretical andlor prac-
tical ways in health-related research. each of 
which will be discussed briefly below. 
Studies of Iifeworlds and health 
beliefs 
There is a tradition of health-related research 
that uses focus groups to explore people's own 
meanings of health and illness. Some of this 
work seeks to develop in·depth understandings 
of individuals' lifeworlds. e.g. women's experi-
ences post·partum (DiMatteo. Kahn. & Berry. 
WILKINSON 
1993). the experience of living in a nursing 
home (Brody. 1990). or the experience of living 
with multiple sclerosis (Lyons & Meade. 1993). 
Other studies broadly in this tradition seek to 
. • develop more specific understandings of indi-
viduals' health beliefs or models. c.g. about 
HIV/AIDS (Irwin et al .• 1991). heart attacks 
(Morgan & Spanish. 1985) or nutrition (Crock-
en. HeUer. Merkel. & Peterson. 1990). As 
Hoppe. Wells. Wilsdon. Gilmore. & Morrison 
(1994. p. 118) point out, focus groups are 'a 
useful method for learning about the voc:mulaI)' 
and thinking pattems of a population within its 
social context'. In addition. as a relatively 
naturalistic method. which enables relatively 
spontaneous interaction between people, focus 
groups increase the likelihood of 'gaining 
deeper insights than might arise with individual 
structured interviews or questionnaires' 
(Ritchie, Herscovitch. & Norfor, 1994, p. 97). 
Focus groups have been used to study. for 
example, the knowledge and beliefs of elemen-
!aJY schoolchildren about AIDS (Hoppe et al .. 
1994), the beliefs of blue collar workers about 
coronaI)' risk behaviours (Ritchie et al., 1994) 
and the traditional beliefs of Black women in 
relation to breast cancer (Duke, Godon-Sosby, 
Reynolds. & Gram. 1994) and AIDS (F1askerud 
& Rush, 1989). 
Assessment of health status and 
health care needs 
Focus group research has also been used to 
obtain an index or me3surementof individuals' 
states of health. or health care . needs. including 
assessments of 'quality of life'. e.g. in relation 
to breast cancer (Wyatt, Knnz, & Lyken. 1993) 
or asthma (Hyland, Finnis, & Irvine. 1991). 
Other such indices derived from focus group 
research include individuals' satisfaction with 
their health status or with health care services 
on offer to them. such as general practice 
(Murray. Tapson. Tumbull. McCallum. & lit-
tle. 1994) or community health services (Col-
Iins. Stommel. King. & Given. 1991). In some 
of these studies. focus groups arc used on a 
stand-alone basis to assess individuals' needs or 
attitudes. In others. they arc used as an initial 
data-gathering tool to inform the later develop-
ment of surveys (O·Brien. 1993) or scales 
(Hyland et al .. 1991). One major advantage of 
this. as O'Brien (1993) notes. in reporting the 
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use of focus groups to develop an instrument to 
survcy the social relationships of gay and bisex-
ual men at risk for AIDS. is that focus groups 
enable the investigator to identify concepts and 
practices central to the respondents, and so to 
construct more appropriate survey items. Fur-
ther. using material derived from focus groups. 
the investigator can design a questionnaire using 
respondents' own words or phrases. thereby 
enhancing their understanding of the research 
questions. Focus groups may also be used as an 
exploratory technique to generate hypotheses 
meriting further qualitative or quantitative 
investigation. 
/fealth education and health 
promotion 
There is a great deal of focus group research 
focused around health education and health 
promotion. Key areas where focus groups have 
been used include: the US National High Blood 
Pressure Education Program (cf. Basch. 1987); 
uptake of cervical screening facilities, partic-
ularly among ethnic minority women (Oignan et 
al .• 1990; Naish. Brown. & Oenton. 1994); 
prevention of teenage pregnancy (Kisker. 1985; 
Okonofua. 1995); and sex education. partic-
ularly the promotion of safer sex in the context 
of HIV I AIDS (Kline. Kline. & Oken. 1992; 
Lupton & Tulloch. 1996). Used in the context of 
health education. focus groups are particularly 
useful for identifying obstacles or objections 
that prevent or discourage individuals from (say) 
. using contraception or practising safer sex. 
There is also a substantial body of focus group 
work on individuals' understanding of. and 
responses to. health-related media messages 
(e.g. Aitken, Leathar. & O·Hagan. 1986; Frei-
muth & Greenberg. 1986: Kitzinger. 1990; Philo 
et al .• 1994). Health education messages have 
often been proposed. or modified. on the basis of 
focus group research which has assessed their 
likely effectiveness. For example. following· 
focus group research in which men spoke of 
their sense of responsibility. the message 'pro-
tector of the family' was designed to encourage 
condom use (Kline et al.. 1992. p. 455); and 
another focus group study on compliance in 
taking medication led. to the extension of the 
health promotion message '00 [t For Them' to 
include 'doing it for onesdf (Basch. 1987. p. 
424). 
Partldpatory and sodaJ action 
research 
Focus groups have been used extensively in 
planning and developing health-related social 
. action prognunmes. Examples of such pr0-
grammes include: smoking prevention (Hei-
mann-Raitan, Hanson. &: Peregoy. 1985): work-
site nutrition (MuUis &: Lansing. 1986): malaria 
and child survival (Olik. Gardon. Ward. 
Kouame. &: Guessan. 1988): and-notably-
family planning (Folch-Lyon et al .• 1981; Kno-
deL Havanon. &: Pramua1ratana. 1984: Suyono. 
Pie!., Stirling. &: Ross. 1981). Some focus group 
researchers (e.g. Plaut. Lannais. &: Trevor. 1993) 
suggest that the method is particularly useful for 
accessing the views of those who have been 
under-represented in. or poorly served by. tradi-
tional research. Others suggest that focus groups 
can be used radically in participatory or action 
research 'to empower and to foster social 
change' (Jobnson. 1996. p. 536). For example. 
Jean Orr' s (1992) project on well woman clinics 
encouraged participants to view their problems 
as deriving from social structure rather than 
personal inadequacy and offered 'support to 
members in changing aspects of their lives' 
(p. 32) via the community health movement. 
Similarly. Annie George (1996), conQucting 
participatory research on sexuality with poor 
women in Bombay. ran focus groups in collab-
oration with an NOO aiming to help separated 
or deserted women in regularizing their legal 
status. 'The focus group meetings'. she says. 
'were a means in the process of analysing the 
various forces which were bottlenecks. in their 
search for greater autonomy' (p. 128). Other 
examples of the use of focus groups in feminist 
action research on health issues may be found in 
Brems and Griffiths (1993) and de Koning and 
Martin (1996). 
Evaluation and marketing of 
products and services 
This tradition of focus group research draws on 
the early development of the method in the 
context of business and marketing in a number of 
ways. First. focus groups are used as a means to 
evaluate the success of health promotion. disease 
prevention. early intervention or social action 
programmes (see Basch. 1987. for a review). 
Basch argues for the value of focus groups in 
both 'formative' evaluation (i.e. monitoring pro-
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grammes dUring their development and use) and 
'summarive' evaluation (i.e. maldng fina1 judge-
ments about their worth). Second, focus groups 
are used in service evaluation and public rela-
tions exercises. Typically. health care 'consu-
mers' are asked to give their views on the 
, services available to them; more rarely. pro-
viders are asked to reflect on consumer views, or 
on their relations with consumers. Examples 
include the evaluation of mental health services 
(Richter. Bottenberg. &: Roberto. 1991). abortion 
services (Flexner. McLaughlin, &: Uttlefield, 
1977). public health care" in the community 
(Leery &: O·Brien. 1994) and hospital admin-
istration (Hisrich &: Peters. 1982). Third, focus 
groups are used to facilitate the marketing of 
health care services and products. Focus group 
studies have been used. for example. to increase 
the acceptability of contraceptive implants (Zim-
merman et al .• 1990) and to maximize the impact 
of television advertisements for spermicidal 
foaming tablets (Freimuth &: Greenberg. 1986). 
Having outlined these five broad traditions of 
health-related focus group research. in the fol-
lowing section I will highlight the use of focus 
groups in developing understandings of partici-
pants' own meanings. 
Exploring the meanings of health 
andiIIness 
Focus groups are an ideal method for the study 
of people's own meanings of health and illness." 
As Williarns and Popay (1994. p. 123) suggest. 
'understanding the nature of lay knowledge 
requires an approach to data collection that is. in 
a sense. egalitarian. and most certainly phenom-
enologically open'. Focus groups satisfy both 
these criteria. and newcomers to focus groups 
often comment favourably on both the quantity 
and the richness or depth of the data the method 
generates in comparison with other methods. 
For example. Nigel Fielding (1993) has descri-
bed how. as an experienced one-to-one inter-
viewer. he had initially seen group discussions 
as 'too difficult to bother with·. but he was 
'rapidly converted' to the value of focus groups 
through their use in a project on domestic 
violence: 
A group of women from a local refuge were 
[sic] in"ited and eight of them came .... We 
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found that the women were prepared to share 
information of remarkable emotional inten-
sity, about harrowing experiences we regar-
ded as deeply private and which we bad not 
thought we would be able to address .•. It 
seemed· that. because they all shared the 
experience of having been abused· by their 
partners, once one respondent launched a line 
of discussion the others were more than 
willing to join in. We wefC certain that we 
would not have got the amount and depth of 
data using one-to-one interviews ... (Field-
ing, 1993, p. 142) 
Focus groups, then. produce mOfC-and bet-
ter-data than fCsearchers, even experienced 
qualitative fCsearchers, typically expect. 
The words and phrases used to describe that 
which is elicited in focus groups vary across 
research topics and with the theofCtical bent of 
the researcher. Some researchers, like Fielding, 
say that what participants' talk provides is 
infonnation about their experiences: other 
researchers use termS like 'understandings' , 
'ethno-concepts', 'lay representations', 'com-
mon-sense beliefs', 'folk theories', or 'models'. 
In this article, I am using the term 'participants' 
own meanings' as a catch-all phrase to encom-
pass the crucial component of all these descrip-
tors: that they are the understandings. concepts, 
representations, beliefs, etc., as developed and 
expressed by the panicipants. These under-
. standings, concepts, and so on, are not derived 
from academic theory or from medical models: 
rather they reflect and embody. the meanings 
attributed by the participants themselves to their 
own experience. My argument in this article is 
that focus groups are an especially good method 
for eliciting panicipants' own meanings, and 
that this makes them invaluable to all those 
researchers for whom the study of participants' 
own meanings is of central relevance. 
In this section. I highlight the ways in which 
focus groups facilitate access to research partici-
pants' own meanings. As I will show. this 
accrues directly from the distinctive feature of 
focus groups, i.e. that data are produced in 
interactions between group members. I consider 
here the specific mechanisms through which 
focus groups elicit participants' own meanings: 
by enhancing disclosure: by providing access to 
participants' own language and concepts: by 
enabling participants to follow their own agen-
das; by encouraging the production of elabo-
rated accounts: and by providing an opportunity 
to observe the co-construction of meaning in 
action. 
Enhandng dfsdosure 
Contrary to the common assumption that people 
will be inhibited by the presence of other group 
members, the group conlext facilitates openness 
and disclosure. Focus group participants often 
assist the researcher by asking questions of each 
other (perhaps more searching than those the 
researcher might have dared ask). by contrn-
dicting and disagreeing with each other (in a 
manner which, coming from the researcher, 
might have seemed authoritarian) and by point-
. ing to apparent contrndictions in each other's 
accounts (often in a manner that an empathetic 
and sensitive researcher might feel to be inap-
propriate coming from him or her). The effect of 
these questions. disagreements and challenges 
from other group members is generally to 
produce enhanced disclosufC, as people answer 
questions. resolve disagreements and defend 
their views against attack. 
This enhanced disclosure is especially evident 
when sensitive issues are under discussion. 
Many focus group researchers report that when 
research participants share common experi-
ences-in particular. painful or emotionally 
intense experiences (such as domestic violence. 
a stigmatizing illness or a sudden bereave-
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. ment)-individuals typically offer considerable 
detail about such aspects of their lives, partic-
ularly when their contributions are reinforced 
and their concerns legitimated by other group 
members (Zeller. 1993). It is commonly found 
that the less inhibited members of the group 
break the ice for shyer participants. and that one 
person's revelation of 'discrediting' information 
encourages others to disclose similar experi-
ences. According to Kissling (1996), for exam-
ple. it is easier for young people to talk freely 
about menstruation in a group context than in a 
one-to-one interview with an adult researcher: 
the 'solidarity among friends' seems to 
'decrease their discomfort with the topic'. Sim-
ilarly. Kitzinger (l994a. p. 111) cites data in 
which interaction between female focus group 
members enables one of them to talk about oral 
sex. and she describes this as an example of the 
. .." .. ~ . 
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facilitation of the expression of difficult or taboo 
experiences in a group context. 
In patticular. social desirability may be less of 
'a problem in focus groups than in one-to-one 
interviews. Several researchers have noted that; 
compared with interviews. group discussions 
tend to generate the expression of more 'socially 
undesirable' opinions and emotions. In a focus 
. group study of lovers of people with AIDS. for 
example. the researchers found that there were 
more angry and emotional comments about their 
treatment by the medical profession than are 
generally found in individual interviews (Geis. 
Fuller. & Rush. 1986), Similarly. researchers 
have found that women whose babies are 
delivered healthy are generally unwilling to 
express dissatisfaction. in one-to-one interviews. 
with the practices and procedures of childbirth. 
In focus' groups. by contrast. the 'supportive 
environment' of other women also taIlcing about 
their birth experiences facilitates women's abil-
ity to ll.e critical of the management of the birth 
process (DiMatteo et a1 .. 1993). In sum. then. 
contrary to the commonly accepted view that 
intimate or sensitive information is best elicited 
in a one-to-one context. it seems that focus 
groups typically facilitate disclosure,'· . , 
Providing access to participants' 
own language and concepts 
Researchers often carry out research on people 
very different from themselves. across differ- . 
ences of age, culture. race/ethnicity, (dis )ability, 
and so on (cf. Wi\kinson & Kitzinger, 1996). 
Some familiarity with the language habitually 
used by research participants is important both 
for effective communication and for the devel-
opment of an adequate understanding of their 
experiences and beliefs. Like interviews, focus 
groups enable the researcher to listen to people 
talking. However. in focus groups, the research 
participants talk primarily to each other rather 
than to the researcher. and they talk in a way 
that is much closer to everyday conversation 
than is a one-te-one interview. They are not 
primarily concerned with providing explanations 
to a researcher who is 'Other' to them, as is 
often the case in interviews. The relatively free 
flow of discussion and debate between members 
of a focus group offers an excellent opportunity 
for hearing 'the language and vernacular used by 
respondents' (Bers. 1987, p. 27). Focus group 
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researchers have seen the method as providing 
an opportunity for 'listening to local voices' 
(Murray et al,. 1994). for learning the partici-
pants' own language instead of imposing the 
researchers' language upon them (Freimuth & 
Greenberg. 1986; Mays et al.. 1992) and for 
gaining an insight into participants' conceptual 
worlds. on their own terms (Broom & Dozier • 
1990). 
Listening in on focus group discussions-or 
'structured eavesdropping' (Powney. 1988) 
-enables the researche( "to become familiar 
with the way research participants habitually 
talk. the particular idioms. terminology and 
vocabulary they typically use. the ways in which 
they joke. tell stories. construct arguments. and 
so on. In listening to participants talk in the 
social context of a focus group, the researcher is 
able to observe a (sub)cultural argot in use. 
Focus group interactions reveal not only shared 
ways of talking. but shared experiences. and 
shared ways of making sense of these experi-
ences. The researcher is offered an insight into 
the commonly held assumptions, concepts and 
meanings which constitute and inform partici-
pants' talk about their experiences. 
In particular. focus groups can enable 
researchers 'to observe people who may be very 
different from themselves' (Bers. 1987. p. 26). 
Such respondents may use very different lan-
guage from that of the researcher to describe 
their experiences or convey their opinions. For 
example. few researchers are likely to use, or' 
perhaps even be familiar with. the tenns 'muff 
diver' and 'muffing'. to refer (pejoratively) to 
the practice of oral sex. These tenns were used 
spontaneously by ex-prisoners talking among 
themselves. when asked in a focus group to . 
assess the extent to which lesbians are at risk of 
AIDS: 
El: They're faggots aren't they. 
everyone of them 
8: No. they are faggotesses! 
E3: They're quite a lot at risk 
(All shouting at once) 
Researcher: They are quite a lot at risk? 
Several voices: Aye 
Researcher: Why? 
E2: They're faggotesses 
E3: Muff divers (oral sex) 
E~: Licking pussycut 
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E3: Licking all sorts mind. you never 
know what's been in there 
E7: They might have had sex with a 
guy before 
E?: Muffing dogs 
E?' Muffing snakes. (Kitzinget. 1990, 
p.328) 
Note that the focus group members do not offer 
a 'tranSlation' of their language for the 
researcher: it is she who provides the explana-
tion. '[oral sex]', for the reader. 1bis exchange 
provides a gtaphic example of the ex-prisonetS' 
vocabulary and humour, and offers an insight 
into a shared conceptual world which is very 
different from that of the researcher (and prob-
ably from that of most readers). In sum. then, 
focus groups provide an opportunity to learn 
participants' own language and to develop some 
understanding of their conceptual worlds. 
~nabling participants to follow their 
own agendas 
Simply by virtue of the number of participants 
simultaneously involved in the research inter-
action. focus groups inevitably reduce the 
researcher's power and control. making focus 
groups a relatively 'egalitarian' method. (It is 
this feature of focus groups that has proved 
especially attnlCtive to feminist researchers: cf. 
'Wilkinson [1998a. 1998b].) Compared with a 
one-to-one interview, it is much harder for the 
~ researcher to impose her or his own agenda in 
the group context. Note. for example. the diffi-
culty experienced by the researcher in the focus 
group extract quoted above: me ex-prisoners' 
badinage about implausible sexual practices is 
vety much their· agenda. rather than hers (even 
though it may inform her understanding). As 
focus group researchers have pointed out. the 
researcher's influence is 'diffused by the very 
fact of being in a group rather than a one-to-one 
situation' (Frey & Fontana. 1993. p. 26) and 
focus groups place 'control over [the] inter-
action in the hands of the participants rather 
than the researcher' (Morgan. 1988. p. 18). 
Indeed. reduced researcher influence is seen as 
a problem in much of the focus group literature. 
which typically offers the researcher a range of 
techniques for constraining participants and 
reasserting control (e.g. Krueger. 1994; Slewart 
& Shamdasani. 1990; Vaughn el al .. 1996,. 
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Howevet, reduced researchet influence can be 
seen as a benefit of focus group research for 
researchers who are primarily interested in 
participants' own meanings, and who encourage 
participant-direc:ted interaction. rathet than con-
straining it. Reduced researchet control gives 
focus group participants much greater opportu-
nity to set the research agenda. and to 'develop 
the themes most important to them' (Coopet. 
Diamond, & High. 1993). These may diverge 
from those identified by the researcher and 
participants may challenge. or even undermine. 
the researcher, insisting, on their own intet-
pretations and agendas being heard in place of 
the fonna1 requirements of the research project. 
For example, one researcher changed her ana-
lytic focus to include social class as well as 
gender after the insistence of young women in 
her focus groups in talking about this issue 
(Frazer. 1988). 
One particular benefit of focus group partici-
pants' increased role in setting the research· 
agenda is to provide researchers with new 
information or to draw their attention to pre-
viously neglected or unnoticed phenomena. For 
example. researchers running a focus group with 
former LSD-using adolescents uncovered the 
possible use of Robitussin (a strong cough 
medicine) as a substitute for LSD. In character-
izing this discovery as a new piece of the 
contempomry drug puzzle, they comment: 
this is one place where focus groups shine. 
Through group interaction. we learn that 
something we hadn't noticed before is a 
significant issue for drug-experienced young 
people .... From the way the group takes up 
the topic. it is clear that something significant 
is going on, something significant to them. A 
new piece of territory is revealed. (Agar & 
Macdonald. 1995. p. 80) 
In sum. then. reduced researcher influence in 
focus groups enables participants to have more 
control over the research agenda. which in turn 
may generate unexpected insights. 
~ncouraging the production of 
elaborated accounts 
Focus group interactions also encourage individ-
uals to develop and elaborate their accounts in 
response to both agreement and disagreement 
from other group members. For example. bols-
tered by the support of others. one or more 
group memQeIs may enthusiastically extend. 
elaborate or embroider an initially sketchy 
account. In the following extract. focus group 
participants who share the experience of 
multiple sclerosis collaborate to provide 
the researcber with an elaborately detailed 
account of what living with the illness means to 
them: 
S: Another thing that has changed is my 
appearance. The way that I dress ... some 
fads that come out like shoes. Well, you 
have to. I know myself and I notice other 
people. r ve been checking underneath 
the table ... flat shoes! High heels are no 
way ... 
S: High heels are gone! 
S: And just like our clothes. We go and 
instead of messing around with those little, 
little, tiny buttons where you're all 
thumbs-pull on stuff. Something easy to 
get on and get it off. And another thing-
jewelry ... the neck pieces ... I can't get 
the clasp done 
S: Some earrings I can't get. The one's [sic] 
now that you have to get through the hole? 
Like the loop thingy 
S: And another thing-hairdos. Like we 
can't go and sit there with a curling iron. 
not anymore. You'd bum your scalp half 
to death and your fingers 
S: So, it's wash and go 
S: Yeah. and forget about putting makeup on. 
Try to put on mascara and you get it in the 
eyeball. (Lyons & Meade, 1993, cited in 
Lyons et al., 1995, pp. 24-25; fornating 
amended to highlight changes of speaker; 
individual speakers undifferentiated in 
original) 
Througb the consensual piling up of fine 
detail-the height of shoe beels, the size of 
buttons, the fastening mechanisms of jewelry 
and the dangers of beauty appliances-these 
women not only provide information about the 
functional limitations of multiple sclerosis. but 
also convey a consensual sense of what it is like 
to live with multiple sclerosis on a mundane and 
daily basis. Their jointly elabor:lted account 
offers the rese:lrcher a far more detailed and in-
depth insight into their shared lifeworld-and 
direct evidence that it is a shared lifeworld-
thun could one·to-one interviews. While focus 
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group researchers commonly emphasize the role 
of disagreement between participants in encour-
aging the elaboration of accounts, agreement 
can also have this effect. 
However, as focus group researcher Jenny 
Kitzinger (1994b, pp. 170-171) points out. 
participants do not just agree with each other: 
'they also misunderstand one another, question 
one another, try to persuade each other of the 
. justice of their own point of view and sometimes 
they vehemently disagree'. These challenges 
and disagreements between participants are also 
effective in provoking the' development and 
elaboration of accounts. In the British-based 
AIDS Media Research Project. which ran focus 
groups based on pre-existing social groups (e.g. 
colleagues, friends), participants often chal-
lenged each other on contr:ldictions between 
what they claimed to believe and how they 
actually behaved. e.g. 'how about that time you 
didn't use a glove while taking blood from a 
patient?', 'what about the other night when you 
went off with that boy at the disco?' (Kitzinger, 
1994a. p. 105). Challenges like these, in 
forcing people to defend and justify their 
actions or beliefs, often lead to the produc-
tion of more elaborated accounts. This process 
can be seen in another AIDS-related study with 
Australian schoolchildren. In the following 
extract, three 14-year-olds are discussing the 
likelihood of contr:lcting AIDS through being 
tattooed: 
Child 1: Unlikely to get AIDS 
Child 2: AIDS is possible if you share 
needles 
Child I: Yes, but you would have to share 
the needles very quickly 'cause 
AIDS virus is volaIile and dies 
within seconds when it gets out of 
the body 
Child 2: Yes. but still possible 
Child 3: Yes, but you wouldn't just tattoo 
someone and then just switch over 
very quickly. The only thing possi-
ble, not in professional tattooing 
studios. but in any amateur or back-
yard tattoo and they are doing 
friends or something like that. there 
would be a chance-they just use 
compasses. (Houghton et al.. 1995. 
p.977) 
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Here. Child I initially offers the kind of risk 
assessment ('unlilcely") that could have been 
recorded via a rating scale or in a structured 
interview. Child 2'5 challenge (suggesting a 
ciItumstance in which contracting AIDS 
.' through tattooing is more likely) prompts the 
· fint speaker 10 defend her original assertion and 
to offer additional information about her under-
standing of the AIDS virus. This elaboration of 
her viewpoint is very much a product of the 
group contexL Child 2'5 subsequent defence of 
her position (as 'still possible') enables Child 3 
to enter the discussion. developing the argument 
in terms of different risks in different contexts. 
In sum. one important benefit of focus groups 
is that interaction between participants results in 
the production. by individual group members. of 
more elaborated accounts of their beliefs and 
lifeworlds. 
Providing an opportunity to observe . 
· the co-construction of meaning In 
action 
Finally. focus groups are an ideal approach for 
researchers interested in exploring participants' 
own meanings. because they offer a unique 
opportunity to observe the co-construction of 
meaning in action. People's health beliefs. their 
ideas about what causes a disease or what cures 
an illness. the meanings they attribute to dif-
ferent parts of their bodies or to different 
medical procedures are not generated by indi-
viduals in splendid isolation. Such beliefs are 
forged and shaped in everyday social contexts: 
in discussions between family members in the 
home; in conversations with others at school or 
in the workplace: in exchanges with medical 
professionals or members of self-help groups. 
· People build their ideas. beliefs, understandings 
and world views in interaction with others, in a 
social context: as Radley and Billig (1996. p. 
223) say. 'thinking is a socially shared activity'. 
I am using the term 'co-construction of mean-
ing" to refer to the interactive processes through 
which individuals collaboratively construct their 
meanings of health and illness in a social 
context. A focus group is itself a social context: 
its participants are members of a social group in 
interaction. and it is this social interaction 
among participants that constitutes the primary 
data. . 
Focus groups are not. of course. entirely 
naturalistic. and a researcher running a focus 
group (unlike a researcher engaged in partici-
pant observation) is not witnessing a naturally 
occurring evenL in the sense that focus groups 
constitute part of a research enterprise and are 
not part of participants' everyday social con-
texts. Such everyday social contexts are nOL 
however, always easily accessible to the 
researcher. For example. although Morgan and 
Spanish (1984). in studying how people col-
lectively make sense of heart attacks, would 
have liked to observe 'informal discussions of 
friends' and acquaintances' heart attacks'. such 
discussions are. of course.-relatively rare events. 
By using focus groups' rather. than participant 
observation of naturally occurring discussions. 
they were able to coUect far more data. And 
although. as they point out. the focus group 
discussions 'lacked the "Oh my God. not 
Harry" quality of a lunch table group first 
hearing about one of their number's heart attack' 
(Morgan and Spanish. 1984. pp. 258-259). 
these data do nevertheless share many of the 
features of ordinary social interaction. Focus 
group data reflect everyday social processes of 
communication. such as arguing, joking. boast-
ing, teasing, persuasion. challenge and disagree-
menL Focus groups may, like those run by 
Robin larrelt (1993. p. 194). have ·the feel of 
rap sessions with friends'. Crucially. then, focus 
groups offer an opportunity for researchers to 
observe how people interactively construct the 
meanings attributed to health and illness: how 
opinions are formed. expressed. defended and 
(sometimes) modified within the context of 
discussion and debate with others. 
We have already seen that focus group inter-
actions can enhance disclosure and yield elabo-
rated accounts through participants' support for. 
or challenge of. each other's views. But there is. 
more than this. In a focus group. people are 
confronted with the need to make collective 
sense of their individual experiences and beliefs. 
This collective sense-making involves sharing 
information. pooling experiences and comparing 
and contrasting them. negotiating divergent 
ideas and experiences. expressing agreement as 
well as disagreement with other participants. 
asking questions that challenge or which seek 
clarification. and providing answers that elabo-
rate. justify or defend the speaker's views. It is 
also sometimes possible to observe people shift-
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ing their, views in the course of focus group 
discussion: augmenting and strengthening their 
ideas based on complementary input from other 
. group members. incorporating discrepant infor-
mation. or simply changing their minds, All of 
these processes are key aspects of the co-
construction of meaning. 
I will now illustrate how the co-construction 
of meaning can be explored through focus group 
research. using two specific examples of women 
talking about their breast cancer, I have drawn 
on my own data here not only because it is 
apposite. but also because published reports of 
focus group studies rarely include the kind of 
detailed. interactive data extract necessary for 
this kind of analysis. I also' hope to make a 
substantive conuibution to the breast cancer 
literature. J J 
In the first example, three focus group partici-
pants interact: Anne had a mastectomy a year 
before: Carol had a lumpectomy some weeks 
ago; and Barbara. who arrives for the focus 
group looking tense and nervous. had her mas-
tectomy only a few days before. Within about 
10 minutes of the start of the focus group. Anne 
asks Barbara whether she is wearing a prosthe-
sis, and Barbara explains that. because her 
mastectomy is so recent. she has 'only a little 
soft comfie' (a lambswool puff. typically 
given to women until the scar heals sufficiently 
for them to be fitted for a silicone prosthesis). 
Anne responds by reflecting on the difference in 
size between 'your bosom' and 'my bosom'. and 
then offers to show Barbara (who /las never seen 
a prosthesis before) what hers looks like. As 
Barbara hesitates. Anne reaches inside her bra. 
, pulls out her prosthesis. and passes it around the 
table: 
Anne: Would you like to. see my prosthe. 
sis? The si~e of it? 
Barbara: [laughs] Well. mine's only really 
tiny [laughs] 
Anne: Excuse me [pulls out breast prosthe-
sis and passes it around the table] 
Feel the weight 
Carol: [gasps] 
Anne: You don't. you don't feel it though. 
once it's 
Carol: My friend's. though, isn't as. it 
doesn't seem as heavy as that 
Anne: [to Barbara] Pick it up. Look at it 
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Barbara: No. I've had-
Carol: [cuts in] [1' s very heavy 
Several: [raucous laughter. voices indistinct] 
Carol: Ifs ra-[coIlapses into laughter] 
Several: [more laughter] 
Carol: It's rarher heavy. isn't it? 
Anne: You can imagine my scar 
Barbara: Do you want to see my scar? 
Several: [more laughter and clamorous 
voices overlapping] 
Look at my scar. Look at my scar 
[more raucous, laughter. voices in-
distinct] , , 
Barbara: [Picks up prosthesis] My goodliess. 
it feels so nice, It even feels warm 
[laughs]. 
Various features of this brief interaction (it 
lasts only a few minutes of a focus group 
totalling over 2 hours in all) point to the 
advantages of focus groups in studying the co-
construction of meaning. Anne. Barbara and 
Carol are sharing information in a relatively 
naturalistic way: it is possible to imagine that 
similar interactions might take place, for exam-
ple, in a self-help group discussion. or among 
friends. Though this sharing of information. 
Barbara's ideas about her post-mastectomy 
experience are being actively constructed, 
She is learning not only what a prosthesis 
looks and feels like, but also a socially 
acceptable attitude to it (and to the mastec-
tomy scar"): that it is - something 'that can be 
shown to and discussed explicitly with others. 
something about which women with breast 
cancer can laugh. joke (and even brag!), She is 
also being socialized into the conventional belief 
that a prosthesis (however small) is an essential 
part of post-mastectomy life: this group is 
typical in that prostheses are taken for granted." 
The possibility of nor wearing one is rarely 
discussed in my focus groups. and then only as 
an oddity. 
Barbara's attitude to prostheses can be 
observed changing over the course of this 
interaction, At the beginning of the extract. she 
deHects Anne' s question about whether or not 
she would like to see the prosthesis (perhaps she 
doesn't take the question seriously: in any event. 
she sounds embarrassed and awkward). The 
group interaction then shifts to Anne and Carol. 
who compare and contrast prostheses they have 
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known. while Barbara sits stunned. unable to 
. ·look at or to touch the prosthesis. although Anne 
specifically encourages her to do so: 'No .. :. 
she says. Various other group members juggle 
the prosthesis from hand 10 hand. crack jokes 
(sadly. inaudible on tape). talk excitedly over 
each other. and laugh together. Fmally, Barbara 
relaxes and joins in. holding the prosthesis and 
saying with surprise and laughter in her voice, 
'My goodness. it feels so nice'. For rese3rChers 
interested in people's own understandings of 
health-related . issues. this extract offers the 
opportunity to observe the co-construction of the 
meaning of a prosthesis. It shows how Barbara. 
in the social context provided by the focus 
group, responds to the collaborative construction 
of a prosthesis as something to be joked about 
publicly. and begins to incorporate this benign 
image into her own understandings. 
My second example of the co-construction of 
meanings in a focus group also involves inter-
actions between three women with breast c:mcer. 
Doris and Fiona are both pub landladies 
(although Doris has recently retired). They 
arrived early, met each other for the first time. and 
discovered their shared occupation while waiting 
for the other participants. During this pre-focus 
group conversation. they developed a joint theory 
about the possible role of their work in causing 
. their breast cancer. Specifically. Doris and Fiona 
co-constructed the explanation that 'pulling'" 
(drawing beer from a cask.by means of a hand-
pump. which is quite a strenuous activity) was to 
blame. Immediately prior to the following 
extract, I ask the focus group participants if they 
have any ideas what might have caused their 
breast cancer. Doris turns to Fiona:md says. 'Like 
you I wondered if it was with pulling'. The other 
participants look blank. so I explain that Doris 
and Fiona were talking earlier about whether 
being pub landladies could have contributed in 
some way. Edith is very quick to catch on (asking 
a clarificatory question which I as rese3rCher 
would certainly not have thought to ask): 
Edith: Is it at the side where ... ? 
Doris: Mine's at the side where [indistinct] 
Fiona: Where you pulled 
Doris: Yes 
Fiona: And mine's the same side. and I've 
got two friends who are both pub 
landladies down south 
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Doris: And then 
Fiona: And they're sisters and both of them 
have got breast cancer. both on the 
same side as they pull beer 
Doris: And then there's the atmosphere of 
the smoke in the [stutters] in the pub 
Fiona: Well L I'm not, I don't know,l'm DOt 
so sure about that one 
Doris: Well. I think I le:m to that more in. 
what do they call him? The artist. Ray 
Castle .. 
Fiona: Oh Ray Castle, yeah. with passive 
smoking. 
Doris and Fiona respond to Edith' s question 
by pooling their similar experiences: Fiona even 
completes Doris's sentence for her. in expound-
ing their joint theory. Fiona then offers addi-
tional information: she has two friends who are 
also pub landladies. and they too have breast 
cancer on the same side as they pull beer. This 
strengthens their joint theory still further: with 
the evidence of four pub landladies all with 
breast cancer on the same side as they pull beer. 
who could doubt that pulling beer is a contribu-
tory factor? However, Doris then offers an 
alternative or additional contributory factor for 
breast cancer in pub landladies: 'the atmosphere 
of the smoke in the pub' . 
There are several possibilities open to Fiona 
at this point: she can reject this new information 
out of hand in favour of the 'pulling' theory (in 
which case she will need to defend pulling as 
the stronger contender. perhaps offering more 
evidence to support pulling or to refute the 
'smoky atmosphere' theory); she can elaborate 
the pulling theory to incorporate smoky atmos-
phere as an additional possible cause: she can 
engage with the new information as offering a 
possible alternative theory (perhaps exploring 
the parameters and implications of a smoky 
atmosphere. or challenging Doris to provide 
examples or additional evidence of its effects): 
or she can simply accept the smoky atmosphere 
as a better explanation for breast cancer. [n the 
event. her hesitant and qualified response ('Well 
I. I'm not. I don't know. [' m not so sure about 
that one') implies disagreement or. at the very 
least, uncertainty. Fiona's apparent disagree-
ment leads Doris to marshal supporting evidence 
for the smoky atmosphere theory. in [he form of 
a recent television documentary featuring a 
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celebrity with cancer. Fiona has seen the docu-
menW)' too. and in her response to Doris. we 
see a possible beginning of a shift in her views 
(or at least a willingness to engage seriously 
with the smoky atmosphere theory): she recog-
"nizes and names (as passive smoking) the 
phenomenon that Doris has identified. 
These two examples have illustrated, then. 
how focus groups offer the researcher the 
opportUnity directly to observe the process of 
the c~onstruction of meaning in action. In a 
focus group; contributions to the discussion are 
made for a purpose. e.g. to amuse, inform. 
illustrate or explain something to the other 
participants. Although focus groups also have an 
affinity with narrative and storytelling methods 
(see Bruner. 1991; Howard, 1991: Murray, 
1997)" within the context of a focus group. a 
narrated story is never just a stand-alone. In 
contrast to narrative approaches. which typically 
isolate material from the social context of its 
production. a story told in a focus group pro-
vides a stimulus for others also to tell their 
stories for comparative or contrastive purposes. 
and so provides an impetus for the development 
of shared knowledge within a group: stories told 
in focus groups facilitate 'the translation of 
common knowledge displayed by individuals 
into shared knowledge ... elaborated· consen-
sually by the group' (Hughes & DuMon!, 1993. 
p.794). 
In sum. in this section I have identified and 
illustrated five ways in which focus groups are 
of particular value for researchers interested in 
exploring people's own meanings of health and 
illness. Focus groups facilitate access to individ-
uals' own meanings by enhancing disclosure. by 
highlighting participants' own language and 
concepts; by enabling participants to follow 
their own agendas. by facilitating the production 
of elaborated accounts, and by enabling the 
researcher to observe the co-construction of 
meaning in action. 
Conclusion 
As I have shown. then. focus groups are an ideal 
method for eliciting people's own meanings and 
understandings of health and illness. This makes 
the method well suited to those researchers 
concerned with ·the patient's view'. or who are 
approaching health-related research from theo-
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retical perspectives in which meanings. folk 
theories. lay representations. common-sense 
beliefs. and so on are crucial. Given this 
apparently good fit between focus group method 
and the aims of phenomenological. experiential 
or narrative researchers. it is surprising to find 
how rare it is for such researchers to see focus 
groups .as an appropriate method. For example. 
Wil1iams and Popay (1994), who claim that 
methods that elicit 'the nature of lay knowledge' 
should be 'egalitarian' and 'phenomenologically 
open'. highlight the use of unstructured inter-
views (not focus groups) i.1} achieving this goal. 
For health researchers emphasizing a crucial 
concern with eliciting 'meanings', the one-to-
one interview is most often the method of choice 
(e.g. Conrad. 1985: O'Connor. Wicker. & Ger-
mino. 1990: WilIiams & Wood. 1986). Others 
have used written accounts (e.g. Robinson. 
1990). or even questionnaires (e.g. Harding & 
O'Looney. 1984) and scales (e.g. Fife, 1995): 
the use of focus groups is not common. 
Moreover, it is also surprising that to find that 
in a great deal of published focus group 
research. the interaction between participants. 
i.e. precisely that feature of focus groups which 
makes them such a good method for eliciting 
meanings. is neither reported nor analysed. In 
expounding the theory informing focus group 
. method. researchers typically emphasize inter-
action between participants as a distinctive 
characteristic of the method: writing in the 
journal Qualitative Health Research, Carey and 
Smith(1994, p. 125) state clearly that 'research-
ers who use focus groups and who do not attend 
to the impact of the group setting will incom-
pletely or inappropriately analyze their data'. In 
practice. however. focus group researchers typi-
cally neglect this very feature. Both an earlier 
review of 40 focus group studies (Kitzinger, 
1994a) and my own review of over 200 studies 
for this and another article (Wilkinson. 1998b), 
reveal that it is rare to find reports that concen-
trate on the analysis of group interactions and. 
indeed. very few that include any data extracts 
showing participants' interactions. Focus group 
data are most commonly presented as if they 
were one·to-one interview data. Consequently. it 
should be noted that in writing this article I have 
deliberately sought out and presented these rare 
published examples of interactive data. and my 
presentation of focus group data in this article is 
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therefore not typical of the way in which these 
data are normally reported: indeed. I have often 
drawn attention to interactional features that are 
not commented upon by the authors themselves. 
Further. I have had to rely upon my own data in 
illustrating the process of the co-construction of 
meaning. in order to have sufficient information 
about interactive features. There is a pressing 
need to develop focus group research in order to 
benefit more fuDy from the interactive nature of 
its data. 
FmaUy, it should be noted that focus group 
method is flexible in terms of the analytic 
frameworks within which it can be used. It is 
possible. as I have shown. to use focus group 
method within a traditional essentialist frame-
work (such as in some versions of cognitive 
psychology and some types of research on 
health beliefs and attitudes). It is also possible to 
use focus groups within the alternative (social 
constructionist) framework offered by the 'turn 
to language' in health psychology (e.g. Radley 
& Billig. 1996). For those health researchers 
worlcing within an essentialist frameworlc. focus 
groups offer a valuable way of studying ·the 
individual in social context' (Goldman. 1962; 
Rubin & Rubin. 1995, p. 95) an4 provide 
insights both into the content of cOgIutions and 
into the processes through which such cogni-
tions are formed and modified. For those health 
researchers worlcing within a social construc-
tionist frameworlc. Il focus group data offer a 
route to studying the construction and negotia-
tion of health-related taIlc, the social functions 
served by different accounts or' discourses, and 
the ways in which aspects of health and illness 
are produced and perpetuated through tallc. I. In 
this article, r have shown that focus group 
method can be used flexibly across a wide range 
of health-related research contexts. to address a 
wide range of research questions central to the 
study of health and illness. I have argued that 
the method is of particular value to those 
researchers (e.g. phenomenological. experiential 
or narrative researchers) interested in exploring 
individuals' own meanings of health and illness 
because focus group interactions facilitate 
access to such meanings. Health researchers 
were pioneers in the early use of focus groups 
and we have continued to malee extensive use of 
the method in our research. If we are able fully 
to exploit the analytic potential of group inter-
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action. in exploring the meanings of health and 
illness. focus group method offers health 
researchers a major opportunity for the future. 
Notes 
I. These 'anlipositivisl' perspectives include: (aulo) 
biography. ethnomethodology. experientilll 
research. grounded theory. life histories and Iife-
worlds. narralology. phenomenology. social rep-
resentations. symbolic inter.lCtionism. and other 
approaches. . . 
2. These include: HN/AIDS (e.g. Brown. 1993; 
F1askerud 8< Rush. 1989; Gei. elal .. 1986; Hoppe 
ellll .• 1994; lrwin el 01.. 1991; Kline el 1Il .• 1992: 
Lampon. 1995: Luplon 8< Tulloch. 1996: Nyma-
thi 8< Shuler. 1990; Rogler. Cones. 8< Malg.dy. 
1994: Vera. Reese. Paikoff. 8< Jarrett. 1996): 
asthma (Hyland ellll .. 1991): high blood pressure 
(Basch, 1987): breast cancer (Duke et 1Il .. 1994: 
Wy.tt ela!.. 1993): diabetes (Crabtree. Yanoshik. 
Miller. 8< O·Connor. 1993): hean attacks (Mor. 
gan 8< Spanish. 1984. 1985; Ritchie et 1Il .• 1994); 
tropical diseases (Khan 8< Manderson. 1992); and 
body image and eating disorders (Grogan 8< 
Wainwright, 1996). 
3. For example: menstruation (Kissling. 1996; 
Lovering, 1995); contraCeption (Cooper el 1Il .. 
1993: FoJch-Lyon el al.. 1981; Knodel et 1Il .. 
1984): and pregnancy and childbinh (DiM'tteo el 
al .. 1993; Okonofua, 1995). 
4. For example: child sexual abuse (Barringer. 
1992); domestic violence (Brown el al.. 1993; 
Fielding. 1993): and s«ual aggression (Nonis. 
Nurius.8< Dimeff. 1996). 
5. These include: multiple' sclerosis (Lyons & 
Mead •. 1993); resmcled mobility following frac-
tures or falls (Quine 8< Cameron. 1995); and 
young children with disabilities (Brotherson. 
1994). 
6. For example: cervical screening (Dignan et al.. 
1990; McKie. 1996; Naish el.l.. 1994); commu-
nic3tion within hospice teams (Zimmennan & 
Applegate. 1992); mental health services (Richter 
et .1.. 1991); midwifery practice (Jaffre 8< Prual. 
1994); and community care and self·help groups 
(Loevy 8< O·B';en. 1994; Orr. 1991). 
7. For example: diet and numtion (Crockelt et al .. 
1990; Mullis 8< Lansing. 1986): drug use (Agar 8< 
M.cdenald. 1995): drinking (Beck. Summons. & 
Hansen-Matthews. 1987); driving and road safety 
(Basch. DeCicco. & Malfetti. 1989): smoking 
(Aitken et al.. 1986; Heimann-Rat.in et al.. 
1985); and stress and coping (Hamon & Thiessen. 
1990; Mates 8< AIIi,on. 1992). 
8. These include: environmt:ntal assessment C Bure 
g .... Umbo et Harrison. 1988); job SOIisfo<:tion 
(e.g. Frey et Cams. 1988); racism at school and 
work (Hughes et DuMon!, '1993); poverty (e.g. 
Geerge. 1996; 1arrett. 1994); soc:iaI class (Walk· 
erdine. 1996); and UDemployment (Willott et 
.• Griffin. 1997). 
9. Other examples include: urban American children 
(Vera et at .. 1996); adolescents in rurat Nigeria 
(Okonorua. 1995); sexually active black male 
teenagers (Nix. Pasteur. et Servance. 1988); New 
York Puerto Ricans (Rogler et at .. 1994); black 
gay men (Mays et at .. 1992); African-American 
single mothers (1arrett. 1994); Hispanic women. 
especially LV. drug users (Kline et at .. 1992); 
'difficult to-reach. high·risk families' in an inner 
city (Lengua et at.. 1992); poor women in 
Bombay (Geerge. 1996); immigrant/refugee 
women (Espin. 1995); older rural Americans 
(Crockett et at.. 1990); urban Indonesians 
(Suyono et at .. 198\); physicians (Brown et at .. 
1993); and midwives (1affre et Pruat. 1994). 
10. For discussion of some of the factors inftuencing 
self-<lisclosure in focus groups (e.g. group cam· 
position. relationships among participants. mod· 
erator style). see Kmeger (1994) and Zeller 
(1993). 
I t. I see this work as contributing in particular ·to 
qualitative studies of breast cancer. particularly 
those informed by a feminist perspective. e.g. 
Cannon (1989). Datan (1989). Kosper (1995). 
Morris (1983). Rosser (198 \). Tait (1990). Win· 
now (1992); see atso Wilkinson et Kittinger 
(1993). 
12. Anne and the other focus group members laugh 
and brag about mastectomy scars in • similar 
manner to their joking obeut prostheses. Note that 
by the end of this extract, Barb ... is also able to 
join in with this joking: she echoes Anne' s initial 
question 'Would you like to see ·my prosthesis?' 
with. playful 'Do you want to see my scar?' 
13. Later. the group discusses swimming as post· 
mastectomy exercise. and Barb ... is involved in 
an exchange of information about exactly what 
'you put in your bathing costume' to m.ke a post· 
mastectomy breast 'Iook like the other one". 
14. Indeed. some narrative reseorchers have started to 
use focus groups (e.g. DiM.ttea et al .• 1993: 
Espin. 1995). 
IS. Within a social constructionist (or discursive) 
framework. however. focus group dalO are con· 
sidered to be just as constructed-albeit differ· 
ently as (soy) responses to • questionnaire or 
me3Surements on :I scale. Viewed within this 
fr:lmework. the method offers access to 'the 
patterns of talk and interaction through which the 
members of any group constitute. shared reality' 
(DeVault. 1990. p. 97)-aou not to any unuer· 
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lying cognition. or cognitive proceSses.. The 
analytic focus is on the talk and conversadonat 
interaction itself. and unly on this (e.g. Paner and 
Wetherell. 1987). 
16. For further examples of this approach see. for 
example. Antoki (1994). Edwards (1997). 
Edwards et Potter (1992). Potter (1996). and 
Wilkinson et Kirzinger ( 1995). For rese:ucb that 
applies sociat constructionis!' discourse anatytic 
or conversation anatytic techniques to the anatysi. 
of focus group dau. see. for exomple. Agar et 
Macdonatd (\ 995). Frith et Kittinger (1998). 
Myers (1998) ~d Wetherell et Edley (1997). 
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Thinking differently about thinking positive: a discursive 
approach to cancer patients' talk 
Sue Wilkinson*, Celia Kitzinger 
Department of Social Sciences. Loughborough Universit)'. Loughborough L£1 I 3TU. UK 
Abstract 
There is an extensive social science and psycho-oncology literature on coping with cancer which claims that 
Uthinking positive" is correlated with.-.and, by extension, causally implicated in - individu~ls90 morbidity and 
mortality rates, and their overall level of mental health. Drawing on our own data, in which groups of women with 
breast cancer talk about "thinking positive", this paper interrogates the basis of such claims from a discursive 
perspective, by challenging the data analyses upon which they are based. We show that previous literature 
overwhelmingly relies on self-report data, which are taken as offering morc or less accurate depictions of speakers' 
psychological states (i.e. their mental adjustment or coping style). A discursive approach, by contrast, explores talk 
as a form of action designed for its local interactional context, and pays detailed attention to what statements about 
"thinking positive" actually mean for speakers in the contexts in which they occur. We show that "thinking 
positive" functions not as an accurate report of a internal cognitive state, but, rather as a conversational idiom, 
characterised by vagueness and generality, and summarising a socially normative 'moral requirement; we also show 
that even those breast cancer patients who report uthinking positiveH can also actively resist its moral prescriptions. 
Finally, we sketch out the implications of our analysis for analyses of cancer patients' talk more generally and for 
future research on coping with cancer. © 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. 
__ Keywords: Breast cancer; Coping; Discursive analysis; Thinking positive 
People who are seriously ill often talk about the im-
portance of developing and maintaining a positive atti-
tude, of "thinking positive". The following quotations 
are the words of cancer patients, as they appear in the 
literature OIL 'psychological responses to the diagnosis 
of a life-threatening disease: . 
You bave to think positive (Gotay, 1984: 609) 
• Corresponding author. Tel.: +44-1509·223365; rax: +44-
1509-223944. 
E.mail addresses: s.wilkinson@lboro.ac.uk (S. Wilkinson). 
c.c.kitzinger@.lboro.ac.uk (C. KilZinger). 
I really believe that if I have a positive attitude this 
will benefit my health (Watson et aI., 1988: 204) 
I also knew that the best way to tackle it was to be 
as positive as possible (Morris et aI., 1985: 800) 
[ believe that if you"re a positive person, your atti-
tude has a lot to do with it. I definitely reel I will 
never get it again (Taylor, 1983: 1163) 
Because the coping literature often uses quantitative 
approaches to data collection. research participants are 
frequently limited to expressing their views about 
··positive thinkint" via ticking a box on a question-
0277·9536/00/$ - see front matter tl 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. 
PH: 50277-9536(99)00337-8 
· 180 
798 S. Wilkinson. C. Kit:inger! Social Science & Medicine SO (2000) 797-811 
naire or circling a number on a Likert scale. Items 
include: 
I try to see it in a different light, to make it seem 
·more positive (Carver et aI., 1989: 272, COPE scale 
item) 
I believe that my positive attitude will benefit my 
health. (Greer and Watson, 1987: 449, Mental 
Adjustment to Cancer scale item) 
It's best to be positive at all times. I try not to let 
myself get depressed, sad or angry when things go 
wrong. (Temoshok and Dreher, 1992: 390, Type C 
personality questionnaire item) 
Try to keep a positive outlook in life and avoid 
thoughts and feelings about this problem that might 
get me down or depressed. (Reed et aI., 1994: 302, 
item adapted from FolkIIlan &. Lazarus, 1980, 
Ways of Coping Scale) 
Our own data set (described more fully below) con-
sists of tape·recorded discussions between women with 
breast cancer sharing their experiences, and it contains 
many instances of talk very similar to that quoted in 
the literature and embodied in scale items: "I feel very 
positive" (Pauline, TP4, G8'); "I started looking on 
the positive side" (Wilma, TP7, GIl); "You just have' 
to think positive" (Vera, TP2, G2); "I'm the positive 
thinking type of person" (Nettie, TP9, GIl); "I was 
~ positive" (Nina, TP4, G8). This paper arises out 
of our reflections on how to make analytic sense of 
cancer patients' talk about "thinking positive". 
In this paper we introduce and develop a specifically 
discursive approach. We do not seek to make a general 
case for qualitative rather than quantitative research; 
or to differentiate the particular epistemological and 
methodological issues associated with qualitative and 
quantitative approaches (cf. Bryman, 1988). Rather, 
we present a discursive perspective as one key 
approach to the theorisation and analysis of qualitative 
data. Discursive analysis uses tools drawn from the 
interdisciplinary arena of discourse and conversation 
analysis (e.g .. Wilkinson and Kitzinger, 1995; Potter, 
1996; Edwards, 1997; Killinger and Frith, 1999) and is 
still relatively rare within health research. As we will 
show, the traditional approach to talk about positive 
thinking is to treat it as offering evidence about the 
speaker's "mental adjustmentlt or ··coping style". 
1 All quotations from our data are tagged in this way: 
'Pauline' is the participant's pseudonym; 'TP4' is the 4th 
'thinking positive' extract (extracts numbered sequentially in 
order of identification): 'GS' is the 8th focus group discussion 
(groups numbered sequentially in order of occurrence). 
which can then be correlated with a range of other 
variables (such as morbidity and mortality rates, or 
levels of emotional distress). Within the perspective of 
discursive analysis, by contrast, people's talk is seen 
not as offering routes to cognitive processes (e.g. cop-
ing strategies) but as a form of social action designed 
for its local interactional context. 
In the first section of this paper, we explore the 
ways in which talk about "positive thinking" is usually 
interpreted in the social science and psycho-oncology 
literatures, and indicate some of the problems with 
this. In the second section, we use our own data to 
explore alternative ways of analysing talk about "posi-
tive thinking" from a disCursive perspective. Final1y, 
we sketch out the broader implications of our analysis 
for understanding cancer patients' talk more generally 
and for future research on coping with cancer. 
Positive thinking: the existing literature 
The past few decades have seen an increasing focus 
on the psychological states associated with diseases (es-
pecially cancer and AIDS) and attempts to determine 
their causal role in disease progression by correlating 
them with morbidity and mortality rates. In the psy-
cho-oncology and social science literatures, then~ the 
theoretical interest guiding analysis of patients' talk 
about "thinking positive" is usually based in some 
kind of assessment of their "mental adjustment", "ad-
aptation", or "coping style" and its possible influence 
on overall mental and physical health. Patients' talk 
about - and/or questionnaire endorsement or rejec-
tion of - "positive thinking" crops up across a range 
of theoretical and methodological perspectives. We will 
discuss three of them briefly here: the work of Greer 
and his colleagues on "mental adjustment to cancer"; 
the research of Taylor and her colleagues on "positive 
illusions"; and the "ways of coping" research by 
Folkman and Lazarus, their various co-workers, and 
those who have used or adapted their scale (including 
Taylor). It is not our intention comprehensively to 
review or evaluate the findings of these bodies of litera-
ture but to examine them to provide an indication of 
the ways in which they operationalise, define and 
assess "positive thinking". 
The work of Steven Greer and his colleagues (e.g. 
Greer et al., 1979, 1990; Greer and Watson, 1987; 
Morris et al., 1977; Pettingale et aI., 1985; Watson et 
aI., 1988) is one of the most inftuential and widely 
cited series of studies used to support the idea that 
patients' adjustment to a cancer diagnosis may affect 
the progression of the disease. Initially based on 
research with 57 women (Greer et aI., 1979), these 
researchers found a significant correlation between a 
positive mental adjustment to cancer (as assessed in 
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interviews with breast cancer patients) and survival 
rates. without recurrence of the disease, at 5, 10. and 
15 year follow-up. Subsequent work by this group 
iJ)c1udes a prospective multidisciplinary study of 170 
patients with breast cancer and lymphoma (Pettingale 
et aI., 1988; Burgess et aI., 1988), and the development 
of the Mental Attitudes to Cancer (MAC) scale. Very 
little interview data is quoted in any of these studies, 
but -the rating criteria devised for coding interviews 
include the following statement as indicative of "fight-
ing spirit": "I won't let cancer beat me, I'm trying 
everything to get better; I go to these classes to learn 
to relax and to think positively" (Greer et aI., 1989: 
374). Their Mental Adjustment to Cancer (MAC) 
Scale includes among the items scored as indicating 
"fighting spirit: I try to have a very positive attitude" 
and "I believe that my positive attitude will benefit my 
health". Greer and his colleagues (Greer et al., 1992: 
675) diagnose "psychological morbidity" in cancer 
patients with low scores on "fighting spirit". Such 
patients are offered adjuvant psychological therapy, a 
cognitive behavioural treatment programme which tea .. 
ches patients how to replace their "negative automatic 
thoughts" with "a constructive and positive approach 
to coping with cancer" (Moorey and Greer, 1989: 78): 
examples of "positive self-statements" which patients 
arc encouraged to use include: "I'm going to beat 
this"; "I know the chemotherapy is shrinking my 
lumpn; "This isn't going to ruin my life" and "I'm 
going to get .well" (Moorey and Greer, 1989: 117). The 
successful outcome of therapy is defined as "promoting 
a fighting spirit", as measured through agreement with 
MAC items about (amongst other things) positive 
thinking (Greer et aI., 1992: 676). In sum, then, state-
ments about positive thinking such as those cited 
above are taken as evidence of "fighting spirit", ~hich 
is considered a good mental adjustment to a cancer 
diagnosis. 
Another tradition of health research which focuses 
on "positive thinking" is the work of Shelley Taylor 
and her colleagues (Dunkel-Schetter et aI., 1992; 
Taylor, 1983, 1989, 1990; Taylor and Armor, 1996; 
Taylor and Brown, 1988, 1994; Taylor et al.,' 1992; 
Reed et aI" 1994). Initially this group of researchers 
focused on the extent to which positive thinking func-
tions as an effective coping strategy. Drawing on'inter-
views with 78 women with breast cancer, Taylor (1983) 
emphasised that "gaining a sense of mastery-' over the 
disease (an important aspect of successful adjustment) 
is commonly manifested through "a belief that a posi-
tive attitude would keep the cancer from coming 
back" (Taylor, 1983: 1163). Interview extiacts cited as 
illustrative of such belief include: "I believe that if 
you're a positive person, your attitude has a lot to do 
wiih it. I definitely feel I will never get it again" and "1 
think that if you feel you are in control of it, you can 
control it up to a point. I absolutely refuse to have 
any more cancer" (p. 1163). Although, as Taylor 
notes, "such beliefs have yet to yield any factual basis 
of support" (Taylor, 1983: 1161), and there is "little 
evidence that such faith is well placed" (Taylor, 1983: 
1167), nonetheless such "illusion" may be "essential 
for adequate coping" (Taylor, 1983: 1171). In their 
later work, these researchers make use of (adaptations 
00 Folkman and Lazarus' (1980, 1985, 1988) Ways of 
Coping (WOC) inventory, which (in its variously 
adapted forms) is one of the most widely used 
measures in health research. 
According to Folkman and Lazarus (1980) coping is 
both problem-focused (Le. attempts to deal with or 
change the situation or problem that is causing dis-
tress) and emotion-focused (Le. attempts to deal with 
or change one's feelings about it). On. aspect of 
emotion-focused coping is "positive reappraisal'" one 
of the eight coping and behavioural strategies 
. measured by the Ways of Coping inventory (Folkman 
and Lazarus, 1985). Items include "I changed or grew 
as a person in a good way", "1 came out of the experi-
ence better than I went in", "1 found new faith", "1 
prayed" (Folkman et aI., 1986: 574). Factor analyses 
of the items in this inventory, used with a range of 
participants across different studies. consistently yield a 
factor to which some kind of "positive thinking" label 
is applied. A factor called "positive attitudes" emerged 
in research focusing on gay men's response to the 
threat of AIDS,. carried out by Taylor and her col-
leagues (using an adapted version of the WOC inven-
tory): the factor was characterised by items such as 
"try to keep a positive outlook on life" and "try to 
keep myself from worrying about getting AIDS, since 
there is no use in worrying" (Taylor et aI., 1992: 463). 
A factor labelled "focusing on the positive" - alSO_I" 
emerged in Taylor's research on cancer patients' pat-
terns of coping: this was characterised by items (again I 
adapted from the WOC) such as: "found new faith", 
"rediscovered what is important in life", "changed or 'I 
grew as a person in a good way". and ··came out of 
the experience better than before" (Dunkel-Schetter et I 
aI., 1992: 83). In later research with HIV-seropositive 
gay men, Taylor and her colleagues labelled as "active I 
cognitive coping" a similar factor which was character· 
ised by agreement with (adapted) WOC inventory 
items such as "Try to maintain a positive attitude 
about this problem" and "Look for the silver lining, 
so to speak; try to look on the bright side of things" 
(Reed et aI., 1994). Recently, the WOC scale has been 
extensively employed by Folkman and her colleagues 
in researching the coping styles of the partners of gay 
men with H1V/AIDS (Folkman, 1997; Folkman et aI., 
1994; F olkman et aI., 1996). 
Given the importance attached to "positive think-
ing" in the social science and psycho-oncology litera~ 
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tures, it is worth considering in more detail (a) just 
what is taken as evidence that a research participant is 
engaged in "positive thinking", and - conversely -
ho\V we should interpret someone's statement that they 
are "thinking positively"; and (b) the broader social 
context of the emphasis on "positive thinking". 
Evidence 
Inspection of the social science and psycho-oncology 
literature for talk about, and items relating to, "posi-
tive thinking" reveals that a wide range of different 
statements is taken as evidence for "positive thinkingt1 
- i.e. that operational definitions of the concept vary 
widely. Items scored as indicative of "positive think-
ing" include statements as diverse as "I thought of 
how a person I admire would act" (Dunkel-Schetter et 
aI., 1992: 83); "I keep myself from thinking too much 
about the problem" (Reed et al., 1994: 302); "I 
prayed" (Folkman et aI., 1986: 996); and "I remind 
myself how much worse things could be" (Reed et al., 
1994: 302). Moreover, not only are apparently diverse 
statements coded in similar ways, but apparently simi-
lar statements arc sometimes coded in opposite ways. 
For example, the item "I try to see it in a different 
light, to make it seem more positive". is evidence of 
"positive reinterpretation", correlated with self.esteem, 
optimism, and hardiness (Carver et aI., 1989: 272); but 
the very similar item, "It's best to be positive at all 
times_ I try not to let myself get depressed, sad; or 
angry when things go wrong" is used to measure 
"Type C" personality type - supposedly predictive of 
cancer (Temoshok and Dreher, 1992: 390). Here, 
endorsement of a statement which explicitly advocates 
. positive thinking is read as an unhealthy denial of 
negative emotions which is implicated in the onset and 
progression of disease. 
Although rarely quoted, semi-structured interview 
data underpin much of the research in the coping lit-
erature. Here, as in the use of the various scales or 
inventories, evidence that someone is "thinking posi-
tively" is derived unproblematically from self-report, 
and - despite the usual cautions and provisos regard-
ing the reliability and validity of self-report data (cf. 
Folkman et aI., 1986: 1002; Greer et al., 1989) - self-
report is generally treated as offering (more or less 
accurate) depictions of their participants' psychological 
states. 
Evidence that someone is thinking positively is 
essentially read off unproblematically from someone's 
willingness to say in interview, "I think positively" or 
to tick an item to that effect on a scale. Making a 
statement about thinking, feeling, or being "positive" 
(or agreeing with an already-prepared statement) is 
interpreted as a manifestation of an internal state. 
In their initial work, Greer and his colleagues car-
ried out interviews with 57 breast cancer patients, ask-
ing them how they perceived the nature and 
seriousness of their disease and how their lives had 
been affected by it (Greer et aI., 1979). Later, they car-
ried out tape-recorded semi-structured interviews with 
170 breast cancer and lymphoma patients, asking them 
to talk about their discovery of symptoms, their under-
standing of the diagnosis and its implications, their 
beliefs. about the outcome of their disease and their 
sense of control over it (Burgess et aI., 1987; Greet et 
aI., 1989; Morris, 1986; Morris et al., 1985). More 
recently, Folkman and her colleagues analysed tape-
recorded semi-structured interviews with 30 gay men 
whose partners had died of HIV I AIDS related illnesses 
(Stein et al., 1997): each interviewee was asked to 
describe what happened at the time of his partner's 
death, what he was feeling and thinking, what helped 
him and what made things difficult for him. None of 
these.....: potentially very rich - data were subjected to 
qualitative analysis. Instead, the guiding principle 
seemed to be to convert them as rapidly as possible 
into scores which could be entered into factor analyses, 
and correlated with psychometric measures of psycho-
logical well-being, morbidity and mortality rates, 
demographic variables, and health status. Note that we 
are not critiquing quantitative or correlational research 
per se (and we recoguise that data reduction is often a 
design feature of such studies) - rather, our point 
here is that even when extensive qualitative data are 
collected, researchers often do not use such data ana, 
Iytically to inform their understandings. 
As with the coding of scale items, a wide range of 
different statements is taken as evidence for Upositive 
thinking" - i.e. again, operational definitions of the 
concept vary widely. InterView extracts scored as in-
-dicative of "positive thinking" include statements as 
diverse as "I also knew that the best way to tackle it 
was to be as positive as possible", "The first thing I 
said to myself was 'don't feel sorry for yoursele" and 
"My own strength (has helped me). I help myself 
through this" (all from Morris et aI., 1985: 800). All 
three statements were rated as "adopting positive 
approach·', which in turn was coded as one of the six 
possible "confronting responses", which were corre-
lated with psychometric variables. And as with scale 
items. not only are apparently diverse statements 
coded in similar ways, but apparently similar state-
ments are sometimes coded in opposite ways. For 
example, a participant who says (of a distressing ex-
perience) UI've learned so much from this" is coded as 
exemplifying a "positive belief appraisal" (Stein et aI., 
1997: 884); but a participant who "tried to make self 
feel better by thinking positive thoughts" is engaged in 
""avoidance" (Nolen-Hoeksema et aI., 1997). Such 
obvious inconsistencies strongly suggest that labels like 
these reflect the theoretical interests and concerns of 
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researchers, rather than necessarily being faithful to 
the meanings participants themselves intend. A spur-
ious objectivity is produced as an effect of categorising 
st~tements together according to rules devised by the 
researchers. with little attention to what these state-
ment mean to the speaker in the context in which they 
occur. 
Social context 
There is a widespread assumption in these literatures 
that research participants are "naive" subjects. intent 
primarily upon accurately reporting their cognitions to 
the researcher. This assumption ignores the fact that 
research findings about the presumed benefits of 
"thinking positive" have leached out into the popular 
culture: "cancer has become big business for the pub-
lishers of New Age books, with volumes on beating 
the disease by positive thinking selling millions of 
copies" (Morrish, 1998: I). Breast cancer patients are 
typically exposed to a great deal of advice about posi-
tive thinking. Self help books crammed with "positive 
affirmations" ("I am a powerful person capable of 
healing myselr', or "My cancer cells are dissolving" -
both in Brohn, 1987: 137-8) have become "the rage 
these days in America" (Rillenberg, 1995: 37) and the 
idea of thinking positive is celebrated in pop psychol-· 
ogy books and magazine articles with titles like 
"Think Positively: Why self-improvement can change 
your life" (Wilson, 1996), The A-Z of Positive 
Thinking (James, 1999), The Power of Positive Thinking 
(peale, 1998), and The Positive Woman (Lindenfield, 
1992). Much of this advice presents a popular version 
of the social science and psycho-oncology research. A 
book about the Bristol. Cancer Help Centre (which 
offers complementary therapies to cancer patients) is 
called Fighting Spirit, and cites Greer's work as having 
been "perhaps misrepresented as advocating 'positive 
thinking' at all costs" (Goodare, 1996: 7). The medical 
professionals who come into contact with breast cancer 
patients are likely to be knowledgeable about "think-
ing positive" as a coping strategy: e.g. Moorey and 
Greer's (1989) book abour their approach, aimed at 
"nurses, GPsand other health care professionals who 
are involved with cancer patients", describes counsel-
ling techniques which encourage positive thinking. One 
survey found that 62% of respondents to an "illness 
belief scale" believed that "thinking positive" could 
aid recovery from cancer (Bruckbauer and Ward, 
1993). 
This means that cancer patients responding to an 
interviewer's questions, or to items on a scale, are 
doing so as members of a culture in which "thinking 
positive" is a commonpl:tt:e idiom, and in which 
"thinking positively" about cancer, in particular, is 
widely advocated. Indeed, the extent to which "think-
ing positive" has become a pervasive societal moral 
norm is illustrated by the fact that many cancer 
patients "experience moral and psychological pressure 
to 'think positively' about their disease" (de Raeve, 
1997: 249) such. that some psychologists are treating 
patients whose "presenting problem was fear that they 
were not being 'positive' enough" (Gray and Doan, 
1990: 35). Some "self-help" books now see it as part 
of their task to reassure people that it is okay not to 
think positively. For example, under the heading "Let 
Go of the 'Shoulds"', one such book advises its read-
ers that they may be subjected to: 
.. . expectations and attitudes about how cancer 
patients should cope and behave. For example, a 
cancer patient 'should' have a positive attitude [ ... ] 
you will probably feel a constant pressure to be 
'positive'. All cancer patients believe this is import-
ant, and wrestle with it every day. You struggle 
with the feeling because there is a commonly held 
belief, not necessarily accurate, that a positive atti· 
tude increases your chance of survival. Though it is 
clear that living with hope is important and that a 
positive attitude feels better than a negative one, 
you simply cannot be 'up' all the time. (Kahane, 
1995: 244) 
Feminist - and other - critiques of the politics of 
"victim-blaming" have demonstrated the power and 
pervasiveness of notions <:>f individual uchoice" and 
"responsibility" in relation to health and illness (e.g. 
Lorde, 1980; Wilkinson and Kitzinger, 1993). One in-
fluential early critique - Susan Sontag's "Illness as 
Metaphor", first published in 1978 - condemned the 
emphasis on psychological factors in cancer as "pre-
posterous -and dangerous views" which "manage to 
put the onus of the disease on the patient" (Sontag, 
1991: 48) - interestingly, this essay appeared just as 
the concept of "mental adjustment to cancer" was tak-
ing off (Greer et al.'s work was published in The 
Lancet in 1989). Later critiques have highlighted the 
important role of individualism and voluntarism as 
core values of late 20th century capitalism, serving 
governments ~JI in justifying limits on public spend-
ing, and in deflecting attention from broader political 
and environmental issues (e.g. Smith, 1980). A wide-
spread emphasis on health as personal responsibility 
(including the moral duty to "beat" cancer, to show 
"fighting spirit", and to "think positively"), then, is 
the social context within which cancer patients' talk 
about thinking positive must be understood and inter-
preted. 
The studies we have cited here 'represent only a 
small part of the proliferation of literature in this area 
over the last 30 years. Unlike most of this work, our 
aim is not to contribute to the deluge of claims and 
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counter-claims, endorsements and refutations of the 
idea that "positive thinking" is correlated with (and, 
by extension, causally implicated in) an individual's 
ability to cope with disease and other life crises. Nor 
do we aim to provide a thoroughgoing analysis of tbe 
broader socio-politicai context within which "thinking 
positive" has become a moral norm. Rather, we offer 
bere an alternative way of conceptualising "thinking 
positive", based upon detailed attention to talk. In the 
rest of this paper, we use our own data to explore how 
women with breast cancer talk about "thinking posi6 
tive". We take a discursive perspective to explore how 
the various meanings of "thinking positive" arc 
worked up.. used. and negotiated in conversations 
among women witb breast cancer. We look at the 
local context within which such talk occurs and the 
specific interactional business which it performs. 
Our data 
The data reported here form part of a larger project 
on women's experience of breast cancer, conducted by 
the first author. The full data set consists of 13 focus 
group discussions, each lasting 1-3 h, with a total of 
77 women with breast cancer (3-7 women per group) 
plus four individual interviews (all conducted by the 
first autbor, cf. Wilkinson, 1998a,b). Women were; 
recruited through a symptomatic breast clinic at a gen-
eral hospital in a city in the north of England: most 
were working-class and middle-aged or older (mean 
age 58.8 years; range 33-84) and the majority (75%) 
were within 5 years of diagnosis. The focus groups 
(and interviews) consisted of relatively unstructured 
conversations with women about their illness, covering 
(among other topics) their feelings at first diagnosis, 
their coping and support systems, and the effects of 
their cancer on their lives and relationships. All da ta 
were audio taped and transcribed. Note that partici-
pants were not directly asked about "thinking positive·9 
- rather, talk about "thinking positive" was some-
thing that cropped up spontaneously in the data. 
For tbe purposes of the analysis presented here, 
every occurrence of the words "positiveu or hposi_ 
tively" throughout the transcripts was examined, and 
all occurrences which can be heard as referring to a 
cognitive or affective state were included in the data 
]. Transcription conventions used in the data ex.tracts are as 
follows: ellipsis in square parentheses - material omitted; 
round parentheses - enclose comments of transcriber. includ-
ing measurable pauses of 0.4 s or longer; underlining -
speaker emphasis; dash at end M"Word - word abruptly cut 
off; dash between repeated letters - word stuttered; dash 
between different letters - word long drawn out. 
set, i.e. all references to thinking, feeling or being posi-
tive, having a positive outlook or attitude, or being a 
positive type of person. Statements like these are hen-
ceforth referred to by the shorthand phrase, "thinking 
positive'" Note that there were many other uses of the 
term "positive" whicb were excluded from the analysis 
here: in particulart there were frequent references to 
test results as "positive" (e.g. "the biopsy was posi-
tive9'). and occasional uses of "positive" as an indi-
cation of conviction (e.g. "I'm positive it was on the 
Monday"). There were 55 references to thinking posi-
tive across 11 of the 13 groups (ranging from one to 
13 references per group). In the majority of cases (44 
of the 55), the reference is to positive thinking on the 
part of the breast cancer patient herself - as opposed 
to ber. friends, family, doctors, or colleagues - and it 
is upon this former aspect that we decided to focus. In 
sum, then, our data consist of 44 instances of thinking 
positive talk, across 23 data extracts, and our analytic 
focus is on how women with breast cancer talk about 
tbe role of positive thinking in their own lives. 
Positive thinking: a discursive approach 
The phrase "think positive" is an idiom (Oxford 
Learner's Dictionary of English Idioms, 1994: 292) -
that is, it is a commonplace saying which summarises a 
taken-for-granted piece of cultural knowledge (Drew 
and Holt, 1988). Researchers within a discourse ana-
lytic tradition have analysed the way in whicb people 
use formulaic expressions (like idioms, proverbs and 
clicbes), and their work has highlighted several features 
of idiomatic usage which are helpful in understanding 
cancer patients' talk about "thinking positive", With 
specific reference to a short data extract, we will briefly 
outline some of tbese. 
In the following extract', lessie is talking about her 
reactions to being told she has cancer: . 
lessie: So, I just broke down and cried (pause) 
when it just struck me, when I was out the place, I 
was on me own, I didn't want to (pause) do it in 
front of people (Karen: Yeah) didn't want to 
embarrass meself (pause), but erm (pause) no, I was 
erm (pause) I was upset but I accepted it (pause) 
and thought well I've got rid of it now. 
Karen: Yeah, oh aye you do, don't you. 
lessie: Yeah you've got to. (Karen: Yeah) You've 
got to think positive a'n't you? (TP3, 01) 
First, an important feature of idioms is that they are 
vague and general. They are often used in summarising 
talk, in order to convey the overall substance of what 
has been said, but without the circumstantial details. 
This is clear from the contrast between lessie's initial 
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detailed descriptions of her reactions to a cancer diag-
nosis and her final summary of them. Initially she 
talks about the circumstances under which she felt it 
was okay to cry (once she was on her own), about her 
feelings (being "upset"), and about the process of com-
ing to accept what had happened to her (by focusing 
on the thought that she had "got rid" of the cancer): 
finally she summarises this more detailed account by 
saying, "you've got to think positive". As a summary 
of her reaction to a cancer diagnosis, this is a very 
vague and general statement - indeed, it is sufficiently 
general to be used as a response to any disease, com-
plaint, difficulty, or mistreatment. As with all idioms, 
'''we needn't suppose that it was constructed for this 
particular complaint: it was simply invoked" (Sacks, 
1995: 358). This suggests that when people talk about 
"thinking positive·', they are using and endorsing a· 
vague formulaic saying, rather than engaging in careful 
introspection and reporting on their findings. 
Second, the idioms used to summarise the general 
sense of what someone is talking about are not neutral. 
It would have been equally accurate for Jessie to sum-
marise her account with a statement such as ·'it's· shat-
tering when they tell you" - and in fact this is 
precisely the alternative gist formulation offered by 
another participant in the group a few seconds later. 
Summaries of what has jUst been said are intended to 
move the conversation on in particular ways (Edwards 
and Potter, 1992; Potter, 1996). As Holt (1993) has 
shown in relation to conversations in which people 
announce a death. idioms are a convenient way of 
wrapping up what has just been said, and moving the 
conversation on to less painful or difficult topics. In 
. addition to "think positive", idioms like "look on the 
bright side". Uput on a brave face". Ucount your bles-
sings" (or, in Holt's data, "had a good innings") serve 
the same sort of interactional purpose. By summarising 
and "lightening" the import of the previous talk with 
an idiom. participants indicate, via its cliched nature. 
that they have nothing new to add: "you've got to 
think positive. a'n't you1" is the end of Jessie's turn. 
This suggests that statements about "thinking positive" 
might be seen not simply as reports of someone's men-
tal state, but may also function as ways of keeping a 
conversation moving and creating the opportunity for' 
someone else to 'speak next. 
Third, unlike expressions which are couched as indi-
vidual beliefs, or which signal their reliance on idiosyn-
cratic and particular experiences, idioms present 
themselves as "anyone's knowledge", part of the stock 
of ordinary taken-for-granted common-sense we all 
share. Jessie's contribution to the conversation is 
thereby terminated with ... commonplace generality 
upon which co-conversationalists can concur. Idioms 
shift the conversation from the "personal" to the gen· 
eral, and reinforce conversationalists' sense of belong· 
ing to a common culture in which certain ideas (like 
the desirability of "thinking positive") are widely 
shared. From a discursive perspective, then. when 
Jessie describes her personal reactions, she differen-
tiates herself as an individual from all the other 
women in the group, with their wide range of diverse 
reactions to a cancer diagnosis; and when she invokes 
·'thinking positive" she returns the conversation to a 
presumed-shared norm. Through the use of idioms and 
proverbs, "the individual affirms his [sic] belongingness 
to a socio-eultural group" (Coulmas, 1981: 10). 
Finally, many analysts have pointed out that idioms 
are particularly resistant to question or contradiction. 
Whenever idioms crop up in conversation, they are 
likely to attract agreement and endorsement (Edwards 
and Potter, 1992; Sacks, 1995). Analysts suggest that 
this is partly because their vagueness makes it difficult 
to know just what disagreement with them would 
entail. and partly because to contradict an idiom is to 
run the risk of challenging the shared cultural member-
ship on the basis of which conversation is assumed 
possible. This has several important implications for 
talk about "thinking positive". It means that people 
may introduce Uthinking positive" into the conversa-
tion (as one of a number of possible idioms which 
could be introduced) at a point where they are looking 
for affiliation. In other words, when Jessie says 
"You've got to think positive. a'n't you?", she may be 
less concerned with providing an accurate report of 
her own coping strategy, and more concerned with 
seeking support and agreement from the other group 
members (especially as there have been several long 
pauses in her self-report, during which she did not 
receive this kind of support or agreement). The fact 
~~~ that people are likely to endorse, rather than to chal- ~ 
lenge. idioms also means that endorsement of "think .. 
ing positive" may be prompted by the power of the 
idiom, rather than by a thoughtful consideration of the 
pros and cons of positive thinking as a way of coping 
with cancer. Finally, given the documented power of 
idioms to attract affiliative and supporting responses, 
we must take very seriously any apparent challenges to 
"thinking positive'" however tangential or muted they 
may at first appear. 
In sum, the standard social science and psycho-
oncology literature on "thinking positive" would treat 
Jessie's words as indicating that she thinks positive. In 
our analysis, by contrast, we consider why Jessie might 
talk about herself as if she thinks positive. We are 
agnostic about whether or not Jessie does, in fact. 
Uthink positive" - but, as we have seen. there are 
serious analytic problems in trying to read off internal 
psychological states from self-report data (we cannot 
tell whether or not talk reflects cognitions, because we 
have no direct access to cognitions). A further major 
problem with treating talk as a route to cognitions is 
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that when people talk, they are not simply trying faith-
fully and impartially to communicate their mental con-
tents: rather t they are attending to the interactionaI 
business involved in conducting conversations. We will 
now explore in more detail the implications of taking a 
discursive approach in analysing talk about "thinking 
positive", 
What do cancer patients think positively about? 
If we were to take "thinking positive" as an accurate 
report of an individual's coping strategy, it would be 
appropriate to ask what they were thinking positively 
about, If, on the other hand, "thinking positive" is 
simply an idiom, then it makes about as much sense to 
ask about the object of positive thought as it would to 
ask for details about the composition of the music 
someone has to face, or the length of the tether to the 
end of which they have come. And in fact there are no 
instances in our data (nor, as we shall see, in the litera-
ture on coping) in which anyone (including health 
researchers) asks for information as to what, precisely. 
someone is thinking positively about - although, as it 
happens, this is often unclear. In most instances. par-
ticipants - like Jessie - mention "thinking positive" 
without any indication at all as to what might consti-
tute the object of their positive thought (e.g. it could 
be their illness, their lives apart from the illness, the 
prospect of recovery from illness, or none of these). 
One can understand why, despite their negative 
aspects, someone might think positively about other 
major life events, such as having a baby or buying a 
house, but it is not immediately obvious wby anyone 
would think positively about having a life-threatening 
disease. The coping literature is confused (and confus-
ing) when it addresses the object of positive thinking. 
For example, Taylor et al. (1992: 463) states that 
"items assessing Positive Attitudes refer to attempts to 
look at the positive aspects of HIV", but neither of the 
two items she cites as exemplars of this factor actually 
focus on the positive aspects of HIV at all: one refers 
to "a positive outlook on life" (not on HIV), and the 
other refers to an attempt to "try to keep myself from 
worrying about getting AIDS, since there is no use in 
worrying" - .which similarly does not imply that HIV 
has any positive aspects. 
There is oniy one instance in our data set in which 
someone talks about her cancer in exclusively positive 
tenns: 
I wanted to die at that particular time, [ ... ) It was 
an answer, because to die by myself, to kill myself, 
it's. it goes against my religion or whatever. but I 
felt that God gave me cancer, so I die [ ... ) and 
everything will be fine. (MftIa, GI) 
This is not what is usually meant by "positive think-
ing" about cancer, and it is quite different from "focus 
on the positive" (Dunkel-Schetter, 1992) and "positive 
reappraisal" (Folkman et aI., 1986), which involve 
endorsement of items claiming positive benefits to have 
emerged as a direct result of illness: e.g. "found new 
faith", urediscovered what is important in life", and 
Uchanged or grew as a person in a good way", 
In our data, when cancer is talked about in positive 
terms, it is usually either because breast cancer is con-
sidered preferable to some other illness or form of can-
cer ("one in twelve has to have cancer. and mine was 
in a place you could cut off, so that was my positive 
thought" - Wilma, TP7, GII); or because of positive 
outcomes associated with the cancer diagnosis ("I feel 
I've come out a bit more positive about me" - Lucy, 
TP2S, G9). Barbara comments that "what you have to 
do is look positively at what you have got", and she 
continues: 
I think it's been a positive thing that's happened, 
erm, in that it's made me re-evaluate my life, well 
not my lifestyle, but it's made me retake stock of 
what my life is and how much I really appreciate it, 
not that I didn't before, because I've always been 
very happy with what I have, but it's made me feel, 
erm, you know, wonderful. What a wonderful hus-
band, what wonderful children, what wonderful 
friends. (Barbara, TP16, G2) 
The idea that "positive thinking" can cure cancer·-
or at least prolong survival - is now well-established 
in the popular self-help literature (cf. Wilkinson and 
Kitzinger, 1993 for an overview), so it is not surprising 
that several women talked about thinking positively in 
this way. The object of positive thought is here not 
cancer, but recovery from it. The cancer itself is "a 
dreadful thing" (yvonne, TPl, G3), but "a positive 
attitude" will motivate the body "to fight it" (Betty, 
TPl, G3); "You have to fight it all the time, and you 
have think positive" (Yolanda, TP13, G7). Vera talks 
about how positive thinking enabled her to "sail 
through" breast cancer - but here, too, although the 
(alleged) . consequences of positive thinking are 
described, it is still not clear what she was thinking 
positively about: 
It's positive thinking, i'n't? My husband was dis-
cussing it this morning and Peter said to me, he 
said, well, he said, I think you really sailed through 
that, your breast cancer. He said, I think you were 
more ill with your, er, peritonitis. I said, well I said, 
you just have to think E£!itive. Mr. Fell said, think 
positive, otherwise y-you're lost. (Vera, TP2, G2) 
Mary describes positive thinking about her mastect-
omy: 
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I did say "why me", you know, quite a a few times 
you know, like you do. And then you thought, 
"well, it's for the best'\ you know, "you're getting 
; rid of the cancer, you've got to think positiveU 
(pause). And er, I kept these things, thoughts kept 
going round and round. I do think positive. You 
know, at least you won't have £!!leer when your 
breast is off. (Mary, TP5, G8) 
In other instances, women did not talk about posi-
tive thinking as though it would help them to recover, 
but focused rather on the importance of valuing other 
aspects of their lives - despite impending death: 
Life's too short to worry about whether you can 
afford or whether you can't afford, or whether you 
should spend the money or whether you shouldn't 
spend the money, you know. I think we, we're sort 
of thinking that towards the back end of next year, 
we're off on holiday to Australia. I think you've got 
to feeiTike that. If you wanna do it, I think you've 
gotta g2, for it, because ~ of us, I mean, ifs all 
very well, they say, "Oh yeah, you're fine now", 
you, you know, "Everything's gonna be okay", but 
none of us know what next week. or next month, 
or next year has in store. And I, so I think you, 
you have to be positive. (Fiona, TPIO, G6) 
Another woman in the same group responds to 
Fiona by agreeing that "You can't take it with you 
when you go, so you might as well spend it" and talks 
about having discharged her duties to her daughter 
and her grandchildren, so that "what bit there is now 
I'm going to spend - and the whisky at night as 
well!" (Doris, TPIO, G6). These women highlight their 
own mortality ("Life's too,hort", "You can't take it 
with you when you go") as a justification for enjoying 
the positive things life has to offer (holiday, extrava-
gance, alcohol). They are thinking positively neither 
about the cancer and its effects, nor about their poss· 
ible recovery, but about their lives apart from the can-
cer. This, then, is yet another object of positive 
thinking - and is suggested by Burgess et al. (1988: 
265) who refer to those responses "which people use to 
encourage themselves to think positively about their 
lives" (our emphasis) - however, as they do not quote 
any extracts from their interviews, to illustrate this 
point, it is not clear whether they intend this specific 
focus. 
Our finding of vagueness and diversity in the object 
of positive thinking is supported by a study of the re-
sponses of 167 people to open-ended questions regard-
ing their understanding of the term "positive mental 
attitude" (Bruckbauer and Ward, 1993). The authors' 
content analysis of the results led them to conclude 
that the term "does not have a commonly accepted 
meaning among lay people and, in fact, may represent 
a wide range of beliefs" (p. 314) and that "many sub-
jects' answers included more than one theme, 
suggesting that the. term [ ... ] has a complex, multi-
faceted meaning for many people" (p. 314). Analysts 
of the "thinking positive" literatures have found them 
"replete with sweeping and ambiguous statements" 
(Gray and Doan, 1990: 35) and point out that "there 
is no agreed upon definition for what constitutes being 
positive" (p. 36). 
In sum, looking in detail at the ways in which cancer 
patients talk about "thinking positive" indicates vague-
ness, ambiguity and variability in what the term might 
reasonably be taken to mean - and this is neither 
addressed nor theorised in the coping literature. The 
vagueness, ambiguity and generalised applicability of 
"thinking positive" is precisely what one would expect 
if it were functioning not as a report of an internal 
cognitive state, but as an idiomatic formulation in use 
. for interactional purposes, as a discursive perspective 
would suggest. . 
Talk about positive thinking in the context of "troubles 
telling" 
We suggest that, rather than simply reporting cogni-
tive content, one of the functions served by talk about 
"positive thinking" is to round off and close down 
"troubles telling", while simultaneously making it 
possible for troubles telling to take place. Talk about 
unpleasant experiences and negative emotions can 
often be hard for other people to engage with: the use 
of a conversational strategy like "think positive" 
means that the speaker can bring her troubles talk to 
an 6·upbeat" end, relieving her listeners of a potential 
conversational burden. 
In our data, there is often a striking juxtaposition of 
strong negative emotion and a statement about ·'think-
ing positive". Betty describes feeling "devastated" and 
then immediately goes on to talk about having "a posi-
tive attitude" (TPI, G3); Jessie says she "broke down 
and cried" and that she was "upset" and then quickly 
adds, "you've got to think positive" (TP3, GI); Nina 
says she felt "raw" and "hurting" and that others saw 
her as 6'being defeatist", but adds, "1 was ~ posi-
tive" (TP4, G8); Wilma talks about her feelings of 
"shock" in receiving a cancer diagnosis, before she 
"started looking on the positive side" (TP7, G11); and 
Nettie talks about her distress at receiving a second 
diagnosis of breast cancer in her remaining breast, hav-
ing already had one mastectomy: 
It really hit me, you know, hit ine with a (laughs) 
thump and yet I thought there again, I've either got 
to have it done, or, you're not here, and it was 
simple as that. And like Samantha, I'm the positive 
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thinking type of person, and so you've just got to, 
you know, get on. (Nettie, TP9, GIl) 
.Talk about "thinking positive" often occurs in con-
texts in which negative emotions arc being expressed. 
and may actually serve to facilitate their expression. If 
a speaker can establish tbat she is basically someone 
who tbinks positively, then she can speak about ber 
pain. suffering and distress without unsettling others or 
attracting censure. The vagueness of this phrase as an 
idiomatic formulation makes it possible for people to 
express a wide range of negative thoughts and feelings, 
while still maintaining that they are "thinking posi-
tive". In the following extract, Penny is able to talk 
about her tearfulness (and indeed to receive reassur-
ance of its "normality") in the context of having first 
asserted that she is U a positive personu : 
Penny: I am a positive person and a ~ person, 
. but (pause) I could cry at the drop of a hat, a lot 
of the time, and it isn't me at all, you know, I-I'm 
just not like that. 
Rita: You do cry 
Teresa: You do cry, don't worry about it, it's 
(laughs) normal 
Verity: It's normal (TP20,GIl) 
Siinilarly, after introducing herself as a pOSItIve 
thinking sort of person, Gina describes herself as feel-
ing down, even feeling "absolutely rubbish" and 
suicidal. In the minute or so before this next extract 
begins, Gina, who tells the group "I used to be proud 
of my boobs", has been'expressing her feelings about 
her post-mastectomy body. She describes her "two 
great scars" as looking "bloody awlu" and, she says, 
"every time you look down in the bath, you see you 
'aven't got a breast there, and you feel, rubbish". Here 
she is reflecting on her feelings when she was first told 
that she would need a mastectomy: 
I know ar the time I felt really horrible, rubbish. 
And, erm, I'm a happy sort of person really, and 
I've had to laugh a lot off (laughs) in my life, you 
know, and if I think I, if I hadn't been that type of 
a person I think I would have, maybe gone, I don't 
know. you might even commit suicide mightn't 
you? Some people could, but I wouldn't have done. 
But I mean, as I say, you've got to learn to live 
with it. think positive. you have your downs, you 
feel absolutely rubbish one day, another day you 
feel really, well, and thint; oh well, you know, I've 
only lost my boob, I'm still livin', and just ke-, get 
on with your life you know. (Gina, TP6, GS) 
As these extracts from Penny and Gina illustrate, 
the vagueness and generality of "thinking positively" 
make it a rich conversational resource, which offers a 
gloss on a variety of emotional states - including feel-
ing miserable. Instead of representing feeling miserable 
as a failure to think positively, it is reclassified as the 
"downsn , and the downs are part of what positive 
thinking persons think positively about: feeling "rub-
bish" is just part of .. the downs", rather than, say, 
"negative thinking". 
From the perspective of more traditional social 
science analyses, these accounts often sound internally 
contradictory - and there is some (limited) recog' 
oition in the coping literature that people may "reflect 
denial, hopelessness, stoicism and a fighting attitude all 
within the space of the same interview" (Burgess et aI., 
1988: 269). What is not discussed is the relationship 
between these different ways of talking, or the particu-
lar interactional contexts in which they may be most 
iikely to occur. Our analysis suggests that talk about 
thinking positively is more usefully heard not as 
reflecting a particular coping style, {one potentially in 
conflict with other coping styles allegedly present in 
the same interview}, but rather as a conversational 
device which is interactionally useful in enabling cancer 
patients to talk about their suffering and distress. 
Positive thinking as a moral injunction 
If we were to take "thinking positive" as an accurate 
report of a coping strategy, we would expect to find 
participants reporting, in a fairly straightforward man-
ner, that thinking positive is what they do in order to 
cope. If on the other hand, talk about positive thinking 
is functioning as an idiomatic fonnulation, then we 
would expect to see talk about thinking positive as an 
exhortation reinforcing an (assumed shared) moral 
order. 
One of the striking features of talk about "thinking 
positive" in our data is the use of the deontic mO-
dality: that is, "thinking positive" is presented as a 
moral obligation, as something you "have" to do. 
There is considerable linguistic evidence for this - the 
use of imperatives and injunctions is commonplace: 
"You just have to think positive" (Vera, TP2, G2); 
"You've got to think positive a'n't you?" (}essie, TP3, 
GI); "You've got to think positive" (Mary, TPS, G8); 
"You have to be positive" (Fiona, TPlO, G6); "You 
have to think positive" (Yolanda, TPI3. G7). Of the 
44 instances of "think positive" in our data, over half 
(N = 23) are phrased as imperatives or exhortations in 
this way. 
In the following extract, for example, Betty and 
Yvonne talk about positive thinking' in a way which 
would typically be coded as evidence of "fighting 
spirit". as an internal cognitive state. This overlooks 
the extent to which these women are discussing Uthink-
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ing positive" not as a natural reaction to having cancer 
(the natural reaction is that, "obviously you're devas-
tatedbecause it's a dreadful thing"), but rather as a 
moral imperative: "you've got to have a positive atti .. 
tude": 
Betty: When I first found out I had cancer, I said 
to myself, I said, right, it's not gonna get me. And 
that was it. I mean (Yvonne: Yeah) obviously 
you're devastated because it's a dreadful thing 
Yvonne: (overlaps) Yeah, but you've got to have a 
positive attitude thing, I do 
Betty: (overlaps) But then, I was talking to Dr. 
Purcott and he said to me the most helpful thing 
that !!!!,Xbody can have with !!!!,X type of cancer is a 
positive attitude 
Yvonne: A positive outlook, yes 
Betty: Because if you decide to fight it, then the rest 
of your body will st-, will start 
Yvonne: Motivate itself, yeah 
Betty: to fight it (TPI, G3) 
This is typical of the way in which "positive think-
ing" is discussed in our data. Reactions other than 
thinking positive are simply described: "I just broke 
down and cried" (Jessie, TP3, GI); "I felt really horri-
ble" (Gina, TP6, G5); "I was traumatised for a week" 
(Carol, TPI5, G2). These "natural" reactions are vir-
tually never expressed as injunctions: there are no 
instances of "you've got to feel devastatedn or u you 
have to break down and cry". There is some agree-
ment amongst the participants that if you have nega-
tive feelings you should express them (e.g. "if you feel 
bitter you should let it out" - Nina, TP4, G8), but 
having negative feelings per se is permissible not 
required. By contrast, women announce that they have 
"got to" think positively, and simple descriptive state-
menlS like "I just thought positive", or "I felt positive" 
are relatively' rare in our data. As Carol says, "When I 
first found out I was frightened, because we aU are, 
areo't we?", but now she's u come to terms with posi .. 
tive thinking" (TP15, 02). " 
There are many ways in which thinking. positive 
could be talked about - as something which partici-
pants happen to do and are therefore reporting; or as 
something they have found helpful; or as a way of 
dealing with their cancer they are planning to adopt -
and there are a few such instances in our data. But 
moral exhortations (imperlllives and injunctions) are 
more common. They point to the existence of a moral 
order for breast cancer patients: that they should be 
thinking positive (whether they like it or not), that it's 
the right attitude, the required attitude of patients if 
they are to be seen as co-operating with medical treat-
ment: this is what critics have refered to as the "moral 
oppression" (de Raeve, 1997) of positive thinking in 
cancer care. Women often report that it was a medical 
professional who advised them to think positively: 
He ("Dr. Purcott", consultant oncologist) straight 
away said it was cancerous, but it was only very 
smaU, it was you know 7.5 mm, whatever it was. It 
hadn't spread to the lymph nodes and I had to look 
positive on this, and s9 that's the way I've looked 
upon it you know. (Doreen, TP21, G12) 
. My doctor, a lady doctor, examined me. and she 
said, "Oh yes", she said, "You have got a lump 
and it !! cancer, but you must be positive about 
this, you must be very positive, I shaU try and get 
you an appointment". And I thought. "My God. 
I'm going to die - this is it, I'm going to die". 
(Carla, TPI9, G9) 
The exhortation to "think positively", and the psy-
chosomatic conception of disease more generally, re~ 
resents a construction of illness as a moral problem. As 
Greco (1993: 369) points out, a health that can be 
"chosen" represents a somewhat different value from a 
health one simply enjoys or misses: "it testifies to more 
than just a physical capacity; it is the visible sign of in-
itiative, adaptability, balance and strength of will". 
It is evident that there is nothing a-typical about our 
data on "positive thinking", It seems that researchers 
rarely encounter straightforward accounts: instead. the 
interview data quoted in the literature, often includes 
phrases like "I try to .. .'.'. and "It's best to .. .", or 
refers to the advice and exhortations of others. One of 
Greer's coUeagues, Tina Morris (1986: 80), notes that 
"patients try to encourage tlJemseil'es to think posi .. 
tively about their lives" (our emphasis), and elsewhere 
describes a patient's attempts "to exert control over 
his/her emotional responses to cancer diagnosis either 
by exhorting him/herself, or by incorporating others' 
exhortations into his thinking" (Morris et aI., 1985: 
800). Note, however, that from a discursive perspec-
tive, patients' reports of others' exhortations cannot be 
taken simply as transparent evidence of what others 
have actually said: patients may ventriloquise others' 
opinions to avoid having to express their own opinions 
directly, to justify their own behaviour with reference 
to medical theories (as Doreen seems to be doing, 
above), or - as we will see later - to illustrate their 
own robust independence from such authorities (cf. 
also Wilkinson, 1999). 
In sum, when cancer patients talk about positive 
thinking, they are doing so in a social context which 
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strongly endorses positive thinking as an appropriate 
and morally desirable reaction. Talk about positive 
thinking is produced in relation to this cultural norm, 
and orients to it both through frequent reports of 
others' exhortations to "think positive" and through 
moral imperatives. By contrast, the coping literature 
treats cancer patients' talk as arising in a social vac .. 
cum and codes it as if it were simply the transparent 
report of cognitive processes. 
Resistance to Ihinki~g positive 
The cultural pressure on cancer patients to think 
positively - combined with the moral force carried by 
idiomatic formulations - is such that no one in our 
focus groups said that she did not want to think posi-
tively, was unable to think positively, or that thinking 
positively was a bad idea. No one said anything remo-
tely like: "I totally disagree with the whole idea of 
thinking positive" or "I refuse to think positively". 
Nonetheless, there are several occasions when partici-
pants talk about positive thinking in ways that can be 
read as resistant. By this, we do not mean simply that 
they are not thinking positively (or that their coping 
strategy is "denial" or "hopelessness/helplessness"), 
but rather that they are actively engaging with the 
coercive nature of the injuction to "think positively'" 
and attempting to limit its applicability or to challenge 
its assumptions. For example, Olive is sceptical about 
posi tive thinking: 
You were just beginning to hear about different 
visualization techniques and the Bristol Clinic and 
so on at that time, and how you had to think posi-
tively and, er, you know, get yourself together and 
not, not get depressed and all that [ ... ] and 1 
thought, oh well, that's alright up to a point. I 
didn't erm, I didn't (pause) really see it as very 
much relative to me. (Olive, TP22, G13) 
In the following conversation, Barbara introduces 
the notion of thinking positive, first in her own words 
and then using the direct reported speech of "Mr. 
FeU", known~ to all three women as their consultant 
surgeon. Despite this strong medical endorsement. the 
idea of thinking positive is resisted by the other two. 
Anne's comment that Mr. Fell "says it to everybody" 
is hearable as a criticism of his failure to offer advice 
tailored to the needs of specific individuals: it implies 
that the advice to '~think positive" is a crass generality, 
a platitude. Because "everyone's different", the advice 
is not always applicable: 
Barbara: You know, this"is it, you think positive. 
Mr. Fen said, "Think positive" (pause) and he said 
"You, you'lI be, you'll be alright". 
Anne: Y-e-s 
Carol: Yeah 
Anne: Oh I think he says it to everybody, and it's, 
if you, if you do think positive that's fair enough, 
but-
Carol: Everybody's not as strong as. one another 
though (overlapping talk) 
Anne: -people who just can't be positive. 1 mean 
you, in your own family you know that (stutters) 
they're all different people, they all think differently 
don't they really? (TP12, G2) 
A further example comes from Pauline, who - less 
than 5 min earlier - has told the group that she has 
an especially virulent and invasive cancer and is going 
to die fairly soon. Here she is telling a story about 
someone who advised her to be positive, and how she 
responded: 
1 had somebody the other day who said, "Oh y-", 
you know, "but you're so positive", and, etcetera 
etcetera. And I said, er, and, you know, and, and, 
"because you're so positive you will fight, and you 
will conquer this". And 1 was quite aggressive at 
this point, and 1 actually said (pause) "If anything 
happens to me", I said, "I don't want the likes of 
you turning round and saying, "P'rhaps she wasn't 
as positive as she made out she was". I said "You, 
I think you can be positive, but you've got to be 
realistic" [ ... ] you know, and I said, "I don't actu-
ally. believe, it's completely, I quite definitely. it 
isn't, it's not mind over matter'" I know what my . 
results are,-;;nd, you know, I cope with that and 1 
think, okay:YOu know, another six months, a year 
(Pauline, TP4, G8) 
In these extracts, women with breast cancer are not 
simply Jailing to think positively, and thereby demon-
strating themselves to be in need of adjuvant psycho- . 
logical therapy or self-affirmation workshops. They are 
arguing with the exhortation to think positively as they 
have encountered it in self-help books, and in conver-
sation with others. This again illustrates the extent to 
which talk about positive thinking cannot simply be 
understood as a transparent report of cognitive pro-
cesses. Cancer patients live in a culture in which the-
ories about positive thinking are well-known and 
frequently encountered: their talk about themselves 
and how they cope with cancer is constructed in the 
context of, and sometimes in opposition to, such 
theories. 
,----------------- ---
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Conclusions 
In this paper, we have identified some of the pro-
blems with the ways in which "positive thinking" is 
addressed in the social science and psycho-oncology lit-
erature on coping. What "thinking positive" actually 
means to the person who is speaking or filling in a 
scale is obscured, when all that is made available is a 
decontextualised quotation ("I think positive") or a 
checked questionnaire item. Extracts from talk (and 
items on scales) are assumed to have singular and, 
transparent meanings - to 'speak for themselves'; and 
statements about "thinking positive" are decontextua-
lised from talk, (sometimes) recontextualised as ques-
tionnaire items, and interpreted as if they were 
produced (or responded to) in a neutral and disinter-
ested way by research participants anxious only to 
report on their lives as accurately and faithfully as 
possible. 
In order, to make sense of a person's account of her 
experience of coping with cancer. we need to under-
stand what alternative version it may be designed to 
counter. As we have indicated, the past few decades 
have seen a relentless focus on cancer patients as being 
in some way responsible if not for the onset of their 
own disease, at least for its progression. Cancer mor-
bidity and mortality is associated - in both the medi-
cal and the popular literatures - with failing io 
"tbink positive". The frequency with which cancer 
patients produce self-descriptions of the "I think posi-
tive" type must be in part designed to counter any 
such notions. In describing how they "think positive", 
the women in our focus groups are implicitly (some-
times explicitly) constructing themselves as not respon-
sible. for their illness. The claim to be thinking 
positively·'· is made, in pari,· to protect themselves 
against accusations of complicity in the onset and pro .. 
gression of their cancer - of having brought their suf-
fering upon themselves. According to this analysis, 
then, the reasons why women Uthink positive" - or 
say they do - may be located not in their psycholo-
gies, but in the moral pressures of the social world 
they inhabit (cf. de Raeve, 1997, Rittenberg, 1995, 
Gray and Doan, 1990). 
There are at least three different ways in which 
women talk about "thinking positive". As we bave 
seen, nobody in our data claims not to think positive, 
or criticises the wbole notion of thinking positive per 
se. Instead, sometimes they claim' that they "think 
positive" and provide little evidence of other than posi-
tive feelings - as in the discussion between Yvonne 
and Betty (TPI, G3); sometimes (like Pauline) they 
claim to ""think positive" but simultaneously criticise 
its implications: and someti~es (most commonly) they 
claim to "think positive" while using "thinking posi-
tiven as an idiomatic formulation to facilitate, or to 
close down, the production of talk a bout less positive 
feelings - their frequent tearfulness (penny) or their 
suicidal feelings (Gina). All of these women agree that 
they "think positive", but just what they are "thinking 
positive" about is often unclear - and when it is pass .. 
ible to disambiguate the object of their positive think-
ing, it varies across speakers (and includes the disease 
itself, the prospect of cure, and aspects of life other 
than the disease). Like other idioms, then, the meaning 
of "thinking positive" is ambiguous, vague, and highly 
variable in use, and what "thinking positive" means is 
fundamentally contextual. In talking about positive 
thinking. research participants are doing much more 
than simply reporting on their own coping mechan-
isms. When social scientists make the leap from decon-
textualised data snippets to diagnoses of· "mental 
adjustments" or "coping strategies", they obscure the 
social function of talk, and overlook its interactional 
role. 
The broader implications of our analysis, then, are 
to render problematic the usual practices of the social 
science and psycho-oncology literatures - i.e. treating 
talk as if it occurred in a social vacuum, and as pro .. 
viding a transparent "window" on underlying cognitive 
processes. In contrast, the discursive perspective we 
have outlined here, and illustrated specifically in re-
lation to "thinking positive'" pays detailed attention to 
what statements actually mean for speakers in the con-
texts in which they occur, and treats talk as a form of 
action in its own right (rather than as a route to.cogni .. 
tion). Taking a discursive approach to cancer patients' 
talk would entail re-theorising the status of that talk: 
i.e. treating it as interactionally occasioned, rather 
than as an unproblematic report of hexperience". 
Taking a discursive approach would further suggest 
that future research on coping, and the practices of-
therapy and counselling with cancer patients, need to 
be based on more adequate understandings of how 
troubles-talk is normatively constructed, and what it is 
designed to do in interaction - especially in a socio--
cultural context in which cancer patients can be held 
accountable for the progression and outcome of their 
disease. 
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This paper discusses three key traditions of feminist research: positivist 
empiricist, experiential, and discursive traditions. It explores the ways in 
which each is used in developing understandings of women's health and 
improving healthcare services - focusing, in particular, on breast cancer. 
research and activism, including my own work in this area. It is argued that 
all three research traditions are important for advancing feminist political 
goals: positivist empiricism enables us to expose the biases of mainstream 
health research and to develop better (i.e. more objective) research; 
experiential approaches enable us to engage with the diversity of women's 
subjective experiences of health and healthcare; and discursive research 
enables us to explore issues related to identity management, accountability of 
conduct, and the moral order of social life surrounding health and illness. 
Keywords: 
breast cancer, discursive research, experiential approaches, feminism, 
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Feminist Research Traditions in Health Psychology: 
Breast Cancer Research 
Fentinist research and activism has been an important - though largely 
unacknowledged - part of heath psychology since its early days. By 
"feminist", I mean research and activism which acknowledges the oppression 
of women, and which seeks to end it - i.e. research and activism which is 
centrally informed by the political goals of the fentinist movement (c.f. Unger 
and Crawford, 1996; Wilkinson, 1991 for more extended definitions). My aim 
in this paper is to identify three key traditions of feminist research, and to 
examine the particular role of each in understanding women's heaith and 
improving healthcare services. I will illustrate each of the three key traditions 
with a particular focus on breast cancer research and activism, including my 
own work in this area. The emphasis of this paper, then, is on the use and 
implications of different feminist research traditions within health psychology 
(rather than on feminism per se or on breast cancer per se). 
I do not intend to adjudicate between the different traditions in terms 
of their value for feminism - but rather to argue that all are useful, albeit for 
different kinds of research purposes, and in different applied contexts. Some 
fourteen years ago I wrote - in my first book, Fentinist Social Psycholo&y-
that in the service of feminist research "theories and methods will be 
'borrowed' from a range of disciplines, criticized and developed" (WiIkinson, 
1986: 2-3). Ten years later, I argued against "a unified field with a single 
'politically correct' line" in favour of the diversity offered by "a potentially 
dazzling variety of approaches" (Wilkinson, 1996: 2). It is still my view that 
theoretical and methodological eclecticism is crucial to the feminist project of 
better understanding - and improving - women's lives. 
The three key traditions of fentinist research I will address here are: 
positivist e!1lpiricism; experiential approaches; and discursive research. 
1} Positivist empiricism: 
Positivist empiricism uses conventional scientific methods - particularly 
experiments, tests and scales - to produce knowledge about an objectively-
present extemal world (cf. Longino, 1993). Key criteria for "good" positiviSt 
empiricist research include the objectivity of the researcher, the 
standardisation of measures, and the replicability and generalisability of 
findings. Feminist researchers working within this tradition have used it both 
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to critique mainstream research as "bad science"; and to develop their own 
"better science" - c.f. Stanton and Gallant (1995) for a useful overview in 
relation to health). 
Feminists have critiqued mainstream health research as ''bad science" . 
on a range of standard scientific criteria. First, they note that many studies 
have used only male subjects (Johnson, 1992; Travis, 1988). These studies 
include crucial areas of health psychology, such as: risk factors for coronary 
heart disease (e.g. Baker et al, 1984; Shumaker and Smith, 1995); clinical trials 
on the prophylactic effects of caffeine and aspirin for heart attacks and 
migraine (Matlin, 1993; Stanton, 1995); psychosocial research on w~rkplace 
stress (Fisher, 1996); and - extra-ordinarily - the links between obesity and 
uterine cancer (Matlin, 1993), and between diet and breast cancer (Tavris, 
1992). Second, these findings using only male subjects have then been 
inappropriately generalised to women (Rodin and Ickovics, 1990). For 
example, ideal blood cholesterol levels have been determined in men, and 
simply applied to women (I'avris, 1992) - in fact it appears that 'safe' 
cholesterol levels are much higher in postmenopausal women (Palumbo, 
1989). In medical schools, the "paradigm patient" is a 70-kilogram man, and . 
medical students learn how to treat his all~rgies, appendicitis, diahorrea and 
urinary problems, computing medication doses based on his weight (Tavris, 
1992). Third, health conditions which affect only, or predominantly, women· 
(e.g. osteoporosis, lupus, fibroids, ovarian cancer) have been under-
researched, at least until recently (Stanton, 1995; Travis, 1988). Finally, 
. . --- --- feminists point out, when women's health is studied, it is likely to be the 
health of women who are (or who are assumed to be) middle-class, middle-
aged, white, heterosexual, non-disabled women - there has been little 
attention to diversity among women, and its effects on their health (Chrisler 
and Hemstreet, 1995; Dan, 1994; Reid, 1993; Stevens, 1992; Yoder and Kahn, 
1993). 
Within the positivist empiricist tradition, then, there is a substantial 
feminist critique of mainstream health research as "poor science". This is not 
only for the (male) bias apparent in its priorities, but also for the (male) bias 
apparent in its assumptions. For example, one assumption infusing the 
psycho-oncology and nursing literatures on mastectomy, is that women's 
biggest concern after surgery is with their appearance (e.g. Bard and 
Sutherland, 1955; Derogatis, 1980; Holland and Mastrovito, 1980; Rennecker 
and Cutler, 1952). Based on the assumption that after mastectomy women's 
major concern is anxiety about looking unattractive and unfeminine, these 
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literatures typically recommend facilitating successful 'adjustment' by 
encouraging them to '1ook feminine" as quickly as possible: nurses are told to 
help women do their hair nicely and apply make-up while still in their 
hospital beds; typically a cotton or wool puff is pinned to the inside of the 
woman's nightclothes immediately after surgery - and she is encouraged to 
continue to wear this until the scar is sufficiently healed for a (more 
substantial) silicone prosthesis to be fitted (e.g. Anstice, 1970; Byrd, 1975; 
Downie, 1975; Pendleton and Smith, 1986) .. 
Feminists have challenged assumptions like these, emphasising that -
although it is important that women's possible concerns about app~arance 
receive attention and sympathetic understanding from healthcare 
professionals - little empirical evidence actually exists to support either the 
primacy of concerns about appearance, or the psychological importance of 
helping women "look feminine" as quickly as possible: 
At times, and without adequate data, the tendency has been to view 
these recommendations as meeting universal needs among patients, 
despite several studies that have called into question the belief that 
breast loss is the most important concern of patients. 
(Meyerowitz et al, 1988; 81) 
Feminist positivist empiricists also conduct their own, better, scientific 
studies in pursuit of feminist goals. Feminist positivist empiricist research on 
women's concerns after mastectomy, for example, has challenged the 
assumption that 'appearance' is the primary concern. In fact, in a study of 112 
. breast cancer patients, "future health" was cited far more frequently as an 
important concern than was physical attractiveness - and concerns about 
health were also found to be far more upsetting to patients (Meyerowitz, 
1981). So, feminist positivist empiricism critiques mainstream science, on 
standard scientific grounds, for not being scientific enough. It exposes biased 
sampling, 4tappropriate generalization, and unwarranted conclusions based 
on social stereotypes and sexist bias, rather than on objective evidence. And 
it may also involve doing better - i.e. ~ scientific - research. 
Feminists draw on the findings of positivist empiricist research (both 
their own and those of mainstream health research) in support of feminist 
political goals. Breast cancer statistics (e.g. in the UK, "34, 000 new cases a 
year"; "1 in 12 women") are widely cited in feminist campaigns to emphasiSe 
the scale of the problem and to argue for better funding and healthcare 
provision. Targeting health promotion literature, screening and outreach 
programmes can also be enhanced by the use of positivist empiricist research 
4 
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focusing on issues of diversity among women, and showing, for example, the 
likelihood of a higher incidence rate of breast cancer among lesbians (Haynes, 
1992, cited in Yadlon, 1997), and a higher mortality rate among Black women 
with breast cancer (Rosenthal, 1996). The use of such figures has led to the 
recent development of outreach programmes for lesbians, Asian women and 
African-Caribbean women by the charity Breast Cancer Care in the VI<, for 
example. 
Statistical comparisons between the incidence rates of different 
diseases - derived from positivist empiricist research - can also be a powerful 
(if contested) way of revealing inequality and campaigning for res,?urces. 
Describing breast cancer in the USA in the late 1980s as an "unchecked 
epidemic", one feminist activist reveals that 'The annual number of women 
newly diagnosed with breast cancer in 1989 alone is significantly greater than 
the total of AIDS deaths since they were first re.corded in 1980" (Friedman, 
1991: 51). Another invites the reader to compare the 1987 Canadian breast 
cancer mortality figure (of over 4,000 women) to "the 417 deaths from AIDS in 
Canada in the same year" (Batt, 1991: 60). Historically, claims such as these 
have been a crucial contribution to feminists' success in obtaining more 
funding for breast cancer research and seryices (Love, 1995; Kaufert, 1998). 
My own feminist involvement in positivist empiricist health research is 
part of a long-term project, which has involved a range of different 
methodological approaches. These include shadowing a breast care nurse in 
clinic consultations and on community visits; conducting focus groups and 
. individual interviews with 81 women with breast cancer (d. Wilkinson 
1998a, 1998b); and distributing a short follow-up questionnaire, including 
closed and open-ended questions about availability and use of different types 
of support. Analysis of the questionnaire data showed that the community 
breast care service was a key source of support: 75% of respondents relied on 
the breast care nurse for informational support; and 49% for emotional 
support. They also expressed a high degree of satisfaction with the service. 
At a time when the community breast care service was under threat, it was 
valuable, particularly as an independent researcher, to be able to provide the 
breast care nurse with empirical evidence of her clients' use of - and 
satisfaction with - the service. She was able to use these statistical data as part 
of the case for continued funding. 
In sum, then, the history of feminist health research shows that 
positivist empiricism is a pervasive, and powerful, strategy for pursuing - and 
achieving - feminist goals. Despite the various critiques of positivist 
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empiricism produced by critical, social constructionist and postmodernist 
researchers, and indeed, many feminists (e.g. Crawford and Kimmel, 1999a, 
1999b), it is still the dominant paradigm in North American "psychology of 
women" (d. Unger, 1996), including "the psychology of women's health" (d. 
Adesso et al, 1994; Lee, 1998; Stanton and Gallant, 1995). 
2} Experiential approaches: 
Experiential approaches are also a key tradition of feminist research (e.g. 
Gilligan, 1982; Miller, 1986; Belenky et al, 1986), providing an influ~ntial 
counterpoint to feminist positivist empiricism. The key feature of this 
tradition is an emphasis on individual experience: individuals are regarded as 
'experts' on their own lives, and as 'authorities' on their own experience. This 
feminist tradition sits very comfortably with qualitative health research based 
on individuals' own understandings and experiences of health and illness -
"the patient's view" (Armstrong, 1984); often focusing on living with chronic 
illness, such as arthritis (Bury, 1988; Williams, 1993) or multiple sclerosis 
(Lyons and Meade, 1993; Robinson, 1990). Experiential approaches rely on a 
wide range of qualitative methods - inclu~ing one-to-one interviews, focus 
groups, life histories, ethnography and narrative/ storytelling approaches (see 
Grbich, 1999; Murray and Chamberlain, 1999 for reviews). Experiential 
researchers also work with reflexive accounts of personal experience (e.g. 
Ellis, 1995; Frank, 1995); and with published personal accounts in the form of 
diaries, memoirs, anthologies and autobiographies: e.g. Murray's (1997) 
narrative analysis of published breast cancer autobiographies. There is a 
distinct genre of cancer autobiographies, including 'ordinary women' (e.g. 
Conway, 1997; Seagrave, 1995; Wadler, 1994) and 'celebrities' (e.g. Ireland, 
1987; Moran, 1989 and Redgrave, 1995) writing about their experience of 
breast cancer. 
Feminist experiential approaches provide an opportunity to make 
women's experience visible. Feminists have emphasised how, in mainstream 
research (and culture) women's experience has systematically been ignored, 
trivialized or distorted. Feminist experiential approaches reclaim women's 
experience as central (d. Candib, 1994; Brems and Griffiths, 1993). Such 
approaches seek to make visible the diversity of women's experience - in . 
relation to differences of race, class and sexual identity, for example. 
Reflexive accounts of personal experience, and the use of published 
auto biographical material both offer ways of making visible, and drawing 
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on, the experience of a wider range of women than might otherwise be 
possible (c.f. Kitzinger and Wilkinson, 1995). 
Feminist experiential approaches also provide an opportunity for 
hearing women in their ~ voices, expressing their ~ meanings. In 
contrast to positivist empiricist research, which limits and constrains 
responses by means of standardised questions, scales and measures, and 
"loses" the individual in statistical summaries, experiential approaches 
generate vivid, personal accounts of individual women's lives and experience 
(c.f. Mauthner, 1998; Stevens, 1998; Swann, 1997). Sometimes experiential 
approaches confirm the findings of positivist empiricist research; at other 
times they offer new - and unexpected ~ insights. . 
This is especially so when issues of diversity in women's experience 
are addressed. Accounts by aboriginal and by first-generation immigrant 
women are included in Diana Ward's (1996) anthology of women living with 
breast cancer in Australia; the perspectives of Asian-American, lesbian and 
very young women with breast cancer are included in Deborah Kahane's 
(1995) North American anthology. Reflexive autobiographical writings on 
breast cancer include Audre Lorde's well-known "The Cancer Iournals" 
(1980/1985), and Sandra Butler and Barbara Rosenblum's "Cancer in Two 
Voices" (1991/1994) - both of them powerful instances of women speaking "in 
their own voices", on their own terms, and from relatively marginalised, 
invisible positions: Lorde as a Black lesbian feminist, Butler and Rosenblum 
as Jewish lesbians . 
. "Cancer in Two Voices" is unusual,as a memoir jOintly-written by a 
woman dying of breast cancer and her partner, but more particularly becauSe· 
(in contrast to most of the breast cancer literature) that partner is a woman. 
Sandra Butler describes the book as "a map of our experiences" (Butler and 
Rosenblum, 1994: 3). She says "We wanted to tell our story ... ("a story of two 
women w~o found love in each other") ... because this writing made us visible 
to ourselves as we were living it" (p.3). From Barbara's initial diagnosis, 
through her treatment, various cycles of remission and recurrence, to her 
eventual death, the reader is treated to a moving and richly-textured portrait 
of the impact of breast cancer on the lives of a lesbian couple, and their 
strongly supportive community of lesbian and gay friends. Barbara vividly 
describes, for example, the unfamiliarity of her body during chemotherapy. 
With pudenda "as smooth as a fig" (having lost her pubic hair), she feels 
"naked and embarrassed, inadvertently returned to pre-pubescence" (p.31). 
She feels" too exposed" to be touched - and she and her lover respond by 
. '. 
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developing new forms of intimacy (p.32). Or Sandra describes "the week of 
shiva" (the Jewish period of mourning after Barbara's death), when "the house 
was always filled with women", and the kitchen with food (p.l72), and her 
gay male neighbours prepared the garden for the scattering of Barbara's ashes 
(p.173). 
It is very difficult to address diversity in positivist empiricist research -
such as, for example, a large-scale survey of women's health. Most of the 
particular characteristics of anyone individual woman will not be shared by 
others in the sample. In attempting to address the diversity of individuals, 
the positivist empiricist researcher runs the risk either of producin~ a 
complicated - and potentially confusing - survey instrument, Q!: of alienating 
women who do not share particular characteristics. For example, pilot 
studies for the follow-up version of the Women's Health Australia 
questionnaire showed that questions about sexual preference, included in 
I . 
order to identify lesbians, were likely to offend at least some heterosexual 
women - who may then decline to complete the questionnaire (Lee, 1999).· 
Feminist experiential approaches derive from a variety of feminist 
theory often called "standpoint theory" (Harding, 1993; Hartsock, 1983; Smith, 
1992), which - broadly speaking - holds th~t women see the world from a 
particular perspective, or standpoint, because of the specific experience of 
being a woman in a patriarchal world. Contemporary feminist theorists 
typically also emphasise the specificities of knowledge deriving from other 
standpoints/ experiences - e.g. those based ·on social class, or ethnicity - and 
.. the interrelationships between standpOints (e.g. Henwood eta!, 1998). Such 
an approach challenges the positivist empiricist notion of a single, external 
reality, which can best be apprehended by means of objective scientific 
enquiry. Rather, knowledge is seen as contingent upon the standpoint of the 
knower, and as dependent upon the specificities of her experience. 
In h~r interview study of women with breast cancer, for example, 
Anne Kasper (1994,1995) draws explicitly on the early work of feminist 
standpoint theorist Dorothy Smith in explaining the objectives of her 
research: it will explore "how to begin from our own center, how to begin 
from our own experience, how to make ourselves as women the subjects of 
the ... act of knowing" (Smith, 1979: 154, cited in Kasper, 1994: 265). Kasper's 
methodology is based on "the belief that the essential meanings of women's 
lives can be grasped only by listening to women themselves" (Kaper, 1994: 
266) - it consists of just one central interview question ("Can you tell me about 
your experience with breast cancer?'') and it involves "listening differently", or 
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"listening for the meaning behind the words" (p.271). The researcher must 
also "trust the authenticity of the narrator's account" (p.274). Using this 
approach, Kasper has be.en able to obtain a deeper insight into the treatment 
choices women make - particularly around their decision whether or not to 
have breast reconstruction. . 
• 
My own focus groups also provided an opportunity for deeper insights 
into women's experience of breast cancer - and allowed me to address 
diversity. The research was conducted in and around a northern English city, 
and although the majority of participants were working class, in their 60s, and 
had had surgery and radiotherapy, I was also able to include middle class 
women, women as young as 33 and as old as 84, and women who had chosen 
alternative medicine or palliative care only, as well as those who had 
undergone extensive chemotherapy and experimental drug treatments; 
Listening to women's voices, hearing their own accounts of their 
experience, I found that - despite the emphasis in the literature on the 
negative aspects of breast cancer - many of them also emphasised the positive 
aspects. The fear, anxiety and distress were there, of course, but the women 
also spoke of hope, enjoyment of life, and new activities. The breast cancer 
literature would say that these women were demonstrating "coping 
strategies" ("looking on the bright side", or" thinking positive"), but it seemed 
to me that they were doing much more than this: they were talking about the 
ways in which the experience of breast cancer had changed them - telling 
stories of identity change and development. 
...... Many women claimed that the experience of breast cancer had 
completely changed their outlook on life: heightened awareness of mortality 
and uncertainty about the future had made them "appreciate life", "enjoy 
life", and "live for the moment". They spoke of "an urgency about life", a 
need to "live life to the full", to "do more with your life", and to "do it today". 
One declared "if you wanna do it, I think you've got to ~ for it" - and they 
did: new experiences (since breast cancer) ranged from long-distance travel, 
to scuba diving, to flying an aeroplane. One woman described the change 
like this: 
I used to be a person who used to always look into the future. We'd 
got to save up for when we get older and we ought not to have a big 
holiday because really, you know, we might need the roof mending. I 
was that sort of person, but I'm not so much that now. I think to 
myself. 'Oh to heck with it, I might not be here next year'. 
9 
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Others said "my priorities in life have changed" or "I'm having to reassess 
what I want to do now" - they decided to exploit a new-found ability to leave 
,housework undone; to leave an unsatisfactory relationship; or to take a job 
and become independent for the first time. Several women described 
themselves as "more selfish", saying "You've got to thffik about yourself'; "I'm 
number one now"; '1 feel I have a stronger responsibility to myself'. 
Here, then, the insights offered by an experiential approach include a 
reconceptualization of these women's experience. They seem to be telling us 
stories of identity: who they were then, who they are now, why - and how -
they made these changes. Rather than attempting to theorize this under the 
rubric of "coping strategies" (suggesting contained, discrete tactic~'of thought 
or action), we might better consider it within a framework of identity change 
and development over the Iifespan. Instead of postulating "coping 
strategies", and developing scales to measure them, we might, instead, see 
these women as telling us how the experience of breast cancer has shaped 
their identities. (For a further critique of the coping literature, see Wilkinson 
and Kitzinger, 2000.) 
Experiential approaches, then, offer the feminist researcher a "window" 
on the richness and complexity of women's lives - particularly women whose 
"voices" have not traditionally been heard. This tradition of research can 
. . 
address the diversity of research participants' experiences; challenge 
preconceptions; and afford the opportunity to develop new insights. 
Listening to participants' articulations of their ~ meanings and identities, 
. and prioritising analyses based on these articulations (rather than on pre- , . 
conceived analytic frameworks) may afford the feminist researcher a radical 
opportunity to understand and represent women's lives in their own terms. 
In sum, "speaking" and "listening" are fundamentally feminist political acts. 
3) Discursive research: 
A third key feminist research tradition is feminist discursive research. The 
term "discursive" potentially covers a wide range of approaches, including 
those which draw relatively heavily on poststructuralism or postmodernism -
e.g. Burman and Parker (1993); Gavey (1989); Schou and Hewison (1998); 
Ussher (1997); Willig (1999) - sometimes referred to as "Foucauldian discourse 
analysis" or "critical discourse analysis". However, my emphasis here is on 
the type of "discursive psychology" developed, in particular, by Jonathan 
10 
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Potter and Derek Edwards (Edwards, 1997; Edwards and Potter, 1992; Potter, . 
1996; Potter and WetherelI, 1987). 
There are three key features of this approach. First, discursive 
psychology treats talk as a form of action - that is, as doing things (like 
disagreeing with another speaker, supporting a point of view, or presenting a 
particular identity). Second, discursive psychology is the study of talk. 
Discursive psychologists do not study the thoughts, emotions; attitudes, 
beliefs, or life experiences presumed to lie behind (and to be expressed 
through) talk. Third, discursive psychology focuses on how the people 
actually talking to each other understand what their talk is doing - as those 
. understandingsare displayed in the talk itself. Discursive psych~iogy 
requires the researcher to articulate the (inarticulate and untheorised) 
understandin.gs of the participants, as these are displayed through their 
conversational practices. Through these practices (e.g. expressing 
disagreement, offering support, or managing identity) speakers display, in 
their talk, their understanding of the meaning of what is going on - and it is 
this meaning which the analyst aims to capture. In other words, a discursive . 
approach draws on analytic resources "intrinsic to the data themselves" (Sacks 
et al, 1974: 729), rather than deriving from the analyst's interpretive work (see 
Kitzinger, 1998 for a discussion of the relationship between participant and 
, 
"expert" analyses of talk). 
Examples of discursive health research can be found in Frankel (1990); 
Heritage and Sefi (1992); Miller and Silverman (1995); and Perakyla (1996). 
Relatively few feminists have yet used a discursive approach (for exceptions 
see Frith and Kitzinger, 1998; Kitzinger and Frith, 1999; and, in a health 
context, Wilkinson and Kitzinger, 2000; Wilkinson, forthcoming) - but there is 
currently a lot of excitement and debate among feminists about its potential 
for feminist work (c.f. Kitzinger, 2000; Speer, forthcoming). 
I will illustrate feminist discursive research with data analysis from my 
own breast cancer focus groups. These discussions were audio-taped, and the 
data fully transcribedl • In reading through the data transcripts, I noticed a 
great deal of talk about "positive thinking" - e.g. women say things like: "you 
just have to think positive"; "you've got to think positive a'n't you?"; "think 
1 Most discursive psychologists use some fonn of the tr~5Cription conventions developed by 
Gail Jefferson (d. Atkinson and Heritage, 1984). In the extracts quoted here, I have 
deliberately kept the tranScription as simple as pOSSible. The following notation is used: 
Single dash: abrupt cutoff of speech (e.g. No-) 
Underlining: emphasiS on syllable or word (e.g. does) 
Square parentheses: used to indicate descriptive comments added in transcription (e.g. [Cuts 
in). 
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, positive"; '1 believe in going forward positively"; "you have to be positive". 
Rather than taking this as empirical evidence for the existence of positive 
, thinking (the positivist empiricist approach), or as telling us something about 
women's experiences of positive thinking (the experiential approach), I was 
int~rested - from a feminist discUrsive perspective - in looking more closely at 
, what such talk is doin& - as a form of action - in the context of these focus 
groups. Two examples follow. 
(i) "rm the positive-thinkin& type of person" - Mana&in& identity in the 
context of 'troubles talk': 
. 186 
First, I will argue, talk about "positive thinking" is doing identity ',' 
management work in the context of 'troubles talk'. Troubles talk' - a term first 
coined by conversation analyst Gail Jefferson - is talk about difficulties, 
misfortune, loss, and other painful, upsetting or unpleasant events (Jefferson, , 
1980; Jefferson and Lee, 1981) - so it can be seen to include talk about having 
breast cancer. Such talk about unpleasant experiences and negative emotions 
is hard for other people to engage with - they are often unsure how to react, 
or uncertain what to say. The speaker may also be concerned what others 
will think of her, as she relates her troubles - she is accountable to them for 
her conduct. This means that 'troubles talk' needs careful managing, if 
• 
listeners are not to be too discomfited, and if the speaker is to come out of the 
story well- and that's where talk about "positive thinking" is implicated. 
What I found when I looked at these women's stories was that talk 
about "thinking positive" often occurs irt contexts in which ne&ative emoti()ns 
are being expressed - indeed, the availability of a formulation like "you've got 
to think positive" may actually facilitate the expression of negative feelings. 
If a speaker can establish that she is basically someone who thinks positively, 
then she can speak about her pain, suffering and distress without unsettling 
others or attracting censure - she has accounted for her conduct. In the ' 
following extract (an exchange between four women in a focus group), Penny 
is able to talk about her tearfulness (and indeed to receive reassurance of its 
"normality") in the context of having first asserted that she is "a positive 
person": 
Penny: 
Rita: 
Teresa: 
I am a positive person and a happy person, but [pause] I 
could cry at the drop of a hat, a lot of the time, and it isn't 
me at ill!, you know, I·I'm just not like that. 
You do cry 
You do cry, don't worry about it, it's [laughs] normal 
12 
Verity: It's normal 
(TP20, Gll)2 
We can see from their responses to Penny, what Rita, Teresa and Verity 
understand by what she says. The other women understand that Penny is 
"worried" about her tearfulness, and that she doesn't see herself as behaving 
"normally". They do not address whether or not Penny is a "positive" or 
"happy" person ~ rather, they treat her talk about being positive as being 
produced to provide a context for Penny to talk about her weepiness. 
In other groups, Betty describes feeling "devastated" and then 
immediately goes on to talk about having "a positive attitude" (1P1, G3); 
" . 
Jessie says she ''broke down and cried" and then quickly adds, ''you've got to 
think positive" (1P3, G1); Nina says she felt "raw" and "hurting" but adds, '1 
was vel}' positive" (1P4, G8); and here Nettie talks about her distress at 
receiving a second diagnosis of breast cancer in her remaining breast, having 
already had one mastectomy: 
It really hit me, you know, hit me with a [laughs] thump and yet I ' 
thought there again, I've either got to have it done, or, you're not 
here, and it was simple as th~t. And like Samantha, I'm the 
positive thinking type of person, and so you've just got to, you 
know, get on. 
(Nettie, TP9, Gll) 
, , 
Nettie constructs herself as being "like Samantha" (another woman in the 
group) in being a "positive thinking type of person". Here, she's using 
positive thinking to express general agreement and solidarity with another 
member of the group - emphasising their shared experience and (by 
implication) theirshared approach to life. 
Similarly, after introducing herself as positive thinking sort of person, 
Gina is able to describes herself as feeling "down", even feeling "absolutely 
rubbish" and suicidal. In the following extract she reflects on her feelings 
when she was first told that she would need a mastectomy. 
I know at the time I felt really horrible, rubbish. And, erm, 
I'm a happy sort of person really, and I've had to laugh a lot off 
[laughs] in my life, you know, and if I think I, if I hadn't been that type 
of a person I think I would have, maybe gone, I don't know, you might 
even commit suicide mightn't you? Some people could, but I wouldn't 
have done. But I mean, as I say, you've got to learn to live with it, 
2 This data tag indicates that the extract quoted comes from my 11th breast cancer focus 
group (Gll) and that it is the 20th example of 'thinking positive'located within the data set as 
a whole (TP20). 
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think positive, you have your downs, you feel absolutely rubbish one 
day, another day you feel really, well, and think, oh welL you know, 
I've only lost my boob, I'm stilllivin', and just ke-, get on with your life 
youl.<now. 
(Gina, TP6, GS) 
Again, then, presenting a "positive thinking" identity confers accountability 
for negativity, even extreme negativity - it seems to enable women even to 
talk about even suicidal feelings. It sets such feeliitgs in a context which 
makes them not only more understandable, but more acceptable, and so 
. poses less of an interactional problem for the he~ers. 
As these extracts illustrate, talk about "thinking positively'; is doing 
some very important things. It is doing some crucial identity work - in 
presenting herself as a "positive thinker", the speaker is enabled to talk about 
her suffering, distress or anxiety, in a way which accounts for such negativity 
as (relatively) transient, and so presents her in a good light. It is also doing 
some careful management of 'troubles talk', such that it becomes much easier 
for the listeners to deal with, rather than a potential conversational burden. 
A discursive perspective does not treat either the speaker's "thinking 
positive", or her pain and distress, as more "valid" or "experientially real". 
Nor is one seen as a "front" for the other (i.e. a woman who says she "thinks 
positive" is not seen as "denying" her distress; a woman who speaks of her 
distress is not seen as "failing" to "think positive"). Rather, a discursive 
perspective explores the particular actions performed by talk, including how 
... people actively construct their identities in conversation with others. 
(ii) "You've got to think positive" - Reflecting a moral injunction: 
. However, there is something else going on in these data extracts - and it 
provides my second example of data analysis using a discursive approach. 
. The women's frequent references to "thinking positive" may also reflect a 
moral injunction. There are many ways in which thinking positive could be 
talked about - as something which participants happen to do and are 
therefore reporting; or as something they have found helpful; or as a way of 
dealing with their cancer they are planning to adopt (and there are a few 
such instances). But "thinking positive" is most typically talked about as a 
moral obligation, as something you "have" to do. Moral exhortations 
(imperatives andjnjunctions) are commonplace - e.g. women say "you just 
have to think positive" (Vera, TP2, G2); "you've got to think positive a'n't 
you?" Oessie, TP3, G1); "you've got to think positive"(Mary, TPS, GB); "you 
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have to be positive" (Fiona, 1PIO, G6); "you have to think positive" <Yolanda, 
1P13,G7). 
In the following extract, for example, Betty and Yvonne are discussing 
"thinking positive" not as a natural reaction to having cancer (the natural 
reaction is that, "obviously you're devastated because it's a dreadful thing''), 
but as a moral imperative: "you've got to have a positive attitude": 
Betty: When I first found out I had cancer, I said to myself, I 
said, right, it's not gonna get me. And that was it I 
mean [Yvonne: Yeah] obviously you're devastated 
because it's a dreadful thing , 
Yvonne: [overlaps] Yeah, but you've got to have a positive attitude 
thing,Ido 
Betty: [overlaps] But then, I was talking to Dr. Purcott 
and he said to me the most helpful thing that anybody 
can have with IDY type of cancer is a positive attitude 
. Yvonne: A positive outlook, yes 
Betty: Because if you decide to fight it, then the rest of your 
body will st-, will start 
Yvonne: 
Betty: 
(TP1,G3) 
Motivate itself, yeah 
to fight it 
Women often report that it was a medical professional who advised 
them to think positively: 
. He [''Dr. Ptircott"] straight away said it wascancer01.ls, but it was only 
very small, it was you know 7.5 millimetres, whatever it was. It hadn't 
spread to the lymph nodes and I had to look positive on this, and so 
that's the way I've looked upon it you know. 
(Doreen, 1P21, G12) 
My doctor, a lady doctor, examined me, and she said, "Oh yes", she 
said, "You have got a lump and it is cancer, but you must be . 
positive about this, you must be very positive, I shall try and get you 
an appointment". And I thought, "My God, I'm going to die - this is it, 
I'm going to die". 
(Carla, 1P19, G9) 
Note that, within a discursive approach, these women's reports that "Dr 
Purcott" and a "lady doctor" recommended positive thinking are not taken as 
transparent evidence that medical professionals were the source of this 
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advice. Rather, Doreen and Carla are seen as attributing this 
recommendation to "experts" in order to render their conduct accountable: .. 
perhaps to distance themselves from a personal belief in the efficacy of 
positive thinking (and the implication of gullibility), for example, by 
suggesting to the other group members that they were simply following 
medical advice (see WiJkinson, forthcoming, for a more extended discussion 
of the attribution of advice and opWons). 
More broadly, these frequent moral exhortations and injunctions point 
to the existence of a moral order for breast cancer patients: that they should be 
thinking positive (whether they like it or not), that it's the right atti~ude, the 
required attitude of patients if they are to be seen as co-operating with 
. medical treatment. There is plenty of evidence for this moral order in both 
the self-help and psycho-oncology literatures. Self-help books with titles like 
The A-Z of Positive Thinkin& Games, 1999), The Power of Positive Thinkin& 
(Peale, 1998) and The Positive Woman (Lindenfield, 1992), crammed with 
"positive affirmations ("I am a powerful person capable of healing myself' or 
"My cancer cells are dissolving" - Brohn, 1987: 137-8), have become "the rage 
these days" (Rittenberg, 1995: 37) and are "selling millions of copies" (Morrish, 
1998: 1). The medical professionals who come into contact with breast cancer 
patients are likely to encourage, "thinking positive" as a "coping strategy" -
not least because of the work of Steven Greer and his colleagues (Greer et al, 
1989; Moorey and Greer, 1989), claiming an association between "thinking 
positive" and cancer morbidity and mortality rates, and advocating the use of 
counselling techniques and adjuvant psychological therapy to promote 
"fighting spirit". Statements are even posted on the walls of hospital 
palliative care rooms in order to "contribute to the positive thought process" 
(Niessen 1995: 53) - indeed, as nurses point out, "a positive patient is far easier 
to care for than a depressed or angry one (de Raeve, 1997: 250). So pervasive 
is the injunction to "think positive" that psychologists report that they are 
now treating people "whose presenting problem was fear that they were not 
being 'positive' enough and therefore would suffer a recurrence of cancer" 
(Gray and Doan, 1990: 35). Critics have referred to this state of affairs as the 
"moral oppression" (de Raeve, 1997) of positive thinking in cancer care. Little 
wonder, then, that it is reflected so powerfully in the talk of the women in my 
focus groups. Identifying the role of moral injunctions (such as "think 
positive") as powerful and pervasive components of women's oppression may 
therefore be seen as central to the feminist project. 
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In Sum, then, discursive psychology treats talk as a form of action: in 
talking about "thinking positive", these women are doing identity work, 
managing "troubles talk" , and reflecting a moral injunction. A discursive 
approach focuses on talk itself (rather than the cognitions or experience 
prt:$umed to lie behind it); and it prioritises speakers' and listeners' mm 
understandings of what their talk is doing (rather than those of the 
researcher). As a form of feminist research, then, it shares with experiential 
approaches a commitment to ''hearing women's voices" - but it takes what 
women actually say still more seriously. Rather than the researcher offering 
an interpretative "gloss" on what women "mean" (as in experiential research) , 
in feminist discursive research the focus is on the women's mm .. 
understandings, as these are displayed in their talk. 
Feminist political interventions are more likely to be effective if they are 
rooted in meticulous data analysis - and careful attention to the detail of talk, 
in its interactional context, is a productive analytic strategy. This is what 
feminist discursive research - of the type I have identified here - has to offer. 
Conclusion: 
, 
In this paper, I have identified three key traditions of feminist research in -
and beyond - health psychology. Although researchers may not clearly 
differentiate between these three traditions, there are considerable conceptual 
... and methodological tensions between them. Each tradition embodies 
distinctive theoretical and epistemological assumptions, and prioritises 
particular methods of data collection and analysis. In general, the three 
traditions are likely to generate very different types of research (and will 
provide very different types of answer to the same research question). 
Each of these traditions is best suited to particular kinds of research, 
and best addresses particular kinds of research question. The positivist 
empiricist tradition is most likely to be useful for feminist researchers who 
want to answer research questions such as: Who gets breast cancer? What is . 
the best way of treating it? What "coping strategies" promote successful 
psychological 'adjustment'? What support services are needed? By contrast, 
experiential approaches are better suited to gaining a vivid sense of 
individuals' lives, on their own terms, addressing questions such as: What is 
it like to have breast cancer? How does it feel to be a Black woman, or a 
lesbian, with breast cancer, in a racist, heterosexist world? How do women 
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make treatment choices, and how do they feel about these choices? How does 
having breast cancer affect a woman's sense of herseH, and shape her 
identity? And, finally, feminist discursive research is best suited to exploring 
questions such as: How do individuals construct and manage their identities 
as "women with breast cancer"? How do sexist ideas structure interactions 
between women with breast cancer and medical professionals? What 
happens in talk between women in support groups? How do policy makers 
construct effective arguments for Cor against) the deployment of resources? 
Despite - or rather, because of - their different foci, however, all of 
these approaches are useful, in their particular ways, for feminist health 
. f ... 
psychology. As I hope to have shown in relation to breast cancer;'they all 
advance the feminist project of understanding and improving women's lives. 
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This paper explores three different approaches - content analytic, biographical and discursive 
- to analysing the same data set (women with breast cancer talking about causes, and 
Blaxter's classic work on 'lay aetiology"). It compares these three approaches in relation to 
the key epistemological problems of "context", "footing" and "multiple versions" - and 
concludes that a discursive approach offers better solutions to these problems than do the 
other two approaches. Finally, it suggests that both feminist psychology and health 
psychology would benefit from increaSed ~e of discursive approaches, particularly in 
relation to theorising 'experience'. 
Keywords 
biographical analysis; breast cancer; cause; content analysis; context; discursive analysis; 
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Women With Breast Cancer Talking Causes: 
Comparing Content, Biographical and Discursive Analyses 
A3 a fel!linist psychologist, I have long been interested in how we represent and theorise the 
'experience' of our research participants, especially when that 'experience' is very different 
from our own as researchers (cf Wilkinson and Kitzinger, 1996; Kitzinger and Wilkinson, 
1997). I am also interested in the advantages and disadvantages of particualar theoretical and 
methOdological frameworks for feminist research (cf Wilkinson, 1996, 1999,2000, and in 
press). This paper is an attempt to explore these issues in the context of health psychology -
specifically, qualitative research involving women with breast cancer (an 'exPerience' I do not 
share), focusing here on these women's talk about 'causes'. I undertake a theoretically-
infomed comparison of three different approaches to analysing these data - content analytic, 
biographical and discursive approaches - with a particular emphasis on discursive 
approaches. 
Althouih discursive approaches (particularly varieties of discourse analysis) are 
becoming increasingly popular in feminist psychology, at least in Britain, they are rarely used 
in health psychology. Mainstream health psychology (e.g. Sarafino, 1998; Taylor, 1995) is 
heavily quantitative, while the relatively new field of "critical" health psychology, which 
prioritises qualitative research (e.g. Murray and Chamberlain, 1999a), relies heavily on 
"traditional" forms of qualitative analysis: such as content analytic and biographical 
approaches - rather than on discursive approaches. This paper demonstrates the value of a 
discursive approach for a feminist-informed critical health psychology, by presenting a 
discursive analysis of a focus group discussion in which women with breast cancer talk about 
the possible causes both of their own cancer, and of cancer more generally. This discursive 
analysis is contrasted with - more typical- content and biographical analyses of the same 
piece of focus group data, and also of Mildred Blaxter's (1983, 1993) data on women talking 
causes. Blaxter's (1983) paper has become a 'classic' of qualitative research, much cited by 
feminists, as one of the earliest to argue - and demonstrate - the importance of 'listening to 
women's own voices' for what they can tell us, rather than imposing the researcher's 
explanatory framework upon the research participants. 
Here, I make systematic comparisons between content analytic, biographical and 
. discursive approaches in relation to three key epistemological issues for qualitative 
researchers: the problem of "context"; the problem of "footing", and the problem of "multiple 
versions". In each case, a discursive approach is shown to offer better solutions to these 
problems than do either content analytic or biographical approaches. I conclude by 
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suggesting that, in the light of these advantages, feminist psychology and health psychology 
would benefit from greater use of discursive approaches, particularly as a framework within 
which to theorise 'experience'. 
Within health psychology (and health research more generally), talk about the causes 
of heal~ and illness is typically studied under the rubric of "lay aetiology": i.e. 
"commonsense", "lay" or "folk" understandings, as contrasted with "medical" or "scientific· 
knowledge (see Calnan. 1987; Fumham, 1988; Stainton-Rogers. 1991 for reviews). While 
much of this research is based upon the use of quantitative techniques, a substantial subset 
relies upon the collection and analysis of (at least some) qualitative data. The most common 
approaches to analysing such data are content (or thematic) analysis and ~10 a lesser extent-
biographical analysis (of the type also sometimes referred to as "IIlUT3tive" oi:· 
"phenomenological" analysis). However, there is very little research in which the same data 
are analysed using two (or more) different approaches - although an important exception is 
Blaxter's classic research on "lay aetiology", in which interviews with working class Scottish 
women about the causes of disease were originally analysed using content analytic 
techniques (Blaxter. 1983), and subsequently reanalysed using a biographical approach 
(Blaxter, 1993)1. Further, there is virtually no discussion in the literature of the key 
epistemological assumptions inherent in different analytic approaches, and the consequent 
implications of the analytic approach adopted (either for work on "lay aetiology", or more 
generally).. . 
The key epistemological issues examined in this paper. in relation to different analytic 
approaches. are: 
(iJ Context: Qualitative researchers generally afford a central role to "context" 
(contrasting their approach with the "decontextualised" analyses considered typical of 
quantitative research). However. there are important differences in how the term "context" is 
understood across different analytic approaches, ranging from the local context within which 
the data are collected (e.g. interview, focus group, or "naturally occurring" conversation). to 
the broader subculture within which research participants are located (e.g. urban youth 
culture. or the institutional context of a residential nursing home). These different 
conceptualisations of context have very different implications for data analysis and 
interpretation. 
(ii) Footing: Qualitative researchers commonly find that participants report the views 
of others. The term "footing". introduced by Goffman (1981) to refer to the range of 
relationships between speakers and what they say, enables distinctions to be made between 
people making their own claims ("I think .. "), or reporting the claims of others ("My doctor 
said ... "). However, there are important differences in how reports of (what purport to be) the 
3 
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views of others are understood across different analytic approaches, ranging from ta1dng 
them (at face value) as providing evidence for what others actua1ly said or believe, to ta1dng 
them as rhetorical techniques whereby the speaker distances herself from claims being made. 
Again, these different conceptua1isations of reports of other people's views have very 
differen.t implications for data analysis and interpretation. 
(iii) Multiple versions: Qualitative researchers typically find that participants produce 
multiple versions of 'reality': they often disagree with one another; and a single participant 
may offer seveml different - and contrasting - versions of the same experience, behaviour or 
belief. However, there are important differences in how this problem is dealt with across 
different analytic approaches, ranging from attempts to identify the 'definitive' (accurate, 
factual) version, to acknowledgements of the co-existence of multiple versions (while 
explaining them in different ways). Once again, these different conceptualisations of 
multiple versions have very different implications for data analysis and interpretation. 
These three key epistemological issues (context, footing and multiple versions) will 
be explored across content, biographical and discursive approaches2 to data analysis, using 
the same data set; in order to highlight the differences between these approaches, and to 
demonstrate the particular benefits of a discursive approach. 
In addition to Blaxter's (1983,1993) classic interviews with women about causes, I 
will draw upon my own data, which consists of 13 tape-recorded focus group discussions 
with a total ofn women with breast cancer (3-7 women per group), plus 4 individual 
interviews. Women were recruited ~ugh' a symptomatic breast clinic at a geneml hospital 
in a city in the north of England: most were working-class, and middle-aged or older (mean 
age 58.8 years; range 33-84) and the majority (75%) were within five years of diagnosis 
(Wilkinson, 19983, b). My data then, like Blaxter's, are transcripts of 'relatively 
unstructiir~'exchiriges with women about illness, in which conversation was guided to 
cover 'a standard set of topics' (Blaxter. 1983: 59)3: my discussion guide included topics 
such as feelings when first diagnosed, coping and support, effects on lives and relationships, 
and the women's ideas about the causes of breast cancer. I will concentrate in this paper on 
talk about causes in just one of the focus group discussions, held with three working class 
women over tea and biscuits in a comfortable university room. The entire focus group 
discussion (lasting just under two hours) was audiotaped and transcribed orthographically 
and all talk about causes (some of which arose spontaneously, some of which was cued by 
the moderator's question) was extracted for analysis. The content analysis below parallels 
that reported by Blaxter (1983); the biographical analysis parallels Blaxter's (1993) 
reanalysis; and the discursive analysis is conducted on my own data alone. 
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J. Content Analysis: Talk as COinjtjye Content 
The most common approach to analysing qualitative data, such as that derived from 
interviews and focus groups, is some variety of content or thematic analysis - sometimes 
computer-assisted with the use of programmes such as NUD.IST or THE ETHNOGRAPH 
(Denzin and lincoln, 1994; Krueger, 1998). Content/thematic analysis is widely used within 
the health literature, including research on "lay aetiology": in addition to Blaxter (1983), 
examples include Lowery et al (1993); Payne (1990), Pill and Stott (1982) and Taylor et al 
(1984). 
The approach involves coding participants' open-ended talk into categories which 
summarise and systematise the content of the data. These categories may be derived either 
from the data or from the prior theoretical framework of the analyst. In studies of lay 
aetiology, such categories typically include "stress", "heredity", and "environmental 
carcinogens" (all categories used by Blaxter 1983; Lowery et al, 1993; Taylor et al, 1984). 
Content analysis' usually involves converting the qualitative data (talk) into a quantitative 
form by counting the number of responses falling within each category (i.e. their frequency 
or "popularity"), and then summarising the number or percentages of responses for each 
category in tabular form - see, for example, Lowery et al (1993: 46) and Blaxter (1983: 62). 
Brief data extracts are typically used to supplement and illustrate the numerical tables. 
So, in her content analytic paper, Blaxter (1983) extracts all mentions of named 
diseases from her data, examines each in turn to see whether a cause was attributed to it, and 
allots such causes to data-derived categories (p.S9). For example, statements such as "It's a 
nervous trouble, it's worry", "There was a lot of strain at work" and "It's because I'm all 
tensed up" (p. 64) are placed in a category labelled "stress, strain and worry", and, according 
to her table of results, this category accounts for 27 (just over 6%) of the total number of 
causes mentioned. In this way, Blaxter deri~es eleven categories of cause (inCluding, for-
example, "infection, "heredity or familial tendencies", "behaviour, own responsibility"): c.f. 
her Table 3, which also gives the number of instances for each category (p. 62). Table 1 
below presents a parallel analysis' of my own data using these same eleven categories. 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE: SEE PAGES 235-236 
Despite the differences in the two data sets (Blaxter's participants were talking about 
the causes of many different illnesses whereas my participants were focusing on breast 
cancer), Blaxter's category scheme maps fairly well onto the data generated by my focus 
group participants6: As Table 1 shows, the most frequently mentioned cause of breast cancer 
is "caused by childbearing, menopause": Blaxter (1983) notes that women often mention 
5 
reproduction as a cause of illness (believing that "childbearing had left them with many 
gynaecological problems", and offering "a stock of stories to prove that 'a woman is never the 
same when she's had children'", p.66), and likewise, women in my focus groups often 
!Ilention reproductive factors as a potential cause of breast cancer (e.g. "I was a relatively old 
!!!!!!!l, ~ whether it's~, so whether the age at which you have children has got anylmng to do 
with it I don't know"). Similarly, Blaxter fmds that some diseases are considered to be the 
results of trauma or surgery: "a knock, down on the swings' causes meningitis and "an 
operation - when the body's opened up" causes coughs and colds (p. 65). In my own data, 
"secondary to trauma or surgery" is the second largest category of cause, and includes "a 
knock or whatever in the appropriate place" and "air getting inside you" in exploratory 
surgery. This similarity between the types of causes women offered in BlaxtCr's data and in 
my own offers compelling evidence for the value of content analysis in accessing relatively 
stable ideas about cause, and is all the more striking across differences of nationality, health 
status, and date of data collection. 
In considering the value of content analysis, then, it can be seen that this approach to 
analysis provides a useful summary of women's beliefs about the causes, and offers an 
overview of the range and diversity of their ideas. It also gives a sense of the relative 
significance women attach to different causes, if - as in Blaxter's analysis - frequencY of 
mention is equated with perceived importance (1983: 61). I will now examine the 
epistemological assumptions of content analysis in relation to the key issues of context, 
footing, and multiple versions. 
(iJ Context 
In content analysis, "context" is commonly understood to refer to the social context in which 
peOpleIive - for health researchers, ~s constitutes the environment within which their ideas 
about health and illness are fonned. So, for example, Blaxter (1983) refers to the fact that her 
interviewees constitute "an identifiable subculture" (p. 59) of working class Scottish women, 
and that their "particular social situation' (p.68) has implications for the kind of "causes" they 
talk about - see also Taylor et al (1984: 499). For content analytic researchers, then, attention 
to "context" means developing an understanding of the demographic (geographical, 
occupational, economic) social context within which research participants are embedded and 
explicit consideration of the effect of these contextual variables on their attitudes and 
behaviours. This understanding of 'context" is important in recognising the influence of 
broad social forces (poverty, sexism, etc.) in women's lives, but it obscures two other salient 
meanings of 'context" - biographical context and local discursive context - which will be 
explored in the later analyses. 
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(it) Footing 
The important distinction between people making their own claims, and people reporting the 
~[aims of others, and the implications of this distinction, is not always attended to in B[axter's 
conten~ .anaIysis. For example, one of B[axter's (1983) interviewees comments on the cause 
of mental handicap by saying "We were told blood and oxygen didn't get to his brain at birth" 
(p. 68); another says, in relation to diabetes, "They said it was what you ate, eating sugar and 
that" (p. 68) • and it is unclear whether or not these women a8J:ee with the views they are 
reporting. Often, the degree of distance a speaker puts between a reported view and her own 
view is displayed by subtle markers, such as intonation and emphasis, which are hard to 
preserve in conventional transcripts: sometimes B[axter describes her participants as speaking 
"rueful[y" (p. 66), "scornful[y" (p. 64), or with "scepticism" ( p.62) about their doctors' 
opinions· interpretations which presumably rely on paralinguistic features (tone of voice, 
etc.) not available for inspection by the reader. 
There are, of course, many reasons why people might refer to others' opinions when 
asked for their own views· to justify their opinions with reference to medical theories, or to 
indicate their own robust independence from such authority; to illustrate that such ideas are 
widely held in their community; or to pour scorn on 'old wives' tales'. Crucial[y, however, as 
writers on footing (e.g. C[ayman, 1992) point out, the reported views of others are not simply 
a transparent report (c.f. Frith and Kitzinger, 1998) of what others have actual[y said, nor can 
such reports be taken as providing evidence for women's sources of information about illness. 
This is, however, just what B[axter does in her reading of the data : i.e. when women report 
the views of medical authorities (e.g. "The doctors said I must have had mumps"), this is 
taken as evidence that information from doctors is "a primary source" (p. 68); when women 
quote 'the sorts of things people say' (e.g. "over the years you hear people saying, rheumatic. 
fever? Oh it [eaves you with a murmur in your heart. .. "), this is taken as evidence for the . 
importance of folk knowledge (p. 68); and when women speak of watching medical 
programmes, this is taken as evidence that television is "by far their most important source of 
media information" (p. 68). On the basis of this analysis, B[a'(ter claims that women's ideas 
about cause are derived from three key sources: health professionals, "the common stock of 
knowledge in their community", and the media (p. 68). 
[n my own data, too, speakers very often present other people's opinions as to the 
causes of illness, e.g. claiming to have heard "stories" that eating "tomatoes and plums at ~e 
same meal" might cause breast cancer, or reporting the views of "Doctor Patterson". 
However, as we shall see, instead of taking these statements simply as evidence for the 
sources of women's knowledge about illness (as is typical in both content and biographical 
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analysis), they can be analysed from a discursive perspective as relevant to the interactional 
context in which they occur. 
(iii) Multiple versions 
'In research on lay aetiology, multiple versions arise in the context of individual research 
particiPmts each offering a selection of different "causes". So for example, one ofBlaxter's 
interviewees explains her kidney disease (p. 65) by saying that it began with cystitis (coded 
as "secondary to other diseases") and developed into kidney disease because of her own . 
carelessness in not going to the doctor (coded as "behaviour, own responsibility"). Similarly, 
in my own content analysis, one woman raises "the age at which you have children" as a 
possible cause of breast cancer (coded as "childbearing"), and then tells a stdry about a bang 
to her breast with a shopping "trolley bag" (coded as "trauma"). This is a common finding in 
content analytic research: e.g. Taylor et al (1984: 464) specifically point out that"24% of the 
sample had theories involving two or more causes" for breast cancer. As Blaxter (1983: 67) 
points out, content analysis "inevitably conceals" the fact that a selection of "causes" might 
be offered by a single participant 
The coexistence of two (or more) apparently competing or contradictory "causes" in 
the talk of a single interviewee may not constitute an analytic problem if the researcher is 
simply interested in charting the frequency with which a particular cause is invoked (or, as in 
Taylor et ai's 1984 work. in correlating causal attributions with adjustment measures). In this 
case, multiple causes can simply be coded as separate "instances". It becomes an analytic 
problem, however, when the research interest lies, as does Blaxter's, in identifying "the 
structure of the women's thinking" (p. 60), i.e. how women go about "ascribing chains of 
cause to illnesses' (p. 67) and "connecting together the relevant health events" (p. 67). In this 
ease, ihe potentiruly complex relation between different causes is lost in coding. This 
problem cannot be solved within a content analytic framework. but, as we shall see, is 
addressed (in different ways) by both biographical and discursive analysis. 
In sum, the apparently neat closed-category system of content analysis imposes a 
deceptive orderliness upon the data. It obscures a number of problems: problems which may, 
at first sight, seem merely to be coding difficulties, but which often concern issues 
fundamental to the interpretation of qualitative data. Such problems are inherent in both my 
own and Blaxter's (1983) content analyses alike. 
11. Biographical Analysis: Talk as Interpretative Autobiographv 
"Biographical" research (Bury; 1982) - including some forms of "narrative' (Williams, 
1984). or 'interpretative phenomenological' (Smith. 1996) research' - is becoming 
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increasingly popular in the health field (e.g. Bury. 1988; Clarke. 1990; Frank, 1993; 
Mathieson and Slam. 1995; Reissman, 1990; Smith et al. 1997; Williams. 1993). Such 
research is characterised by an analytic framewolK within which people's talk about causes is 
not treated as offering transparent evidence of their aetiological beliefs: rather. it is 
interpreted in the light of people's search for meaning and their attempt to make sense of their 
.' 
lives and identities. 
According to Michael Bury (1982: 169) illness. especially chronic illness. is a serious 
"biographical disruption": it is an experience which undermines structures of everyday life 
and common-sense knowledge about ourselves and the world. "such that a fundamental re-
thinking of the person's biography and self-concept is involved"., In talking about the 
genesis of illness. people offer "not only explanations for the onset of a given'disease. but 
also acts of interpretation. narrative reconstructions of profound discontinuities in the social 
proCesses of their daily lives" (Williams. 1984: ,179). Cancer patients' stories are "the vehicle 
for making sense of. not an illness. but a life" (Mathieson and Slam. 1995: 284), 
Biographical analysis of talk about causes seeks to understand aetiological 
attributions in relation to their meaning for individuals in the context of their whole 
biography. Critiquing the "positivistic tradition' - including the content analytic wOIK of 
Blaxter (1983) reviewed above - Clarke (1990) argues that categorising women's talk in 
relation to brief references to "stress. strain and worry'. or "childbearing and menopause" is 
"reductionist" and serves to "decontextualize and render simplistic the detail and depth of the 
self-analysis in the context of the search for meaning." Instead. she proposes. the search for 
meaning and cause should be seen as an integral part of the value structure and world view of 
each woman (ClaiKe. 1990: 89-90). Instead of dividing talk, across individuals, into 
fragments (as different "causes" are introduced), and regrouping these fragments into 
, categories (or themes), biographical analysis treats the individual as the unit of analysis and 
explores how biographical continuity is achieved. This analytic approach explores people's 
experience in detail on a "case-by-case basis" (ClaiKe, 1990: 90), and through case studies 
(Williams. 1984, 1993; Smith, 1996; Smith et al, 1997). 
This is the approach adopted by Blaxter (1993) in which she reanalyses, from a 
biographical perspective, part of the data set already content analysed in her 1983 paper. 
This time, in contrast to her earlier content analysis, "a single respondent's way of thinking is 
traced back and forwards throughout the hour or two of conversation', as the respondent 
attempts "to achieve that 'experiential coherence' ... sought by those trying to interpret their 
own chronic disease" (p.133). Blaxter's biographical analysis is based on interviews with 
three women (described as '014 - aged 54,12 children"; "040 - aged 53, three children"; and 
"019 - aged 43, five children"), The first stage of analysis is presented in two columns 
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(about a page per woman): the left-hand column summarises the gist of the woman's talk 
about causes (and includes short illustrative quotations); and in the right hand column Blaxter 
annotates their talk across the course of the interview with codes' such as "childbearing", 
. "trauma", "behaviour", and "stress·. In her subsequent analysis, Blaxter seeks to explain the 
chains of cause which run throughout these accounts with reference to women's life events, 
their search for continuity across the life span, and their moral accountability. 
Table 2 below presents a parallel first stage reanalysis of my own data, using a 
biographical framework. The three focus group participants are now identified as individuals· 
("Doreen - aged 40"; "Freda - aged 68"; and "Gertie - aged 84") and each woman's talk about 
the causes of breast cancer is traced throughout the entire two hours of discussion. As in 
Blaxter's biographical analysis, the left-hand column summarises the gist of the talk, and this 
is annotated with the codes presented in the right hand column. 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE: SEE PAGES 237-238 
As with the content analysis, there are clearly many areas of overlap between 
Blaxter's (1993) data and my own. In my data, as i~ Blaxter's, women come up with multiple 
causes for illness, and it is possible to explore the chains of cause that each woman offers. 
So, for example, Blaxter's participant G 14 explains the origin of her chronic bronchitis not 
only with reference to "trauma" (falling on ice), but also - at other points in her narrative - in 
relation to "self-neglect", her own "behaviour" (smoking), "stress·, and "childbearing" (p. 
134). Similarly, in my data, Doreen comes up with a variety of explanations for her breast 
cancer, including "heredity", "contraceptive pill", and (like G 14) "trauma" (a bang with a 
"trolley bag") and "childbearing", particularly (also like G 14, who was "too auld, maybe" 
whell she had b.eilasttwo children) being "an old mum". In-developing a biographical 
analysis of women's talk, Blaxter (1993: 137) interprets these chains of causes as part of "the 
strain to connect, to present a health history as a chain of cause and effect", so that significant 
life events (such as childbearing) are constructed as having a bearing on current health 
problems. Discussions of family history are likewise seen as indicating "a liking for 
continuity" (p. 138): through a "recital of the lives and deaths of [their] own parents, siblings 
and grandparents", Blaxter's participants, like my own (see, for example Dorefm's 
consideration of her "family history") present "chains of cause stretched back through 
generations" (p. 138) .. 
In sum, it can be seen that, compared with content analysis, biographical analysis 
offers a much richer and more intimate sense of the participants' lives, a clearer sense of the 
women as individuals, and a more detailed understanding of their complex and sophisticated 
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ways of grappling with the issue of cause. Biographical analysis explains how multiple, even 
apparently contradictory, ideas of cause can co-exist in one person's story, and how these are 
embedded within, and interpreted in relation to, their life narratives, as part of individuals' 
quest for meaning in a social world. However, biographical analysis does not adequately 
solve tI\.e problems of context, footing, and multiple versions, and we will now revisit these 
concerns. 
(i) Context 
For content analysts, as we have seen, 'context' is generally understood in tenns of variables 
such as geographical location, socioeconomic group, or family composition. For 
biographical researchers, 'context" is generally understood to mean a womanis 'total life 
experience and her values' and the 'network of interaction' within which such experience 
and values are fonned (C1arke, 1990: 93). In her biographical re-analysis, Blaxter (1993) 
describes women's ideas about cause as constructed 'in the light of their own biographies' (p. 
141): these biographies are not created 'in a vacuum ..• the process riot only takes place 
within a cultural context, but is also a continual interaction with others' (p. 139)9. 
In biographical analysis, then, 'context' is understood to refer to the specific and 
. particular details of a woman's life. Instead of the broad demographic variables context of 
content analysis, biographical analysis relates qualitative data to individuals' personal 
cirCumstances, social interactions. and phenomenologicallifeworlds. This is not, however, 
directly accessed by interview and focUs group researchers, who must rely on self-report data 
for evidence of a woman's life experience and social networks .. By contrast, as we shall see 
in discussing discursive analysis, the research situation is a social context directly accessible 
to the researcher, and talk about health and illness takes place, and can be analysed, within 
this immediate local context. 
(ii) Footing . 
Footing remains a problem for biographical analysis in that it does not offer any further 
understanding of why participants often quote others instead of expressing their own views 
directly. or without making clear their own position on such reported opinions. For example. 
Bla"{ter's (1993: 134) gist summary of G 14's talk about her bronchitis includes the following: 
'Doctors told her it was smoking. and 'I stopped for nine months!' (But claims was better 
when she started again.)'. 
Presumably G 14 told the interviewer that the doctors attributed her bronchitis to smoking. 
but it is not clear whether or not this is also her own view, nor is it clear why G 14 has 
(apparently) quoted medical opinion instead of expressing her own views directly. Similarly. 
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in my own data, Genie says that her sister (in nursing training) told her that everybody has a 
(dormant) cancer, and Doreen says that her GP told her "it's nearly always hormonal" (Table 
2). Both my own and Blaxter's biographical summaries also preserve a number of reported 
~nions to which no particular source is attributed - participants simply report that they have 
'heard spmething'; or that, in general, 'they (unspecified) say •• .': e.g. Gertie says she has heard 
·stories" about the causes of breast cancer (Table 2); G40 ·says was also told 'disc is worn in 
the spine'· (Blaxter, 1993: 135). Biographical analysis does not improve on content analysis 
in offering any explanation as to why othelll' opinions should be reported in this way. 
(iii) Multiple versions 
Blaxter (1993) explicitly states that one key reason for reana1ysing her data Within a 
biographical framework is to tackle the issue of multiple versions. Certainly, biographical 
analysis rendelll much more comprehensible the production of multiple versions by the same 
participant stories change over the lifespiln as new experiences are taken into account or new 
information is made available; and conflicting or competing explanations may be reconciled 
by seeing them as evidence of tensions in the ·strain to connect" (Blaxter, 1993: 137). 
However, there is still a major problem, insofar as it is primarily the analyst - and not the 
research participant herself - who imposes meaning upon a biographical account Le. it is the 
analyst who suggests that a statement of cause is produced for a particular reason, or that two 
or more causes are connected in a particular way. In biographical analysis, then, 
·experiential coherence" (Blaxter, 1993: 133) and biographical continuity is achieved by 
analysts, rather than research participants. By contrast, as we shall see, discursive analysis 
focuses on how coherence is achieved by participants themselves. 
In sum, then, despite the obvious richness of biographical analysis, and the particular 
advantages it offe\"S over content analysis (Le. a different formulation of "context", and a 
explanation of the co-existence of multiple versions), this approach still leaves us with a 
number of unresolved problems of interpretation, particularly in relation to the issue of 
footing. Again, such problems are inherent in both my own and Blaxter's (1993) 
biographical analyses alike. 
1lI. Discursive Analvsis: Talk as Action 
Discursive analysis uses tools drawn from the interdisciplinary arena of discourse and 
conversation analysis (e.g. Edwards, 1997; Kitzinger and Frith, 1999; Potter, 1996) and is 
still relatively rare within health psychology 10, although used to some extent in 
sociologically-oriented health research: e.g. Frankel (1990); Heritage and Sefi (1992); Miller 
and Silverman (1995); and Perakyla (1996). Within this framework, people's talk about 
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causes is seen not· as in content analysis· as evidence for cognitions (beliefs, attitudes) and 
the "sources" of the information which underpin them; nor· as in biographical analysis. as 
reflecting the phenomenological search for meaning and continuity of the lifeworld; rather, 
$Uch talk is understood as a form of action designed for its local interactional context. The 
argument here is that talk (in interviews and focus groups, as much as in doctors' surgeries or 
counselling sessions) is designed by speakers for its specific context, and is doing something 
relevant to, and occasioned by, that context. The implications of this will become clearer 
when we consider the meaning of "context" within a discursive framewoIX. 
An important feature of discursive analysis is its artention to the precise detail of what 
people say. In content analysis, the actual words of the research participants are lost in the 
. --
coding process: only a few illustrative quotations remain. Biographical and narrative 
analysts usually put great emphasis on how women "express themselves" (Blaxter, 1993: 
• 
127), "from their own perspectives and in their own words' (Clarke, 1990: 88) but, in fact, 
resort largely to paraphrase and summary: e.g. in her three case studies of women with breast 
cancer, based on interviews lasting several hours, Clarke (1990) presents only one direct 
quotation from each woman. Similarly, Blaxter offers just one extended quotation to 
illustrate the "lively, sophisticated and independent way" (pp. 136-7) in which causal factors 
are explored. This extended quotation is not, however, subjected to any analysis, and the 
biographical summaries on which Blaxter's reanalysis relies are (as she herself notes) "devoid 
of the small details" (p.136) which give talk its immediacy and impact. By contrast, 
, . 
discursive analysis focuses on the detail of the talk itself, including not only the particular 
words and phrases participants use, but also small details of delivery such as pauses, 
intonation. or self-correction. The assumption is that if talk is 'action oriented", then these 
details are constitutive of the action that talk performs • 
. Although both content and biographical analysts typically tape-record their research 
interviews (both Blaxter, 1983: 59 and Taylor et ai, 1983: 491 specifically report so doing), 
they rarely explain how these tapes were transcribed and apparent inaccuracies in quoting 
from the data are commonplace, typically involving the unexplained addition or deletion of 
words, changes of tense, and punctuation differences when the same data are quoted across 
different publications 11. These differences are usually minor, but conversation analysis has 
shown that such apparently trivial features of talk can be interactionally highly significant. 
For example, "mm bm" and 'yeah' are both used as ways in which one person acknowledges 
what another is saying, but they have been shown to have very different conversational 
functions (Jefferson, 1981). Consequently, the smallest details, such as whether the speaker 
says 'at the back 0' your mind' (Blaxter, 1983: 66) or 'at the back 0' my mind' (Blaxter, 
1993: 136), may be of analytic importance. When (as in content and biographical analyses), 
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language is seen simply as a vehicle for conveying underlying beliefs and meanings, then 
participants' messy conversational responses to interview questions can be filtered and coded 
into a set of clear-cut categories or biographical themes. But the study of talk within its local 
~ context, as a fonn of action. depends upon detailed and meticulous transcription. 
preservi.ng the fine-grain of conversation. Although such fine-grained IIanScription of talk 
can appear daunting and difficult to read, it is essential to discursive analysiSl2. 
In the remainder of this paper I will present a discursive analysis of a single segment 
of my focus group talk about causes, lasting just over five minutes. This segment has been 
relIanScribed in more detail than the original orthographic IIanScription (see lines numbered 
1-118), occurs toward the end of the focus group discussion, and is a single passage of 
consecutive talk - although for ease of reference, it is divided up and presented here as a 
series of short. consecutive extracts. In the course of presenting my analysis I will compare 
and contrast the way in which content analytic, biographical, and discursive approaches 
address the three key issues previously discussed: context, footing, and multiple versions. 
(i) Context 
In discursive analysis, "context" means the immediate local context of the research situation, 
i.e. the talk which comes immediately before and after any given statement This is very 
different both from content analysis (in which statements about cause are coded according to 
their semantic content, without any reference to interview context), and biographical analysis 
(in which each statement is contextuaiised in relation to other statements made by the same 
person over the course of an interview! discussion, but without reference to the question to 
which the statement is an answer, or the probe to which it is a response). Neither content 
analysis nor biographical analysis addresses the immediate context of the research situation. 
Mcip3nts'talk in interviews and focus groups is occasioned by questions from the 
interviewer or moderator: as in any conversation, participants are attending to their co-
conversationalists' concerns, countering their assumptions or building with them consensual 
. versions about the world. By extracting phrases from their interactional context, and 
assigning them to decontextualised categories of meaning, the researcher loses their specific 
and occasioned meanings. So, for example, the data extracts Blaxter (1983) quotes often 
appear to be responses to questions or prompts (e.g. "I dinna think their surroundings has 
onything to dee wit it", p. 65; "Bronchial asthma's nae an inherited disease", p. 63) but 
Blaxter gives no information about the questions which produced these answers. This means 
that we do not know what such talk is doing in the context in which it is actually produced. 
In the extract of talk to be analysed here, women are responding to the question about 
causes which I (SW) raise as moderator of the focus group: 
14 
215 
(SW: BCP12, 30-31: 1414-1496)13 
1 SW: O'you have any idea what caused your breast cancer, any of you? 
2 Freda: No- What m cause breast cancer, do you think? 
3 SW: What do you think it might be? 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Gertie: 
Doreen: 
[Cuts in] There's a lot of stories going about. I was once told that if 
you use them aluminium pans that cause cancer. I was also told 
that if you, if you eat tomatoes and plums at the same meal that-
[Laughs] 
A content analysis might code Freda's response in line 2 as "don't know": it so happens that 
.. . 
this is not a categOI), Blaxter (1983) uses (although she does note that cancer "was one of the 
diseases most frequently mentioned without discussion of cause", p. 66) but it appears as a 
category in other content analyses focusing on cancer talk (e.g. Lowery et ai, 1983). Gertie's 
response in lines 4-6 could be coded (as in Table 1) as offering examples of the categories 
"agents in the environment" (aluminium pans) and "behaviour, own responsibility" 
(choosing to eat both tomatoes and plums at the same meal). 
A biographical analysis, as we have seen, would first code these statements about. 
cause in a manner quite similar to the content amiIysis above, but would then seek to make 
sense of them in the context of the women's overall life stories. Perhaps Freda, who has had 
no recurrence of cancer over the last five years, prefers to leave the cause a mystery; whereas 
, 
for Gertie, who has very recently had a mastectomy, and whose daughter died of breast 
cancer, the search for causes is more compelling: her reliance on folk knowledge and 
information from friends and family is a thread running through her account (see Table 2). 
Discursive analysis, by contrast, focuses on the immediate interactional context. Talk 
about causes can be illteiactiollallytricky- particularly when a presumed "expert" is asking 
questions, or in settings in which potentially equally knowledgeable others might have 
different or even conflicting opinions. Conversation analysts (e.g. Sacks, 1992: 340-7) have 
noted the asymmetry between being the first to express an opinion and being second - in that 
going first means having to set your opinion on the line, whereas going second offers an 
opportunity either for agreement or for potential challenge (e.g. you can ask your opponent to 
expand on or account for her claims, implying that her opinion is ill-informed, ridiculous or 
wrong). Consequently, speakers often try to avoid first position, and may try to prompt or 
manoeuvre another into speaking first (Hutchby, 1996: 48-50). This is precisely what Freda 
does (line 2) in response to the moderaior's question about the causes of breast cancer: 
attending to the risk of speaking first (i.e. possible challenge or disagreement), she declines to 
give an opinion, and bounces the 'expert's" question right back to her. It is not simply, then, 
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as content analysis might imply, that Freda 'doesn't know' what causes breast cancer: she is 
not here reporting a state of mind, but is engaged in a piece of local inteIactional business. 
The moderator (SW) avoids answering Freda's direct question: instead, she 
reformulates it (in the manner typically recommended for interviewers and focus group 
moderators), making clear that she is interested in what the participants themselves "think it 
might be" (line 3) rather than in any purported "actual" (i.e. scientific) causes of breast 
cancer. It is with this reassurance that Gertie offers some "stories" (Le. folk wisdom, labelled 
as such), thereby putting herself into the vulnerable first speaking position, and attractingjust 
the kind of second speaker disagreement which Freda's manoeuvre enabled her to avoid: 
Doreen, the youngest and most articulate member of the group, !l!!!gh§, at Gertie's response. 
'. 
Here's what happens next: 
814 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
Gertie: 
Doreen: 
Gertie: 
Doreen: 
Gertie: 
Doreen: 
SW: 
Gertie: 
SW: 
DoreenlSW: 
Gertie: 
Doreen: 
[ro Doreen] Have you heard all these, those things? 
[Laughs] No 
Now that's what! heard, and-
[Laughs] Mm 
Oh there's several things, that if you listen to people [pause], we::ll 
Mm 
[roGertie,laughingly] What else have they told you? 
Pardon? 
, 
[ro Gertie,laughingly] What else have they told you? 
[Laughter] 
I can't think off hand, I knew, I knew a lot that I've heard over the 
years from people who've passed on, "Oh yeah well, that causes cancer" 
Mm 
21 Gertie: but I don'iknow, but-
22 Doreen: [Cuts in] I mean, erm-
23 Gertie: Now I've no views on this, [ro Doreen] have you? 
By the end of this exchange (which only lasts 53 seconds from the moderator's initial 
question), Gertie,like Freda before her, is claiming to have no views whatsoever on the 
causes of breast cancer. Again, this claim is clearly not simply a straightforward report of 
cognitive content: it arises out of the interactional sequence in which it is embedded, in the 
course of which both Doreen and the focus group moderator have implied, through their 
laughter, that Gertie's candidate causes are rather implausible, and the moderator's probe (line 
14) can be heard as positioning Gertie as a sort of passive and gullible person who believes 
anything she is told. Gertie responds first by reminding everybody that she is not reporting 
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her own views, but those of others - the gossip and rumour you hear "if you listen to people" 
(line 12), then flatly refuses to offer further candidate answers ("I can't think", line 18; "I 
don't know" ,line 21; "I've no views on this",line 23), and hands the floor to Doreen. 
Simply coding Freda and Genie's talk as "don't know" (taking it as an accurate report 
of cognjtive deficit), or seeking somehow to root it in their biographies, ignores the effect of 
the immediate context (constituted by an "expert" moderator and potentially knowledgeable 
others) which produces such talk. For discursive analysis, the local "context" of an utterance 
- the talk which immediately precedes and follows it - is crucially important (c.f. Schegloff, 
1997). 
(ii) Footing 
When Genie first introduces some candidate causes of breast cancer, she remarks that 
"there's a lot of stories going about" (line 4); a few lines later she refers to talk about causes 
she has "heard over the years" (line 19). As we have seen, in content analysis statements like 
these are often used as evidence for the "source" of ideas about cause, and within this 
framework, Genie's comments would be taken as indicating her reliance on folk knowledge. 
According to Blaxter (1983: 68), women "were often aware that 'folk' knowledge (correct or 
incorrect) had influenced their thinking" - and she cites one of her participants offering a 
comment very similar to Genie's ("over the years you hear people saying ...• ", p. 68). Within 
a discursive framework, however, these attributions of ideas about cause to folk knowledge 
are not transparent reports of sources 'of information, but interactional devices which only 
serve to protect participants from challenge: they may not be expert on the causes of illness, 
but they can certainly be expert on what they have heard others say. When Genie labels her 
candidate causes "stories", she leaves open the possibility that she herself can later dismiss .. 
them as fiction or rumour: her initial presentation'of them (in lines i6) leaves ambiguous her 
own position on these putative causes, and in the turns which follow, she puts an increasing 
distance between these "stories" and her own beliefs1S• So, whereas, as we have seen, 
content analysis codes Genie's candidate causes ("aluminium pans" and "tomatoes and 
plums") as "environmental" or "behavioural" explanations, attention to the local social 
context shows us how and why such candidate causes are framed as "stories", and why, only 
moments later, even these "stories" are retracted. 
Continuing with the next extract from the data segment, we see that as Doreen takes 
the floor, she is also being very careful. In answer to Genie's question, she also says "No", 
she has no views, before going on to give them: 
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No- The only thing is. I mean from my point of view. I don't know. 
. they say that, they say that breast feeding is supposed to. erm 
[!Ch]. give you some protection. well I breast fed and I mean 
[laughs]. it obviously didn't work with me, did it? Erm. what's the 
other thing? Then they say that taking the pill. it's not proved to be 
[pause] have I got this right? it's not proved that it's only. it's not 
caused an increase in breast cancer. so that, I mean I did to. you 
know. obviously I took the pill at a younger age. I mean, I don't 
know whether the age at which you have children makes a 
difference as well because I had my [pause] eight year old relatively 
late. I was an old mum when I got, I mean. [pause] yeiili. I was 
thirty two when 1-. just nearly thirty two when I had John. so I 
was a relatively old mum, so whether it's-. so whether the age at 
which you have children has got anything to do with it I don't 
know, I mean there's no family history 
[Cuts in] They say that if you've only had Q.!!£ that you're more 
likely to get it than if you had a l2ig family [indistinct] 
41 Doreen: [Cuts in] No. well. there's no family history lbat I know of. at all 
Although Doreen presents a list of more scientifically respectable causes than Gertie's (breast 
feeding. the pill, childbearing age. family history). her suggestions. like Gertie's. are 
, 
attributed to unspecified others ("they say". lines 25 and 28). and qualified by expressions of 
uncertainty ("I don't know" ,lines 31-2 and 37-8). Doreen displays herlack of commitment 
to them when she apparently gropes for these half-remembered. and possibly inaccurate 
beliefs ("What's the other thing?" ,lines 27-8; "have I got this right?" • line 29"): the 
. implication is that these ideas. are not her own. and further. that they are causal explanations 
in which she has so little stake (Potter. 1996: 124-132) that she can barely remember them. 
The attribution of views to (unspecified) others, and the display that these views may be 
imperfectly remembered, is a delicate piece of footing. and illustrates the subtlety of Doreen's 
argument. It seems reasonable to suppose that she is seeking to avoid the kind of ridicule she 
has already levelled at Gertie - and. likewise. that Freda's re-entry into the conversation with 
yet another attribution to others ('They say' , line 39) is attending to the risk of ridicule. 
Simply coding their talk as offering instances of 'folk wisdom" overlooks the interactional 
work in which they are engaged. 
When Gertie re-enters the conversation (at line 65, below), she deals with the risk of 
ridicule using a very different kind of footing: 
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6516 Gertie: My sister was a~, way back in the 1920s, she [mdistinct], and 
66 she, she was at what is Springfield General now, she did her tIaining 
(j/ there and there was a Doctor Patterson at the time, who used to 
68 lecture to the nurses, and he told them nurses in his lectures that 
69 , evervbody has a cancer, and [pause] it's a case of whether it lays 
70 dollDant 
71 Freda: Yes, I've heard that 
72 Doreen: Mm 
73 Gertie: Have you heard that? 
74 (Freda): Mm 
75 Gertie: Well, yes, that, she told us that, and that came in her lectures, and 
76 [pause] according to him, l!!!Ylhing could wake it up 
77 Doreen: Mm 
78 Gertie: a knock or whatever in the appropriate place, and then it would 
79 develop, but that's what-
80 Doreen: Mm 
81 Gertie: that's what she was told 
82 Doreen: Mm 
83 Gertie: ' but when 1-
84 Freda: [Cuts in] Sometimes I've heard that knocks can bring one on but I've 
85 never (had any knocks) [indistinct] 
86 Gertie: No 
87 Freda: [Cuts in] (I don't think: that) [indistinct] 
88 Doreen: [Cuts in] Well,I'd heard that from somebody el~ and so when I, 
89 when obviously this was sus-, my lump was suspicious, I then, I 
90 then remembered I'd banged my breast with this, ellD [ICh] you 
91 know these shopping bags with a wooden rod thing, those big 
92 trolley bags? 
93 Freda: Mm 
Again, Gertie is attending to the danger of being laughed at the "dollDant cancer" theory is 
painstakingly constructed as representing someone else's opinion - this time, that of a clearly-
specified "expert", a doctor Patterson, at Springfield General Hospital. This is in marked 
contrast to the "stories" (line 4) or "things" (lines 8 and 12) that "people who've passed on"17 
(line 19) might have said. She carefully monitors the reception of this theory and even 
though Freda and Doreen affiliate with this view ("Yes, I've heard that", Freda, line 71, and . 
Doreen's confirming "Mm", line 72), she checks to be sure that she has their support ("Have 
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you heard that?", line 73), and continues repeatedly to stress that this theory comes from her 
sister's nursing training ("she told us that", line 75; "that came in her lectures", line 75; 
"according to him" ,line 76; "that's what she was told", line 81). The effect of all this footing 
is to emphasise that these ideas are!!Q! her own, and that she is not to be held accountable for 
believing them. 
In discursive analysis, then, the attribution of views to others does not offer a 
transparent window into what an individual "believes", nor does it reveal the sources of their 
information: rnther, footing is as a conversational resource used by participants for managing 
interactional difficulties. From a discursive perspective, careful attributions of opinions to 
others may indicate that speakers are attending to the risk of sounding ignornnt or stupid: 
. ' 
such respondents are not, as Blaxter (1983: 66) suggests, simply repeating "what doctors had 
told them" - rnther, they are actively engaged in managing the delicate internctional business 
of presenting opinions to a researcher and to co-conversationalists. 
(iii) Multiple Versions 
In lines 24-41 (quoted earlier) Doreen offers multiple causes for breast cancer, including not 
breast feeding, childbearing age, the pill, and family history: in lines 88-92 (above), she 
offers another candidate cause - a bang to her breast As we have seen, content analysis 
simply codes Doreen's talk as offering instances of the categories "childbearing", "agents in 
the environment", "heredity" and "trnuma" respectively, and I~es the fact that these items are 
all produced by a single participant As we have also seen, biographical analysis, by 
contrnst, retains a focus on the individual and interprets what Doreen says as evidence of her 
struggle to make sense of her Iife,linking breast cancer to other salient life events 
. (childbearing), and seeking the cause of her illness in past injury in an attempt to present "a 
chain of cause and effect, wltheach new problem ansmg from previous ones" (Blaxter, 1993: 
137). Here, we will see how discursive analysis enables us to understand Doreen's multiple 
versions of cause as action-oriented talk in local interactive contexts. 
In the final extract of the data analysed here, Doreen elaborntes the story about the 
knock to her breast, again mentioning a number of different possible causes, and specifically 
labelling the cause of breast cancer "multi-factorial": 
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Doreen: I, I, I, don't ask me how I do these stupid things, but I got it wedged 
between the car door, as I was getting out of the £!!!:, I got it wedged 
in the car door, so it, so this appropriately sized rod, that was the 
size of this lump. you know, went into my breast, and I, and I 
queried that, and Mr Fell [consultant surgeon] said, you know, 
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110 (Gertie): 
III Doreen: 
112 
113 Gertie: 
114 Doreen: 
115 (Gertie): 
116 Doreen: 
117 Gertie: 
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"You're always looking for a reason", [laughs] d'you know, 
. "You've always got to find something that might be the cause of it", 
you know, but I thought, well, I'd just better mention it in case it 
turned out to be, you know, sort of, they1l say-, they then come 
round to me afterwards and say, "Are you sure you haven't do, 
done some injury to yourself" , or that sort of thing, 'cos you know, 
it just sprung to mind. 'Cos I mentioned it to the GP and she'd sort 
of said, "No no, it's nearly always hormonal", so it'd gone out of my 
head and, and, but, but then she was saying, "No, it1l be a ml", 
whatever, and when it wasn't a cyst, then I started to think of 
another cause, you see, but-
Mm 
erm, I, I mean, I sup-, if, if they knew what the cause was they 
would, they would be able to treat it, wouldn't they? 
Well you know, 1-
[Cuts in] I don't think it could be one cause, can it? It must be multi 
Mm 
multi-factorial 
[Cuts in] You've heard them say-
118 Doreen: whatever the word is 
Just before Doreen begins her story, Gertie·and Freda have both placed some distance 
between themselves and the "knock" theory, Freda saying it's a theory she's "heard", and that 
she has never had any knocks herself (lines 84-5), and Gertie reporting it as something her 
sister was told (lines 78-81). In telling a story about her own knock, then, Doreen attends to 
the risk of aligning herself with a bel~ef in knocks and thereby possibly attracting scorn or 
censure (c.f. Potter, 1996: 142-7 for a detailed discussion of distancing, neutrality and 
a1igmnent). 
Doreen never actually says directly that she believes her breast cancer to have been 
caused by a knock to her breast She simply "remembered" (line 90) having knocked her 
breast, and reports feeling it n,ecessary to "mention it" (line 101) to her surgeon. She is not· 
telling her co-conversationalists that the knock caused her breast cancer; she is telling them 
that she is a rational person who informed a medical professional of the knock in order to 
check out all possibilities - and she has already indicated that she is aware of a wide range of 
other such possibilities (lines 24-38). The surgeon's reported response, "You're always. 
looking for a reason" (line 99), is a generalised formulation which does not dismiss the 
"knock" theory specifically. but which even-handedly dismisses any theory (actually or 
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potentially) offered by Doreen - and, by implication, anybody else. Ventriloquising the 
surgeon in this way enables Doreen to present the "knock" theory as no more or less plausible 
than the breastfeeding, contraceptive pill, or childbearing age theories (to which the "always 
looking for a reason" dismissal is equally applicable). The surgeon's response, with its 
. implici~ suggestion that looking for "reasons" and "causes" is futile, also provides evidence 
for Doreen's later claim that "they" (doctors) don't know the cause of breast cancer (line Ill). 
If they don't, and if looking for causes is pointless, then the "knock" theory is as plausible as 
any other. Likewise, the GP's dismissal of Doreen's theory is also reported in such a way 
that Doreen leaves the "knock" theory open as a possible cause: the competing cause offered 
by the GP ("it's nearly always hormonal" -line 106) is explained as having been offered as a 
cause for a £Y£ not cancer. The reported misdiagnosis has the added benefit of pointing to . 
the fallibility of the medical profession (re-emphasised in lines 111-2). In this way, both the 
surgeon's and the GP's ventriloquised speech is nicely designed for Doreen to illustrate: (a) 
the fallibility of the medical profession; (b) her own willingness to listen to the opinions of 
expert others; (c) her own rationality. first in reporting the knock, and second in assessing its 
merits and demerits as a theory; and (d) the plausibility of a knock as a cause for cancer. Her 
final statement - that the causes of breast cancer must be "multi-factorial" (line 116) - enables 
her to maintain the possibility that her injury was causally implicated, while not denying the 
potential relevance of more medically approved causes. In this extract, then, Doreen's 
production of multiple causes to explain breast cancer seems designed to establish her 
knowledge, rationality. and open-mindedness. Her talk is a form of action, producing her, to 
her co-conversationalists, as a rational person. In discursive analysis, multiple versions are 
not straightforward reports of multiple alternative causes, or symptoms of cognitive 
confusion (as in content analysis), nor yet indicative of unresolved strain to connect disparate 
. events in a person's life history (as in biographical analysis):iather, they reflect the speaker's· 
attention to specific interactional tasks .. 
In sum, then, discursive analysis addresses the issues of conte~t, footing and multiple 
versions by emphasising talk as action-oriented, and by analysing the particular interactional 
tasks which attentive footing and the production of multiple versions are designed to 
accomplish in their local conversational contexts. 
Conclusion 
Each of the three analytic approaches explored in this paper has particular advantages and 
disadvantages. Content analysis is likely to be most useful for the researcher requiring a 
summary or overview of a data set. of the kind which is provided by the use of a closed-
category coding system; however. it does not offer much depth or detail of individual 
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participants, and, as we have seen, it is subject to a number of problems of data interpretation. 
Biographical analysis is better suited to the researcher seeking a phenomenologically-rich 
account of individuals'lives, and has the advantage of incorporating variability and 
contradiction within the accounts of individual participants; however, it loses the breadth of 
contentanalysis, and places a heaVy analytic burden on the researcher. Discursive analysis 
offers a detailed and sophisticated analysis of talk, grounded in participants' own utterances; 
it is sensitive to shifts in footing and can explain the production of multiple versions. 
However, because it focuses on the specificity of talk in its local and particular context, 
discursive analysis does not easily permit either an overview of the full data set, or a detailed 
focus on the lives of individuals outside the research context 
Such advantages and disadvantages accrue, in part, because content analytic, 
biographical and discursive frameworXs make fundamentally different epistemological 
assumptions about the data - assumptions which lead to entirely different understandings of 
the concept of "cause". From a content analytic perspective, the research participant has 
certain attitudes and beliefs about the causes of disease, and the research task is to elicit 
these. From a biographical perspective, the research participant offers an autobiographical 
narrative into which ideas about causes are woven; the research task is to understand the 
meaning of causes to the individual in the context of her life story. From a discursive 
perspective, the research participant talking about the causes of di~ease (or anything else) is 
engaged in social interaction (with the interviewer, focus group moderator, and others 
present), and the research task is to understand how her talk is produced by and for its local 
interactional context Content analysis, then, elicits "beliefs" about causes (i.e. cognitive 
content), and perhaps also information about the sources of these beliefs. Biographical 
analysis derives the "meanings" of such beliefs within an individual's life (i.e. interpretative 
autobiography). Discursive analysis examines the interactional work done by talk about 
causes (i.e. talk as action). 
These differences are obviously crucial for the issue of representing and theorising 
'experience'. Content analytic research rests on the assumption that 'experience' is structured 
by andlor filtered through the individual's cognitions, and that it is relatively unproblematic 
to infer these (relatively stable) cognitions from an individual's self-report. Biographical 
research rests on the assumption that 'experience' is a constructed story - and that it is 
possible, particularly given a sufficiently 'sensitive' researcher, to infer the (singular, 
enduring) 'meaning' of this story from its telling. Discursive research rests on the assumption 
that the only version of 'experience' to which the researcher has access is that provided by the 
research context itself - 'experience' is created by and for, and must be theorised in relation 
to, this immediate local context 
23 
I want to argue tha.t a discursive approach offers important benefits for the analysis of 
qualitative data. Interviewers and focus group moderators have no direct access to 
individuals' attitudes and beliefs, nor any direct knowledge of the social context of their lives 
and biographies. This information is available to the researcher only at one remove: as a 
report, !n the research situation, of something not immediately observable, with all the 
problems of interpretation which are entailed. What is directly accessible to the researcher is 
only the talk participants produce in the specific interactionaI. context of the research 
situation. Discursive analysis limits itself to, and capitalises on, what can be directly 
observed. Moreover, the findings of discursive research offer a direct challenge to content 
and biographical analyses, because they provide empirical evidence for the dependence of 
talk on its local interactional context (c.f. Edwards, 1997). They demonstrate that talk cannot 
be seen as a transparent window on cognition (Le. offering access to prior or underlying 
beliefs, attitudes or opinions). Nor can talk be seen as providing information, either about 
"real world" events, or about the "personal meanings" of such events to the individual (Le. 
enabling the construction of a valid biographical account). Rather, discursive analyses show 
that the production of (what content analysts see as) statements of opinion or belief, and the 
production of (what biographical analysts see as) information about the real world or the 
phenomenologicallifeworld, is occasioned by its immediate local context, and is best 
understood wi thin that context 
A discursive approach also offers important benefits both for feminist psychology and 
for health psychology - especially a feminist-informed, critical health psychology. Insofar as 
the stated aims of critical health psychology are to move beyond Individualism (Marks, 1996; 
Spicer, 1995), to integrate the psychological and the social (Chamberlain et ai, 1996; Spicer 
and Chamberlain, 1996), and to embrace the linguistic and constructionist turn, in the social 
sCiences (Mlirray and Chamberlain, 1999b; Stainton-Rogers,I996), a discursive approach 
enables it effectively to meet these aims - and provides a valuable set of conceptual and 
analytic tools for so doing. 
Insofar as feminist psychologists have sought to 1isten to women's own voices' - Le. 
to understand and faithfully represent the 'realities' of their research participants' lives, rather 
than to impose their own frameworks and agendas - a discursive approach takes this 
endeavour a step further. Rather than the researcher imposing her own meanings (as in 
content analytic research), or offering an interpretative 'gloss' on participants' meanings (as in 
biographical research), a discursive approach enables a more respectful attention to and 
. faithful representation of, participants' meanings and understandings - as these are displayed 
in the ongoing interactional details of their talk. In short, a discursive approach to research 
offers a way to advance the feminist theorisation and representation of 'experience'. 
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Footnotes 
1 Other exceptiOllS include Atkinson (1981; 1992) and Williams (1984; 1986). 
. Z Although this paper indicates the main cbaracteristics oC these three approaches to data analysis, they cannot, 
of cours~, be differentiated rigidly (and 'hybrids' are common. despite conflicts in epistemological 
assumptions). A further problem is that the labels 'content analysis', 'biographical analysis' and'discursive . 
8118iysis' are not coasistently used in the Iiteratmc to refer to the three types oC analysis I have characterised 
here. For example, some analysis labelled as 'discursive' inspects the data Cor instmces or categories (usnalIy 
labelled 'discourses', rather than examining talk as a Corm of action within its local interactiona1 context· here, 
I characterise, and 1abcl, such research as 'content (or thematic) 8118iysis'. 
3 There are, however, some divergencies between my data set and Blaxter's. For example, Blaxter's research· 
involved (mostly) one-to-one interviews, and mine involved (mostly) group discnssions. Additionally, Blaxter 
selected her 'grandmothen' as part oC a larger research project (Blaxter and Paterson, 1982), and while she 
expected them to have an "identifiable subcultmc" (Blaxter, 1983: 59), such commona1ty depended on a shared 
geogrnphical and social class location. rather than on a shared diagnosis. In my sample, the women shared a 
diagnosis of bleast cancer. 
4Frequency connts are less often undertaken in thematic analysis, but researchen usually report that "the most 
. common theme was ... ", or "a popular theme focused on.. ". 
SAs in Blaxter's (1983) analysis, individual women appear more than once in the table, because individual 
women generaDy produced multiple causes. This means that one woman's talk about causes is geoeraDy 
categorised under a nnmber of different category headings: for example, if she describes cancer as caused by an 
environmental agent at one point, and as by her own behaviour at another, these coastimte two entries in the 
table. As it is not clear from her article how Blaxter classified multiple mentions of the same cause by the same 
participant (typical in the course of a lengthy interview), I hav.e also included these in the table. In Blaxter's 
analysis, "cancer" was mentioned by 28 women (her Table 1, p. 60) and appears in 5 of the 11 categories of 
cause: "heredity or familial tendencies", "agents in the environment", "secondary to other diseases", "secondary 
to trauma or surgery", and "behaviour/own responsibility" (her Table 3, p. 62). 
60nly 5 of the causes mentioned in this focos group were judged as not classiiIable within Blaxter's category 
.cheme (notably non-spccific claims such as "several things" or "muti-factorialj - hence the addition of an 
"Other" category). Causes falling into the category 'stress, stIain and worry" were also Crequently mentioned in 
other focos groups, and an but 2 of Blaxtets categories ("neglect/the constIaints of poverty" and "ageing/natural 
degeneration") were used within the data set as a whole. Obviously the proportion of the data coded into 
particular categories is very different in my own data and Blaxter's: e.g. the largest single category in Blaxter's 
smdy is "infection" (commonly associated with diseases such as measles, mumps, whooping cough. influenza 
ele); Ibis was rarely mentioned in the focos group talk about bleast cancer. 
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71 use the mnbrella tenn "biograpbical" here to designate =earch in which the key unit of analysis is the 
individual. Some forms of namllive or interpretative phenomenological research undertake analysis across 
indivi~. identifying. for example. "narrative genres" or "phenomcnological themes". 
8The following category headings from Blaxter's (1983) analysis also appear (as codes) in her (1993) analysis: 
heredity. environment, s!leSS. childbearing. ttauma. behaviour and ageing. The 1993 analysis also includes: 
social circumstances. life stage. self-neglect, 'not giving in'. westher. self-=poosibility. overwark and some 
diseases unpredictable. Blaxter does not provide any commentary on the relationship between categories and 
codes. For ease of comparison. in analysing my data 1 have used (as codes) only the category headings from 
Blaxter's earlier (1983) analysis. 
9Jn her 1993 reanalysis. Blaxter notes that some of her data were not drawn from one-to-one interviews: rather. 
additional family members were sometimes presenL 1bis is recast as an opportunity to observe the creation of 
biographies in interaction with others. Such an opportunity is similarly available in the coUl'3e of a focus group 
(c.f. WJ!kinson, 19980). 
• 10JIcalth psychologists are beginning to use Foucauldian (rather than conversation analytic) types of discourse 
analysis: e.g. Morgan (1999); Schou and Hewison (1998); Wtllig (1999). Foucauldian (or aitical)discoUl'3e 
analysis is also the variant most favoured by feminist psychologists. 
11See• for example, differences in the same data exttacts in Taylor (1983: 11~ and Taylor (1989: 171); in 
Taylor(l983: 1165) and Taylor(1989: 173); and in CaIb (1985: 47) and Cla!Xe (1990: 94). Apparent 
inaccuracies like this are common in Blaxter's wark too: e.g. in Blaxter (1983: 64) a woman says "We're all 
built on an impression on onr ancestors. aren't we". while in Blaxter (1993: 136) she says "I mean, we're all 
made of an impression on our ancestors. am' we?". 
llMost conversation analysts use some form of the transcription conventions developed by Gail lelTcrson (c! 
. Atkinson and Haiiage: 1984).· bIlhe data segment which follows. 1 have deliberately kept the ttansaipuon as 
simple as possible. The following notation is used: 
Single dash: abrupt cutoff of speech (e.g. No-) 
Underlining: emphasis 00 syIIsbleorword (e.g. does) 
Colons: extension of a sound syllable (e.g. we::ll) 
Round parentheses: used to indicale ttansaiptionist doubt as to speaker or exact words spoken (e.g. (Gertie» 
Square parentheses: used to indicale descriptive comments added in transcription (e.g. [Cuts in] ). or matCrlaI 
which is difficult to render (e.g. [fch]). 
13nns data tag refers to the ~ data segment presented in this section of the paper (not just this first short 
exrract). Please append the data tag if you quote these data (in whole or part) elsewhere. "SW" indicates that 
the data were collected by Soc Wdkioson; "BCPI2" that they come from Breast Cancer Patient focus group no. 
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12; "30-31" arc the page nllll1ben in the original (orthographic) transcript; and "1414-1496" the original line 
IIIlIIlbers. 
14Line I!~ arc sequential and refer to the full text of the (",lransCribedj data segment presented here. 
lSW etherell and Po~s (1992: 96) data provides a parallel example: a (Pakeha) New Zealand customs officer 
uses the fonnulalion "!'h.,., have been you know ideas put out" to distance himself from reports of crimes 
canmitted by Pacific Islanders or Maoris ; and any possible implication of!llcism. Gertie's ~t ways of 
distancing herself include: the self-rq>air (Scheglo/f et ai, 1977) from "these" to "those" things (line 8); and the 
move from "being told" (Jines 4-5) to "hearing" (line 10) to the implication that its possible rot to listen ("if yon 
listen" -line 12). Gertie's "PanIon'/" (line 15) can even be n:ad as a strategic demonstration: ibat she is not 
listening, and therefore cannot hear - and if she cannot hear, she cannot give an answer to the question (cl .. 
Sacks, 1992: 3; Hutchby and W ooffitt, 1998: 18-19). Uni'ortunately, a more extended ama\ysis is beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
16Lines 42-64 arc omitted h.,." in the inten:sts of saving space. In these lines, Doreen notes her mother's 
absence of health problems, despite having eight children, and adds that several of her sisters have had 
gynaecologieal problems. F",da says that her mother had seven childn:n and was also healthy: 00= then 
reiterates that perhaps childbearing age is an important causal factor in bn:ast cancer, or that not having childn:n 
at all may be a cause. In lines 63-4, she seeks agn:ement that "th.,.,'s more to it than that, isn't th.,.,?", and it is 
with this encouragement to proliferate additional or altemalive causes that Genie ",-enters the conversation. 
17Note the punning ",lationship between the two c:3ndidate meanings of "passed on": "passed on" is both a 
euphemism for death. and it also implies gossip or rumour - i.e. it i. an example of what conversation analyst 
Gaillefferson (1996) has termed "the poetics of ordinary talk". 
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TABLE 1 
AnalYsis I: Content Analysis 
1. Infoction 0 instances 
. 2. Heredity Q1' familial tendencies 2 instances 
family history (x2) 
3. Agents in the environment: 'poisons', working conditWn, climate 3 instances 
aluminium pans; exposure to sun; chemicals in food 
Drugs or the contraceptive pill 1 instance 
taking the contraceptive pill 
4. Secondary to other diseases 0 instances 
5. Stress, strain and worry 0 instances 
6. Caused by childbearing, menopause 22 instances 
not breast feeding; late childbearing (x3); having only one child; being singlet not 
having children; hormonal; trouble with breast feeding - unspecified (x4); 
flattened nipples (x2); inverted nipples (x7); nipple discharge (x2) 
7. Secondary to trauma or to surgery 9 instances 
. knocks (x4); unspecified injury; air getting inside body (x4) 
8. Neglect, the constraints of pwerty 0 instances 
9. Inherent suscepti1n1ity, individual and not hereditary 0 instances 
10. Behaviour, uwn responsibility 1 instance 
mixing specific foods 
34 
11 
11. Ageing, natural degeneration 0 instances 
12. CJt!zer 5 instances 
.. ' .. 
'several things'; 'a lot'; 'multi-factorial'; everybody has a 'dormant' cancer; 
anything' could wake a dormant cancer. 
35 
236 
TABLE 2 
Analysis IT: Biographical Analysis 
Doreen -aged 40 
Doreen has had a wide local incision, after finding a lump 
five months earlier; she has an 8 year old son. 
Explores causes related to reproductive factors: 
. First dismisses a potentially protective factor: although she 
breast fed, 'it obviously didn't work with me'. 
Then considers possible risk factors: 
Perhaps it was because· of the contraceptive pill: 
'I took the pill at a younger age". 
Or because of the (late) age at which she had her child: 
'1 was an old mum ._ nearly thirty two when 1 had 
John' . 
. Points out her cancer can't be explained by hereditary 
factors: 'there's no family history' . 
Reiterates possibility of late childbearing: 'maybe it's the 
age at which you have children'. 
Or not having children (although dismisses this as too 
simple an explanation). 
Recalls when she foUnd the lump. she remembered she had 
banged her breast with a shopping trolley bag. 
While others suggested it could be becauSe of an injury, 
this was dismissed by her GP, who said 'it's nearly always 
hormonal'. 
Eventually proposes: 'I don't think it could be ~ cause 
... it must be multi-factorial'. 
Then returns to considering whether difficulties with breast 
feeding could be the cause: '1 had flattened nipples and one 
of them was nearly inverted ... so 1 had a lot of trouble'. 
36 
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childbearing 
con~ceptive pill 
childbearing 
heredity 
childbearing 
chl!dbearing 
trauma 
trauma 
(7) childbearing 
other 
childbearing 
Freda -aged 68 
Freda had a mastectomy nearly five years ago, and has had 
no recurrence . 
. Suggests it's more risky to have just one child than 
'a big family' (giving her mother's seven children and 
age of 92 as an example). 
Then says she's heard that knocks can 'bring on' cancer. 
Later, raises risks of exposure to sun. 
Also, modem food cultivation methods: 'all the chemicals 
in what you're eating'. 
Finally proposes that 'air getting to your inside' (for example, 
. in an exploratory operation) 'brings on' cancer. 
Gertie -aged 84 
Ge.rtie has very recently had a mastectomy; her daughter ,. 
. died of breast cancer a few years ago •. 
Has heard 'stories' about the causes of 
breast cancer: 'aluminium pans'. 
Also, eating 'tomatoes and plums at the same meal'. 
Sister (in nursing training) told her that 
everybody haS a (dormant)cllIlcer •. 
Elaborates theory: 'anything could wake it up' -
gives specific example of 'a knock'. 
Later, raises possibility of an inverted nipple as something 
to 'be wary of: ten years ago her right nipple 'started to 
go inwards' (NB not clear whether this is presented as a 
cause or a symptom). 
Adds nipple discharge (again not clear whether as cause or 
. symptom): 'periodically it used to leak", saying 'I think 
there was some connection' (although dismissedby doctors). 
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childbearing 
trauma 
environmental agent 
~~vironmental agent 
secondary to surgery 
environmental agent 
behaviour 
other .. 
other 
trauma 
childbearing 
childbearing 
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